UNIVERSITY OF WROCŁAW
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

GIULIA CIRILLO

Spinning Semiotic Chains. Theories of Truth and Their Common Translative Understructure

Doctoral thesis written under the supervision of
dr hab. Daniel Sobota, prof. IFiS PAN

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UNIWERSYTET WROCŁAWSKI
WYDZIAŁ NAUK SPOŁECZNYCH
INSTYTUT FILOZOFII

GIULIA CIRILLO

Splatając łańcuchy znaków.
Teorie prawdy i ich wspólny translacyjny fundament.

Rozprawa doktorska
napisana pod kierunkiem
dr hab. Daniela Soboty, prof. IFiS PAN

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Introduction: an Aporia Which Unites

The enticing beauty of abstract concepts as a potential field of investigation consists in their relentlessly elusive nature. Any attempt to arrest them in a hoop of a finite definition stands as much chance of success as a struggle to pin down flickering light glints. In this respect, they are astoundingly akin to those which make up reality, since just as in the case of elementary particles, the closer one approaches them, the less tangible becomes their essential structure. And the challenge becomes even more dare-devil when the analysed notion is precisely the one which encapsulates a capricious relation between language and the world, a contentious degree of accuracy which the former may achieve in representing the latter.

Bearing this in mind, the aspiration which propels the following research may strike as sweepingly naïve. To make matters worse, as one might soberly remark, what novel can possibly be discovered regarding an idea which carries a baggage of commentary so copious that even the strongest eloquence caves under its burden?

And yet, in a truly quixotic fashion, the challenge will be taken. For it is in fact this very futility of pursuit after the sense of truth that serves as an inspiration to pair it with another notion which involves a similarly inviable quest – namely the idea of translation. Yet the similarity between these attempts grants hope that when they become mapped onto each other, the tools developed within one theoretical field will aid the resolution of problems within the other. Let this parallel be formulated more clearly.

Among a plethora of philosophical problems swirling over the idea of truth, perhaps one of the most unsettling aporias which has always accompanied the notion is an inherent and apparently insoluble conflict between relativity and absolutism. Regardless of the context in which the concept is analysed – be it ontology, epistemology, language, ethics or any other possible field – a desire of universal agreement as to what truth is or what it stands for clashes with a multitude of proposed definitions. On the one hand, many individuals would rather expect this concept to be a form of a safe beacon, a guiding light in the ocean of confusion which arises together with a variety of subjective perceptions of the world. It is hoped that its meaning will encapsulate something stable, constant, objectively cognisable about the universe. Some sort of an ultimately accurate account of reality. On the other hand however, it has been long recognised that such an ideal is unattainable. Whatever understanding of truth one proposes and by whatever means, it is unavoidably imperfect, fragmentary and person-specific.

A strikingly similar conflict can be observed in the phenomenon of translation process. Its overarching goal is to construct a reflection of the original or reveal its meaning to the reader as accurately as possible. And yet this goal is forever beyond reach; since the medium of expression changes and the activity is performed by an individual with a necessarily biased interpretation of the source text.

The astounding affinity between the problems involved in understanding what truth is and creating a translated text serves as an initial rationale behind the strategy which this research assumes; it inspires to employ translation theory as a framework for an enquiry into truth in the hope that superposing the solutions developed in the translational field will facilitate finding them also in one of the most fascinating quests of philosophy.

An overarching goal of the study is to defend a claim that each of the five chosen theories of truth involves an element which should be identified as translation process. A critical analysis of various selected texts proves that at the fundament of each theory there is an activity of a translative nature. This invariable presence of

the process within the phenomena which the examined texts aim to describe will in turn serve as possibly sufficient corroboration that translation is a fundamental semantic ingredient of the concept of truth, and that this activity is inherent in the act of stating or defining truth. Such a demonstration will not only reveal a dimension in which truth theories can be synthesised, but also impart a better understanding of the philosophical concept by unveiling its crucial, hitherto unacknowledged component. In the end, this component will hopefully allow to suggest a possible solution to the abovementioned aporia.

When spanning the research over such a vast field, a justification of methodology is essential. It will be maintained that although their countless variations and combinations have been proposed, the five major truth theories can be considered as the correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, deflationary and semantic one. The following study addresses diverse accounts, attempting to highlight that they invariably employ translation, their general category notwithstanding. The order in which the commentary will be provided reflects roughly the chronology of their development. The semantic theory was chosen for closure on account of the highest significance it holds for proving the thesis of the work. Yet the author remains aware of the existence of many other approaches. Therefore, such a specific selection still calls for an apology. That is why the first chapter will be devoted to justifying the choice of truth accounts.

Within an infinity of questions that can be posed regarding truth, formulation of the above aporia is certainly only a vague hint. So the first chapter will also specify in greater detail the particular problem which the study aims to address as well as rationale behind the strategy assumed for its resolution.

What follows is a chapter devoted to translation. This seems essential, because before one may proceed to demonstrating its presence within truth theories, it must be clarified how the process should be here understood. Therefore, the second section will draw on the legacy of translation scholars and present the history of theoretical insight into the process, together with several points when these insights crossed paths with philosophy. Subsequently, this part will also elaborate four key pillars on which every instance of the activity essentially rests. Finally, several crucial features of a translative action will be distinguished, with the help of analyses proposed by major translation theorists. As the reader will see, the concept of translation applied here is broader than the way in which it is perhaps traditionally understood and will be described – in reference to the Jakobsonian typology – as intersemiotic.

Such a characteristic is outlined at the beginning of the work in order to give the reader a more stable grasp on the phenomenon which will be later pointed out in the analysed texts.

The central five chapters are then devoted to the analysis of truth theories.

At the end, having completed the examination, the study will tentatively make for the open sea. If the connection between truth and translation is successfully demonstrated, one may feel authorised in using this link to draw wider conclusions. So the final part of the work is an attempt to suggest a precursory description of reality in which, as it turns out, truth has an intersemiotic understructure – a reality which therefore itself should be explained in semiotic terms. Having painted such a background, a natural direction for the research is to propose a new theory of truth. The following work does not aspire to construct a fully-fledged, autonomous model. Nevertheless, the closing section will offer what might be considered a preparatory skeleton on which later a new, more detailed and mature scheme might be developed.

Last but not least, a more than welcome corollary of the research will be drawing attention to the gravity of translation process, whose philosophical depth so far has hardly been explored.

The journey begins at dawn of enquiry into the nature of truth, with the classical idea of correspondence. A form of translation process recognised within the analysed models will establish a pattern which henceforth will recur in all accounts examined later on. In order to appreciate this subtle, repeated ingredient in the sense of truth, one will not venture outwards in the world where, as it might be expected, some objective key to verity might be lying. It will be instead a journey inwards, to the depths of human mind, bold enough to lean over the edge where the self firstly meets the foreign – and it is over this precipice that the bridge of translation will be arched. A quest indefinite by assumption, however not in the sense of its futility, but rather, as is the case with translative work, inexhaustible in all creative ways it can possibly become realised. It is in these mental depths of each individual where the silent figure of a translator will be found, and an effort will be made to bring them closer to light so that, as one may wish also for every practitioner of translative profession, they could reclaim their presence and indispensability whenever the question of truth arises.

1. Truth in Philosophy – An Unchartable Territory

Truth is a pathless land

Jiddu Krishnamurti

At the very outset of the following work it must be openly admitted that its apparently overblown pretentions stand bare against accusations levelled by philosophical ascetics. In order to outrun precipitous critics and forestall their diligently detractive thought, let a few things be stated immediately. The study indeed aspires to make a meaningful contribution to one of the central, vastest and at the same time oldest problems in the history of philosophy. Additionally, it aspires to make this contribution from a dizzyingly wide perspective, a truly high, bird's eye view – and still hopes to be regarded in a serious fashion, boldly maintaining that the insights it offers, should be recognised as valuable without begging for floods of interpretative generosity.

So as to prove that the author[1] fully realises the gravity of the situation in which she puts herself, the opening part of the work will be devoted to catch a glimpse of the vast territory onto which one ventures. In this way, the task which aims to be fulfilled here might be at least deprecated as consciously suicidal and not ridiculously myopic.

The word glimpse was not used accidentally. One of the highly acclaimed contributors to the field Michael Glanzberg states that even providing a general review of all the possible ways in which the question of truth can be approached is downright impossible (Glanzberg 2021:1), not to mention embracing all the number of answers which might be or has already been proposed. As the poetic, succinct quotation recalled above suggests, truth indeed seems to resemble a borderless, intimidating land. When starting to explore its richness, on the one hand, it offers freedom to roam through as many proposed models as one may possibly wish. Simultaneously though, whichever direction one assumes, they will also certainly find themselves deeply lost within endless thicket of explanations and detailed, thorny arguments, not one of them tied into a hopeless cul-de-sac. To make matters worse, the land has been so well-trodden, that even the 'geographical' metaphor used here for its description turns out to be, as one will see in further parts of this section, hopelessly worn-out.

Let the linguistic caution applied so far be appreciated and taken as a starting point – only phrases such as 'the problem of truth', or 'the question of truth' has been used. This is because one gets tongue-tied even when there is a need to paraphrase the problem for stylistic purposes. Any synonym which is potentially chosen, already implies adherence to a certain tradition or at least a particular slant. If the words such as 'term' or 'concept' are used as synonyms to truth, this may sway the discussion already into the dimension of language or

[1] At this point it is a conscious choice to remain behind a 'third person' formula. Such a mode of expression will be maintained throughout the research as long as the preliminary assumptions are being explained as well as throughout the part containing the analysis. The author dares to emerge in the 'first person' only in the final chapter of the study – when her own theory and conclusions are tentatively proposed.

spark accusations of taking such a dimension as an unfounded basis. Even more so for expressions such as a 'noun' or 'predicate' (when used as a substitute to 'true'). The word 'notion' in turn evokes associations connected perhaps with the sphere of opinion. The term 'value' pushes one into a bottomless precipice of ethics and aesthetics. The same applies for 'verity', which irreversibly directs towards the dimension of human conduct, being close to 'honesty' and opposing falsehood in the sense of 'lie', rather than incorrectness or lack of knowledge. The word 'idea' in turn may implicate in assuming the existence of suspicious realms of abstractness. The term 'phenomenon' may be interpreted as implicitly referring to the legacy of phenomenology. In the text which follows the author will be using some of the above terminology interchangeably, yet only for the sake of avoiding stylistic repetition, being aware that virtually no expression remains innocent, no statement impartial or sufficiently unbiased.

Formulating the above chaotic verbal anxiety in slightly more formal terms, let us consider the most general categorisation. Where does the problem belong, or at least where should be its starting point? Should it be ontology, epistemology, ethics, the philosophy of language? In his seminal textbook devoted to the problem of truth (*Epistemologia. Poznanie, prawda, wiedza, realizm* 1992) Woleński devotes a separate section to the discussion whether a separation merely between the first two categories is at all possible, which in conclusion he denies, and states only that the relation which binds ontology and epistemology in the nature of truth remains deep (Woleński 155).

In the face of this initial dilemma, the following study intends to take it as a conscious premise that all these dimensions of significance which accompany truth remain inextricably tied, and narrowing the study to any of them would result in elaboration of a dry, artificial construct. The mystery and depth of truth stems, among other things, from the fact that it encompasses them all. And the utterly fluid nature of human thought defies such a dissection and makes all these connotations seep into one another so that they are in the end confluent. But this view already prefigures the specificity of the author's perspective; the reader is asked to wait for a justification of such an approach since it will be more formally expounded in the upcoming sections.

Before it happens, it must be made manifest that the author realises the enormity of land into which she enters. Because the topic already fills entire libraries, the first aim of this section is not a fully exhaustive review of literature. Rather, it is to recall the research of the most prominent scholars in the field who created what might be considered the most important maps and signposts organising the territory. The floor will therefore be given to authorities in order to obey the summons of tradition. If the reader happens to share the author's aversion towards rewriting, they must be excused. Combining their perspectives will make the further meta-remarks and assumptions hopefully more plausible.

Having many of the possible formulations of the problem laid out, the next step will be to justify the choice of one of them as a propeller for this research, as well as to present the rationale behind the strategy chosen for it resolution.

Classifications, typologies, distinctions

There are naturally many comprehensive anthologies which organise the most important papers devoted to analysing the concept. Simmons and Blackburn's *Truth* is notable for the fact that the authors for the first time draw something which might be taken as the most general dividing line; they distinguish between substantive

and minimalist approaches to truth (cf. Simmons & Blackburn 1999). Marian David, an accomplished scholar within the topic, explains this difference in the following way. The 'substantive' or 'robust' approaches imply that there is something substantial to be investigated regarding truth, or even more specifically, truth has to be explained in terms of a special relation between something which 'bears' it and reality. Theories proposed by for instance F. H. Bradley, H. H. Joachim, W. James or Russell would exemplify this category, but also adherents of phenomenological tradition, such as Heidegger or Gadamer. On the other hand, minimalist or deflationary theories maintain that such accounts are unnecessarily 'inflated', and that there is no particularly meaningful essence of the idea which might be discovered and described. Representants of this category would be philosophers such as G. Frege, F. Ramsey, Quine or Wittgenstein (David 2006:184). In the following paper the distinction into inflationary and deflationary approaches will be marked and therefore should be mentioned already at the beginning.

There is also the classical compilation edited by D. Lynch. In *The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives* he distinguishes the following categories into which the papers on truth are organised: the correspondence theories, coherence theories, pragmatic and verificationist ones, phenomenological and postmodernist conceptions, deflationist ones, primitivist and identity theories, pluralist and replacement theories. Finally there is a separate section devoted to Tarski's semantic account (Lynch 2001). In the introduction, the author again draws on the 'robust/deflationary' distinction. Yet Lynch's guide will not be evoked here in greater detail, since it lacks a more extensive justification for the organisation which he introduces. Still, it remains a comprehensive point of reference.

Apart from the above anthologies, there are perhaps four seminal volumes which may be taken as the most general and at the same time exhaustive research which present a wide spectrum of the ways in which truth has so far been philosophically approached. On the Polish ground, there is already aforementioned Woleński, who might be positioned next to Kirkham (1992), Künne (2003) and Burgess & Burgess (2011); they all offer a book-size surveys of the topic.

Taking both methodology and chronology as a criterion, one shall start with Kirkham. As already signalled in the introduction, his work will be frequently referenced in the following theses. This is because he opens the review with a particularly illuminating analysis of formulating the initial research question and how it later influences the theory which is being proposed. Another advantage of his work is that he supplements each account not only with the most important objections that may be levelled against it, but also neatly summaries a given theory.

His systematic disentanglement of the discussions around truth begins with noting that they should be first analysed in terms of what each analysis assumes as its overall purpose. To a greater or lesser extent of explicitness, various accounts of truth may be attempting to answer numerous highly divergent questions. The major ones would be: What is truth? What is it for something to be true? What do people mean by the terms 'truth' and 'falsehood'? How do people use the term 'true'? What is the criterion of truth or 'criteria of evidence' for something to be true? How do the truth conditions of a given sentence depend on the syntactic structure of this sentence? What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of a statement's truth? (Kirkham 2).

In the next step, he argues that upon the sketched list of questions, one should map a distinction into extensionality and intensionality. Although this distinction will not play a direct role in the problem chosen to be

solved in the following work, it is important to explain the difference in order to understand the classification introduced by Kirkham.

The terms ‘intension’ and ‘extension’ date back to the work of E. E. C. Jones (Jones 1911), and were later formalised by R. Carnap (Carnap 1947). But the clearest explanation of both requires making a recourse to Gottlob Frege’s seminal ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’ (English: ‘Sense and Reference’). The terms apply to systems which are composed of signs, such as natural and formal languages. Stating carefully, intension of a given sign refers to what it connotes, its sense (in Fregean terminology a ‘Sinn’). It includes that which is needed to understand the sign, and it corresponds to the idea or concept which the sign evokes. Extension on the other hand refers to an object or a set of objects which the sign denotes. To employ a classic example, an intension of a word ‘bachelor’ is the idea of an ‘unmarried man’, and its potential extension includes all men who are not married.

In his typology, Kirkham also makes use of another fundamental distinction, namely that into locution and illocution. For clarity, let it be briefly recalled that the terms are drawn from the speech act theory proposed by J. Austin. Considering the linguistic statements in terms of what they express, their intended meaning and final effect, he distinguished three types of acts: locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary. The first one refers to what a given statement formally means, the second to what is the intended message which is actually being communicated, and the last one describes its effects (Austin 1962).

Kirkham observes that when attempting to propose a theory of truth, philosophers often do not specify or even realise which kind of definition they aim to create – to grasp the intension of the term ‘truth’ and the predicate ‘true’, their extension or perhaps both (Kirkham 4). Nevertheless, so as to categorise various theories he considers the distinction as handy, since specifying the purpose of a given analysis is crucial for a proper evaluation of its success, and his research aims to offer not only a review, but criticism of each theory. And so, taking the purpose of studies as the main criterion, he distinguishes what he calls three types of projects: the metaphysical one, the speech act one and the justification one (Kirkham 4).

The aim of metaphysical project is to ‘identify what the truth consists in, what it is for a statement (or belief or proposition, etc.) to be true’. Within this category there are three sub-divisions: the extensional, naturalistic and the essence scheme. Theories which attempt to unequivocally establish the extension of the phrase ‘is true’ by providing its necessary and sufficient conditions. Those who embark on the naturalistic project try to provide a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient for a statement to be true in any naturally possible world (which means such a world which has only the same laws of nature as the actual world). The essence scheme also attempts to provide such conditions, but in any possible world.

The speech-act project is focused on determining ‘a set of characteristics possessed by a given statement’ on the basis of which its truth or falsity can be assessed (ibid. 5). The goal is to grasp the locutionary and illocutionary purpose of expressions which seem to be ascribing the property of truth to some sentences; for example, expressions such as ‘Statement x is true’. This category of theories may also be divided into two further sub-types: the illocutionary and the assertion scheme. If a philosopher does not believe that expressions such as the one above have any locutionary force, they would fall under the former category, since in their analysis they attempt to describe merely what is done by making such an expression. On the other hand, those who develop the assertion project believe that such sentences do possess locutionary force and they focus on specifying the intension of the phrase ‘is true’ (Kirkham 20-21).

Kirkham's exposition of theoretical goals is noble. However, with authors not specifying their aim explicitly, some of the accounts will be subsumed under more than one category. In addition, as one may clearly see, the classification has a strongly linguistic bias. And hence in bit risky fashion, Kirkham will be now categorising major truth accounts according to the distinguished projects, even though the orientation of some of them might not be so straightforwardly linguistic. Let us see how the works of particular philosophers fall under the proposed typology.

The extensional project comprises the semantic theory, specifically the works of Tarski and Kripke. Theories of Peirce, James, Blanshard, Russell, Austin and Horwich become classified as the essence project. But then James, Blanshard are again ascribed to the justification project, together with F. H. Bradley. The accounts proposed by Strawson and Price are the examples of illocutionary type, and in the category of assertion once more there is Ramsey, together with C. J. F. Williams, A. White and others. Finally, Kirkham also notes that the works of philosophers such as Davidson or Dummett, due to their particularity, defy any of the proposed types and must receive a separate treatment (ibid. 37-8).

Because the theories turn out to be multifaceted and rather too complex to sort out in terms of their aims, arguably it would not be the most illuminating strategy to take the proposed typology as overarching. Raising awareness of the philosophers' theoretical purpose is highly significant, but it may also lead to a misguided criticism, when a given account is deemed unsuccessful because it failed to reach the goal which it had not in fact assumed in the first place. Therefore, the author of the following study will not adopt to the projects distinguished by Kirkham as the primary determinants. Instead, one will take the liberty of drawing two merits from his volume. Firstly, it will serve as a signpost and authority, helping to determine which theories should be chosen as the most important. And secondly, the author will frequently support the analysis with his expert commentary.

But before one can make such a choice in an informed and unbiased way, the lay of the pathless land should be explored further.

A slightly more recent survey was compiled by Wolfgang Künne in his *Conceptions of Truth* (2003). When attempting to gain possibly the most comprehensive view of the foregoing philosophical enquiry into the idea, Kunne's volume again should not be perhaps treated as the principal guide, since already at the beginning he states that the focus of his review are the analytical papers. Yet even when attempting to stay impartial, his analysis remains valuable. He also concentrates on different varieties of the correspondence theory, which in essence can hardly be restricted to the analytical tradition. Additionally, his typology proves useful in realising what other principles may be used to organise the variety of threads in the discussion as well as which truth accounts remain dominant.

Already in the introduction he offers a few points worth taking into account. What is first worth noting is that he points to an even more general determination one can make when approaching the subject than the distinction into inflationism and deflationism. Namely, to decide whether any satisfying 'conception' of truth can be elaborated at all or not – in the latter case the theory can be aimed at demonstrating essential futility of the task (Künne 3). He also acknowledges that the goals pursued by those who conduct the enquiry may be seemingly divergent, and at the same time internally related.

Similarly to Kirkham, he begins the study by listing a number of questions which might determine the profile of a given model. He employs a metaphor akin to the one used at the outset of the following section,

presenting the discourse around truth as an extensive land, and proposing a 'flow chart' which delineates different directions within the terrain.

The 'flow chart' comprises sixteen questions. He suggest to begin by asking whether truth is a property – if one assumes that it is not, then this results in a stance which Künne calls 'nihilistic'. Going down this path leads to various forms of redundancy theory, according to which all true sentences may perhaps share some property by virtue of the predicate 'true' attached to them, but those who endorse the view argue that this predicate is essentially meaningless, unnecessary or possible to paraphrase. In the first chapter Künne analyses the nihilistic approach on the basis of texts by Frege (Künne 34-92).

However, a vaster horizon unfolds if the above question receives an affirmative answer. Then one may ask: if truth is a property, is it relational? Is this a relation towards objects or facts? The first option yields 'The Object Correspondence' and the second 'The Event Correspondence'. Proceeding further down the latter possibility, there is a question whether truths are identical with facts Is there a one-to-one correlation between them? Different responses result in still more refined versions of correspondence (Künne 5-6). Later in the volume, having provided a brief history of this approach from the reverend Aristotelian beginnings, he focuses on the works of Moore and logical atomists (Künne 93-107).

Next he raises the problem whether truth is a property of sentences, and if so, then whether it can be explained in a finite way. This path leads towards theories such as disquotationalism and the semantic conception of truth (ibid. 13).

The final set of questions considers truth as a property of propositions. Although philosophers such as Russell or Bolzano would explain the distinction between a sentence and a proposition in slightly different ways (cf. e.g. Russell 1903, Bolzano 1837), the subtleties of their argument do not seem to bear strongly on the following study. For the purpose of the present discussion, the standard explanation proposed by Frege will be recalled. Various sentences which differ in structure may still express the same proposition, which in Fregean terminology would be called a sense – 'Sinn' (Frege 1892). One needs not engage in an deep analysis of the Fregean paper 'Der Gedanke' (English: 'Thoughts') to recognise that the ontological status of senses expressed by linguistic expressions were to belong to the famous 'third realm'; a dimension of abstract, sharable, timeless entities (Frege 1918).

That is why, from this point onwards, Kunne's line of questions gains in finesse. Acknowledging truth as a property of propositions, one may further ask if they are stable, temporal or eternal. Accordingly, a belief that truth conceived as a property of propositions can be explained in a finite way yields various versions of the minimalist theory (propositional primitivism, minimalism and the so-called modest account) (Künne 15).

This brief overview of Künne's research was not drafted without reason. In fact, there are a few crucial points which must be noted for the sake of future analysis.

Firstly, if one wishes to identify certain flagship approaches, theories which remain in focus are the deflationary and the correspondence ones. They are supplemented by the minimalist accounts, yet the latter emerge only when the study ventures into detailed debates within the linguistic tradition. At the same time, and this is the second momentous observation to be strongly highlighted, the growing refinement of analytical approaches shows that hard as they may try, their authors cannot remain entirely detached from certain metaphysical considerations or underlying ontological assumptions. This is the first out of many points in the following study at which awareness is being raised how much caution should be exercised when trying to clearly

separate the analytical philosophy from the continental thought, especially phenomenology, which has been addressing the most important philosophical problems remaining distanced from their linguistic formulation. A view that each analytical theory must at least implicitly rest on some phenomenological assumptions is advocated for instance by an acclaimed interpreter of D. Davidson, Jeff Malpas (cf. Malpas 23).

Now yet another publication will be taken under a short scrutiny in terms of how it proposes to 'chart the territory'. In their *Truth* (2011) Alexis G. Burgess and John P. Burgess begin the review by specifying the limits of their focus, and it is interesting to note on what grounds they turn away from certain possible directions of research.

What is first excluded from the analysis is the postmodernist approach, according to which truths are rules and opinions forced upon an individual by 'the hegemonic structures of society'. They argue that the concept of truth applied in such a context becomes appropriated by the jargon of politics, which in turn overlooks a more fundamental question. And this question is: 'What is something that passes for true in a given society passing *for*?' (highlighted in the original). They also set aside truth as an ethical concept, considering it a possible expression of honesty and virtue. Such a line of investigation, they claim, studies in fact the idea of 'intrinsic value', rather than truth itself. It aims to describe and promote various ways of speaking the truth and the fact that it should be spoken, which the authors take for granted. Thereby, truth as a problem of ethics is set aside (Burgess & Burgess 2011 'Preface').

From their perspective, the most pressing philosophical challenge would be to pinpoint what it means for something to be true and whether all true things have something graspable in common. Already the very beginning the authors acknowledge that various conceptions of truth might be studied and elaborated to a varying degree of success. But one may clearly see that for them it is the dichotomy of absolutism versus relativity that rears above all other problems which might be posed in the field (ibid. 'Introduction').

Primacy of this particular problem is further agued in the first chapter, where they distinguish between the traditional and the contemporary approaches. It is demonstrated that both in the earlier history of the debate as well as in modern times there is essentially a tripartite feud, but the substantive essence of these three possible approaches has changed.

Specifically, the traditional theories include the correspondence view (taken together with the entire long line of its evolution since the Aristotelian definition), the coherence approach as proposed by Joachim and Blanchard, and the pragmatic accounts, whose fathers were Peirce and James. These three positions become roughly profiled as realist, idealist and utilitarian respectively. The authors also maintain that each of them to some extent encroaches on metaphysics, epistemology and ethics (ibid. 2-3).

The contemporary tradition on the other hand transforms the past viewpoints into a dialogue between realism, antirealism and deflationism (ibid. 5). Realism develops in the modern correspondence versions (such as those proposed by Russell and Moore). Antirealism can be understood as a certain evolution of idealism (and involves primarily a debate between the positions of Davidson and Dummett (ibid. 90-94). Deflationism is a collection of views diverse in themselves, which nevertheless commonly oppose the traditional approaches in that they do not regard truth as a part of either ontology, epistemology or ethics, denying that it holds substantive meaning in any of these fields. (ibid. 34).

The authors openly admit that their study will be devoted to the contemporary approaches, concentrating primarily on the linguistic ones. Therefore, they commence with the Tarskian semantic theory, in itself perhaps

the most intensely debated classificatory challenge (ibid. 16-32). But their commentary to the proposed typology is highly significant, if one intends to draw conclusions from a wider perspective. Burgess and Burgess underscore the fact that directions within the modern debate remain under the constant influence of one another as well as the past theories, so in the end a broader picture which emerges is that of a devilishly complex, sixfold crisscrossing. Moreover, their choice of analytical tradition appears to be a matter of investigative choice, since they admit that in fact none of the distinguished theories dominates over others, with still equally many present adherents and developers of the classical ideas (ibid. 5).

Having considered this yet another typological proposal, one can quite firmly establish the following points. The theories which remain considered as landmarks are the correspondence, coherence and pragmatic ones – these do not exemplify the analytical tradition, with their origins emerging long before the linguistic school. The analytical studies comprise primarily the deflationary and semantic theories. Both the realist and idealist/antirealist models involve some elements of metaphysics, epistemology and ethics, from which only the deflationary ones attempt to disengage.

In order to complete the picture, one should now once again draw on the eminent Polish contribution to this classificatory research, made by Jan Woleński.

In the section devoted to the systematization of theories he soberly states that it is hard to expect that anyone would be able to find a scheme which presents all the approaches in terms of every possible question which may be posed within the philosophical enquiry into truth (Woleński 165). He considers Künne and Kirkham, who were discussed in detail above, to be quite reliable signposts. However, he observes that for instance Kirkham's overlapping, multifaceted parameters ultimately yield a rather complex, if not obscure picture. He concludes by reiterating that an exhaustive typology is impossible, and one has to avail oneself of various checklists and enumerations. (Woleński 166-8).

In his own treatment of the problem, there are several important aspect which seem to be coming to the surface. In order to make them manifest, one has to first contemplate Woleński's historical overview of the topic, in which he follows the study of Ajdukiewicz. But he supports it with his own brief interpretation of the insights which were successively emerging. This review and commentary will be now briefly recounted for the sake of further reliability of conclusions.

In the ancient times, the opposition which appears predominant is again the one of absolutism against relativism. The former is identified with the intriguing though infinitely ambiguous claims of Parmenides, who advocated a unity between thought and being. Yet as Woleński notes, recognising this unity does not make it any easier to grasp his ultimate view on truth, which might very well be some form of correspondence and coherence at the same time. Parmenides' vision is juxtaposed with the Protagoras' *homo mensura* maxim, as an early expression of subjectivity. Yet the reflections focus primarily on the work of Aristotle, who seems to have done the most for the evolution of the idea of truth (Woleński 63-77).

In the Middle Ages, what deserves greater attention are the remarks of Anselm of Canterbury, since he defines truth in terms of cognitive correctness and it is therefore the first time when the concept is interpreted as expressing a sense of normativity. Naturally though, the most space is devoted to Thomas Aquinas and his formulation of the correspondence view (ibid. 77-84).

Passing on to modernity, Woleński concludes that at that time, truth was predominantly interpreted as involving some form of agreement. He refrains from an exegesis of each thinker in order to avoid

oversimplification. Yet such philosophers as Gassendi, Locke or Holbach are rather straightforwardly classified as endorsing some form of correspondence. The works of Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza or Kant are less easily categorised, but seem to maintain this general tendency. Descartes defined truth in terms of clarity and distinctness, but also as conformity of though with its object. Leibniz distinguished between the truth of reasoning and the truth of facts, separating its ontological and epistemological sense. In the end however, he also seeks truth in accordance between things and sentences in mind. Similarly Spinoza, for whom a true idea had to agree with its object. Kant also famously states that truth is an agreement of cognition with its object. According to Woleński then, these were essentially different variations on the correspondence paradigm (ibid. 85-88).

In the 19th century the situation does not seem to change drastically, although the models naturally grow in sophistication. Studies which become especially highlighted are those of Austrian philosophers such as Bolzano and Brentano, who can be regarded as representatives of a continental version of analytical philosophy (ibid 95-6). What seems particularly of note is the legacy of Brentano, in which we find an account of correspondence between two psychical objects, rather than between a mental construct and its physical equivalent. Brentano's insight should be remembered, since his specific view of correspondence will be brought up once again in the following work, in the section devoted exclusively to this theory.

It is in the 20th century that witnesses the emergence of a pronounced rift between the analytical and the phenomenological traditions. Within phenomenology, the idiom of expression becomes of course strikingly different from the scientific terseness typical for the linguistic thinkers. Together with this change comes an increase in ambiguity. Woleński turns to Husserl, Pfänder and Ingarden, among whom the first one is given the most attention. Woleński explicitly denies making claims to any satisfactory interpretative attempts due to the complexity of Husserl's vision. However, terse as his commentary may be, it sill seems to be grasping certain focal points.

The Polish scholar considers Husserl as a follower of Brentano, and recalls essentially four definitions which he proposed – truth as 'an objective correlate of an objectifying act', truth as an idea of 'absolute adequacy', truth as 'that which gives fulfilment to an act of intention' and finally as 'rightness of intention' (translated from Woleński). In the light of such mysterious formulations, there are commentators who classified Husserl as a believer in some form of correspondence theory (Schlick 1910 in: Woleński 109), and the Polish philosopher takes it to be the most commonly accepted interpretation. Yet it remains unclear which of the proposed explanations should be regarded as the primal one, and what is also evident is that Husserl's theory encapsulated both the ontological and epistemological understanding of the concept (Woleński 108-109).

At this point his study turns again to the investigation of analytical schools and the figures of Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein and Schlick. The first two have already been mentioned in the foregoing review and will be discussed at length in later parts of this work. Wittgenstein's legacy is entirely maverick, and even though strongly debatable in terms of its internal consistency, its incredible significance and scope inevitably leaves a mark also on the following research. That is why he will have his own place in the upcoming sections. Schlick in turn is regarded as the author of yet another version of correspondence (Woleński 119).

The tendency which subsequently comes to the fore is the coherence approach. As its contemporary followers Woleński points to Neurath, Hempel and Carnap, although views of the last one continued to evolve throughout the development of his work. Next, one proceeds to the section devoted to the redundancy theory, deflationism, disquotationalism and minimalism, all of which remain rooted within the analytical tradition.

There is additionally a short remark on the so-called prosententional theory of truth, whose origins should be attributed primarily to D. Grover (cf. Grover 1992). This account is also clearly linguistically oriented. It focuses on the expressions which contain the term 'truth' or the predicate 'true'; according to Grover, they replace statements which might be otherwise independent. When used as an attachment to other expressions, they turn into pro-sentences, whose function is akin to a that of a pronoun. Their effect comes down to reasserting the main sentence. Her theory is thereby propounding a form of deflationsnism. Woleński however criticises artificiality of this account, and observes that it fails when applied to more complex linguistic structures as well as does not tackle the liar paradox in a satisfactory way (which is an objection levelled against other deflationist approaches as well) (Woleński 133).

At this point the study turns to the legacy of the Lvov-Warsaw School – primarily Twardowski, Łukasiewicz and Kotarbiński. Arguably the most significant movement in the history of Polish philosophy, it was in many respects similar to the Vienna Circle and had a clearly analytical profile. Its contribution to both the Polish and international philosophical history would be difficult to overestimate. However, for the purpose of the foregoing study, one needs not recall in detail the analyses of each eminent contributor. It is enough to draw on Woleński's own summary; questions which preoccupied members of the movement revolved around the classical conception of truth, differentiation between truth and its criterion, the connection between the correspondence theory and the fundamental logical axioms such as the rule of non-contraction or the excluded middle. They were also debating the perennial problem of absolutist versus relativist understanding of the concept (Woleński 141).

This last problem is simultaneously the subject of an extensive section in Woleński's own volume (*Epistemologia*), especially against the background of various logical systems (ibid. 178) . As regards the rest of his survey, the philosopher addresses in greater detail the question regarding a possible nature of truth-makers and truth-bearers – ideas strongly tied to the correspondence approach. Finally, the most in-depth analysis concerns Tarskian semantic theory; its both formal and informal exposition.

Having taken such a glance at Woleński's treatment of the topic, one may now specify a few key characteristics of his approach.

First of all, as he himself admits, the default point of departure in philosophical enquiry of truth is the field of epistemology, where the idea pertains to the complicated relation between language, cognition and the world. Moreover, although he underscores the impossibility of providing a satisfactory, exhaustive categorisation of all truth accounts, the theories which emerge as dominant in his historical overview are the following: correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, phenomenological, deflationist or minimalist models as well as the semantic one. Among them, the first four originally are not analytical in nature (unless some of them becomes embraced and developed later by an exponent of the analytical school).

Furthermore, Woleński clearly points to the correspondence model as both the oldest one and the most commonplace in all its possible varieties. It is also transparent that he himself would embrace some form of the classical theory or favour an interpretation according to which the correspondential thinking underlies most explanations of the idea. And even if such a conclusion would be too far-reaching, Woleński's study certainly exposes an inherent relationality of the concept.

At this point, with the reader having had a chance to contemplate the juxtaposition of several most important attempts at systematising the problem of truth, the following study may proceed to the exposition of its own

approach. The path taken within the meandering land will be now justified together with the prism chosen for its observation.

The choice of research question and the strategy of its resolution

As it has been established, the territory can be safely regarded as unchartable.

Nevertheless, the overview of the foregoing investigation makes it possible to distinguish the main tendencies in how the concept of truth used to and still is philosophically analysed. The overlapping points in the above studies demonstrate that the primary theories of truth can be identified as the correspondence – perhaps the most fundamental one – the coherence, pragmatic, phenomenological, deflationist and the semantic account.

Within these theories, a plethora of questions about truth might be addressed, which make the sense of the idea spread over the field of epistemology, ontology, language and ethics, so that eventually, to some extent, the concept overlaps with each of them.

Thus when attempting to take possibly the broadest perspective on the debate, the problem which comes to the surface as the most general, if not inanely obvious, is that with all the developed theories in existence, there is still no consensus regarding the ultimately satisfying elaboration of the idea, even though it continues to be the object of philosophical reflection. Unless they explicitly narrow down the goal of analysis, each theory seeks or proclaims to have found some final explanation. And each appears to be achieving this goal to a considerable degree of success. In metaphorical terms, upon the vast territory one may take each of the delineated paths, and it will open before them yet another important and non-negligible area. All these paths essentially coexist, even though their initial aim is to lead to some sort of central, most significant point, from which one would be able to embrace the view of the entire landscape – to be able to determine its outermost, longed-for, definitive borders. And yet, the roads cross and meander, showing still more diversity, but no such eventual perimeter.

Hence it will perhaps not be overly controversial to state that this seems to be the most conspicuous if not paramount aporia one finds in the subject of truth – regardless of whether one enters the field of ontology, epistemology, language, ethics or some combination of them all, there is a conflict between the pursuit of a certain ultimate explanation and a simultaneous existence of their multiplicity, with the justness of each account only making one's perplexity all the more painful. It is the problem of apparently unavoidable relativity set against the expectations of universal agreement. The problem of how to accept polyphony where one would wish for unanimity. And finally, one might say, it is the problem of how to accept the existence of such richness of investigative outcomes, even though it is still the same land which every individual explores.

This aporia happens to be astoundingly similar to the one which pertains to the phenomenon of translation. In the most basic terms, within translation theory, there is also one original text, whose perfect rendering is sought by every translator. Yet at the same time, there are countless target texts which are being created, each of them showing some semantic dimension of the source text, and which are valid by virtue of equivalence that is always defined by a set of subjective criteria, limited by the translator himself as well as the circumstances of his work.

The parallel between these aporias serves as an inspiration to join two apparently hopeless quests – the one after the sense of truth and the one after an ideal translation. By doing so, one my apply tools developed within translatory field to possibly gain some new, valuable insights in the area of philosophy. Such a strategy should

not be derided as an attempt to map one obscure concept onto another, which would thereby confuse one's understanding of both. On the contrary; it is an attempt to walk once more through the well-trodden paths, but looking at them through a new set of glasses. Unlike the theories of truth, translation theory seems to provide a more tangible analytical apparatus on account of being less abstract and having its foundations rooted in actual translation practice – in a range of specific intertextual operations. As an idea and potential subject of analysis, translation has its foothold in activities which are continually performed across cultures and between individuals, by professionals and amateurs alike. That is why such a strategy will hopefully not proliferate more questions, but help one to better understand the universality/relativity conflict identified above.

Moreover, it should be observed that it is not only this conflict which translation and the quest after the sense of truth have in common. Without yet reaching for the scholarly literature on both topics it is enough to draw on one's intuition to be able to recognise more intersection points.

Similarly to truth, the phenomenon of translation also spreads itself over the dimensions of ontology, epistemology, language and ethics. The activity must begin at the moment of encounter with the original, which is an entity of a particular ontological status (this status will be discussed and carefully problematised in the subsequent parts of the work). This source text must be then somehow understood, so an individual must make a cognitive attempt at comprehending it. The process also obviously involves a transition between linguistic systems. Additionally, setting aside a rather narrow and far from paradigmatic instances of machine translation, the procedure requires the presence of a translator, whose individual decision-making process bears the burden of ethical responsibility for their choices.

The list of similarities does end with a cross-discipline affiliations. If one acknowledges the tendencies observed by scholars who were systematising the history of investigation into truth and assume that indeed, it is thinking in terms of correspondence that remains predominant among various approaches to truth, then the structures on which both ideas can be mapped turn out to be strongly resemblant. In the most intuitive correspondential model, truth is roughly understood as a relation between a certain entity which bears the property of truth and something which imparts this entity with the property. So there is a tripartite relation between a truth-bearer, truth-maker and the relation of correspondence between them. By analogy, translation also has a three-part foundation; the original, the target text and the relation of equivalence between them (though it must already be stipulated that later, in the section devoted to a more detailed characteristic of the process one more element will be added).

This relationality which both ideas seem to share is closely tied to another common denominator, which is a certain representative role – the most intuitive, correspondence model the truth-bearer is supposed to represent the truth-maker. In translation, the target text serves as a representation of the original.

Even if one sets aside the classical, correspondence model and following Heidegger, reach back to the Ancient Greek to identify truth with 'aletheia' – 'nonconcealedness' or 'disclosure' (Heidegger 1919-1961) – its semblance to translation remains. The target text is after all supposed to reveal the original, opening its content before the reader for whom it has been in a sense covered by the foreign language.

Taking the above into account, a strategy which involves marrying the two notions turns out to be far less nonsensical than at first glance.

And yet, as an eminent scholar of translation Anthony Pym remarks, the philosophical significance of translation process has been so far explored only to a little extent (Pym 25). This is surprising, and prompts

strongly to push this research further. While seeking translatory grounds in truth may initially indeed appear startling, it has been long acknowledged that translation is after all the very process which enables communication as well as dissemination of ideas. And still, it is usually taken to be a merely technical procedure, a cumbersome obstacle on the way to the substance of the argument. Even if this is often the case, nowadays one is well aware that techniques of conveying information, formulating expressions an thoughts essentially co-create the intended messages. that Upon recognising translation's indispensability for the very chance of opening and continuing an intercultural and interlinguistic dialogue, it should be definitely conjoined with the substantive level of the philosophical debate, since it may happen to be one of the chief factors that shape its course.

The above observations hopefully serve as a sufficient premise to apply the translational framework in revisiting the philosophical problem of truth; specifically, to examine major theories of truth with the aim of discovering interpretative potential of the observed similarity.

In doing so, embarking on the venture through this complex land, one is prompted to choose the area of language as an observation tool. This should by no means be confused with focusing the study on the analytical tradition. Something different is meant here by the idea of taking the language perspective. Namely, regardless of what one may consider as the ultimate meaning of truth, the problem seems to have first presented itself to the human mind as a linguistic entity, as a language term – only then its sense could have been investigated further and spread over other dimensions of human existence. That is why, if it should not be given an everlasting priority, the linguistic perspective could be perhaps accepted as a sensible foothold.

But what does it actually mean to choose language as an orientation point? Language in itself is a monstrous phenomenon, at the mention of which only the variety of its definitions proliferate around, churning like snakes over Medusa's head. Without implicating oneself in unjustifiable claims, it should be stated that the intention of the author is to examine philosophical texts through the linguistic lenses.

In particular, often the analysis will be drawing on discoveries made by cognitive linguistics. This recently developed view of language, pioneered by R. Langacker, is an approach which acknowledges language as an essential tool of cognition (cf. Langacker 1987).

Although the postulates of cognitive grammar will not be frequently evoked, its spirit will permeate the analysis, which any linguist will certainly recognise. Therefore, several words of explanation are in place.

Langacker argues that the cognitive approach should be favoured since it is not only psychologically plausible, but uniform and neat in conceptual terms (Langacker 2008:13). In line with postulates of cognitive linguistics, the choices and the imagery which a given author applies are treated as a reliable reflection of the way they conceptualise the object of their descriptions. Analysing these linguistic choices in terms of the so-called 'dimensions of imagery' may give insight into how the ideas present themselves to the mind of both the author and a potential reader (cf. e.g. Langacker 1987:23-45). Such a method is in fact quite an obvious interpretative strategy, which the cognitive linguistics merely organise into a systematic study and equip with terminological apparatus. Another assumption which will be adopted from this field is that of a holistic view of language. According to cognitive linguists, grammar, syntax and lexis are inextricably tied, and remain an equally expressive reflections of the author's mental construal of the topic which they present. All elements of language exists as a continuum (ibid. 47).

At this point one may possibly raise vehement objections – after all, adopting such an analytical strategy may fly in the face of intentions with which the chosen texts were written. And this is true – the method is

unorthodox. Yet arguably, in order to gain novel insights concerning truth, one should not perhaps construct an entirely new, jarring theory, which would therefore drift even further away from the goal – which is reaching a possibly most universally agreeable account of truth. Instead, one should rather revisit the old, beaten tracks. The fact that they have been treaded for so long undoubtedly testifies to their at least partial rightness. Discoveries which these paths led to should still be taken into account, as they reflect all the multifaceted ways in which the human mind understands truth. But if they are to yield new revelations, they must be looked upon through a new prism; such that will succour their legitimacy and at the same time illuminate their new, previously unnoticed dimension.

Having presented such an apology of the chosen framework, now it is time to justify the selection of theories which will be analysed.

Before any detailed arguments are presented, the author would like to make an observation which is perhaps the most crucial for the acceptance of the entire work.

As the overview provided in the following section showed, the paradox involved in the quest after the sense of truth is that the aim which is chosen at the beginning automatically determines the scope of the outcome which may be achieved. Choosing and following only one given direction already limits the destination; one may go extremely far, but will never embrace the entire land.

For this reason, the plan assumed in this work is different – it is to take a very distant perspective and examine not one, but a few major, hallmark theories. Without doubt, such an objective may at first strike as spectacularly naïve. But only from such a wide perspective more fundamental, common tendencies can be observed. Therefore, this work will focus on several, most representative directions in the enquiry.

Based on the studies recalled above, the following approaches emerge as dominant: the correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, deflationist and the semantic theory – thus they will become the subject of analysis. In this way, a healthy equilibrium seems to be maintained. The first three of them represent general, traditional accounts, and the last two belong to the analytical movement. What is more, examples of both inflationary and deflationary schemes will be taken under scrutiny. In order to secure impartiality of the conclusions, these accounts should be at least initially treated on a par with one another. If any of them turns out to prevail, it should transpire as a result of the analysis. Moreover, the investigation will focus on texts authored by philosophers themselves, rather than on their interpretative elaborations, so as to appeal to the most basic, core intuitions associated with each theory and address their standard, most famous formulations.

Naturally, there also remains the phenomenological tradition. As one might see, its discussion in the above surveys was rather cursory. Only Woleński reserves for it a longer section, focusing primarily on the involved account developed by Husserl. At the same time, there is no mention of Heidegger, whose famous identification of truth with ‘aletheia’ in fact came to be used as a name for the entire philosophical study (the Polish ‘aletejologia’). What is more, Heidegger should be also credited with an insightful study of translation itself, the complexity and significance of which he was clearly aware. Moreover, this inspiring study was clearly linked with his views on truth. For this reason, the present work adopts the following order: five theories singled out above will be discussed in the central part of the study, while the Heideggerian legacy will be recalled elsewhere – in the section devoted to the historical interconnections between truth and translation, remaining thereby a respectful nod towards phenomenology.

At this point, one may transition to the second part of the research. Before the connections between respective truth theories and translation are demonstrated, it seems requisite for the translative procedure itself to be better clarified. Affinities suggested above were based on mere intuition, to serve as an initial premise rationalising the chosen framework. The next chapter however offers a closer specification of how translation may be understood – starting form a recourse to the commentaries made by key figures in the history of translatology, then passing on to an identification of four main components which the process comprises, and finally to the enumeration of features which identify a given activity as translative. Armed with such a theoretical equipment, one will be prepared for analysing theories of truth.

2. Translation as a framework for an enquiry into truth

The historical interplay between two disciplines

Even if the Cartesian Dualism can be now regarded as a philosophical relic, it is doubtlessly within the dichotomy of self and the other that any common individual most intuitively finds their own existence. It is the impression of this divide which precedes, preconditions and at the same time drives the quest for knowledge or any other cognitive activity. And it is precisely the same divide which inevitably inscribes translation process into the human condition.

Although until today the philosophical significance of translation remains explored only to a little extent, in the course of past centuries a number of thinkers seem to have prefigured its indispensability for answering fundamental epistemological questions. Therefore, the following section will offer a brief overview of the key insights from the history of translation studies, which hinted at the possibility of regarding translation as an object of philosophical curiosity. The summary will proceed along the guidance of a recently published, thorough compendium *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Translation* (2019).

With the tradition of theorising upon translation already long in motion, the overview begins in medias res by recalling the figure of Friedrich Schleiermacher. He did not yet consider the activity as something which can be identified anywhere outside of a range of certain linguistic practices, but the poeticism of his remarks already points to how much philosophical gravity one might recognise in the process.

The theory he proposed in a seminal lecture 'Über die verschiedenen Methoden des Übersetzens' (English: 'On the Different Methods of Translating') (1813) sprouts directly from a radical ground of his philosophy of language and hermeneutics. Some of its postulates, such as semantic holism or identity between language and thought, could prove rather fateful for the general possibility of translating. Schleiermacher was well aware that human beings remained separated by a gulf which existed between linguistic-conceptual worlds their languages created for them. This posed a major difficulty for the translator, who remained outside of the original author's linguistic world, being additionally influenced and tied to their own. In view of this distance, Schleiermacher distinguishes two basic strategies which the translator might choose. Either he could attempt to bring the author of the original closer to the reader of the target text or the reverse, try to move the reader closer to the author. And so there emerge two fundamental translative techniques – one which consists in stretching the target language so that it echoes the source one (later called foreignization), and the other which sacrifices resemblance to the original for the sake of the target one's internal fluency and smoothness (domestication).

Of the two methods, Schleiermacher argues for an unmistakable superiority of foreignizing. With domestication inevitably divergent from the original idiom, it is only foreignizing that stands a chance of conveying the author's intention to the greatest possible degree, which remains the translator's primary goal. This goal can be accomplished thanks to an inherent plasticity of the target language. The translator should constantly challenge it, so that the strangeness of the produced work could incessantly raise the reader's awareness of the existing linguistic-conceptual gulf (Schleiermacher 145-9).

Even if not explicitly stated, Schleiermacher's argument made a significant contribution to the philosophical understanding of translation. By stressing the existence of disparate linguistic worlds he not only foreshadowed the advent of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. More importantly, by identifying the foreignization –

domestication dichotomy, he also appears to be showing that between these worlds there is no passage other than through the bridge of translation. In this way, a step was made towards acknowledging the process as an essentially cognitive tool. This may be further confirmed if one takes into consideration Schleiermacher's entire philosophical legacy, together with his own translation practice. As Hermans argues, Schleiermacher's notion of the 'irrationality' of languages – the way they resist being completely comprehended – meant that translation had to be an ongoing dialogical path which enabled any exchange of knowledge (Hermans 31).

Such thoughts were extensively developed in the writings of scholars who elaborated the problem of linguistic relativism. The first who should be recalled is Schleiermacher's contemporary, Wilhelm von Humboldt.

Although he did not comment on translation explicitly, the epistemological importance of the process shines through his legacy. The study wherein he analyses the relation between language and human intellectual development (1836) reveals an inextricable, insidious connection which according to Humboldt holds between physical experience and the sphere of abstractness. Although the former triggers the creation of the latter, concepts which the individual synthesises are capable of autonomising themselves, gaining thereby a power to influence the individual back. In this way, they further intensify the subjectivity of their perception. In this way, a person would be condemned to operating within a certain vision of reality carved for them by their language. As an illustration, Humboldt employs the famous metaphor of the spider's web: 'a men spins the language out of his being, [and thereby] he ensnares himself in it. […] Each language creates a magic circle from which there is no escape' (1836:60).

Humboldt's intuitions were later evidenced by E. Sapir and B. L. Whorf, who through their research of indigenous languages used by Native American tribes ultimately proved the linguistic backbone of perception. Even the meaning of such fundamental ideas as time and its linearity turned out to by mouldable by the irresistible conceptual structures (cf. Sapir 1929, Whorf 1956).

Nevertheless, much as it was impossible to disentangle oneself from the linguistic chains, one could still attempt to switch them for another, the moment when a new language was acquired. And here lay the proof of the continuous role of translation in human existence; since language was tied with reality, any act of translation both within and between languages, would simultaneously entail a modification in one's world view.

As the next step, it is impossible not to mention the thought of Heidegger, who regarded the process as inherent in any hermeneutical task (Heidegger 1966). He states that not only is every act of translating simultaneously a form of interpretation, but also the reverse is true – 'every interpretation, and everything that stands in its service, is a translating' (Heidegger 61). The process was to be taking place both between different languages as well as within each of them, having the effect of 'awakening, clarification and unfolding' of meaning (Heidegger 62).

The point was clearly illustrated in the philosopher's own translative practice. Greaves argues that a prime example could be his translation of the concepts which remained in the main focus of Heidegger's philosophical analysis; notions which he considered as the so-called 'Grundbegriffen' ('grounding words'). In his view, they served as capsules for an entire philosophical enquiry into their meaning.

Such was for instance the Greek term 'Aletheia'. Heidegger insisted that the term should not be translated simply as 'Wahrheit' ('truth'). This would cover its fundamental sense as conceived by the Greeks. Instead, its translation had to proceed in stages, which allowed one to unfold and comprehend the subtle layers of

its meaning: from a ‘discovery’ to ‘being-discovering’, until the final ‘disclosure’. In this way, the process of translating was not a mere word exchange. It had to involve a form of re-enactment of an entire hermeneutical situation, adopting and immersing oneself in a specific way of thinking, which was consequently becoming a specific way of being (Greaves 50).

Here, as it was foreshadowed in the opening chapter, one must appreciate the first point of a subtle parallel between the phenomenon of translation and truth. The Heideggerian processual revelation of meaning which takes place in the act of translation finds its intriguing correspondence with his vision of truth itself. The gradual translative activity, which finally leads to assuming a specific mode of existence, allows one to discover a similarly multifaceted, dynamic nature of truth. ‘Aletheia’ conceived as disclosure was the fundamental level of truth, since it enabled an individual, by assuming a proper attitude, to establish around them the space of intelligible reality. On such a ground, there could emerge an intermediate stage of truth, which might be called ‘instrumental’ – truth could be practically realised when an individual made use of entities around them and established between them relations of reference (Dahlstrom 2001: 108). And only then, within the revealed, intelligible space whose elements were mutually related, could there appear the propositional, the most intuitive yet in Heideggerian terms derivative, correspondence level of truth. In the end however, Heidegger states that ‘the essence of truth is freedom’ – freedom defined as ‘letting beings be’ (Heidegger 1943: 8). So it turns out that what binds these three levels and ensures progression between them is the proper ‘existential mode’ of the subject, a mode which is of course ‘Dasein’. As Heidegger states: ‘To Dasein’s state of Being, disclosedness in general essentially belongs’ (Heidegger 1927:221). This was to be a continually maintained state of gradually acquired understanding – which is akin to every single act of translation.

Although Heidegger’s account of truth will not be analysed here in greater detail, the impact of his intuition could not be emphasised enough. His vision of translation elevates the figure of a translating subject to the role of an actor who constantly carries out the hermeneutical retrieval of meaning, and moreover, it incorporates into the process their entire environment, in the end to establish translation as a certain mode of existence.

In search for even more consequential remarks, it is impossible not to pay a proper tribute to Walter Benjamin.

Already at the beginning of ‘The Task of the Translator’ (1923), when characterising the process Benjamin employs a highly dignifying metaphor. To emphasise and justify essential creativeness of the activity, he argues that translation is akin to cognition; just as a subjectively acquired image of reality cannot objectively represent its source, the translated text cannot be identical with the original, for a change is inscribed in the very aim of the process (Benjamin 16).

This purpose, which makes the title of Benjamin’s article, goes way beyond a singular rendition of the original in a new language. Benjamin claims that the development of all languages is driven by one common goal: to converge into what he calls a ‘pure language’ – a certain ideal form of expression. No single language is however capable of attaining this goal on its own. They remain in the process of mutual complementation. And this is where the role of translation comes to the fore. Each translative act is an attempt at deriving from the source message the essence of its meaning, which constitutes in fact a kernel of pure language. And when the source becomes equated with every thought which an individual holds or wishes to express, then it is hardly possible to overestimate the value and scope of translation. In Benjamin’s own words: ‘If there is such a thing as

a language of truth, the tensionless and even silent depository of the ultimate truth which all thought strives for, then this language of truth is — the true language. And this very language, whose divination and description is the only perfection a philosopher can hope for, is concealed in concentrated fashion in translations.' (Benjamin 18) One cannot also overlook a highly dignifying, theological background of Benjamin's project. His search for an ideal language – the language of Adam, which would be capable of reversing the damage done by the Babel catastrophe, thereby rebuilding a bridge of communication between human beings and God. This Jewish perspective on the origins of language as well as its role in communication with the Absolute, finds its echo in the Christian hermeneutics, which, aimed at the utmost perfect rendition of the word of God, necessarily had to recognise the importance of translation for the possibility of carrying out the task (cf. The Septuagint project, Vulgate, etc.).

His astounding vision becomes more systematically formulated in another text which became the translators' credo, namely in Roman Jakobson's 'On Linguistic Aspects of Translation' (1959).

Jakobson affirms the omnipresence and necessity of the process by arguing that it is inseparably tied to the idea of meaning. He explicitly draws on the legacy of C.S. Peirce and states that 'the meaning of any linguistic sign is its translation into some further, alternative sign' (Jakobson 114). In the typology which he proposes, he significantly stretches the boundaries of how translation is understood. Apart from changes within and between languages (intra- and interlingual respectively), he distinguishes the third category – an intersemiotic type. It consisted in transformations between different semiotic systems.

Jakobson's recognition of this last variant is undeniably groundbreaking. If reality is understood as a combination of media which remain in constant interaction, then translating becomes an essential catalyst for any reciprocal influence or any transfer of information between them. The Jakobsonian classification is crucial for the thesis which is argued in the following work, for it is precisely the 'intersemiotic' understanding of translation that will be later employed to the reinterpretation of the concept of truth.

The above tripartite distinction becomes welded together in a seminal monograph of a thinker who became a central point of reference for translation scholars. In *After Babel* (1975) George Steiner argues that all three types distinguished by Jakobson share in fact a common essence, in that they are all a manifestation of human attempt to achieve mutual understanding. Indeed, the idea of 'understanding as translation' becomes the central theme already in the opening parts of his work (Steiner 1-48).

Although he devotes a lot of attention to the intra- and interlingual categories, Steiner also strives to provide a theoretical elaboration of the intersemiotic one in an astoundingly visionary fashion. He suggests that various media of expression share certain constant points of meaning. Using the example of a merger between music and poetry, he analyses how translation might proceed along steps of such invariant places, which he calls 'topoi' (Steiner 448). Naturally, such a perspective leads to broadening the view of the original and the target text, with both of them becoming a sort of multimodal complexes. And it is also his preoccupation with intersemioticism that ultimately explain incredibly vast limits which Steiner envisions for the scope of translative activity. For him, the process is not merely a branch of communication sciences, but remains 'formally and pragmatically implicit in every act of communication'. When understood as a transfer of meaning, translation becomes a *conditio sine qua non* of all human mental activity (Steiner 290).

Steiner's broad, 'anthropological' approach to translation is only further confirmed in the theory of four-stage hermeneutic translative motion he proposes. First, there is initial trust in the possibility of deciphering

the message, then aggressive appropriation of the obtained knowledge, incorporation of the foreignness into what is familiar and finally, restoration of balance (Steiner 312-16). All these steps may be carried out equally between texts as well as entire societies. In this way, translation turns out to be present both at the microlevel of cognition as well as macrolevel of culture. One could hardly ask for a better argument in favour of an enormous epistemological significance of the process.

It is possible to identify significant interconnections between translation and philosophy also in Antoine Berman's classical reflection 'Translation and Trials of the Foreign' (1985). His approach is strongly influenced by the legacy of Schleiermacher, as he continues to advocate for the superiority of an 'alienated' target text. He notices a mutual influence between philosophy and translation practice. It is the long tradition of Platonism that in his view should be blamed for a prevailing tendency to favour smoothly written translations. An attempt to produce a text which is 'fluent and elegant' while adherence to the original would spoil its clarity affirms in fact the Platonic division into sense and word, into content and form; an embellished translation destroys the former in favour of the latter (Berman 296).

Furthermore, the epistemological weight of the process is hinted already in the title of his work. He uses the term 'trials' in a double sense: first, for the reader a proper translation becomes a challenge since they need to face that which is unfamiliar. Secondly, and here Berman echoes the idea of Heidegger, the process also challenges the original, because it is through translation that the most deeply ingrained, the most primordial sense of the source text becomes revealed, when it is uprooted from its initial language ground and in a twisted mirror-like fashion confronted with itself (Berman 285). What is thereby suggested is that translation has a powerful cognitive potential in a way which was not observed before: it not only opens access to the unknown, but also becomes a tool of introspection.

It is inadmissible to overlook the contribution made to the philosophy of translation which was offered by the scholar who became the bastion of modern hermeneutics, that is Hans Georg Gadamer. In his works translation would naturally play a non-negligible role, since he argued that the individual existence is grounded in the process of understanding, and the medium of understanding is language (Gadamer 1960/2004). While such an idea might not have been in itself novel, Gadamer claimed that language in fact precedes the subject, who find themselves in a way slung into a circle of processing phenomena around them The process consisted in a continuous comparison of parts to the whole, and thereby still deepening one's understanding of a given experience. Within this circle, the subject's approach is always informed by certain prejudgements; assumptions and knowledge they have become equipped with which present for them the object of comprehension. Even at the moment of trying to grasp the sense of for example a visual artwork, the progress of comprehension may take place – and assumes this particular course, not another – is thanks to language (ibid. 399).

The importance of translation in such circumstances transpires especially during an encounter between individuals. Since Gadamer claimed that different languages are separated by an 'insurmountable gulf' (ibid. 388), translation was the only tool enabling an attempt to bridge it. Although in this respect his view on the procedure remains fairly traditional, it must be noticed that against the background sketched by Gadamer, not only interpersonal communication is possible through translation, but the procedure in fact is inherent in every step of the individual's existence; when through the steps of hermeneutic circle their knowledge is constantly revisited - re-translated – into a broader horizon of understanding.

The subsequent thinker which must be mentioned, Paul Ricoeur, offered still more sophisticated treatment of the procedure. Both Steiner's and Berman's views had a direct impact on his work. Paul Ricoeur presents an insightful analysis of the process in three essays collected under the title *On Translation* (2004/2006). Already from the outset Ricoeur recognises translation as a multilevel phenomenon. An interlingual exchange is only one of its manifestations, with other taking place between individuals as well as entire cultures.

Ricoeur's first profound insight pertains to the individual level and develops Berman's introspection argument. Namely, translation plays a major role in the course of constructing an individual character. For Ricoeur, personal identity was a continuous dialogue between those aspects of one's personality which remain stable and those which change over time. This dialogue would be conducted precisely through a translative act, whereby the original, unchangeable dimensions of character were carried on and integrated with those which were responsive and tractable to the constantly oncoming novelty (*Time and Narrative* 1984). So in a sense, an individual translated themselves through time, consolidating thereby their narrative self. As Kearney explains, this is how each person becomes the author and the reader of their own life; their sole translator (19-20). Jervolino neatly sums up Ricoeur's idea: 'To think, to speak is always to translate, even when one speaks to oneself, when one discovers the traces of the Other in oneself' (Jervolino 659-68). This continuous process was driven by an incessant 'desire to translate', which might be understood as a quest for knowledge – concerning both oneself and the surrounding world.

In his next step, Ricoeur elevates translation beyond the level of an individual and argues that the process is also an essential mode of encounter between communities and cultures. It becomes one of the three models proposed as a means of integrating Europe. Translation as a ubiquitous practice would become a fertile soil for multilingualism as well as mutual cultural hospitality. And it is not merely in the sphere of language that Ricoeur recognises translation's unifying impact. A translative dialogue would ensure continuous re-evaluation of historical events from a plurality of perspectives, and therefore their more informed understanding. The translatorial approach would preserve respective national identities and at the same time ease their mutual coexistence. A conclusion suggested by Foran grasps the essence of Ricoeur's incisive reflections. She states that for him 'translation reveals something fundamental about human condition: not just that we speak languages and learn others, but more fundamentally, that our experience unfolds between the universal and the particular [..] Balancing the concerns of the one and the other is always possible, even if it remains an infinite task that can always take place in a different way (Foran 102).

There is one more extremely valuable analogy to be found in Ricoeur's analysis. When commenting on the possibility of equating the source and the target text, he emphasises that their equivalence can always be merely 'supposed'. This is because there is no 'third text', the bearer of identical meaning, which would allow one to compare and verify the semantic identity between the original and its translation. Hence equivalence is never 'a priori', it is always produced by the translator (Ricoeur 35). And for Ricoeur this is a clear exemplification of 'the third man argument' proposed in Plato's *Parmenides*, developed by Aristotle. Just as it is impossible to create a finite definition of any abstract concept without regressing into further abstraction, there is no transcendental, constant gauge for translation equivalence. The analogy may serve as one more argument in favour of putting the translator's endless quest on a par with an agelong enquiry into the ultimate meaning of abstractness.

The foregoing overview should close with a brief report on how the relations between translation and philosophy are being explored in contemporary research. Végső confirms that while language and translation were the subjects of heated philosophical debates in the previous century, at the beginning of the new millennium this interest waned, and an idea of pairing the translative and epistemological processes is rarely explored (Végső 157).

In translation studies, the works of Douglas Robinson and Dinda Gorlée are certainly of note. Robinson shows applicability of C.S. Peirce's terminology to the translator's tasks, while Gorlée inscribes translation into his semiotics (this point is elaborated further in the section devoted to the pragmatic theory of truth). Michel Callon in turn employs the idea in the field of sociology (Callon 1999).

A rather intriguing, if not an extreme treatment of the concept can be found in the work of Levi Bryant. His idea is what he calls an ontology of translation – he argues that all objects which constitute reality interact with each other by producing specific information. The exchange of this data should be considered as translating. Bryant's project has doubtlessly enormous consequences for the way in which translation is understood. By turning it into an ontological category he arguably pushes the boundaries of its meaning to the farthest possible limit. 'There are as many forms of translation as there are types of objects', says Bryant. Ennobling as his study might certainly be, it is at the same time extremely risky. As Végső concludes, it leads to 'the absolute de-essentialisation of translation' (Végső 165), which becomes detached almost entirely from its original sense. For this reason his account will not be further analysed here.

The most appropriate closure for the overview, which will at the same time serve as an excellent transition point to the central parts of the following research, is the figure of Barbara Cassin. It is in her work that one may find not merely a strong link between translation and philosophy, but specifically the relevance of the process to the enquiry into the nature of truth.

Her monumental *Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon* (2014) became a milestone which collected nearly all major translational conundrums hidden in the writings across all philosophical disciplines. But more importantly, she also argues how significant is translation itself for pioneering new philosophical approaches.

In her view, the time has come to rethink the pursuit of truth which so far has been developing via the traditional, univocal logos inherited from Aristotle. Instead, the goal should be to understand and accept the concept of truth which is instrumentalised, portionable and person-oriented. Such an idea necessarily violates the principle of non-contradiction. And for Cassin, the process of translation becomes an ideal mode in which this new vision of truth could be understood and articulated. In 'The Relativity of Translation and Relativism' (2012) she argues that translation and truth align perfectly in terms of their inherent 'interpretative plurality'. It is nothing other than the process of translation which has the potential to dethrone the hegemony of meaning exclusivity and replace it with a new order, in which the pattern along which truth develops is that of 'arborescence' (Cassin 27).

Cassin's proposal turns out to be precisely aligned with the essential thesis posited in the following work. Her general appeal adds all the more plausibility to what will be argued here, and conversely, the subsequent analysis of truth theories becomes a direct confirmation of Cassin's idea. Aimed at exposing the translational substructure of truth, the study can hopefully be acknowledged as an ample proof of the two concepts mutual interdependence.

The four constituents of translation process and their epistemological gravity

The phenomenon of translation spreads between four essential poles, which remain mutually constitutive: the translator, the source text, the target text and the translational equivalence. Each has become a focal point and a subject of close scrutiny throughout the history of translation studies, with scholars relentlessly attempting to provide their exact definitions. But they used to be considered primarily in the context of an actual linguistic practice, so for instance in terms of the ambiguities and difficulties involved in rendering the content of the source text, the characteristics of a well translated text, the consequences which particular translational decisions may have or the impact of the introduced discrepancies on the target culture. For the purpose of this work however, these four pillars will be weighed in terms of their philosophical charge, going beyond merely textual practice, so as to be able to recognise their broader applicability to the analysing questions about general human condition.

The description will summarise ideas gathered in the previous section. The analysis will focus on the intersemiotic category. Even within this single type one may distinguish at least four general subtypes – multimedia into multimedia, multimedia into single-medium, single-medium into multimedium and single into single (where the source and target media are different). Since ultimately translation will be presented here as a backbone of predicating truth, the case involving a transfer from a multimedia original into a single-medium target text will be of primary interest.

The original

Each act of translation necessarily begins with the source text. An intersemiotic original is an external set of data. For its recipient it is a certain foreign element, given or encountered. The precise point of its origin as well as the process of its creation are never fully traceable. It comprises different communicative modes, which are mutually interwoven. Moreover, to each of them belongs a different mode through which they are received (O'Hallloran and Smith). A leading scholar of translation studies Teresa Tomaszkiewicz refers to the set as an 'initial semiological complex' (Tomaszkiewicz 41). One may regard it as an amalgam of information whose carriers become not merely linguistic concepts, but also elements belonging to other semiotic systems – tactile, visual, kinaesthetic or vocal – which together constitute a strongly cohesive whole.

Some theoreticians attempted to propose a formal representation of a such a complex. For instance, in a model developed by Zabalbeascoa there is a plane divided by two axes, one representing the degree of verbal component and the other the extent to which sound and image were applied. Various kinds of intersemiotic source texts, (e.g. operas, theatre plays or audiodescriptions) might be then identified as points located somewhere in the system, whose coordinates would represent proportions in which different semiotic channels built up the entire work (Zabalbeascoa 4).

Notwithstanding the formal exactness and comprehensiveness of such models, they nevertheless point to one extreme difficulty and perhaps the most crucial feature of an intersemiotic original. Namely, its complexity is essentially indissoluble. It is impossible to delineate its ingredients in a single, clear-cut way. The intersemiotic components remain mutually incommensurable and resist a finite analysis, just as it is impossible to exhaustively divide nonquantifiable numbers. Consequences of this feature cannot be underestimated, since it

means that there is an infinite number of ways in which the source text can be described or structured; it has an endless analytical potential.

It is this very complexity which gives rise to the supposition that the text is imbued with significance, and also this complexity would later trigger the hermeneutic reading process. Yet even if any intended significance was there, neither is it accessible nor fully embraceable. Thus the original meaning remains merely presupposed.

There is one more characteristic of any source text, not merely the intersemiotic one, which further refines its intricacy. The work is in constant evolution. Although created at a particular point in history and often for a specific kind of audience, each original remains sunken in the river of incessantly changing times. It is affected by the evolution of languages as well as semiotic systems which comprise it, always influenced by the changing soil of cultures into which it is planted. The source text is therefore forever fleeting, elusive, inimitable – like an iridescent shade of sunlight refracted on a white façade of a cathedral, which cruelly eludes the brush of an impressionist painter. Trying to capture the true colour, they desperately continue to repaint the same image, just as the person who resumes their translative attempts.

It is valuable to set the above perhaps somewhat poetic characterisation against the legacy of Roman Ingarden, who famously subjected the nature of a literary work to a detailed analysis. Although he is preoccupied with artworks, and the original text does not belong to this category exclusively, it does so in many cases, and that is why it is important to evoke here Ingarden's study and the way it interestingly corresponds to ideas which are being developed in the following research.

In the first volume of *Spór o istnienie świata* (*The Controversy over the Existence of the World* 1947) he states momentously that a literary work is an intentional object – and hence it does not possess anything which might be regarded as a stable, ontological basis. Ingarden gives priority to the sonoric, vocal aspect of language, which serves as a material for such an artwork. But even this linguistic dimension does not constitute a tangible fundament of the text, since its role is essentially 'to point to something else, something which in the end exists autonomously' (ibid. 444). Ingarden rightly admits that artistic pieces do appear in the real world; apart from written and vocal aspects of literary works, there are also paintings, sculptures, etc., which are in part constituted by objects such as canvas, paints or block of marble. But the fact that they 'appear in the real world' only contributes to their constant evolution, and crucially the artworks themselves 'are not real' (ibid. 384). This aligns precisely with the character of an intersemiotic original which remains a semiotic complex; a combination of signs whose function is to refer, sending away from themselves, never to solidify in a stable finite form. And Ingarden himself admits that it is impossible to specifically describe the features of this 'ontological fundament *generaliter*' (Ingarden 1981:185, highlighted by Ingarden). Having such a highly indeterminate physical basis, the work gains autonomy even from the author themselves (Łempicki 282).

Moreover, Ingarden's seminal thesis is that a literary text is a multi-dimensional creation (Ingarden 1960:4). The semiotic level mentioned above is not only volatile, but has what he calls a 'schematic formation', which means that it containts 'places if indetermiancy' – certain cognitive gaps, which can be filled in various ways. Thanks to this essential incompleteness, a schematic formation may give rise to its various 'conctretisations' (sometimes translated as 'concretions'). These are recreations of the work when indeterminate places become filled upon the work's reception by readers, viewers or listeners (Ingarden 1961: 289–313).

One may now appreciate how the philosopher's model plays into the subtle dynamic of intersemiotic translation. The semantic potential of the original semiotic complex is as though suspended between the individuals – the author and the translator as well as among all other potential receivers – dispersed into countless forms, assuming a different, utterly unique shape within each of them.

The above characteristics can be equally transferred to the epistemological dimension and ascribed to the original understood as an object of human cognition. The intersemiotic amalgam is now 'The Foreign, The Other' – a perceived fragment of reality or a stranger encountered therein. Although on a daily basis the subject find themselves in a surroundings of organised phenomena – objects, people, events, which are already furnished with a certain meaning and function, it is not only upon seeing a novelty among them when this surroundings reveals its unobvious nature. When attempting to understand the principles that govern the chains of circumstances, the laws of nature or the true character of the other individual, the inscrutability of the world is hardly an infrequent or questionable realisation. So the subject faces here the source text of reality, whose precise origins are a mystery, which is an infinitely complex, semiotically diverse plexus, and cannot become steeked within one univocal definitional frame. All the more so, because they remain in the process of constant change.

The last chapter of the foregoing research will once again take up the fascinating problem which Ingarden analysed within the strictly artistic field and consider it from a broader, if not maximal perspective. There, a tentative model of the ontological status of the source text and its relation to the subject will be tentatively sketched. At this point however, one should pass on to the initial characteristic of the next pillar of the process, which is the individual who performs it.

The translator

Neither any work of art nor any object of cognition would come to be called the original had it not been approached as such by its recipient. So the next crucial component of translation process is the figure which confronts the source text.

The most influential contemporary characteristic of the translator was elaborated by Lawrence Venuti in his famous *Translator's Invisibility* (1995). There he assumes an approach favoured by Schleiermacher, inasmuch as he criticises the long tradition of insistence on 'smoothness' of the target text. According to him, such a strategy misleadingly disguises its derivative character. Instead, he advocates a proud assertion of the translator's presence in their work as well as their legitimacy to introduce as many modifications as they deem sufficient, in order for the original to shine through. It is also Venuti who introduced the names for the two opposing strategies, which are now in official use, calling them respectively 'domestication' and 'foreignisation'.

It seems that Venuti's claim calls for justification not only on political and aesthetic ground (as provided by him), but also on the level of philosophy. For this purpose it must be observed that when the role of a translator as both a textual practitioner as well as a cognizing subject is brought under scrutiny, in the course of their work their self-awareness seems to be undergoing a certain cyclical process.

It is the complexity of the approached data described above which incentivises the translatorial action. Upon the first encounter with the puzzle of foreignness, the person starts trying to resolve the abstrusity. In their attempt they tend to become entirely engaged in the analysis and understanding of the original. Even though by

virtue of this very act, a mark on the text is already being seared, the subject generally remain ignorant of their own influence. Having acquired an initial vision of the text, the individual begins to realise that their understanding is obviously subjective. And this is how their presence begins to emerge. So the moment when they assume a translatorial function, their identity is already transpierced with conflict – they come to existence and immediately strive to annihilate themselves.

The dramatic nature of this conflict is further exacerbated when the subject realises an endless number of possible readings of the original, among which their own will represent merely a tiny fraction. As an immediate consequence, they cave under the burden of a countless necessary choices they will have to make while materialising their vision. The weight of the burden increases together with the amount of responsibility which every decision entails – each resting exclusively on the translator's shoulders. Such an exposure to spotlight becomes dazzling even more acutely, because by default, any traces of translatorial interference are undesirable. And so, backed into a corner of this apparently unescapable paradox, the translator's first instinct pushes them to hide their presence with all possible means. They will now strive to achieve objectivity and credibility in their rendering of the original, hoping that these features will serve as an 'invisibility cloak' for their involvement. Thus they may reach for Berman's 'analytic' of translation – a series of deformative techniques, aimed at smoothing the target text, making it intrinsically concise, predictable as well as approachable in terms of collocation and idiom; in short, hiding behind domestication.

It is precisely this instinct which scholars of Schleiermacher and Venuti's tradition urge to suppress, encouraging the translator to take one more step in their personal evolution – to boldly proclaim their presence in the work. On a philosophical ground, there are naturally several arguments which might legitimise such an audacious move. It might be claimed that two different languages can never ideally overlap, so at least partial modifications are always necessary; or that providing a more raw yet more authentic reflection of the original is paying a tribute of respect to the source culture. But crucially, in the spirit of Berkeleyan *esse est percipi*, it must be also observed that the original does not exist without the translator, who together with all its other recipients, contributes in fact to its constitution. And it is this co-authorial function which perhaps most legitimately justifies the translator's confidence in making themselves 'visible'.

With such a realisation, the translator can consciously become a part of the original, as a vessel for channelling its content. They begin the process of decomposing the intersemiotic continuum, singling out certain approachable constituents, whose equivalents they might subsequently search and test. Specific features of the translating process itself are discussed at length in the following section of the work. For now, what needs to be only acknowledged is that they no longer have to shy away from adducing their personal sense of aesthetics or artistic flair in conveying whatever value they noticed in the original, nor restrain their creativity when faced with item which lack straightforward counterparts. Their work becomes an extension of the source text, one of the possible explorations of its semantic potential.

With this in mind, it becomes clear that invisibility has always been an illusion, a misguided dream that needs to be foregone – the translator's prism being unavoidable, the more it is undisguised, the more authentic view of the access to the original can be given to its potential foreign reader.

The above cycle can be quite plausibly mapped on the phases through which the individual subject passes in the course of their cognitive processes. Arguably, what happens first is the emergence of a foreign element, which becomes an object of interest and an incentive for its analysis. A trace which the individual

leaves on the object by the very act of encounter initially tends to pass unnoticed. Rather unquestionably, becoming aware of the individual self comes only as the second stage. And at the very end (which should be perhaps regarded as an actual beginning) the person arrives at the realisation of their involvement into the object of cognition and the degree to which thereby their knowledge of it becomes tainted.

The target text

With legitimacy of their presence thus indisputably justified, the translator may now boldly begin their work, which is from the very beginning sated with tension involved in trying to strike a balance between creativity and re-creativity. While originally the target text was to be a window which gives insight into the source text, in reality it turns out to be an intriguing, warped, stained-glass mosaic, whose ultimate shape becomes a resultant of a plethora of factors.

One of the most commonly cited studies regarding the nature of the target text is the famous *Skopos* theory, proposed by Vermeer and Reiss. As the name suggests (gr. 'skopos' defined as 'purpose'), they argue that translation process is a strongly intentional activity, so the primary determinant of how the target text is constructed is the purpose which the translation is required to serve. This ultimate function may be an outcome of negotiation between the translator's economic goals, the expectations and degree of receptivity of the target community or the conditions set by the target culture (Vermeer 2000). While the theory enlists a number of further principles which should guide the choice of translating strategy, such as internal coherence of the target text or fidelity to the source one, it is the 'skopos' rule that must override them.

Another influential approach is the so-called polysystems theory, developed by Even Zohar. According to him, the construction of the target text is shaped by even more wide-ranging forces, that is international, historical and political power plays, where each created work becomes a clog of an immensely large mechanism – a plain of confrontation between entire literary systems (see e.g. Even-Zohar 1979).

When the analysis is narrowed down to the intersemiotic transfer, the rate of alterations which the text has to undergo seems to increase even more drastically. In accordance with the terminology introduced by Tomaszkiewicz, the outcome of the process may also become 'a semiological complex'. In such case, at least the proportions between semiotic codes must diverge from the original by the sole virtue of their change. But when there are many semiotic systems in the source text which are later translated into only one semiotic code – so in the case most referrable to the act of cognition, when the perceptual experience is processed into the dimension of consciousness or language – a sense of semantic loss and impoverishment appears unavoidable, because the number of expressive tools at the translator's disposal decreases. Hence several theoreticians suggests to define to such a process as 'constrained translation' (cf. e.g. Chaume 2004, Mayoral, Kelly, Gallardo 1988).

These remarks unmistakably point to an overarching feature of the target text – namely, its relativity. A faithful representation of the original, however understood, turns out to be nowhere near the ultimate criterion which the translator attempts to fulfil. If to the above higher-level conditions one adds the multiplicity of micro-choices made exclusively on the basis of the person's unique sense of aesthetics, imagination and literary taste, the target text must be acknowledged as a new work. It is shaped largely by the circumstances of its production, but most of all, its final form is extremely closely reliant on its creator. This may apply particularly to the literary

texts, yet to a greater or lesser extent has to be acknowledged with regard to each of them – in the target text it is primarily the image of the translator that breaks forth.

When the phenomenon is again referred to the individual experience of the external world, the target text should be regarded as some form of its representation. It is the foreignness which has been tentatively made familiar. The otherness of environment which becomes processed at least to such a degree which allows the subject's mind to apprehend it and coexist with it. Analogously to the nature of the target text, such a representation becomes a vestibule of understanding. Of course, such an argument is hardly novel or controversial. It is after all one of the fundamental assumptions of cognitive grammar elaborated by Ronald Langacker, which was later planted and nurtured on the Polish ground by Elżbieta Tabakowska. According to their theory, processing a text consists in analysing its specific parameters, the so-called dimensions of imagery – this is both analogous to and supportive of general human cognitive processes.

Nevertheless, just as in the case of an intersemiotic target text, the degree of understanding has to be 'constrained'. The processed data is restructured and most likely impoverished, at least due to the reduction of resources available in the new medium. The distortion cannot be avoided also because the data becomes literally a part of the individual. Whatever their mind produces, has to bear their own 'signature'.

With all these individualising properties accepted as inherent features of the final work – the target text or one's cognitive reworking of reality – the complex mosaic created by the translator should not be nevertheless discarded as unfaithful, inaccurate or misleading. The stained-glass window may not be opening a clear view of the interior of the cathedral. But it possesses a unique quality as an inseparable part of the entire structure from which it was derived. Therefore, it should be approved and treated on a par with other such translative attempts. Their slanted frames and interfluent hues only add mystery and intrigue to the inaccessible, original interior.

Equivalence

Having consented to the target text being so far removed from its source, one may ask: what is the actual relation which ensues between them? What sort and degree of equivalence can be hoped for?

Perhaps most frequently recalled analyses of equivalence was the one introduced by Eugene Nida, which he developed on the basis of his work with translations of the Bible. He distinguished two types of equivalence: formal and dynamic. The former is achieved when there is a syntactic and phraseological similarity between the original and the target text, while the latter occurs when the translation fulfils a function analogous to the one played by original, in a way which is most natural in the target context (Nida 129). Nida'a two categories can be basically regarded as an echo of the two strategies defined by St. Jerome – translating either word-for-word or sense-for-sense. Since preserving the original structures stretches the conventions of the target language while rendering the text's function intelligible makes it simultaneously more approachable, the two tactics also correspond roughly to Venuti's foreignization and domestication. In the light of the foregoing study it has hopefully become indisputably clear that either case entails a loss of certain essential qualities of the original.

Thus the perennial questions seems to remain. Is the translator condemned to an equivalence 'merely supposed', as it was adjudged by Ricoeur? Is their activity merely such that allows ungraspable, poetic qualities

of the source language to slip out, as pronounced by Robert Frost, who stated that 'poetry is what gets lost in translation'? Or perhaps the translator is trapped between a dichotomy – either they can achieve equivalence which is always possible, yet diluted on assumption that all languages share a common substructure or they can never achieve equivalence, which is unattainable by virtue of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.

I intend to argue that the suffocating alternatives presupposed by the above questions may be altogether misguided. The real working of translation should be understood somewhat differently, with the focus on its creative-cognitive function. This function would be simultaneously an intersection point between the two dimensions analysed above – it is applicable both to strictly textual practice as well as to epistemological enquiry.

In order to better illuminate this role, let us once more bring up the artistic metaphors employed earlier. How much can an impressionist painting of a cathedral reveal about the real texture of its facade? How much of the interior can be seen through a stained-glass mosaic? Doubtlessly not much if one expects to get a clear, unobstructed and accurate view.

Nonetheless, something essential does happen within the entire the process. First, what often escapes attention is that each window is at the same time a reflecting surface – looking through it is always simultaneously, even if unconsciously, looking at one's own face. So what is certainly being revealed is the 'inside' of the creator themselves. Furthermore, the original work in its pure form has never been accessed or recreated, but it was explored and extended. The artist was getting to know their model by developing it; their cognition and a subsequent attempt at re-enacting the source consisted in building it on. They did not solve or explain an original meaning of the image they saw, because such an original sense was inaccessible, if at all existent. Rather, it was they who created and added the meaning, problematised and sophisticated the encountered phenomenon, charging it with the weight of their own contemplative glance.

How does this metaphor apply to translation? In terms of textual practice, as it has been established, the target text is strongly relativised by its purpose, target audience and the writer themselves. Moreover, with a countless number of the translator's individual choices determining the work, the outcome is their own reflection. So in the end, to a large extent their activity is always in fact an inconscient self-translation. Re-expressing one's own view of the original creates for them a further impression of similarity and prompts to assert that they have reached equivalence.

If such a claim is accepted, then equivalence is ultimately to be sought only within the person of the translator. Although they may be influenced by a number of external factors, such as the target community or its culture, but it is them who have become a channel which carried the source text and created its representation in the target medium. Thereby, they become a part of it – so it is them who validate agreement between the two works, as their constitutive, binding element. They themselves constitute equivalence.

Now let us turn to the level of epistemology. After the subject has confronted the intersemiotic amalgam of external reality and made an attempt to analyse its complexity, they constructed some form of its representation. It is necessarily imperfect, distorted and subjectively marked, already by the very fact of their mutual encounter. Just as any target text, the created vison reveals the nature of the individual perhaps even more than what they wished to portray; naturally, one's understanding of the world is a more or less involuntary reflection of one's own character. With these two entities coming to existence, what is the relation which holds between them?

It seems that in the end, the only thing which connects the reality with the image of its understanding is the person who creates this image – again it is the individual themselves who becomes the equivalence. Through and together with the subject their creation constitutes a part of the reality, so they are the only ones who legitimise its validity as its desired counterpart. They are the link which ties the foreign with the familiar self, who in the act of cognition constantly try to bridge the gap between them, turning the former into the latter.

In this way, all four pillars of translation become consolidated, to form an indissociable unity: a multi-semiotic complex which is incessantly being turned into an intimate, personalised construct, equivalent to its source within and by virtue of the cognising subject.

Those who adhere to the traditional view of translation and its purpose may continue to ask: what happens to the original complexity? Does the process allow one to solve it, elucidate it by familiarisation? Yet these questions again presuppose a misconceived view of the merit of the entire process. Perhaps the explanation and understanding of complexity has never been the translator's proper task or capacity. Crucially, it must be noticed that the original complex appears alien at the moment of encounter with the translator. It is the person who makes the foreign become foreign. Quite plausibly, a puzzling differentiation into various semiotic systems exists only in the perception of the subject. So as long as there is an eye of the observer, there will always be that which is alien. Consequently, each individual is forever destined to instinctive attempts at taming the otherness of reality, while it seems that a better way of finding and entrenching one's place in the world would be rather to foster its inevitable alienness. Then acceptance of this inherently conflicted condition might enable one more easily achieve peace of mind.

Here lies also one of many ethical functions of translation. Since it helps to accept the foreign, it tempers a merciless futility of the quest for understanding, and shifts the goal more towards contemplation and reverence. By accepting alienness, an implicit effect of the process is alleviation of the pain involved in an endless struggle to make the foreign intelligible. Thereby, one's existence within the world becomes more easily consolidated.

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In the subsequent parts of the work the characterised elements will be identified in truth theories, so as to further expose their epistemological role. But at this point, only the basic constituents of the process were described. Before translation can be actually localised in any account of truth, the activity of the translator must be more closely specified. That is why the next section is devoted to outlining essential features of the translating process itself.

Key Features of the Translation Process

There is clearly an unescapable tension accompanying any discussion around the notion of truth. It is because on the one hand, the concept is tacitly shrouded in a momentous philosophical hope. An allusion to the existence of something that would transcend the confines of human mind, an external reality in some more or less determinate, intersubjectively accessible form – a forever elusive goal of perpetual philosophical reflections. On the other hand, the idea is inseparably tied to the very centre of relativism – the human mind in its most

individualised activity, namely that of perception. This inherent conflict continually propels the quest for a satisfactory theoretical background of the concept, which has been sought by nearly every thinker in the history of philosophy. And perhaps precisely because the notion alludes to a supposed, mysterious agreement between thought and external reality, it remains a philosophical riddle.

The following work aims to become one more attempt at specifying its theory, yet possibly with more modest pretensions. It will be here assumed that, just as in the case of all abstract concepts, the notion of truth is a kind of artefact; an evolving, man-made construct. Therefore, any investigation which would strive to discover and expound some supposedly ultimate meaning contained in the idea might be considered as misguided, with no such original, semantic kernel actually being in existence. Instead, what seems perhaps a more viable project, is to offer yet another perspective from which the concept can be viewed, showing how such a perspective relates to others that have so far been proposed, and highlighting its possible benefits. And the frame which this study would suggest to apply is that of another construct, namely the idea of translation process. Such a combination is proposed in the hope that the resulting model will turn out to be appealingly more concise than its competitive versions, as well as one which more effectively counters potential criticism.

Yet it might be instantly objected that similarly to truth, translation itself is also a wide and complex term, for which some universal formula is yet to be proposed, were it at all to exist, and combining the two will result in nothing less than an even greater confusion. So before one sets out to locate the process in the chosen models of truth, it has to be specified how translation will be here understood.

It will be assumed here that it is possible to uncontroversially single out a number of general features which, if exemplified by a given phenomenon, allow one to call it translation. In order to support their validity, the chosen aspects will be also identified as present in various translation theories.

Firstly, for translation to be taking place the presence of an active agent has to be involved. One would argue for such a condition, since the dynamism of the process requires an initial incentive, in order to commence – an agent, even if understood very broadly, seems necessary to provide such an impulse. In their absence, speaking of translation would arguably remain a mere metaphor (as for example in the case of conversions taking place within genetic code).

Since otherwise it would also be difficult to distinguish translation from any other change or transformation, the agent should be conscious. It seems quite obvious that in translation studies, which centre around the practice of language and culture translation, the figure of a self-aware translator who is able to act knowingly and wilfully can be identified in the majority of theoretical approaches, since their early beginnings. From Schleiermacher, who spoke of a translator performing a movement either towards the author or the recipient of the translated material (1813), to Benjamin who insisted that the process consisted in the translator's finding an effect intended behind the original (1923); from the translator's 'happy and creative' acts in literary translation underscored already by Borges, to Ortega y Gasset who viewed the practice as distinctive and 'splendorous' precisely due to the 'historical consciousness' it required in manipulating and matching different cultural aspects (1937 [in:] Ventuti 2000), to name but a few. Later studies such as the Skopos theory, showing translation as essentially purposeful action (Vermeer 1998), the polysystems theory which showed the process as a counter in a game of uneven relationships between communities holding different status (Even-Zohar 1990) or the recently developing cognitive approaches which analyse translation through a psycholinguistic framework (Halverson 2014, Risku 2012 et al.) seem to be more and more focused on the figure of a conscious translator.

Such a condition does not immediately exclude instances of 'translation' occurring in nature or performed by a machine, as long as certain further requirements would be met.

These may be formulated along the following lines. Within their consciousness, the subject should have at their disposal some instances of data of at least one more kind apart from the one they are facing. Most intuitively, the mind constitutes a mixture of data belonging to various types. This is necessary, so that the agent could correlate with each other these different kinds of media, imbuing them thereby with 'meaning' – adding information by their mutual assignment. To illustrate, when perceiving a certain colour, apart from knowing an array of other possible hues, one should also keep in mind for instance the medium of sound, which would allow them to assign notes to colours. As a result, subjected to such a process, each perception that the individual may experience acquires a degree of what might be called an interpretative potential; there is a surplus of meaning ascribed to the substance it consists of. In still other words, the medium becomes unequivocal – or at least appears to be such to the agent. This ambiguity yields the next condition.

'Meaningfulness' of the data would signify to the individual that the medium contains an additional piece of information, going beyond what constitutes its physical substance. Taking an instance of this additional layer, one might call it a message encoded in the perceived phenomena. The presence of this ambiguous layer appears to be necessary, so that there could arise for the agent an incentive to begin deriving, extracting the encoded 'message'. The fragment of medium which is being considered should in a way pose a cognitive problem.

While in the context of language translation the necessity of the presence of meaning hardly needs to be advocated, such a requirement seems to pertain as well to other areas – in sociology for example, where one could also distinguish situations of a 'text-like' nature. Drawing on the analysis of Callon, the process of translating similarly begins with the so-called problematisation, when a given actor formulates a series of questions regarding a phenomenon they are facing and subsequently set themselves as necessary link within a larger network for their resolution (1986). Even in the fields where the term is applied in a more distantly metaphorical way, it involves a multi-layered, in a way 'problematised' medium. Translation in geometry takes place when an origin of coordinate system is shifted, which moves the figures on a plane towards new grid reference, so when there is a possibility of modification – a space and potential to operate (Smith 2011). Just as in the case of translation understood traditionally, although there are certain rules along which one should proceed, the initial possibility of movement is infinite, leaving a span for undetermined action.

So an attempt to separate this added layer of signification would be another important element. It should be stressed that the agent's intention is to extract the 'message' as accurately as possible, to restore it exactly as it was applied to the medium in the first place. The activity does not involve diverging away from it towards impressions and associations it may provoke, nor to produce any kind of variation, but to recreate the data itself. The source idea is to be recognised and recovered – moreover, together with the ambiguity proper to the medium. In other words, there should be vagueness in both the initial data as well as the material that is chosen to render it, so that their mutual assignment is never exclusively one-to-one. For instance, when describing a cloud as 'frilly', both the perceived shape has multiple features and the chosen term may have multiple applications. Consequently, what should underlie the attempt is a need for equivalence, reached not only by grasping the original 'message', but also rendering it together with the charge of any additional information with which it was imbued by the source medium.

This leads directly to the next assumption. Much as there has to be a desire for identity, an ideal equivalence can never be achieved; otherwise, the process cannot be called translation. In support for such a condition one might present the following argument. The subject is recreating information within their own consciousness, within the same medium as the one in which the message was contained or with the use of another. In all of these three cases, unless it is merely a repetition of the given data, the material used for its recreation has to be different – and that seems to necessarily exclude the possibility of obtaining the desired sameness.

Within the field of translation studies an increasing emphasis seems to be placed on the acknowledgement of difference between the source and target text. Already Schleiermacher advocated the value of foreignizing strategy, which was to expose an inevitable distance from the original. Eugene Nida's famous concept of dynamic equivalence was based on similarity in function which the text performed among individuals within different communities, with its change being not only advisable, but even necessary (1964). The later approaches within the so-called cultural turn underscored the variable external factors by which the cultural background shaped the translated texts, making them one of possible 'refractions' of the original (Lefevere 1982), and the recent insistence on making the translator 'visible' naturally entails making the target text a new, complex creation, akin neither to its source nor to the possible expectations of its recipient (Venuti 1995). And although observable particularly in the case of literary translation, the tendency is present also in technical contexts (e.g. considering a translation of an instruction manual, its steps may need to be significantly changed, in order to elicit similar action of its reader, when the target language categorises movement differently than the source one).

From the above, one may derive a few more essential features of the process. So the subject is not reduplicating the information, but recreating it. This means that the activity which they undertake shares some characteristics with an act of creation – and one of them is choice. It necessarily requires the agent to review the repository out of which the target structure is to be built and decide which of the available alternatives is to be taken. One may draw here on a model proposed by Levy, who compares the translative process to a series of steps in a game; a person proceeds by choosing from a specific number of possible solutions (1967). What must be added as a crucial property of this choice is that, just as in the case of a creative act, while there can be external factors which prompt the subject to favour certain options over others, the ultimate decision originates within the individual. Hence the rules of the process are not in any way predetermined. Translation is performed through a series of decisions which are particular to the agent and its circumstances – they necessarily cannot be universalised.

Another highly important feature is the fact that the process involves not a disengaged act of perception, but one which is coupled with an element of judgement – when the agent is submitting effects of their choice for his or her own evaluation. But the activity is not purely creative in a sense of absolute freedom; there always remains a given external data, on which the new construction is to be modelled. So the judgement is formed as a result of comparison – at the moment of juxtaposing the created structure with its source, when their degree of similarity is being assessed. Bilczewski shows the act of comparison as necessarily taking place both at the level of apposed source and target structures, as well as a higher level of their context (e.g. when comparing their cultural backgrounds) (2016, 307-314). Here one may also recall a wide-ranging study by Kadiu, in which she draws on both Berman's idea of literary translation being an act of self-reflexivity as well as Meschonnick's

analysis of machine translation, arguing convincingly for the human decision-making as underlying both types of processes. She stresses that in each case there should be recognised an element of critical reflection, an act of judgement which is formed in response to the essential uncertainty involved in the practice (2019, 71-144).

Thus it may be suggested that what further has to characterise a translative activity is a certain backward reference. The target object is shaped not according to some future projection within the agent's imagination, but in such a way as to resemble an instance of memory; something which has already been perceived or experienced. Even though in the course of the process the understanding of initial recollection changes and hence also a vision of the desired goal remains in motion, adjustments are caused by continuous returns to the model set in the past. Hence within translation studies it is common to characterise the activity as *re*-telling (Nikolaou 2019), *re*-writing (Forrai 2018), *re*-fraction (Lefevere 1982), *re*-creating, etc., which clearly indicates an intuition that translating involves a certain effort to preserve what ages, to keep it fresh and alive. In this sense, one may risk saying that the process is an attempt to defy the passage of time. This fundamentally rebellious and at the same time powerful intent lying behind the translator's procedure will turn out to be highly important in the final section of the research and therefore should be borne in mind. For in the final chapter, a model of the intersemiotic activity will be transferred to the cognitive level and this translative ability to preserve meaning will be closely related to the act of retaining memories, which in turn will allow one to better understand how the identity of a particular translator-subject may emerge.

From the above it seems logical to draw yet another property, even more obviously analogous to a creative act. When equivalence as an unattainable goal becomes the engine of the entire process, and additionally there are no universally definable rules regarding motivation of particular choices made along the way, the practice is essentially inconclusive. It does not have a terminating point together with the moment of creating a structure which could be objectively deemed correct. The endeavour may continue interminably, and it is only the subject's decision – determined again by a degree of personal, arbitrary sense of satisfaction – that puts an end to the work considered as complete. Just as an artist who through their work unveils merely a fleeting fraction of the original richness and complexity of an idea that inspired their act, the translator always stops at only one of endless possible changes of the source. In Cassin's view, this is precisely what the impossibility of equivalence consists in – not so much in paralysis of the process, but its constant perpetuation (2014). This would expose translation as an essentially hermeneutical task – a characteristic that comes to light even more clearly from the perspective of an analysis proposed by Tylor. He argues that the hermeneutical circle of interpretation is proper to any science which involves such components as meaning, the way this meaning is expressed as well as its being expressed 'for or by a subject' (Tylor 5) –naturally, translation process meets his criteria.

Finally, one more aspect of the activity should be mentioned. The initial condition which was required in order to be able to speak of translation was the presence of a conscious agent. Yet it will be here also assumed that much as the consciousness of the subject is needed so that they are able to make certain choices, evaluate them or evoke the source data in their memory, it is not necessary for them to be aware of performing the entire procedure. It seems that the process may as well be carried out intuitively, may be a part of larger operation or only a part of it might be taking place with their full awareness. Just as a painter in their work manages to unwittingly capture resemblance to a specific landscape or atmosphere, the translative activity could have all the properties pointed above – be initiated by a conscious agent, involve recalling a previously perceived data and

their interpretation, consist in a creative attempt aimed at recovering the message by means of another medium, require making decisions and judgements, be indeterminate and inconclusive – and still remain subconscious.

Having set out such conditions for the process, it must be admitted that although they may be rather intuitively agreed upon, they themselves are far from clear-cut. Depending on their interpretation on the one hand and on detailed aspects of a given situation, it may be possible to have different classification of processes which are seemingly alike. One should therefore provide an example of both the phenomenon which fulfils the above criteria as well as one which fails to meet them.

Naturally, various transformations between and within natural languages would fit in the former category. A paraphrase or change from one language to another would naturally constitute an instance of translation. But one should view the process from a wider perspective, as in the famous Jakobsonian classification. There, apart from an intra- and interlingual translation, he also distinguished an intersemiotic type (Jakobson 1959) – one might consider an example involving a museum exhibit. Taking a photograph of a sculpture to be placed in an album documenting the exhibition does not seem to have the above properties of translation. Even though there is a deliberate attempt, the subject does not intend to recover some original meaning expressed through yet going beyond the work, as well as to recreate its ambiguity. The action seems to be merely a symbolic representation via a different medium, a copy, a mechanical reproduction. Yet if the work was to become a subject of ekphrasis – when a viewer of the exhibition recalls admiring the sculpture and wishes to describe the entire complexity of the experience, one might arguably classify such portrayal as translation. Equally, taking a photograph might still have a translative nature, as long as the photographer, rather than to fulfil some purely documentary purposes, would aim to recreate the unique richness of the impression which the exhibit left on them (one may for instance recall here a potential philosophical complexity of a photographic act, analysed in-depth by Sontag (1978)).

The example above shows that what determines the fulfilment of conditions is strongly tied with how the data are approached and what is assumed to be the aim of the process; it is this stage that ultimately defines how a given activity should be classified. Therefore, as the final condition one should underscore that bearing in mind an inherent indeterminacy of translation, whether an action in question has a translative nature cannot be conclusively inferred from its outcome alone.

At this point, a legitimate objection might be raised. From a strongly traditional point of view, the process described here may seem hardly classifiable as translative, and the meaning of the term as explained here may strike somebody as excessively broadened and hence diluted. There might also be a charge against the proposed set of characteristics as being possibly insufficient to specify the activity. Regarding the latter objection, the Admittedly, the process in question does not represent a paradigmatic instance of translation, and the notion as such, similarly to truth, is still awaiting a satisfying elaboration. Nevertheless, the phenomenon exposed in the analysis does seem to be meeting criteria of the Jakobsonian intersemiotic translation in a rather unquestionable way. And the goal of the study was not to further blur the investigation into truth by adding another vague concept into the string of its definitions, but rather employ the translational context as a convenient, illuminating framework into which truth should subsumed.

That being established, one may begin analysing the chosen theories.

3. The Correspondence Theories;
An Illusion of Correspondence in a Self-translative Act

The question should now be raised, which of the available perspectives on truth must be given priority, if one would like to show the relevance of the notion of translation for the entire debate. It seems appropriate to begin with those which centre around the idea of truth as correspondence with reality – their origins can be traced back to the most reverend thinkers in the history of philosophy, and the remaining models were later born in response. Naturally, there are many theories which try to avoid ontological assumptions and explicitly disentangle truth from any problematic commitment to the existence of external reality. Many of those most notable accounts attempt to achieve precisely that – for instance Joachim's version of coherence theory explains truth in terms of consistency, Peirce's and James's pragmatic analyses focus on the process of verification and practical consequences of true ideas, etc.. But, as Williams aptly observes, in order not to appear vacuous, each proposed explanation should be accompanied by some theory of the world (Williams, 1977, 25-60) addressing thereby the question regarding the status of external reality. Thus, taking a stance regarding metaphysical realism seems necessary. And lastly, reference to the notion of correspondence seems inevitable if the theory aspires not only to create a plausible philosophical construct, but also to accommodate some basic, most widespread intuitions regarding truth.

Reconstructing the correspondence theory is only deceptively straightforward. Formulations vary to an astonishing extent, inviting different types of criticism, and are usually rooted in other postulates of a given philosopher's system. Their readings may be so distinct that it is possible to encounter directly opposite interpretations. While it is often said that the other theories of truth developed in opposition to the idea, correspondence has also been many times presented as implicitly contained in most of them. For instance, James and da Costa combine correspondence with coherence (Costa 2018, James 1909), Tarski's semantic version was intended as an improvement on the correspondence view (Tarski 1944), etc. It therefore seems impossible to invoke the theory's essence as if innocently, without positioning oneself within a specific philosophical landscape.

This landscape is shaped by an array of questions which every theory answers more or less explicitly. As Kirkham enumerates, initially there are those concerning the entire project; does the author aim to provide a definition of truth or its criterion; the conditions that need to be satisfied for something to be true, or the usage of the term; does it strive to describe 'truth' and 'falsehood' as phenomena or account for the meaning of terms 'truth', 'true' and 'false' (Kirkham, 1-2)? Then one may ask more precisely: if the theory employs the notion of correspondence, what exactly does it consist in? And even if one takes the term for granted, what is the nature of the corresponding entities? Providing answers will considerably narrow down any commentary. In the light of the above, the following work also cannot remain neutral.

Two criteria will be applied to narrow down the scope of the study. Firstly, it will focus exclusively on the contemporary formulations of the correspondence theory. Secondly on those, which are considered classical. That is partly because in common view the chosen texts seem to sufficiently convey essential thoughts which had been developed earlier regarding the notion of correspondence. The other reason is that the goal of the

analysis is to reveal the importance of translation for the philosophical debate as it is developing nowadays, and additionally, to show how this debate may elevate translation as a tool of a promising philosophical potential.

The approaches which are traditionally credited with laying foundations for the current discussion around truth are the so-called correspondence as congruence, proposed at the beginning of 20th century by Russell, which can be paired with the argument of Moore and which together with the Wittgensteinian ideas contained in *Tractacus* came to be associated with the notion of structural isomorphism. There is also a somewhat later, yet still distinctive account: correspondence as correlation suggested by Austin (Marian 6., Kirkham 119, et al.). It has to be admitted that in many respects these explanations radically differ, and hence each will be considered separately. But the ultimate purpose of the analysis will be to argue that there is an element which they all have in common – namely an inconscient act of translation form the source text of experiential data into a target text of a true statement. If it proves successful, the argument would gravitate towards the claim that this process is a key component underlying the idea of correspondence, and it is on such ground that the nature of relation between this theory and others should be sought.

Russell – the theory and its criticism

Despite a plethora of existing versions, any model that can be classified as a type of correspondence theory rests on three basic elements. There is a relation of correspondence and two entities which it is supposed to be binding, traditionally referred to as truth-makers and truth-bearers. These elements, referring to certain quite elusive phenomena within the world, require making a number of ontological assumptions. Hence, drawing on Kirkham's typology, each such project constitutes to some extent also a metaphysical theory (Kirkham, 20-1).

Commitment to a tripartite scheme already prefigures an unobvious construct, and Russell's model confirms the expectation. At first glance, his theory develops seamlessly, but upon closer look, its seams turn out to be thinly disguised. As the assumptions of his logical atomism may foreshadow, both on the side of truth-makers and truth-bearers Russell would be portioning reality quite distinctly, into entities as to the nature of which he himself changed views together with the development of his philosophy, perhaps deepening his understanding of their problematic nature.

The vision we find in the canonical *Problems of Philosophy* opens with three conditions required for any satisfactory theory of truth, which he expresses as unquestionable, and which define for his theory a specific ontological ground. Firstly, a proper account of truth has to provide an explanation for both truth and falsehood. What follows according to him, reveals the nature of Russellian reality; 'If we imagine a world of mere matter, there would be no room for falsehood', and 'it would not contain any truths' either, since they are both 'properties of beliefs and statements' (Russell, Chapter XII). So there would have to be two realms constituting the world: the material one, to which truth-makers belong, and the one reserved for mental phenomena. Admittedly, the view Russell was later advocating was that of neutral monism (Stubenberg, 4.3), which holds generally that consciousness and physical matter are both different arrangements of the same material underlying the entire reality. Yet here, it is evident that at least on a certain level the division exists, with the two dimensions remaining separate. This is further confirmed by the third condition, according to which beliefs and statements must be dependent on something which lies outside of them (Russell, Chapter XII).

So the correspondence should be sought somewhere between these two dimensions. In order to specify its nature, on both sides Russell carves further structures. Initially, to refer to truth-makers and truth-bearers he employs the notion of a fact and belief respectively, soon providing a more detailed analysis for each.

The term 'belief', being philosophically enormously loaded, leads Russell to proposing his own model and nomenclature which becomes incorporated into his theory of truth (Kirkham, 129). Believing was to consist in an occurrence of a certain relation which knitted together several 'objects' into one 'complex'. It comprised a subject (a judging mind) and terms (the entities which a given judgement concerned), all of them still to be found in the mental sphere. Recalling Russell's famous example, in a belief held by Othello that Desdemona loves Cassio, Othello would be the subject who unites three terms into one 'complex': his conceptions of Desdemona, Cassio and the relation of loving which occurred between them. Russell highlights particularly that it was the act of believing which connected the elements, 'cementing' the entire structure. Additionally, there was one more crucial property which the judging mind imparted to the belief. That was what Russell called a 'sense', 'direction' or 'order'. The subject was namely arranging elements of the complex in a particular way, so that it differed from other beliefs which might involve the same terms. And here appears the first hint at the role of language; the chosen 'order' would later be reflected in the structure of a sentence expressing the given judgement.

At the same time, outside of the judging mind, another 'complex' had to be found. It needed to involve the counterparts for the ingredients of belief. Russell does not preoccupy himself to a large extent with the problem of identifying these counterparts, nor does he comment on the tricky difference between their nature and what appeared in the subject's mind. He states merely that it had to be a fact consisting of the same 'objects' – in the case above, it would be Desdemona, Cassio and the relation of love between them – arranged together in the same 'order' as they were in the belief.

When those two structures came together into being, they would ultimately allow for the final, desired relation to ensue; the relation of correspondence. And its presence would be what was adding to the judgement a property of truth. That is why the theory is often associated with the notion of congruence; Russell maintained that it was the structural resemblance between the belief and the corresponding fact that made belief true.

It should now be pointed out in what respects the model above may appear questionable. Having exposed its possible shortcomings, one could proceed to demonstrating how the inclusion of translation process might smooth away some of the difficulties.

Following Marian's summary, a plethora of counterarguments can be grouped into three main categories (Marian, 5.). Firstly, such a definition of truth may be considered too narrow; the correspondence is called into question when beliefs regard statements from a discourse for which there are no easily observable facts, such as for instance the domain of ethics. So from such a perspective, Russell's theory would fail to accommodate basic intuition, which would prompt to consider certain judgements as naturally true or false, and yet it would be impossible to identify a 'complex' confirming their truth-value.

It can be also argued that the theory which defines truth as correspondence with facts is vacuous or comes down to stating a platitude. Davidson for instance convincingly elaborates on how the notion of fact makes the theory circular, leading to an 'ontological collapse'. Explaining facts through the idea of truth yields a vicious circle. And on the other hand, if one tries to single out facts by pointing to their constituents, as Russell appears to be doing, then the logical possibility of substituting names of these constituents with their coextensive

terms may in the end amount to concluding that each expression of a true belief corresponds to one great fact; a totality of everything that occurs. This makes the account of truth clearly inadequate (Davidson, 752).

At the same time, the theory might be considered too vague, with such an objection directed towards any of its three basic elements. Turning again to facts, Quine argues that they are not so much redundant as fictitious, 'projected from true sentences for the sake of correspondence' (Quine, 213). The notion of belief appears equally elusive; along with other terms belonging to the field of folk psychology, it was famously attacked by Churchland, who advocated eliminativism with their regard, claiming that this entire conceptual framework was an artificial theory, a set of concepts which were incapable of describing accurately the intricate workings of human mental processes (Churchland, 67-90). And finally, the very relation of correspondence may be deemed inexplicable. In Russell's analysis it is founded on structural resemblance. But in *On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean*, he himself states that although the two corresponding entities are both 'equally solid and equally actual facts', propositions, which constitute for him the content of beliefs, are 'composed of images with a possible admixture of sensations', while facts beyond the human mind 'may be composed of anything' (37). If so, then it seems difficult to imagine a structural similarity between sensations and for instance tangible objects.

A particularly insightful criticism was formulated by Geach, who spoke against Russell's account of relations. He observed that the relation involved in the act of judging would have to change each time for beliefs that differed with regard to the number of constituents present in the believed proposition (Geach, 47-50). Worse still, in the case of compound or general propositions, the relations within them would have to be showing how exactly they combined the terms (how they evinced the Russellian 'sense' or 'order'); so they could not simultaneously be the relations towards the judging mind or presenting themselves before it (Geach, 51-2). Even though Russell is known to have acknowledged the problem, he did not propose a successful response (Prior, 1967).

There also remained the problem of falsehood, an account of which was expressly required from the outset. In *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism* as truth-makers for the false propositions Russell suggested the existence of negative facts, which he nevertheless refrained from defining, as they were to be ultimate and irreducible (44-6). His proposal has already been rebuked on various grounds (see e.g. Oaklander and Miracchi, 1980). But even if one admits negative facts into the ontological repository, then as Prior points out, this would entail having real objective falsehoods as their constituents, which even Russell himself was reluctant to accept (Prior, 1967). And if such facts together with their ingredients were introduced, then what proof would there be that they constituted the exact opposite of true facts (as the theory required), and not simply some additional ontological category?

Taking into account all the recalled arguments, one may conclude that the analysis is not so much erroneous as requiring specification and a link which would tie its elements into a coherent unity. For ultimately, the model provokes the following questions.

How can the dynamism of a judging relation in Russell's description be so strangely detached from the activity of the mind itself? How can the order, i.e. the 'sense' of this relation be ascertained in any other way than by being recognised by the subject? Why not say rather that it is the agent who makes the arrangement? Furthermore, Russell notes that the content of belief is originally a proposition composed of images based on memory (1919, 37-8); so what becomes the source of the structure imposed on the image? What rules or

schemata prompt the arrangement? Similarly, how can the 'sense' occur at the same time in a fact – a complex of which the mind is not a constituent? And how can its order be governed by the same rules and patterns? This problem resounds even more gravely, if one considers negative facts; were they taken as theoretical constructs, their structure would appear even more dependent on how the subject shaped them. Finally, to bring out the problem signalled above, suppose the relevant fact becomes somehow already identified. How can one posit the presence of similarity between the two structures without the subject's mental involvement in the congruity relation? If, as Russell admits, 'all our knowledge of truth is infected with some degree of doubt' (1912, Chapter XIII), would not such admixture expose the property of truth's inevitable dependence on the mind?

The place of translation in Russell's theory

These questions already point to the direction which the analysis should take instead. Let it now be shown how recognising the idea of translation implicit in Russell's theory changes his model. Since the following study does not extend to the further problem of knowledge and its conditions, the proposed description will focus on what happens when an individual is already met with the 'corresponding fact'.

Initially it should be observed that if one recalls the definition of similarity between two physical phenomena, they can be labelled as alike if it is possible to carry out a conversion from the values describing the characteristics of one into the other, a transformation from a system of units organising one medium to those found in another (*Encyclopaedia of Mathematics*, 'Similarity theory'). So for each pronouncement of similarity there turns out to be taking place a specific process.

What process is occurring in Russell's analysis? It starts with the subject being exposed to a certain portion of external information, which results in their having in mind an instance of mental data; in Russellian terms it is the 'image-proposition', a fragment of memory. Be it visual or 'mixed with sensations', it would not possess any meaning in itself, had it not been granted by the agent. So the subject needs to impart 'a sense' to the data, structuring it in a particular way. Since he or she presents this 'sense' to themselves in a linguistic form (as a 'word-proposition'), it is primarily language that would be providing patterns along which the structure would be carved. That is how the first 'complex' becomes created, bound by a relation established and made meaningful by the individual.

Subsequently, the agent acquires further, perceptual data. These may be an amalgam of forms, accessed through various channels (auditory, visual, tactile etc.) – they constitute the second Russellian 'complex'. Faced with such a blend, the subject searches for ways in which the structure they hold in their mind can be applied to the perceived compound (they expect the presence of certain meaning and wish it to be equivalent). Since the data evince no order in themselves, and no tendency to be structured in one way or another (has an endless interpretative potential), ultimately it is the subject who chooses how to impose on them one of the possible 'orders' (selecting its elements from the repository of meaningful patterns belonging to the medium of their consciousness) and it is they who affirm suitability of the chosen pattern (through an act of indeterminate judgement). Thus the data become organised, certain boundaries and elements within them are delineated, so that as a result one may claim to be dealing with a distinguishable fact. Through such imposition, by affixing the meaning to the acquired perceptual input, the individual creates for themselves a relation between the two

'complexes', which they deem a relation of similarity. What seems most important however, is that they consider the structures as congruent, since in fact it is they who arrange both 'orders'.

The features pointed in the formulation above seem to confirm that the process meets criteria of translation. The external medium to which the 'fact complex' belongs can be viewed as a kind of source text, an original instance of data. Having in itself no unequivocal objective meaning, being regulated with no universally measurable system, it remains inherently ambiguous. It is approached by the agent looking for a certain 'sense', a particular structure that would match their 'belief complex'. So within the amalgam they search for regularities which they would consider suitable. But in the end, the elements they find and consequently the 'order' they perceive are ones they delineate themselves. That is why the 'sense' of belief and the 'sense' of fact appear congruent – since they are both construed by an active, translating individual. The 'complex' imposed on the original medium can be therefore understood as a target text, in that it is linguistically articulated, modelled on the external source data and aimed at rendering it with utmost accuracy. Such a process – constructing the 'order' within the truth-bearer medium and applying it to the medium of truth-maker, striving to recover the external source, but recovering only already possessed patterns of meaning – concludes when equivalence is thought to be discovered between both 'senses'. Yet with them both being creations of the individual, that is in fact when the agent becomes deceived by similarity which they themselves have spun. The ultimately established relation of correspondence enables them to ascribe to the 'belief complex' a property of truth – which turns out to be an effect of inconscient self-translation.

At this final point the question may be asked, why are the two orders usually perceived as having distinct origins, and why is the agent as if unwittingly construing the meaning two times? It seems unavoidable, precisely because in the end, consciousness of the subject remains only one sort of medium, through which any potential other can be access; so both in the case when it is assumed that apart from the mind there exists an external reality to which truth-makers would belong, as well as in any other case their consciousness remains a prism. Similarly, the medium of truth-makers would also constitute only one closed system. And it seems necessary that at least two such mediums are needed if the phenomenon of 'sense' is to occur or if any relation of reference is to take place; there has to be at least two categories, so that they could start to be mutually ascribed. The question why the agent remains unaware of their own role in acknowledgment of similarity may be explained by the fact that usually they do not remain mindful of an unescapable grid which their own consciousness imposes. But recognising one's role is not impossible; after all, Russell's remark that every truth remains 'infected with some degree of doubt' hints precisely towards such a realisation.

In this way the Russellian theory of truth reveals its translative ground. What are the advantages of such an articulation? Most of all, it allows one to retain Russell's assumption that there must be a division into 'the world of mere matter' and the realm of beliefs, without purporting at the same time that there can be any kind of structural similarity between them. It explains the source of both 'orders' as created by the individual.

Furthermore, with them being dependent on the mind, the theory might also account for truth-value of propositions belonging to problematic fields of discourse. For example in ethics, instead of adopting the contestable moral realism, one may still point to the correspondence occurring between structure of a given proposition and certain internal dispositions (so for instance, rather than looking for a fact validating a statement that 'Lying is wrong', the property linguistically ascribed to 'lying' can be seen as reflecting the feeling of revulsion which accompanies the conception of the act – resulting in the perception of structural similarity).

As for the vacuity objection, the theory could hardly be accused of obviousness, if one accepts that in its essence there is an unknowingly conducted process of translation. Moreover, for those who would consider the notion of belief as vague and inadequate in describing mental phenomena, there could still be corresponding regularities between the two orders, with them both traceable back to language patters, the conceptualisation of which seems less questionable than the possibility of isolating mental phenomena such as judgements.

And finally, regarding the problem of falsehood, this model does not require postulating inexplicable entities such as negative facts, as well as does not necessitate commitment to objective falsehoods as their constituents. It offers a solution more in the spirit of Wittgenstein. For each proposition and its negative counterpart, the truth-making instance of data would be the same fragment of external reality (so recalling the Russellian example, both for the proposition 'Socrates is dead' as well as 'Socrates is not dead', it would be the dead body of Socrates that gave them truth-value), only in the case of false statements, one would not come to the approval of correspondence (attempting to translate the belief, one would not delineate a satisfying target 'complex'). After all, for both true and false propositions, it was the subject who ultimately decided whether equivalence was satisfactory. The consequence of such a view would be that the assertion of falsehood is just as inconclusive and 'infected with doubt' as truth – but such a corollary could hardly be accused of conflict with intuition.

Enriched by the idea of 'inconscient self-translation' the proposed model has nevertheless leaned visibly towards relativism. The proceeding sections will further develop this problem, proving hopefully that combining the two theories need not necessarily yield a scheme which would be entirely idealist. Having then located translation in Russell's analysis, one may now turn to the thought of Moore, which follows shortly, and which even further attests to the presence of the process in the correspondence idea of truth.

Moore – two theoretical gaps

Moore's early account of truth contained in 'The Nature of Judgement' and 'Truth' came to be identified as the so-called identity theory. Yet he later changed his views radically, hence the following work will focus directly on the revised version presented in *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*.

There, even more visibly than Russell, Moore meanders around the key elements of truth assertion, as if half noticing their underlying dynamism, trying to readjust their definitions, only to in the end conclude in a typically Moorean, cavalier fashion, that there are parts of his theory the explanation for which he cannot provide; nevertheless the analysis must be correct. As a result, his model becomes similar to the Russelian one, but less fine-grained. Moore also chooses beliefs and facts as truth-bearers and truth-makers respectively, but denies the existence of propositions, disposing thereby of the 'complex' inside the individual. And he seems latently brought to such denial by the problem of non-existing falsehood.

In his view, belief was as if empty; it was merely a mental act, the same regardless of what was believed. Its linguistic descriptions in a form of a statement which made it different from others might sometimes – namely in the case of false beliefs – not be a name for anything which existed. And if it sometimes might be so, then by Ockham's razor, one should probably assume that it is the case at all times (Moore 264-5). So propositions as the content of beliefs disappeared, and their linguistic formulation became as if a vacuous name. Moore acknowledges the resulting gap, claiming that the only proper thing which distinguishes a given belief is

its connection with an actual fact, belonging to external reality. Crucially, he notes that the fact carries the same name as the belief – this is exactly what they share.

As a consequence of such a common factor, Moore ascribes to every belief a specific property, which is being bound to the relevant fact by a relation of 'referring'. And this relation leads him to provide his definition of truth – for a true belief is such that 'the fact to which it refers *is*' (267, highlight of the author). In this way, explaining the mechanism of 'referring' becomes vital for elucidation of truth. But here comes another gap; Moore openly admits that he can neither define nor completely analyse the relation. Nevertheless, he claims we know it and are 'perfectly well *acquainted* with it'. Let his words be highlighted here: 'we have [the relation] before our minds; for you cannot try to determine the nature of, or to compare with other things, a thing which you have not got before your mind' (260) That is why he claims that it is possible to intuitively understand his account of truth, even though the notion was not perhaps disassembled to its most fundamental components (268). And although there is supposed to be no 'unambiguous' name for the relation, Moore provocatively suggest to call it correspondence.

One more final aspect should be underscored in Moore's description, which goes against his openly held views, yet which seems to be inevitably following from his characteristic of beliefs. In his view, they do not appear to be true or false independent of an individual. The property of truth or falsehood appears together with their assertion. He gives an example of his friend believing that he has gone away: 'In merely asserting that 'I have gone away', we are not attributing any property at all to this belief – far less a property which it shares with other true beliefs. We are merely asserting a fact […] Plainly I might have gone away, without my friend believing that I had; and if so, his belief would not be true, simply because it would not exist' (276). So the relational property of truth is added together with the subject's act of naming a given judgement, as in 'It is true that Moore has gone away' – it is not a timeless feature waiting to be discovered. Such a conclusion seems natural if one defines propositions exclusively by means of a particular mental act.

So the scheme appears rather contrived; in Moore's account there are two gaps left explicitly without further explication: the structure of belief and the nature of 'referring' relation. One may therefore question the model with the following problems. How should the emptiness of belief's 'name' be understood? How is it possible that this name – a juxtaposition of linguistic terms put together by the individual – immediately and on its own constitutes a connection with a specific fragment of reality (in the case of true beliefs), or connects the belief with a fact which does not exist (as in false ones)? Where does the 'name' of the fact come from? In what way are we 'already acquainted' with the correspondence relation? Is this relation particular to the phenomenon of truth-making or perhaps one's acquaintance with it suggests that one already knows it from other circumstances which may be regarded as analogous? It should be now demonstrated how employing the idea of translation helps to address these questions.

Translating as the reference relation

Since it was the problem of false beliefs that prompted the removal of propositions and yielded an incomplete scheme, one ought to redraw the theory precisely on the basis of such an example.

Thanks to Moore's intuition that there is no such an artificial complex of objects as the mind and elements of its judgement, his analysis already gets the proper bearing. The process starts together with a belief

which consists in a mental activity of the subject who approaches an amalgam of data found within the external world (a medium with interpretative potential). In the perceived medium they expect to be embedded a certain piece of information (using Moore's example, it would be for instance his friend wishing to know whether Moore departed or not). From their linguistic repository of meaning the subject chooses a given pattern to combine a sentence (a creative act) – this would be organising the medium in a specific way. The imposed pattern becomes a 'name' of the belief (for instance a statement 'Moore has gone away'), and at the same time the chosen structure delineates a specific frame within the medium, drawing the boundaries of a fact, which thereby obtains the same 'name'. In this way, there is indeed no such an ideal, separate entity as a proposition on the one hand and the fact to which it refers on the other, but merely a piece of external information being given a 'name' that constitutes both the judgement and the fact.

Let it be therefore considered what happens when the belief gains the 'property' of falsehood. As pointed above, a given judgement would not possess it on its own, regardless of the individual; the phenomenon of falsehood – and truth likewise – emerges together with the subject's assertion. Initially then, as in the case of Russell's model, the data belonging to external world become a form of source text. The translating agent attempts to apply the pattern of meaning held in their mind to the perceived medium, so that the information contained there could be recovered as accurately as possible (and equivalence was achieved, in the sense that the belief could accurately reflect the actual state of affairs – whether Moore has gone away or not). But this 'original text' is already being approached trough the label of belief's 'name' which also simultaneously frames the fact. So the subject may be trying to adjust the pattern and submit the effects of these adjustments to their own evaluation; but how they choose to match the pattern and when they decide to conclude the process is dependent in the end entirely on their subjective verdict. Any objective 'congruence' or 'match' is not possible, in that they never actually get a direct, 'unbiased' access to the original medium, already approaching it through the created frame. In other words, they are looking for a match with something which they themselves created; both the meaning patterns as well as the belief's and fact's 'name' which was constructed out of these patterns.

The moment they acknowledge that the label does not satisfactorily reflect the data, they realise that equivalence cannot be achieved, and the closest they can get to recovering the information is by 'renaming' the belief as false (in the example above it would be 'It is false that Moore has gone away'). In this way, the belief simultaneously turns into a target text, which renders the message contained in the medium as faithfully as possible (by communicating that, according to the subject's arbitrary judgement, its pattern cannot be in any way satisfyingly aligned with the structure of the medium).

Falsehood would then be the meaning added to the description of the agent's translative activity, an addition to the 'name', signalling merely that they did not decide to proclaim equivalence between the source and the target medium. For each translation process the exact semantic content of that addition would be different, as each such an attempt would involve different kind of rejection. The same can be said about the delineated frame of a 'false fact'– it would not be any kind of non-existent object, but a 'name' which now stands for a specific action. Conversely, attaching to the belief the notion of truth would mean that the individual decided to create a target structure which they deem equivalent to the source data. To shed more light on such a perspective, one might recall here Brender's analysis of the agent's movement in space and reflection that results from it. He highlights that through shifts in perception which can be understood as a form of translation, the

subject themselves enact meaning in the world, and it is only their 'symbolic conduct' that 'opens for the first time the question of truth and objectivity' (167).

Such reformulation has several advantages. It reveals the sense in which we are 'already familiar' with the relation of correspondence – the idea not only turns out to be one's own activity of unaware translation, but moreover, as in the Russellian model, it involves translation between structures conceived by the individual themselves. Furthermore, applying the translational framework, the two gaps left within Moore's theory become accounted for, and additionally, their explanation seems less ontologically committing; it does not call for further elaboration on the nature of entities such as properties, relations or non-existent facts.

Yet clearly, any such a solution does not come without a cost. It may be argued that clarifying the above aspects only replaced them with further controversies. The inevitable questions arise; how can one regard equivalence as dependent entirely on the subject's ordinance? Is not such an account strikingly unintuitive, with the concept of truth being employed almost at random? Does the creative process of translation not call precisely for explaining what would be the incentives that prompt certain choices rather than others? If the activity would be in the end a form of self-translation, how could one ever come to the assertion of falsehood? Does the model not become now entirely idealist? Is there indeed no access to the original medium?

These dilemmas lead directly to the third version of the theory developed by Austin, the analysis of which will possibly help to answer the above questions as well as address those that impair the model of correspondence as congruence in general.

Austin – recognition of arbitrariness

The essence of Austin's proposal was expounded in a surprisingly brief essay 'Truth', where he drafts a version of correspondence theory, aiming primarily to strip it off its most contentious claim – the structural resemblance between truth-makers and truth-bearers.

He develops the analysis upon a few crucial, far from unarguable assumptions. Echoing Russell, he states that to talk about truth there need to be at least two dimensions; a repository of symbols and the reality which they are to describe (Austin 4). And although he claims that the latter may include the former, at least to some degree they have to remain distinct, since the former is employed to carry meaning (6). Moreover, in order to be 'right or wrong' the symbolic medium not only may, but actually must be entirely artificial; natural signs or different forms of replications may only be to a various extent reliable or accurate, but it does not make sense to consider them as correct or incorrect (8). And the third particularly significant assumption was that the world has to be characterised by the existence of similarities – to which Austin immediately adds that at least 'we must observe' them. It remains ambiguous whether such a terse remark was a supplement or correction; it was perhaps partly to retreat from any strong ontological premises, and also to reinforce his approach which remained strongly focused on the individual.

It is this individual who upon acknowledging similarity between the observed patterns, divides them into types and accordingly, in the symbolic system which they use to describe the world, they also introduce certain regularities. This gives rise to what Austin calls 'descriptive conventions' – correlating 'sentences' with types of situations. But as he observes – in a footnote, though the comment seems crucial – whether an event can be classified under a given type of sentences is not 'a purely natural relation'. Therefore, the classification

requires the subject's judgement. When they decide that similarity is sufficient, they employ a general 'sentence' to refer to a particular state of affairs, making thereby a 'statement', whose meaning thereby becomes specific. This is how 'demonstrative conventions' arise; by combining 'statements' with particular ('historic') situations. In the end, a 'statement' is true when an event which is being referred to by a 'demonstrative convention' indeed belongs to a type which is ascribed to it by a 'descriptive convention' (9).

Such a definition allows one to notice a few key features from Austinian concept of truth. Entirely dependent on the established convention, truth would be an artificial construct just as the symbolic medium within which it is created. Secondly, its creation is not only subordinate to general conventions, but to the subject's choice at any moment the concept is evoked – a decision essentially arbitrary, since as Berdini points out, 'it is impossible to foresee all the possible circumstances which could lead us to modify or retract a sentence' (2.). And finally, as he also adds, together with falsehood the two notions do not constitute exclusive, binary opposites, but rather fall under the same category as adjectives like 'vague', 'concise' or 'exaggerated', which means that they 'come in degrees or dimensions' of their applicability to a given situation (11).

In this way, the inconvenient postulate of structural similarity is disposed of. But to quote Strawson, the theory raises at least just as many questions as it answers (1950), the most pressing of which are best summed up by Kirkham. 'What precisely are the conventions and how do they work? […] How exactly does a statement refer to a particular state of affairs? Can a statement fail to refer to any state of affairs? Can a declarative sentence fail to describe any type of state of affairs?' (127) He also asks whether a statement could be correlated with a situation which does not obtain (such as for instance an event of a round square standing on a mantel). Strawson enquires further as to how the theory would accommodate general statements, which do not seem to refer to any particular situation (1950).

So one may finally reflect – are there any rules that govern the subject's classification of an event under a given type? Is their choice indeed entirely arbitrary or can the process be somehow generalised? How does the subject single out what Austin interchangeably calls state of affairs, events and historic situations? Can the theory still hold if one forgoes the assumption that similarities are an inherent feature of the world?

Translational order within conventional chaos

The analyses of Russell and Moore should have already pointed to the line of reasoning which will now be assumed, with Austin's theory as presented above clearly revealing the underlying process of translation.

Austin's own example of a 'sentence' may serve as an illustration, considered only in a little less typical circumstances. Let it be assumed that an individual who sees a photograph, on the frame mat of which there is a small picture of a woman who appears haughty; a situation which they subsequently describe with words 'The cat is on the mat'. They then hold their statement to be true. What happens, is that there is an active agent equipped with one sort of medium – their consciousness, containing a certain repository of symbolic patterns, out of which they may form 'sentences'. Next, they approach another kind of medium intent on describing it, insofar as they have an expectation that it includes a piece of information to which some of the patterns will be applicable.

But like in the models above, the medium of external world as such is not in any way structured or imbued with meaning. No boundaries between 'events' are set, and more importantly, none of its fragments is

repeated or identical with any another. The chosen example of a woman on a frame demonstrates it distinctly; even if the situation in question involved an actual animal sitting on a piece of fabric, it would still remain entirely unique and inimitable. A potential similarity with any other fragment of the medium becomes imposed only by the subject, who searches for it, having in mind certain repeatable templates (the 'descriptive conventions'). Though unlike Russell and Moore, Austin avoids the notion of 'fact' and uses the term 'state of affairs', for him they both refer to particulars (Austin 1954), and he does not escape thereby the problem of how such an entity is singularised in the first place. And what seems quite certain, is that as in the case of previous analyses, it is thanks to the possessed patterns that the agent may distinguish 'states of affairs', 'events' or 'situations'.

Accessed then only through such a prism, the external medium becomes again a form of original, source text. In the act of describing the constructed 'state of affairs' and using the phrase 'The cat is on the mat' the subject will be carrying out the process of translating this general 'sentence' into a particular 'statement'. He or she will be changing its generality into specificity, filling its interpretative potential with concreteness. They will be making a number of subjective choices, settled in the end with a personal judgement. For instance they will deem it enough to possess the feature of haughtiness and independence in order to be called a 'cat'. Or they will consider it enough to use the word 'mat' instead of a more precise 'frame mat', referring to a decoration of the photograph. And perhaps both of these decisions will be made with a view to achieving a humorous effect and recovering thereby a certain comicality of the perceived situation. This is how the 'demonstrative convention' would work – by showing the way in which the subject interprets the template of 'sentence', translating it into particular circumstances.

The finally uttered 'statement' can be therefore understood as a target text. It becomes connected with its source by virtue of translational equivalence – the Austinian correspondence as correlation – the moment when the individual proclaims it to be true. It is this proclamation that the notion of truth would stand for, signifying a process of translating successfully completed. In accordance with what was pointed initially among the features of the process, its outcome remains largely unpredictable, which echoes Austin's own words: 'there are no limiting rules as to what we might or might not say' in given circumstances (1940). Similarly to the models analysed above, although the external reality is necessarily involved in the sense of truth (as the defenders of correspondence theories may insist), the precise content of what the notion describes is in no way determined by the external medium, dependant instead exclusively on the agent's choices. For the reality is accessed already as a certain construct, and so the process of establishing truth would still remain invariably a form of self-translation. Accordingly, the subject would consider a given 'statement' as false if they did not find the observed particulars includable in the generality of the 'sentence'. In this sense, falsehood would also signify the agent's process, this time deemed as not completed in a satisfactory way.

In one more respect the Austinian model reveals its translative character. It should be noticed that the 'conventions' which are decisive for constitution of truth cannot be created by a single individual. They emerge from a common cognitive effort of a larger community, which determines both what 'types' they would distinguish within their language, as well as which of their applications would be considered acceptable. The point resonates even further in the way Austin formulates his ultimate definition. Namely, a 'statement' '*is said* to be true' in specific circumstances (5, highlight of the author). Therefore, truth appears as a proclamation of validity of a given 'demonstrative convention' uttered or expressed by some group of individuals. This also

makes the concept akin to the practice of translation, which is usually performed not only for the translator himself, but from an original text existing within a source community into a product for a target audience, and it is largely the way it functions within both these groups and their agreement that permits to say that equivalence was achieved.

Finally, a question may be raised concerning the 'descriptive conventions': are they not formed prior to the 'demonstrative' ones? And if so, it may be objected that what 'sentences' stand for is not entirely arbitrary, that these conventions were determined not by individuals, but precisely by the types and similarities present within the external world. While it would be vastly inappropriate to try to present here a theory of how language was formed, since the problem clearly extends far beyond the scope of this study, it might still be argued that the relation between patterns originating in the mind and the perceptual material which they structure has always been reciprocal. A considerable number of studies emphasise that it seems rather misguided to try to point out what was precedent, with the mind and the object of its perception constituting a mutually sensitive unity. Russon writes that perception as 'apprehension of the truth of the world' is essentially a creative performance, consisting in reality's openness to the subject's activity (21), to their 'transformative contributions' (28). Conversely, Maclaren stresses how the institution of meaning in the world reciprocally changes also the subject themselves, precisely due to the creativeness of their perception, which ensures that whatever they establish always goes beyond their initial intentions (73). From such a perspective, the types and similarities on the basis of which 'descriptive conventions' were established would also be introduced by the subject, and moreover, as a result of carrying out a constant process of creative translation – if one recalls the definition of similarity quoted in the first chapter.

In this way, both conventions which for Austin determine truth and falsehood would be grounded in translation process, by virtue of which the unknowingly carved structures are turned into their consciously validated counterparts. The possible benefit of such a supplement to his theory is that it provides an explanation of the mechanism behind conventions, and with this being identified as a translative activity, the theory becomes more uniform – both in itself as well as in relation to the previously analysed accounts.

Now it also seems easier to address the questions posed by Strawson and Kirkham. The 'statement' not so much refers to a given state of affairs, but rather constitutes it; they are one and the same lens of the individual's perception. This also means that it cannot 'fail' to refer to any event, as it may potentially become a template for any chosen fragment of the medium. Whether it actually would, depends only on the agent's decree. Accordingly, a 'sentence' cannot fail to describe any type of situation, since such a description was the very reason for its creation by the individual. Generalisations or 'sentences' containing contradictions ('a round square standing on the mantel') cease to pose a problem, in that the individual conceives both of them as well as of the structure with which they are correlated.

Conclusion

On the face of it, the three analysed models differed in the way they explained the concept of truth; Russell viewed it as a relation of structural congruence between beliefs and facts, Moore insisted on beliefs and facts having the same 'name' which yielded between them a familiar sense of connection, and Austin understood truth as inclusion of specific situation under a relevant type determined by conventions. Yet each proposal

entailed similar theoretical obscurities. They necessitated postulating dubitable entities such as properties, relations, facts and beliefs, whose precise nature and origins were left without explanation (e.g. negative facts in Russell, acquaintance with correspondence relation in Moore, and the mechanism governing conventions in Austin). Each strived to present truth as a phenomenon independent of an individual and determined in large part by external reality, yet upon closer examination each account was implicitly dynamic and relied on the actions of the subject, so that in the end, truth turned out to be a variable outcome of their creativity, rather than a self-contained, unchangeable ideal emerging from outside of them.

Thus in the course of analysis, every model seemed to have been leading closer to acknowledging translation process as a ground for the concept of truth. Russell's view involved the strongest ontological commitment which called for reduction, and at the same time affirmed the presence of a dynamic 'order'. In Moore, the commitment was limited and the role of individual began to be more pronounced, in their mysterious, automatic familiarity with the relation of correspondence. And finally Austin argued for the notion to be partially tied to the conventions established by the subjects, noticing also the significance that a larger community played in shaping the meaning of truth.

In the end, the three accounts turned out to be underpinned by the same process of translation. It consisted in the agent's building a number of mental patterns, subconsciously projecting them upon the medium they interacted with, only to later consciously recover them, in the act of which they perceived accordance they ultimately called truth. Tying the notion with the idea of translation allowed one hopefully to present the theories as more coherent, and thereby also to impart translation itself with additional prominence.

Eventually, the study exposed an additional, paradoxical property of truth. It should namely be observed that when an outcome of creative process becomes labelled as 'translation', it signals that such a creation has a derivative character; that it is essentially imperfect, insofar as it necessarily differs from the original, constitutes its transformation which, since in the context of translation process any changes are undesirable, one might call distortion. So the notion of 'truth' would be inheriting all these features. Applying it, one would be indicating not the accuracy of one's description, but precisely the opposite – the fact that whatever receives the label is secondary, inaccurate, distorted. And as the study showed, with translation entailing such an unconscious involvement in the approached medium, evoking the concept of truth would testify to the detachment from reality, rather than its embracement.

Contrary to objections which might likely be raised, the recognised process did not yield the theories entirely relativist or idealist. Although the external reality does not determine either the form of mental phenomena or their expressions, to which the concept of truth would be ascribed, the outside medium does provide necessary material for the subject's creative manipulation. Through the agent's involvement in such manipulation they become partially constitutive of both the medium of their consciousness as well as that of external world. Together with blurring a boundary between them, the term 'truth' must necessarily lose a sense of independent objectivity one might seek in it. But the final section of the analysis pointed to a possible anchor which would save the notion from drifting onto directionless waters of relativism – it was the role of community recognised in the last model. Its significance clearly suggests that the subsequent perspective on truth which should be examined in terms of its translative foundation is the coherence theory – and this is the direction which the following study will now assume.

4. Translation in the Coherence Theories of Truth; A Bridge Spanning over Idealist Islands

No pleasure comes without a cost. On the one hand, the idea of coherence as a basis for a theory of truth continues to retain an irresistible appeal. Its nod towards the laws of logic coupled with recognising the importance of a wider community in the process of establishing truth seem to provide a highly promising recipe for a proper elaboration of the concept. Yet the beauty of models based on coherence remains in a constant, hardly escapable shadow – an accusation of idealism, of uprooting truth from its desired stable ground, namely some form of objective, external reality, and instead leaving it lost among airy mists of ever-changeable system of judgements. Must such a cost indeed always be paid?

The aim of the following section is to challenge the above conflict. By taking one more glance at two texts containing the first extended formulations of coherentism it will be pointed out that there is an element which they both have in common, and which helps to understand how their apparent idealism might be anchored, as the authors of the texts themselves argued. Expectedly, the element in question is translation process.

Additionally, both articulations are of course subject to multiple objections and their postulates are far from unambiguous. On the one hand, they are viewed as chief competitors of correspondence (cf. Young 2018, Woleński 1996). At the same time it has been argued that they implicitly take basic assumptions of correspondence for granted (Walker 1989). Moreover, their reliance on logic might carry a threat of circularity, and a specification of the system with which true propositions should cohere is also often a matter of dispute – to name but a few possible dilemmas. Therefore, it will be also shown how by accepting translation as a part of both theories, they can be made more consistent in themselves.

H. H. Joachim – idealism rooted in concreteness

Early traces of coherentism can be ascribed to the systems of German and British idealists, but the theory finds its extended formulation at the beginning of 20th century in *The Nature of Truth* by Harold Henry Joachim. It is towards his vision that Russell levelled what came to be considered standard objections against the coherentist approach. Although Joachim is classified as an exponent of late British idealism (Griffin 1.), both his metaphysical system and the account of truth built upon it are nuanced and resist a straightforward categorisation, hence his thought should be recalled with due precision.

The analysis opens with a criticism of the correspondence view. From the very beginning it is clear that Joachim recognises how essential is the role of the subject in the establishment of truth. He directs his criticism primarily towards the basic assumption of correspondence, namely the view that ‘experiencing makes no difference to the facts’ (Joachim 39). The mind which forms certain beliefs and the facts which it perceives cannot be considered two separate entities, as the advocates of correspondence would maintain. In the spirit of neo-Hegelian thought, he claims that the relation which binds these two elements is internal (it constitutes an intrinsic part of their nature, and any change within one of them necessitates a change in the other (Moore 1920)). ‘Experience, we have insisted, is a unity of two factors essentially inter-related and reciprocally involving each other for their being and their nature’. (Joachim 60) Therefore, much as the external medium

would be providing perceptual material for subjects, at the same time the subjects themselves would be its active architects. Consequently, 'Truth and Falsity do not attach to one of those factors in itself, if only for the reason that neither factor is, or can be, in itself.' (Joachim 61)

Such a perspective enables him supposedly to ward off an accusation of propounding subjective idealism. Solipsistic minds, 'self-contained and exclusive entities' are mere 'fictions'. What he was advocating, was precisely the opposite; a universe where each constituent is essentially bound with all others and whose nature remains highly attuned to everything that it is surrounded by (Joachim 62). He seemed to be suggesting that the existence of externality is as if inscribed in the very essence of each subject, and together they constituted an indissoluble whole. His vision would be therefore a form of absolute idealism, a characteristic inherited from the thought of Hegel.

A metaphysical landscape thus sketched bears directly on Joachim's model of truth, which is an attempt at reconciling what appears to be the exact opposites. It involves a specific merge between the individual and the universal, wherein the individual serves as a starting point and an anchor.

For an initial feature of truth as coherence Joachim chooses 'conceivability'. It is not to be understood as a possibility to visualise; it means rather to think logically, presenting to oneself many elements, neither part of which excludes the rest. In the interpretation of Griffin, this means that 'intrinsic properties of each part determine the intrinsic properties of all the others' (4.). These elements together constitute what Joachim calls a 'significant whole' (66).

The Joachimian holistic nature of truth meant that all its elements 'reciprocally involve one another' building up a meaning which was 'single' and 'concrete'. From the fact that the 'whole' was to be 'significant' one might infer that the character of elements themselves was composite, similarly to the entire system they constituted. If meaning was to be present, the system had to be multi-layered; its 'meaningfulness' could be interpreted as a potential for action, a cue that sparks a problem-solving process, inviting an attempt to single out the 'sense' and understand it. Hence the suggested multidimensionality – the 'sense' had to be a property laid upon a certain foundation.

The semanticity of the 'whole' entails its dynamism, inasmuch as the meaning had to be both initially applied to it, as well as later uncovered and understood. Joachim further writes that all its internal parts were constantly adjusting themselves to one another. Given this property of truth as a dynamic whole, it seems only natural that the philosopher also accepted various degrees of truthfulness; each element was as if a step on the way towards grasping the perfect entirety.

One should now ask what was the status of truth as a 'whole' with regard to the individual. The subsequent remarks reveal how Joachim imagined the combination between particularity and universality. Elements of the system were to be specific human judgements, each of which would be true to some degree. They would be made about and on the basis of experience. This experience was in Joachim's words 'self-fulling and self-fufilled' (76). It meant that the individual was constantly expanding their knowledge and organising it. They acquired new information and simultaneously reworked the incoming data, so that they could create a consistent unity. What Joachim kept emphasising though, was that he had in mind something more than logical consistency. He argued that reasonings of logic could remain consistent and valid, and yet at the same time not be true. Truth as he envisioned it was to be on the one hand rooted in and verified by the concrete perceptual

environment of the subject, and simultaneously, in a quasi-platonic manner, it was to participate in the overarching 'Ideal', which could be only one and all-embracing.

Finally, it should be also pinpointed what exact account would Joachim provide of the nature of entity to which the term 'true' would pertain. Disowning traditionally understood idealism, he says that 'systematic coherence is the Truth as a character of the Real (Joachim's capitalisation)' (69). In his criticism of the correspondence idea he categorically denied that individual experience and facts could be considered two separate phenomena. They were inseparably tied and mutually influenced by each other. (56) Consequently, truth would have to be extending to cover both the entirety of what was being experienced (the Real) as well as the experience itself, in its numerous particular occurrences, where it would manifest itself as true knowledge. Importantly, there was one more logically following property of such a bipolar unity. Although he rejected the notion of 'proposition' as anything more than an 'unreal abstraction' (37), he postulated that 'the truth, […], emerges in its perfect completeness as an individual meaning with an internal logical connectedness and articulation'. Hence 'its articulate connexion demands discursive expression as a system of judgements' (109). So ultimately the quality of trueness would be describing 'judgements' – 'ideal developments of facts in the medium of thought' (Joachim 1948, 262).

Joachim's model does possess a certain tempting appeal – it aspires to incorporate perhaps all the desired elements and accommodate all the intuitions one might have regarding truth. Yet is the model actually providing a satisfying explanation of how all these elements could be squared together?

Naturally, there is a set of standard objections raised against coherentism. Russell asked about the status of truth of propositions which seem to possess a determined truth value, yet nobody believes in either their truth or falsity (Russell 1907). He pointed also that a mere coherence with a set of propositions cannot guarantee the truth of a given judgement, since there may equally exist such a set for false statements (Russell 1907). The objection however has already been refuted; the theory does not demand coherence with any abstract system, but such that is actually believed (Young 2001). Russell then also observed that resting upon the notion of consistency, the theory seemed to be tacitly assuming the truth of the laws of logic (Russell 1912). Joachim's model appears to fend off the accusation as well. He insisted after all that the notion of 'conceivability' should involve more than logical consistency.

Russelian arguments were recently developed into a more menacing criticism by Walker, with a similar line of reasoning proposed earlier by Davidson (1986). Walker maintains that the theory leads either to regress or has to fall back on the notion of correspondence. Coherentists namely must hold that a certain set of judgements is believed. But this claim as such requires its own verification; if its truth consists in coherence with other beliefs, then one arrives at a regress. If in turn the claim is made true by facts, then the theory seems to be ultimately superseded by the idea of correspondence (Walker 1989). Joachim's unusual account of facts does not seem to be providing a straightforward answer to the objection, however it is difficult to see how his vision could avoid the regress.

Apart from such general criticism, one may formulate a number of specific objections against the Joachimian model. Optimistically, he claims that the degrees of truth which the subject would be apprehending through experience constituted parts of the 'Real', universal truth. But at the same time, he maintains that all individual experience is mediated by thought (Joachim 43), which seems to lead unavoidably to relativism. It is difficult to imagine universality of thus apprehended partial truths, if they were to be held in an individualised,

human thought. Moreover, if the ties that bind particular elements of the entire system were to rest upon something more than abstract rules of logic, grounded in the unity of rich, concrete experiential environment of the subject, would not the criterion of consistency be inevitably subjective? And what would be the actual nature of the relation between the concrete and the ideal ends of the truth-spectrum? This subjectivised thought was to be actively bound with facts, playing a crucial role in their constitution – how then these facts would become the basis for a system of knowledge developed and agreed upon by a wider community?

Furthermore, there is also a problem of expression. As Joachim himself admits, the goal of creating a common system of truth demands its articulation. Yet clearly, even if exact sciences expressed in universal, formal languages constituted a substantial part, still some of its elements would need to be formulated in natural languages. Is one allowed to dismiss the problem of linguistic differences among communities, in the face of which an agreement on certain truths would forever lack any objectively shared ground? This problem may be narrowed down even to the discourse remaining within the same language – is not the dilemma of interpretative discrepancies inherent in any communication threatening the way in which the system would be understood?

As regards the postulate of dynamism, one should finally enquire what was the movement that characterised the 'whole'. How exactly would the constant 'reciprocal adjustments' be carried out? How truth could be an ideal and at the same time subject to the process of such constant change?

Truth as translation from and into the 'Ideal'

Doubts expressed above were not intended to undermine the theory, but to point towards the way in which it might be more satisfyingly completed. Hopefully, the above reconstruction itself already turned the reader's thought to the concept of translation.

In the philosopher's view, truth is to be a concrete-universal, a dynamic and articulated system. As Joachim demands, individuals are bound with facts through an internal relation. That is how the Ideal – external reality in its universal shape – is rooted in particularity. There must be therefore an active subject, exposed to the data given in experience of facts. The data become for them a form of source text. This text however does not preserve its universality, just as for the translator, who approaches the original already through the lenses of their knowledge of the source language. Since whatever the subject apprehends 'is mediated by thought', the data immediately become reworked, in such a way that any information is subjectivised. Obtaining such a particularised source text (roots of the universal) becomes the first step of translation process. That is how the system is 'self-fulfilling', providing material for its own further transformation.

Subsequently, the person deepens their involvement in the apprehended data. Their consciousness allows them to realise particular nature of the acquired perceptions – since they may become aware of the role of their own thought in manipulating the information, its individuality may also become acknowledged. This means that they are able to change perspective; conceive of different features their perceptions might have, such that not necessarily remain in agreement with experience they themselves gained. So the data becomes problematised – the person gains an incentive to start making sense of them. And at this moment the process of 'reciprocal adjustments' may begin, which could be viewed precisely as a form of translation.

Why should the activity be considered translative? Upon recognising 'interpretative potential' of the data, the subject will be now attempting to universalise it. This means that, as in the process of translation, they

try to make the text understandable beyond themselves and accessible to others. They analyse a given instance of experience, identifying and separating those elements which might be proper exclusively to themselves, such as for example memories or personal associations. Similarly to what takes place within translation process, the practice must involve a number of choices regarding which aspects of experience would have to be rejected and which ones preserved. That is how one might explain Joachim's 'conceivability' – as imagining other perspectives, the array of which would be constantly growing together with the subject's development within the world. As modifying individual perceptions, so that they could be comprehensible, conceived of from other angles and consistent with them.

These are not the only translative elements of the model. Another one is an act of creation. Holding in their mind their own specific interpretation of the source text, the translator subsequently goes on to create the target one. By analogy, modifications with which the subject shapes the obtained data result in creating a new mental construct.

In both cases, the goal of creative process is to produce a message which would retain as much of the source experience as possible – so both the translator and the subject attempting to establish truth aim at reaching certain equivalence. Furthermore, the target construct has to be formed in such a medium as to be conveyable to other individuals ('truth demands discursive articulation'). Hence the target text of a cognising subject would assume a linguistic form, to be included in the continually expanding system of judgements. That is how the system becomes 'self-fulfilled'.

Again, in a translative manner, the person is making a series of decisions as to which of the available linguistic structures should be applied, in order to best reflect the perception they obtained. Much as the target text is intended as universally acknowledgeable, the choices themselves are essentially arbitrary, since they remain proper to what the subject personally considers as distinctive of a given experience.

On the basis of one original text an infinite number of translations can be made, and each one can be endlessly worked upon. In this sense one could understand dynamism of the Joachimian 'whole' – 'reciprocal adjustments' continue interminably, with an ever growing body of information acquired by the subject and multiplying perspectives with which the target structure should agree. Similarly, an endless number of new translations may be appearing to make the source text understandable for communities of people whose language, culture, level of awareness and worldview is still changing.

The translational framework allows perhaps also to clearly incorporate an interesting Joachimian postulate of 'meaningfulness'. In the section above, a question was posed regarding the significance of the system, the origins of its meaning and its impact on the absolute nature of truth. Indeed, significance implies complexity; it also seems to implicate the necessity to decipher, and together with it the relativism of understanding, which would necessarily occur in those parts of the system which were not formulated in formal languages. But such complexity and relativism need not affect the ideal nature of truth and its 'oneness', demanded by Joachim. If it is acknowledged that there is a process of translation taking place from the particular, individual experiences into the universal judgements making up the 'whole', then the bridge between both poles of the system would be translational equivalence. In such a case, truth as one end of the bridge might remain stable, with certain relativism pertaining to the status of equivalence. Relativism of this bridge would however be acceptable. Each of the countless acts of translation strives to return to the source in its own way, declaring validity of its own equivalence with the source, and thereby turns relativity into variety.

Let it be summarised what was gained by exposing an additional element in Joachim's theory. It allowed one to account for coexistence and mutual connection between the concrete and the ideal. It explained simultaneous completeness and dynamism of truth as a 'whole' and made it possible for the individuals to communicate with each other in the co-creation process. Truth as an ideal entirety was then constantly providing people with translational material, which they subjectivised (problematised), built significance around, and realised thereby its meaning potential. Then they remained in interminable process of reapplying their creation to newly gained experiences in further confrontation with reality as well as with target constructs of others. A possible burden of relativism was taken over by translational equivalence, which turned it into ever-legitimate creativity.

B. Blanshard – linking the nature of truth with its criterion

A more widely recognised version of coherence theory was proposed by Brand Blanshard in the second volume of *The Nature of Thought* (1939). The American philosopher proposed a model closely related to the Joachimian one. He was also influenced by the British idealism, so expectedly, his vision would inherit several key features found already in the previous account, such as the doctrine of internal relations or a merge between concreteness and universality. His articulation may appear still more convincing, thanks to systematicity of its exposition, its 'clarity, rigor and persuasiveness' (Fogelin 1967). Moreover, it includes an elaboration of an essential problem involved in the coherence project, which was absent from the Joachim's scheme, and which will possibly allow one to recognise even better the necessary links between coherentism and translation process – it is the question of coherence theory of justification, coherence as a test for truth.

Let us begin by outlining Blanshard's own view of coherence. With a disclaimer that no fully satisfactory account of the notion can be provided, he defines it in strongly logical and causal terms. A coherent system would be composed of strictly interdependent judgements, each of which entailed and was entailed by the remaining parts (Blanshard 264). They are not to be merely non-contradictory, but necessitated by one another. Such an ideal system would be identified with the universe as a whole – a certain Absolute – and with the totality of knowledge.

It is a challenge to specify exactly the ontological status of Blanshard's model; what remains certain however, is that he did not go as far as to postulate the substance of the world to be purely mental. Thought must have had its continuation in some sort of external reality. This transpires for instance in the importance he attached to causality as another argument in favour of coherence (Dimech 27). Illustrating how each fragment of the universe influences others, he argues that the slightest change in an individual's mind would have its bearing even on the most distant galaxies (Blanshard 293) – thus within the system there appeared to be a distinction into what was mental and what went beyond, providing the mind with objects of perception and experience. And as it will be shown, the distinction provides a valuable key to recognising a translational ground of his system.

Blanshard's subsequent strategy was to prove that coherence must be accepted as the ultimate criterion, because this idea was what all other methods of verification must in the end inevitably fall back on. Having dealt briefly with such insufficient tests as those appealing to authority or mystic insight, he focuses on validation through correspondence and self-evidence.

Correspondence, he claims, occurs between facts and judgements. Yet facts themselves consist in nothing but further judgements. For instance, when spotting a cardinal, one immediately and implicitly needs to grasp an idea of a bird, the notions of flight, song, animal kingdom, etc. What one may assume to be a 'brute fact' is in reality always 'mixed with theory' (Blanshard 228). Consequently, because the 'substance' of judgements and facts is no longer different, what holds between them should not be considered correspondence, but coherence.

His reasoning with regard to the criterion of self-evidence proceeds along similar lines. When referring to the axioms of mathematics and science he points that with time, they also very often turn out to be questionable. Moreover, it is impossible to accept them without 'leaving their meaning unanalysed', and going 'beyond them' to find their significance within a larger system (e.g. in order to assert that 2 + 2 = 4, one needs to understand the notions of number, equation, etc.). As for the laws of logic, their apparent self-evidence involves in fact an implicit reliance on the entire system within which they operate. Consequently, their validity appears to be resting on a more fundamental idea – that of coherence.

This is how the concept is defended as the ultimate criterion of truth. For Blashard, what necessarily follows is that the same notion must constitute also truth's nature. When asking about its essence, one may posit that this essence is something other than coherence, for instance correspondence with external reality – yet in such a case one would have to reject coherence as its final test, because from the fact that a given judgement might cohere with a system of beliefs it does not necessarily follow that this judgement in any way matches the external world (Blanshard 271-2). Echoing evidently his remarks on the criterion of truth, he also states that in order to identify the nature of truth with correspondence, one would have to deal with a thought and a fact as two separate entities, which could only then be compared and their similarity acknowledged. Since such separation is impossible, it seems unfounded to define their relation as correspondence.

Unquestioningly, the argument hinges on accepting coherence as the ultimate truth criterion. It has already been argued by Resher that Blanshard fails to take into account a possibility that coherence might be a good, but not absolutely reliable test of truth. What transpires even more clearly, is that both his choice of the criterion and its subsequent determination of the nature of truth remain, as Blanshard himself admits, a corollary of the way he characterises the relation between thought and reality. And this relation, although clearly idealist, turns out to be rather difficult to interpret precisely (Kirkham 111). So it is that element of his system which one should subject to scrutiny, in search of any further tacit assumptions.

Self translation from the subject into an object

Blanshard's description of how thoughts are connected with the external world is often replete with metaphor. He stresses that the primary objective of mental activity is to seek understanding, which makes this activity incessantly dynamic. It is aimed at 'building a bridge of intelligible relation from the continent of our knowledge to an island we wish to include in it' (261). Thought is further said to have 'two ends, one immanent and one transcendent' (262); the goal of any cognitive activity is for these two ends to coincide. The relation of thought to the world is that of a 'partial to complete fulfilment of a purpose', as consciousness is gradually 'identifying itself' (264) with reality. In that process it is like a seed, growing to break into a full flower.

In the end, Blanshard stresses that although this goal of complete identification and fulfilment is never achieved, it is not impossible, since nature has intelligible character. If thought and reality were indeed in the process of becoming one and the same, as if two merging substances, then just as reality would be imparting thought with content, the world itself would emerge as transformed by creative influence – a product of mental activity. By virtue of such transformation there would no longer be a subject-object distinction, with the dividing line between them melting away.

Now it is certainly difficult to resist the impression of similarity which the described process would bear to translation, understood analogously as it was in the case of Joachim. The subject seems to be carrying out a specific, inconscient self-translative act from a lower to a higher state of awareness.

In his model, Blanshard acknowledges that the data which the subject experiences are always already combined and transformed by their own judgement (Vol. I, 181). Such an individualised perception becomes an original text, a starting point for the translative activity. Then, in an attempt to understand and make sense of the data, the subject is drawing on a wider, already established system of knowledge trying to incorporate in it the newly acquired data, so that they gain validity. They are changing and adjusting the judgement, making decisions as to how its elements should be modified and which of them should be discarded as inconsistent with the system. As long as their final outcome is suited to the established rules, decisions made along the way remain arbitrary, in a sense of being specific for each person.

Next, in order to incorporate their perception in the system, the data have to assume a specific form – become formulated in one of the languages through which the system itself is expressed. So the person is again adjusting the judgement, choosing suitable equivalent terms in their repository of knowledge, making decisions determined only by how far they themselves consider the chosen structures to be accurately reflecting their original experience.

Furthermore, Blanshard wants to show the process as a gradual identification of thought with its object. Yet as it was pointed above, in his model there was still a distinction between the mental sphere and the external reality, about which the subject would be gaining knowledge. So it seems that the identification does not involve here actually becoming the system, as if blending with it – this would preclude 'approximating' stressed by Blanshard as characteristic of truth. Rather, it meant constructing a personal representation of the system. In this way, one could be dealing with two 'islands' and an attempt to bridge the gap between them. 'Approximation' meant creating a target text whose similarity to the original would always remain a matter of degree.

Here it is easy to see another translative feature of the process – a bridge built towards the system is analogical to translation equivalence. Being a matter of degree, it is never complete. Its reliability is ultimately determined and acknowledged by the individual; even though the judgement they hold is being adjusted to the external rules, what is subjected to change and the outcome of modification depends ultimately on a given person. The process aims to disclose the original which, interpreted through their lens, is proper and unique exclusively to themselves. So incorporation of a personal belief into the body of knowledge is, just as establishing equivalence, a fine interplay between the use of pregiven principles and creativity.

Blanshard himself notices that when articulated as such – in terms of a relation connecting two separate entities – his vision comes suspiciously close to the correspondence model (Blanshard 267). But the translational framework makes it possible to avoid the risk. When it is accepted that both the initial data (the original) and their ultimately reshaped version (the target text) are an outcome of the subject's creation, they remain within the

dimension of their own consciousness and as such, in accordance with Blanshard's intuition, they should be viewed as a form of personal evolution.

Blanshard's idea of truth was coherence understood as a bond which, through the relation of mutual entailment, cemented together a growing system of judgements. Now it turns out to be a dynamic, translative process through which individuals are developing, a mechanism they employ to creatively expand their comprehension of the world by increasing self-awareness and in constant attempt to render this comprehension accessible and acceptable by others. They are elevating their judgements from the subject-level of individual perceptions up to the point when they become more fully realised objects of thought, consistent with the systemic principles and therefore possible to be shared. Through increasing self-realisation, they are gradually objectifying themselves.

The translational framework allows one to address the primary objection levelled against the theory by Resher. If one interprets Blanshard's coherence as underpinned by translation process, it seems logical to maintain that the concept would have to be an infallible test for truth. If a judgement successfully proved to be coherent, it must be considered true – for it would have to pass through the process of translation as specified above. It means that it would be created on the basis of an original text – the data reliably acquired from the external reality and individualised by the subject – then later reformulated into a new language of the target text, in such a way as to agree with other theses of the system. And so its truth did not need to be questioned, with its concordance approved both by the individual person and the other creators of the system. The subject would naturally validate their own final judgement, and the rest of the community would also view it as legitimate (since it was produced by observing language principles of the system). Having such a double anchor, the truth of a given belief was successfully safeguarded.

When coherence is explained through the concept of translation, it seems inevitable to recognise it as constitutive of the nature of truth. It would not be merely a feature of judgement, but instead it would signify an act of producing it in a specific way. Truth is 'approximation' in a sense of articulating such a belief that via translational equivalence links the original reality of subjective experience with its target collective representation.

Conclusion

The authors of both accounts argued that the search for truth involved development of the individual. Using the term 'self-fulfillment' Joachim viewed it as a dialectic between the particular and the ideal, while Blanshard's 'self-realisation' was described more in terms of subject-object transition. Against appearances, both thinkers disavowed ontological idealism; the translational framework made it possible to explain how their models managed to defend themselves against this accusation.

Inscribing the translative element into the notion of coherence emphasised its processuality, with an outcome of establishing truth being a work in constant progress – just as in the case of producing a translated text. Next, similarly to the translator's task, unavoidable creativity involved in asserting truth could be recognised. At the same time, defining the initial experiential data as an original text allowed one to view it as a combination of what was externally given and an individual interpretation of it. Inclusion of externality – that which was given to the translator – though transformed inevitably by their personal perspective, enabled one to

anchor truth outside the individual, saving the intuitively desired stability of the notion, defending it against relativism. Furthermore, the concept of translation equivalence provided a possible explanation for how the concrete and the ideal, thought and reality were to be connected. Presenting this 'truth relation' as analogical to equivalence revealed its two desirable features – on the one hand, it was established by the individual, yet at the same time created for other subjects, to be approved by them and stay in accordance with commonly accepted principles.

In this way coherence implied in the notion of truth turns out to be essentially translative. However the theory which appears soon after coherentism focuses on the latter aspect – on how efficiently true beliefs allow one to function in the world. So it is this view on truth that will be now examined in terms of it potential translational background.

5. The Pragmatic Theory; Beliefs Translated into Action

Stating that the attitude to truth adopted by exponents of the pragmatic theory is tainted by a note of cynicism would not be perhaps an inconsiderable understatement. Much as it is grossly imprecise to subsume all the pragmatic accounts under one category, their authors indeed appear to be asking a question: 'what do I get from holding a given belief as true?'. By doing so, they go strongly against common intuitions which would prompt to regard truth as some form of an undisputable, unchangeable shape of reality, rather than a source of benefit to be discarded when proven inoperable. With their line of argument they also blow the coals under the fire of the most fundamental objection to the theory (called as such by Capps 5.2) – an accusation of anti-realism.

At the same time it cannot be denied that in providing their explanation for the concept they bring together a few crucial factors which seem to be playing a significant role in how truth is actually treated by both the scientific circles and the average members of society. Three such factors should be pointed out: an ongoing investigation into the sense of the term, transformative character of its reference and consent of a wider community as vital in establishing its meaning.

In the light of such a dilemma, there appears to be a need for softening the unsentimental, somewhat hard-headed overtone of pragmatism, so that its advantages could be more readily appreciated. The three aspects mentioned above already prefigure the existence of a promising mutual ground between the pragmatic take on truth and translation process. As in the case of the previous theories, this relation will be here exposed and defended. Enveloping pragmatism in the translational framework will help it shed its calculative, relativist image, and simultaneously at least to some extent deflect the blade of the 'fundamental objection'. Additionally, since its status with regard to other theories remains open to discussion, recognising the translational nature of pragmatic truth will provide one possible way in which this relation could be specified – namely, as similar in nature of the process it consists in.

While some elements of pragmatic tradition are carried on by several contemporary thinkers, their versions of the theory draw on ideas which appeared later (such as deflationism), and therefore might obscure the analysis. (cf. for example Rorty's notion of 'solidarity' 1991). That is why the study will focus on explanations proposed by two classical representatives of the theory: C. S. Peirce and W. James. First, because they are unquestionably considered as fathers of pragmatism, and second, since their contribution differs in many respects. So what may be thereby shown is that irrespective of how each account is nuanced, they invariably retain a translative character.

C.S. Peirce – the semiotic nucleus under the crust of science

Thanks to the foundation he laid for the field of semiotics, numerous attempts to combine translation with the thought of Peirce already have been made. His tendency to organise all phenomena on the basis of triads immediately brings to mind basic elements of translation process. One may for instance view the source text, the target text and its reader as participants in the Peircean 'signifying relation' or the activity of the translator as

following steps of abduction, deduction and induction (See e.g. Robinson (2016); Hartama-Heinonen (2008)). These studies hint that there should be meaningful analogies also between translation and Peirce' remarks on truth.

These remarks should be briefly gathered against the background of his wider philosophical system. Its grounds were clearly idealist and, as Burch observes, characterised by strong affinities with the thought of Kant and Hegel (Burch 2018:4). In Peirce's view, the world was a realm of appearances, which he called *phaneron*, and which consisted entirely of signs. Human consciousness, in its cognitive activity was constantly interpreting these signs, creating their mental representations. Simultaneously, in the act of interpretation consciousness itself was turning into a sign – this triggered an endless chain of reading and representing (Peirce *The Collected Papers*: 1.339).

On such an unstable, idealist foundation Peirce develops a surprisingly firm, scientific approach – also towards the concept of truth. According to his 'pragmaticism', the conception of a given object could be reduced to 'conceivably practical effects' which this conception might have. These practical effects were the conception's meaning (Peirce 1905:165). Out of such building blocks of meaning one could later construct beliefs. In order to confirm them and expand knowledge, one had to explore practical effects of experiments within the realm of experiential data (Peirce 1905:165), following the steps of what Peirce called the Scientific Method – a process of enquiry which consisted in formulating hypotheses, making generalisations on their basis and subsequent testing their validity. Beliefs confirmed in this way could be ultimately called true. Hence his idea of truth is often summarised as 'the end of enquiry'.

Peirce specifies his definition in 'How To Make Our Ideas Clear', combining semantics with ontology (Legg 5). He states that 'the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real' (Peirce 1878:15). In *The Collected Papers* he further adds that it is 'a character which attaches to an abstract proposition'; its 'concordance with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, which concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of the confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness, and this confession is an essential ingredient of truth' (Peirce *The Collected Papers*: 5.565). This concordance ultimately consisted in the strength in which the statement forced itself upon one's mind together with practical enquiry (ibidem: 5.566).

The Scientific Method as a translational workshop

Fragmentariness of Peircean reflections makes any attempt to arrange them into a decisively coherent whole a questionable venture. His mysterious remarks have provoked a number of critical voices. Among the most famous objections there are those formulated by Russell, who argued that one does not observe a tendency in the human history for beliefs to gradually converge into a unified theory (Russell 146). Field was among those who noticed that Peirce's vision excludes a possibility of arriving at a plurality of opinions, while such an outcome would seem quite likely, being essentially proper to human nature and not requiring any further agreement (Field 554). Quine noticed that it is possible to approximate numbers, but not theories, since in their case one cannot be 'nearer' a given limit than the other (Quine 23). And echoing the 'fundamental objection' mentioned above, Horwich expresses the obvious fear of relativism. Dependence upon the agreement of

community and evolving, personal beliefs of its members make 'truth' changeable, disprovable and hence forever unreliable – while for the majority the idea should be conveying a sense of ultimate, autonomous stability (Horwich 12).

In the face of such in interpretative riddle, the notion of translation is offering itself as one possible solution. Recognising its role is not an attempt to posit that there is an ultimate reading of his entire theory, but merely suggest that when viewed from at least one such angle, his vision presents a consistent picture. In that picture, objections recalled above seem to fade and it becomes easier to explain how the idealism of *phaneron* might underlay a world of reliable science.

External reality, the source of appearances, was providing people with their sense perceptions. It could be therefore considered as a source text. Each person is then a translator who approaches the original through the prism of their own understanding. Because the original consisted entirely of signs, its reception was naturally subjectivised in the act of interpretation. Beliefs formed in such a personalised way, if they were to be called 'true', had to be acknowledged as an intermittent stage, a work in progress towards obtaining an ideal representation of reality. With their cognition expanding thanks to employment of the Scientific Method, the individual would continually find their beliefs discordant with those held by others or with their own still newly acquired perceptions. Hence they would recognise a need to adjust them. Taking any such original claim as a basis, they would transform it into a target text – a new representation of reality – which might again undergo further transformations in an analogous way.

This activity has a translative character. The source text is formulated in the language of perceptions acquired from the external reality, modified by the individual's reading. The target text is to be formed in a different language – a medium which would be intersubjective and which could be shared with other community members. Construction of the target text was a process determined by a series of choices involved in applying individual creativity on the one hand, and responding to external requirements or expectations on the other. The subject first needs to decide how to articulate information about their experience of reality, and then what changes they would accept to introduce, in order to make the target text operable within a larger community.

The 'practical effects' of a given belief, the consideration of which according to the Peircean 'pragmaticism' accompanied the conception of every object, function as norms and conditions regulating the translator's creative process; every person who intends to coordinate their vision of the world with others is not free to hold it as originally conceived. Possible unwanted consequences of their belief, inconsistencies with opinions of others and obstacles in functioning within the world act as still new restrictions which the translator uses as criteria of adjustment. The finally created target text has to be a balance between what is preserved form the original and what is modified by the translator, to make the original content understood and accepted.

Another translative feature in the Peircean theory is the fact that the opinion agreed upon by the community does not mark the end of the process. Just as the translated text is not taken to be the ultimate rendering of the original and better solutions may always be suggested, together with the ongoing scientific enquiry every belief held as true remains subjectable to revisions. Moreover, similarly to discrepancies that occur between different target texts, changes which are introduced to scientific beliefs tend to be small and gradual, with a major breakthrough being rather a rarity. What is more, Peirce significantly stresses that a true belief is necessarily accompanied by 'confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness'. This brings it even closer to the target text, the latter being inevitably imperfect and offering only one of many possible readings of the original.

In this way, verification process can be regarded as constant translation of one's beliefs, in order to make them better suit the results of scientific enquiry. When the finally established opinion is viewed as a target text, elements of the Peircean definition fall into place. Truth as 'concordance with an ideal limit' becomes translation equivalence with the original – external reality – which the target text of its human representation forever strives to yet never actually achieves.

By supplementing the theory in such a way, several points may be gained. The unreliability objection seems to be losing its force. The changeable nature of truth should not be considered as its relativism, but rather as its inherent adaptability, with various translations remaining appropriate in the respective circumstances for which they were produced. In response to Russell and Field, translational workshop of the Scientific Method could acknowledge plurality of opinions or theories as its outcome. This would not expose the Method as unreliable. Even less so – if the source text is a dynamically evolving *phaneron* which not merely breeds multiple interpretations, but literally consists of interpretation itself, then applying different tools for its analysis and obtaining diverse results appears inevitable. The translational framework allows one to justify the Method employed on such mutable ground and legitimise variety of 'truths' it yields. And finally, the theory might perhaps defend itself against the accusation of antirealism. When *phaneron* is understood by analogy to a source text, even though it begets endless an process of signification, there should still remain faith in a certain primitive, mind-independent root which gives rise to interpretative chains – 'the original' – whose reading Peirce believed to be an ideal goal of science.

William James' propitious venture through the stream of experience

It is Jamesian comments on truth which came to be considered as exemplary slogans of pragmatism. Fame notwithstanding, their provocative and rebellious overtone can hardly pass unnoticed, and criticism they may ignite becomes all the more fierce upon exposing their notorious, mutual inconsistency. As in the case of Peirce, James theory seems to be rather a nebula of ideas, if not a signpost leading to plainly opposite directions (contradictions are pointed by Kirkham, Gale, Hu et al.). Again therefore, as it was done in the previous section, his statements will be gathered and set against a relevant background of his philosophy, not so much to forcefully synthesise them into a unified model, but perhaps to prove that using the concept of translation it is possible to draw within the nebula a line which reveals the shape of a logical constellation. And as it will turn out, the choice of metaphor is not coincidental.

Similarly to the Peircean account, James' theory of truth rests on a particular, astoundingly fluxional ontology. Its most crucial assumptions were drafted in *The Principles of Psychology* (1890) and *Essays on Radical Empiricism* (1912). For the purpose of the following study, what should be recalled is that James discarded any division into mental and material substance, claiming that the universe was built of a unity which he called 'pure experience'. It constituted the content of each individual consciousness, which was realising itself in the famous 'stream of thought', neither physical nor spiritual – the idea for which he was perhaps most distinctly remembered. One's mental activity was to be an incessant, interchangeable succession of moments when cognition rested in a certain state of contemplation and when it proceeded to another by following a thread of multiple relations: the 'substantive' and 'transitive parts' respectively (PP 120). These relations were to be experienced by the individual as directly as the contemplative moments and were themselves an inherent element

of the experience (ER 95-6). At the same time, James underscores the difficulty in grasping the real mechanics behind the 'transitive parts', stating that there is no name which could exhaustively describe the complexity of a process wherein the stream matched one state with another, only 'by an inward colouring of its own' (PP 121).

James' most significant remarks were included in the preface to *The Meaning of Truth* and can be roughly subsumed under two categories; those of descriptive and those of evaluative nature. As far as description goes, in tribute to the reverend correspondence tradition he states that truth is a property of certain ideas which 'means their agreement with reality'. In the light of James's ontology however, reality is not independent of the mind. The stream of 'pure experience' which linked consciousness with the world seemed to be exerting its influence bidirectionally, in that the individual was constantly structuring perceptual data according to the prompts given by their conceptual scheme ('We carve out groups of stars in the heavens, and call them constellations, and the stars patiently suffer us to do so […] We make an addition to some sensible reality, and that reality tolerates the addition.' (James 'Lecture 7')). Consequently, the belief might agree with reality in different ways, and the property of truth was not 'stagnant'. Instead, it 'happened to an idea' and was made jointly by events and human beings ('like health, wealth or strength'). What also clearly follows is that truth would be relative (as it 'varies with the standpoint who holds it'). Lastly, the human contribution to truth-making consisted not only in structuring the reality with which the belief was to correspond. The idea needed to be practically tested ('its verity is in fact an event, a process, the process namely of its verifying itself, its verification' (James 'Preface' to *The Meaning of Truth*)).

What may open the list of evaluative claims is James' strong insistence that whatever was labelled 'true' was 'one species of good'. True beliefs were leading people to other parts of their experience through transitions which should feel 'progressive, harmonious, satisfactory'. 'This function of agreeable leading' was precisely what James meant by an idea's verification (James 'Lecture 6'). Moreover, the degree of truth which a given belief might possess would be measured by its 'cash value', which meant how successfully it would allow one to 'ride' into further aspects of reality, and how useful an instrument of action it would prove to be in the course of this venture. Hence his account is often described as 'instrumentalism' (cf. Stanford 319). Kirkham distinguishes four senses in which an idea could be useful on James's view. It allowed one to properly manipulate physical objects around them, it facilitated communication with other people, it enabled to make accurate predictions and provided explanations for various phenomena (Kirkham 94). As a summary of these functions one might consider James's famous statement: '"The true" is only the expedient in the way of our thinking' (James *The Meaning of Truth*).

Russell demeaned such emphasis on utility as reducing the concept of truth to that which has good effects, and objected that it would be impossible to determine an overall practicality of a given belief – all its effects being infeasible to embrace or evaluate in the absence of any universal benchmark. Putnam however defends James, arguing that Russell's interpretation does not do justice to the theory. He argues that it is misguided to trivialise James' idea of truth as whatever makes one satisfied. Rather, for different types of claims there would be various kinds of expediency; in science for instance, satisfaction with a belief would be measured by how well it preserved the past discoveries, the degree of its simplicity and coherence with other claims (Putnam 8-10). Indeed, James says that for a satisfactory opinion to be formed, 'first and object must be findable in the world […] and second, the opinion must not contradict everything else of which one is aware' (James [in:] Hu 3.) Hence in conclusion to James' evaluative characteristic it must be observed that the philosopher seemed

to have intended one's judgement of truth as a balance between personal contentment and empirical basis together with logical consistency, where the latter two take in fact precedence.

Translation ensuring agreeable continuity

It appears in place to ask how truth of an opinion could consist in agreement with reality and at the same time be made by human beings. How to accept the fact that to any true belief there would be a necessary admixture of subjective satisfaction, as well as that its truth has an expiry date? And how truth could always be considered good, if there seem to be claims towards which one might remain indifferent? These are but a few concerns which the theory may raise, and several prominent commentators have naturally grappled with reconciling James' mutually exclusive postulates. Yet they usually address only selected aspects of the theory, and even if they analyse its entirety, then to the recognised dilemmas they propose different solutions (for instance Haack deals with the problem of correspondence (1984), Russell addresses the notion of usefulness, Chisholm defines the purpose of James' overall project (1992), Gale interprets each problem separately (1999), etc.). By contrast, here a single notion will be suggested as a way to accommodate the majority of conflicting claims.

A good initial premise which may prompt one to view James' idea of truth as grounded in translation is his emphasis on processuality of the concept ('verity is in fact a process'). As in the case of Peirce, a true belief is for James merely a starting point, an incentive for action and a material which will be subjected to further transformations. This event is defined as the belief's verification, which James in turn attempts to explain better by introducing a notion of 'agreeable leading'. So this notion turns out to be lying at the heart of his model of truth. The idea remains sketched rather vaguely and seems difficult to grasp in terms other than metaphorical. Arguably, it can be specified as consisting in a form of translation.

Any opinion which is a potential candidate for truth should be then considered a source text. As such, it constitutes an inextricable combination of data which the person receives externally and their own immediate reworking of it. This would remain in perfect accord with the basic postulate of James' ontology, by which there is no subject-object distinction, and only the flow of experience.

Let us take as an example a belief that 'In Westminster Abbey there is a tomb of king Henry III'. The individual forms such a belief on the basis of information gathered from history teachers, books, or the media. They hold it as a certain mental construct, which is a resultant of images they may have seen or words they have heard and their own visualisations of the place which they consequently created. The belief as the original text represents what was in James' theory called the 'substantive part'. When the person acknowledges the belief as true, they move further in the experiential stream.

In his analysis, this movement was regarded as the elusive 'transitive part', which may be explained as initiating a process of translation. The individual engages in practical actions: they may personally visit Westminster, notice a crowd gathering around it, prepare money for the ticket and in the end see the tomb with their own eyes. Each of these events would provide an example of how the belief became a useful instrument. Turning the opinion into a useful tool consisted therefore in changing it into events. This change is carried out in a translative manner.

Firstly, in this process the person makes a series of semi-determinate decisions regarding how the belief should be transformed (which place to visit, how it explains the crowd outside or whether the picture they had in mind matches the view they ultimately faced). They choose from a repository of available experiences, checking how they reflect the content of belief by enabling to perform successful actions; the decisions are largely free, yet they have to conform to the external conditions, as long as they are to yield a successful venture. Secondly, in the case of translation, when a new language is applied, on the surface the target medium is different, however essentially remains the same in the sense of still being an information carrying system. Similarly in James's vision, mental content becomes translated into events, yet both phenomena happen within uniform 'pure experience', constituting a fusion of the objective and the subjective.

Moreover, just as the target text is an effect of the translator's creative work with the original, it is up to a person how they interpret the belief and to what practical uses it inspires them – consequently, the target text of events initiated by the individual will be different for each person. Still more significantly, in both cases, whatever these practical effects turn out to be, the process is aimed at establishing a certain type of equivalence. For the translator it should be primarily the equivalence of meaning, with simultaneous preservation of the text's structure whenever it is possible. By analogy, the individual strives to achieve correspondence between what the belief means and how it works in practice, where the relation of sense is of primary importance, while the structural similarity desirable, yet secondary (as the example above shows, what influences the person's actions making them successful is the sense of opinion they hold, while the question to what extent the image which accompanies the belief copies reality remains less relevant).

In this way, James's idea of verification process as 'agreeable leading' would mean translation of judgements into their satisfying effects – establishing a relation of equivalence which links two 'substantive parts' of the experiential stream. A 'transitive' movement is performed translatively, in that it is driven and shaped by factors coming from both inside and outside of the individual. Translators are incentivised by the desire to externalise their 'reading' of the original text and at the same time confined to the resources available in the target language as well as norms imposed by the community for which they translate. In the same way the subject's action is motivated by their personal beliefs, yet must conform to the conditions imposed by the environment. Just as the translator's aim is to make the original understandable for a certain community, the translation process behind truth is aimed at making mental content of individuals operable within the world and manifest for other people, so that they have but some degree of insight into one another's minds – a passage opened by a bridge of equivalence, which always rests merely on a frail benefit of the doubt granted to the translator.

There is yet another highly significant property of the 'transitive part' involved in truth which it shares with translation, namely simultaneous reliance and dependence on the conceptual scheme. Creative material which the translator uses is the way they have come to understand and organise the indivisible totality of meaning offered by the target language. They remain under its unavoidable influence, since this semantic whole inspires and utterly determines their work. As noted above, James himself acknowledges that a similar phenomenon can be recognised in the individual's interaction with reality – hence also in the way they give rise to practical effects of their beliefs. The external world, though somehow removed from the person further in the experiential stream, is nevertheless to a certain extent also a product of the subject. They continually structure perceptual data according to the patterns prompted by their language. So they construct the target text of

practical consequences not only by initiating different events, but also in every arranging act of perception, turning a scattered randomness of stars into a meaningful order of constellations.

Now it also seems easier to account for James's postulate regarding the unfailing 'goodness' of truth. When viewed as consisting in translation, truth could be considered good in a way demonstrated above – it consists in a continuous strife to lift the veil of secrecy from the individuals' mind, even if there be facts towards which they remain indifferent. Moreover, 'goodness' can be understood in terms of translation quality; no matter how personally irrelevant the content of the source text may seem, the way in which it was turned into the target one is always subjected to the translator's evaluation, and may be deemed 'good' upon conclusion of the process. Accordingly, such a sense of evaluative attitude would also accompany each instance of 'truth making'.

Finally, translation process inherent in truth enables to explain and waive the burden of relativism to which the pragmatic theory seemed condemned. It came to be accepted that the choices made by the translator as to which rule to honour and when to enrich the target text with uniquely creative elements would vary for each transformation they carry out. Consequently, their works differ – and yet it does not preclude having a common concept as a name for all the instances of their activity. And so the same would apply to the pragmatic truth, if the idea is acknowledged as grounded in translation process. Furthermore, neither of the phenomena involves a completely unpredictable and hence utterly relativised action. If the translator wishes his work to be officially recognised as the target text, it is adherence to the norms and social expectations that has to take priority. A similar assumption can be found in James' theory, in the form of empirical anchor the role of which, as pointed above, was to prevent the belief from falling into total subjectivism.

Another aspect of pragmatic relativism was temporariness of truth (since it merely 'happens to an idea'). Again, this feature also seems easier to accept if one keeps the suggested framework in mind. Translations are made to serve specific communities at a specific point in time. It is natural that together with societies' development and transformation not only of their language, but also their general living conditions, target texts would gradually cease to be relatable and there would continue to arise a need for their actualisation. The new ones do not invalidate the old, but rather further contribute to exploring a full scope of the original meaning. The previous ones remain accurate in the circumstances for which they were produced. Transience of truth could be understood in the same way. Beliefs do not have to be considered unreliable merely in view of the prospect of losing the property of truth, and truth itself need not be deemed worthless. On the contrary, each such opinion, before it is updated, has a role of delivering one of numerous components which together fulfil the truth's ever growing capacity.

Ultimately, this is how on the firmament of James insight it is possible to delineate the constellation of truth theory which forms itself in the shape of source and target texts, linked with translation process in its still new manifestations.

Conclusion

The two thinkers laid different corner stones to the theory; Peirce elaborated the concept of enquiry in establishing truth, while James focused on practicality of holding true beliefs. Yet they both constructed their visions on comparably fluid, dispersive ontology ('phaneron' in the case of Peirce, and 'pure experience' for James), which coupled with a rather hard-headed approach to truth exposed their analyses to similar objections

(most grave of which would be conflict with intuition and relativism). Recognising translation at heart of their systems made it possible to reconcile incompatible postulates and took the edge off the pragmatic blade. It was demonstrated that true beliefs apprehended subjectively by the individual could be viewed as a source text, which was subsequently translated into a target text of actions – chains of interpretations, physically performed events, etc. The notion of satisfaction which disassociated true beliefs from reality was revisited as the one which accompanies translational equivalence, where a relative sense of aesthetic approval arises on the grounds of a properly performed, specific procedure, and which additionally remains regulated by the norms of a target community. Truth's finite lifespan was in turn re-understood as an enduring role that each act of translation plays in unearthing still new significance layers of the original for a continually changing audience in different places and times.

6. Deflationary Theories of Truth; Translation as Fulfilment of the 'Redundancy' Gap

The correspondence, coherence and pragmatic theories have contended with an arduous challenge of locating truth somewhere in the sphere of beliefs and the external world – each to a moderate degree of success. This struggle evidently brought on a sense of exhaustion, and together with it, a need to infuse the discussion with a fresh idea. Thus the subsequently developed truth accounts are marked by a decisive reversal of strategy, being as summative as perishingly radical.

Deflationists enter the stage in the middle of a lofty dialogue around a concept whose semantic content was presumed to be a golden fleece of philosophy. Yet the solution they offered pierced the balloon of pompous intuitions – they declared that the notion of truth does not in fact have any special, philosophical 'charge' beyond what it serves for in ordinary language. A caesura they thereby marked created a distinction between deflationist and inflationist approaches – by many considered as the most fundamental (see e.g. Boghossian 1990).

It may therefore seem that this entirely new approach taken by deflationists, so strongly reductionist and critical towards the foregoing proposals, severed also the translative foundation which had been exposed in the previous theories. The opposite however turns out to be the case. Even though the character and the main concept behind analyses drastically changes, they still testify to an inextricable link which binds truth with translation.

A key prompt can be recognised already in a formula which one may consider as common for many varieties of deflationism. Their central claim becomes one of possible versions of the schema which expresses equivalence between two statements – the first one to which the predicate 'true' is added, and the second which lacks the predicate. It should be therefore noted that in order to observe and later declare such an equivalence, it is necessary to carry out some sort of comparison and transformation between the two structures. Depending on the approach, the precise nature of this transformation will vary, yet it will invariably retain a translative nature, as it will be shown in the following sections.

Two different deflationist accounts of truth will be analysed: the Fregean remarks, since they are regarded as the origins of deflationism, and the paradigmatic study proposed by Ramsey, since it may be regarded as a standard formulation of the theory (it is considered as such e.g. by Kirkham 317 and 342). The aim of the entire section is to show how translation plays a crucial role within the models, regardless of their wider, general frame.

Fregean origins of deflationism

The first deflationist insight comes from perhaps one of the most eminent logicians and philosophers of language. Frege outlined his idea of truth in the seminal 'Thought: a Logical Enquiry' – the same paper in which he introduced a distinction into three dimensions of reality. The famous 'three realms' referred to the objects of external world, ideas of individual consciousness and universal, abstract 'thoughts', such as for example laws of mathematics. This ontological division provided a background for his attempt at characterising truth.

Dynamism inherent in the Fregean understanding of the notion is suggested already in his initial statement. Truth becomes described as 'the goal of logic', with science aimed at discerning laws of truth (Frege 1956:289). Similarly to the idea of nature then, the concept refers to a number of processes, a chain of recurrent yet unchangeable principles and regularities. These laws constitute the meaning of the word 'true' (ibid. 290). Moreover, because they must apply in an infinite number of different situations, it is impossible to provide any stable characteristics of the concept, which therefore becomes utterly 'unique and indefinable' (ibid. 291).

Foregoing an attempt to pinpoint any specific features, Frege nevertheless goes on to determine what the predicate 'true' would pertain to. As an adjective, it was to be applicable to a specific kind of sentences – those which express aforementioned 'thoughts'. With their exact character difficult to clarify, one might say that these entities had to be some form of abstract refraction of reality, a reflection created on its basis, which constituted the content of sentences. Most intuitively, among them there were theorems of science, but also those ideas which represented for individuals their experiential data (ibid. 292-3). They could be bearers of both truth and falsehood. Timeless and unchangeable, they were grasped by the individual mind in a unique process of 'apprehension', themselves still remaining unaffected by the subjectivity of consciousness. In an act of judgement the person might recognise a thought as true and express it by making a relevant assertion (ibid. 294).

It is at this point that deflationist intuition appears to be looming; adding the predicate 'true' to the thought recognised by the individual as unarguable seemed superfluous. When people formulate scientific axioms or speak of their personal sense impressions which they hold as incontestable, the adjective 'true' seems automatically and obviously attached to them. Hence Frege's insight: 'It is also worthy of notice that the sentence "I smell the scent of violets" has just the same content as the sentence "It is true that I smell the scent of violets". So it seems, then, that nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to it the property of truth' (ibid. 293).

But the remark comes early in the analysis and words which follow suggest that it does not entail emptiness or triviality of the concept of truth. Subsequent paragraphs paint a more complex picture.

To begin with, it is a very specific type of sentences which do not change content regardless of whether they are endowed with the predicate. Frege proceeds to listing a number of conditions which must be met, so that a sentence could express a true 'thought'. Such a sentence had to be affirmative, and each of its components had to have a reference ('Bedeutung' – an object in the world, to which it refers). Moreover, its meaning could not be dependent on an individual's opinion and had to be properly specified as a sentence in a logical sense. Time expressions should be explained, along with any other deictic words, so that they are clearly unequivocal. Only then may the sentence become a universal, timeless, intersubjective and nonrelative member of the 'third realm' (ibid. 293-8). Ascribable exclusively to such a complex entity, the adjective 'true' could hardly be taken as genuinely vacuous or irrelevant.

Furthermore, there is another way in which the concept of truth is used in Frege's analysis. In order to reconstruct it, one should recall several remarks from 'Sense and reference'. There Frege states that a 'Bedeutung' of a sentence consisted in its truth-value. So apart from the predicate mentioned above, truth was to be understood also as a form of object, possibly tied with or a part of external reality. When used in such sense, it was capitalised and together with 'Falsity' elevated to an ontological status (Frege 1892:28). This postulate would be clearly in line with the philosopher's initial presentation of the idea as a highly regarded notion, fundamental for both logic and science.

Derra points out that it remains a challenge to explain the exact relation between the supposedly empty predicate and the idealised object; he suggests to regarded them as belonging to different categories (Derra 265). Florescu argues in turn that the two roles are indeed connected, and the meaning of the adjective proves problematic precisely because of the truth-value postulate, which prompts to regard Frege's ultimate vision as everything but deflationary (Florescu 8, cf. also Heck and May 24-5). It is indeed possible to argue that there exists an element which links two proposed functions of the term, and which explains simultaneously how the idea could be both a term that is in a sense semantically empty and at the same time an object which remains a sublime goal of scientific enquiry.

Vacuity as a place of translation

Let the arguments sketched above be brought together. In Frege's model there is a sentence which is linked with the idea of truth twofold, by a relation which extends in two directions. One goes towards its sense – a thought which is endowed with the property of being true and which is signalled in the sentence as an empty predicate. The other goes towards reference – the external world where its object, the 'Truth' can be found.

In addition, as already hinted at the beginning of the previous section, the entire scheme appears dynamic. Frege writes that the thought 'acts' upon the subject 'by being apprehended and taken to be true' (Frege 1956:310). So it seems that when the individual grasps the thought, its property of truth needs to be first discerned. And as Frege emphasises, it is not a real property, for it does not carry any additional meaning – instead, it serves as a point of redirection, turning the subject's focus outside, towards the object 'Truth', on the basis of which the assertion of a true sentence could be made. Just as Frege intends, 'true' is not a genuine property or predicate; it stands for a transformation which the person has to make – from an initially received thought to the conception of its truth-value, i.e. to 'Truth' as an object.

In order to expose the translative nature of this transformation, further remarks from 'Sense and reference' should be recalled. Frege describes the transition in the following way: 'it is the striving for truth that drives us always to advance from the sense to the reference' (Frege 1892:28). And 'in every judgement, no matter how trivial, the step from the level of thought to the level of reference has already been taken' (ibid. 29).

The way he specifies his problematic idea of reference as truth-value contains another crucial hint. Many have criticised the postulate as entailing the existence of only two objects ('Truth' and 'Falsity') and that this suggests that all sentences may have only two such strange designates (most resonant objections were formulated by Dummet 1981). Yet the picture originally intended seems more refined. Frege stresses that he uses the two terms only for the sake of brevity. What he in fact means by truth-value of a sentence is 'the circumstance that it is true or false'. The word 'circumstance' is arguably more capacious and may signify an entire complex alignment between the meaning of sentence and a situation which is its truth-maker. In this way, the complex could remain constant in name ('Truth'), while the situation would be changing together with a thought which it was supposed to express. Consequently, such a reference would be indeed undefinable (since it was different for each thought) and at least in part constructed by the individual; firstly because it is they who decide which of the truth-values the sentence refers to, and secondly since it is also they who decide how to match the thought with a certain fragment of reality, by choosing and putting together elements belonging to the medium of external world.

The creative nature of Fregean 'Truth' would be further confirmed if one understands truth-values as ontologically abstract entities (as suggested by e.g. Church 1956); as such, they are likely to be a derivative product of the mind. Moreover, Frege himself describes very clearly the analytical procedure mentioned above: 'One might also say that judgments are distinctions of parts within truth values. Such distinction occurs by a return to the thought' (Frege 1892:30). He accepts that the process is unique and different for each thought: 'To every sense belonging to a truth value there would correspond its own manner of analysis' (ibid. 30). And finally, he also admits that 'distinguishing parts within the reference' is not a satisfyingly accurate phrase, because these parts do not determine the entire object as is the case for parts of sentences. So in the end 'a special term would need to be invented [to name the activity]' (ibid. 31).

In the light of these remarks, one is tempted to employ precisely the concept of translation and perceive the process indicated above as translative; on the basis of an original piece of information the subject will be constructing a new one in a different medium, with an intention of achieving equivalence between them.

First, the individual is confronted with a universally true thought, which can be understood as a source text. It is externally given and independent of a person, since thoughts were to be nonrelative and objective. Upon its apprehension, as Frege writes, the individual recognises that it is endowed with a 'property' of being 'true', which on the level of a sentence is indicated with an empty predicate. It does not contribute to the meaning of original thought, but instead, its discernment becomes an incentive to begin the process of analysis and translation. So the subject 'returns to the thought' and recognises its constitutive elements, deciding which of its characteristics determine the entire content most crucially. Then the term 'true' guides the subject's focus towards external reality, to affirm the thought by finding a correct reference.

This activity is in turn analogous to constructing a target text. Within the medium of their perceptions, the individual is looking for elements which can be said to correspond to the parts of original thought. The activity must be creative – since the new medium differs from the source one there can be no identity between them, and since elements found among the subject's perceptions, as Frege notes, do not determine the whole which they are to constitute, the way in which parts of thought necessitate one another. Therefore, as in the case of translation, it is only the person's decision process that resolves how the target object should be put together on the basis of their own analysis of the original. The ultimately obtained object is also their own construct, because in the end they have to assign it to one of the two truth values – and this means that the object will at least to some extent become abstract, with the ideas of 'Truth' and 'Falsity' belonging to the mental sphere and ascribed on the basis of the object's supposed connectedness with the abstract thought.

Naturally, any such connection is in fact illusory – the target reference only appears to match, since it is to a large extent the individual's own creation. In translational framework this last step is analogous to declaring equivalence between the original and its translation; equivalence is a final product of the translator's choices and to a major degree established on the basis of their subjective sense of satisfaction.

In conclusion, a seemingly redundant, 'deflationary' predicate 'true' functions here as a catalyst of translation process, from the source 'thought' to the construct of a target 'reference'. It cannot possess any constant meaning, with the activity being different in each case of a translative act. At the same time, in compliance with Frege's intention, the object 'Truth' remains a fleeting, sublime goal of sciences; it consists in their incessant struggle to construct an ideal reflection of the 'third realm', in which just as for a translator, their own creativity becomes at once a blessing of inspiration and a curse of unfaithfulness.

Frank Ramsey's redundancy theory

While Frege expressed only a preliminary deflationist idea, the work of Ramsey is commonly believed to be conveying its essence, often labelled as a redundancy theory. His text will be therefore analysed here as containing key deflationist features. Yet it must be noted that there is a clear paradox surrounding his account of truth. Although it is often quoted as a paradigmatic example of deflationism, anyone who comments on his analysis more extensively is compelled to admit that his legacy cannot be easily categorised, bearing unobvious relations to the previous theories (such as the correspondence one) as well as laying groundwork for the upcoming ones (such as the prosentential one, argued by e.g. Frápolli 2005)).

According to Kirkham, at the core of the redundancy project there is a postulate which states that whatever is expressed with the help of a truth predicate can be equally well conveyed without it (Kirkham 321). And it is precisely this basic claim, embraced by Ramsey, which will serve as a proof of translation taking place at the heart of his vision of truth.

The analysis remains naturally in harmony with his general philosophical project which, inspired by the teachings of Russell and Wittgenstein, may be described as purifying philosophical problems by stripping them of linguistic burden (e.g. he disposes of the distinctions into universals and particulars, denies existence of facts, etc. (MacBride 2005)). His thoughts on truth, laid out primarily in 'The Nature of Truth' (1929) and 'Facts and Propositions' (1927), are accordingly terse – he contends 'there is really no separate problem of truth, but merely a linguistic muddle' and 'anyone can see what [the meaning of truth] is and that difficulty only arises when we try to say what it is, because it is something which ordinary language is rather ill-adapted to express' (Ramsey 1929:9).

Initially, it is clarified what entities the predicate would be applied to. As a truth bearer Ramsey chooses a belief, which he understands as any mental state having an assertive force. He defines them pragmatically, not through their surface linguistic form, but through the prism of causes and effects, actions they would lead to. These provide content for a given belief, becoming its 'propositional reference' (ibid. 7).

As there are two ways in which propositions can be linguistically expressed, Ramsey divides his analysis in two parts, distinguishing two ways in which the term 'true' can be applied. His goal is to demonstrate that in each case the concept is essentially disposable. Firstly, the predicate may be added to propositions which are given explicitly, as in for example 'It is true that Ceasar was murdered'. In this case, a function of the term is to emphasise what is being said or reassert one's view. Such a statement can be equally well paraphrased into 'It is the fact that Ceasar was murdered' (Ramsey 1927:158). As Ramsey crucially observes, the notion is therefore possible to eliminate, which confirms its redundancy.

In the second case, the predicate is combined with a proposition which is given indirectly, through a description. Examples include statements like 'What he says is true', 'They are always right', etc. In such cases the function of the truth predicate is to make some sort of generalisations. While it may seem that it is impossible to convey them without using the term, Ramsey suggests that they may also in fact undergo a transformation which will yield their underlying structure – such that does not in the end include the concept of truth. That is why Kirkham suggests to subsume Ramsey's idea under the category of the so-called 'deep structure' project (Kirkham 20).

In order to see this underlying skeleton, one has to employ logical quantifiers and variables, and then the sentence 'He is always right' can be expressed as 'For all p, if he asserts p, then p' (Ramsey 1927:158). The first instance of the symbol 'p' represents a propositional reference of the belief, and the second refers to a set of relevant aspects in the objective reality. Ramsey argues that the transformation proves there is no substantive sense in the concept of truth, and it is applied only because ordinary language does not normally make use of logical tools. In the end, his definition of truth states: 'A belief is true if it is a belief that p, and p' (Ramsey 1929:9). He returns then clearly to the idea of correspondence – an outcome embraced by the philosopher himself (Ramsey 1929:11).

The truth predicate as an incentive for translation

Let it be demonstrated how the translational framework plays into Ramsey's deflationist treatment of truth: in each of the two cases distinguished above the term 'true' stands for the process of the same nature.

In the first situation, language users are to employ the predicate for emphatic or reasserting purposes. What happens then, as the theory appears to suggest, is that initially the individual is confronted with a sentence containing the term 'true', as in 'It is true that Ceasar was murdered'. This becomes for them a source text – the statement is a complex, in which the predicate signals the need for a specific kind of interpretation. Namely, the individual should create a corresponding structure, the sense of which presents itself to them more emphatically, and in the linguistic form of which the predicate is eliminated. They create a new sentence – a target text – using one of the phrases like 'It is the fact that…', 'It is really the case that…', 'Indeed…', etc.. Such a transformation should be regarded as translative firstly because, in accordance with the Jakobsonian typology, it is a kind of paraphrase, and thereby also a form of intralinguistic translation. Additionally, it is up to a person how they choose to paraphrase the original statement. As a new mental construct, the target text is their individual creation not only since it may be formulated in various ways, but also because when evoking the reference of the target structure the person draws on a link between language and their vision of reality: naturally, the nature of this link as well as their vision varies depending on the individual.

It is however in the second case when the translational ground of the theory comes to the surface more visibly. Ramsey claims that when the sentence described as true is not given explicitly, then each such usage is subjectable to a transformation into a logical formula which does not contain the predicate. Frápolli explicitly refers to the process as translation (Frápolli 7). The original statement is articulated in ordinary speech, which acts as the source language. In order to illustrate the meaning of the predicate, one needs to translate the sentence into a target language – richer than the source one, equipped with the logical apparatus. Labelling the process in this way is not merely a metaphorical turn of phrase, for the activity seems to be meeting the initially specified conditions to be classified as translative. The person confronts the original which is to be read and interpreted by them. Such interpretation is needed, because as one can see in the examples provided by Ramsey, the sentence does not always have to contain the word 'true' ('What he claims is right', 'All their statements are correct', etc.), and yet one needs to grasp how each of different formulations conveys the same idea of truth, triggering the same process. As in the case of a translator understanding the source text, such reading will be subject-specific, since every individual connects these original formulations with a differently construed concept, and they will later carry out the translating procedure in their own way.

Subsequently, the meaning of the notion becomes an incentive to create a new target structure. Again, similarly to the act of producing a translation, the activity is partially constrained by rules commonly agreed upon – to the extent that there is a specific way in which logical quantifiers and variables should be included. But at the same time, it contains an element of individual creativity, because the 'propositional reference' of the belief is then combined with 'objective factors' (a belief that *p*, and *p'*), which involve construing, evoking, referring by the person to a relevant aspect of reality – a process that is naturally individualised, an outcome of a number of choices they have made in their perceptive acts. Finally, one may also observe that since Ramsey accepts the correspondence ground of his analysis, translation plays here an analogous and equally substantial role as it had in the previously discussed correspondence accounts.

In this way, the concept turns out to be indeed in a sense 'empty', because it does not retain any particular, stable meaning. Instead, it prompts the agent to conduct a process of translation from the source construct formulated in natural language into a target medium, intersubjective thanks to its logical skeleton and creatively unique due to the contribution of the subjects' experiential reference to reality. Now, bringing also Frege's text into perspective, in deflationary theories the idea of redundance becomes in a sense a mental shortcut; the semantic 'emptiness' of truth is filled by the activity of language user tacitly transforming the sentence described as true into the way they would construe its reference.

Ramsey's treatment of truth, with his recognition of two languages as a key to understanding the concept, provides a convenient point of transition towards the last theory which will be examined – the semantic one. There, an extensively developed dual language distinction will be advocated as fundamental. Affirmation of this dichotomy will entail and ultimately prove how essential translation is to any attempt at illuminating the sense of truth.

7. The Semantic Theory; Truth as an Emergent Symbol of Translation

Now the foregoing study approaches its final point of interest, where the analysis turns out to have come a full circle. Intricate as its authors account of the relation would be, the semantic theory retains a strong link to the idea of correspondence. But the significance of choosing such a closure for the following research should be appreciated not only because it is this elaboration of the concept of truth that arches back to the momentous Aristotelian beginnings of the enquiry, and still not only because it attempts to straddle over both formal and natural languages, but since precisely in the texts which build up the semantic theory the bond between translation and truth is perhaps most convincingly proven as inextricable.

The bipolar nature of the theory – comprising the models proposed by Tarski and Davidson – continually invites new commentary, since its authors seem to be perpetually throwing between each other burning coals of vague concepts which bear relation to the physical reality, and which neither of them wishes to take for granted. In doing so, they attempt to elevate their analyses to the level of scientific validity; yet as a result, Tarski arguably drains his scheme of a potential relevance to the actual philosophical problems, and Davidson manages to achieve his goal to a highly questionable extent. As Malpas neatly concludes, Tarski relies on the concept of meaning to get to truth, while Davidson reverses the approach (Malpas 3.2). What remains undoubted, is that they both seem to fail to acknowledge the full extent of the role which the notion of translation plays in their models and they do not elaborate it sufficiently.

The most obvious premise which prompts to examine this role is the fact that both philosophers employ the notions of two languages and a transformation from one into the other as a necessary step in defining truth. Hence the goal of the following section will be to highlight the importance of translation in their works. First the study will concentrate on the theory proposed by Tarski, whose main focus were formal languages, and later on Davidson, who attempted to develop his scheme so that it could accommodate also the natural language. Due to the large scope of both programmes, the study will be narrowed down only to those points which encapsulate translation process. Although acknowledging translation as part of their projects goes directly against the philosophers' intentions, what will be hopefully shown is that at least several of the major objections to the theories could thereby be countered. The translational element will be also offered as a clarification of how the semantic theory relates to its competitors; how despite evolving in different directions, they all invariably retain the same translational core.

A technical skeleton provided by Tarski

Remaining under the influence of logical positivism and in accordance with the physicalist doctrine, Tarski's wider intention was to purify the field of semantics by granting it the status of science. Unspecificity of sematic concepts – and among them also the notion of truth – would consist in the fact that they involved a relation between expressions and objects in the world (Tarski 17). The goal was however to be able to purify them of abstractness and explain in terms of logic, mathematics and physical sciences.

Already at the outset of the analysis contained in *The Concept of Truth for Formalised Languages* (1933) Tarski admits that his aim is to elaborate the idea behind the classical conception of truth, so that of correspondence (Tarski 153). His intention was also to avoid the famous liar paradox, which seems to be showing that certain cases of assigning truth value to sentences lead to contradiction. He further observes that it is impossible to construct a proper definition of truth for the natural language, due to its essential universality and semantic inexhaustibility. It can be infinitely expanded by addition of new meanings and it is impossible to determine whether its sentences are properly formed (Tarski 164). Thus he proceeds to develop a definition for a narrower, embraceable kind of language, taking the calculus of classes as an example.

In essence, considering truth as a property of sentences, his idea is that to be able to define a true statement for what he calls an object language, one has to apply a language of a higher order – the so-called metalanguage. The latter would contain the former, and additionally, it would be equipped with a set of theoretical, 'structural-descriptive' expressions used to describe the object language, among which there would be a predicate of truth (Tarski 172). It is with the help of these that a general definition of a true sentence could be articulated. And so, he first poses what he named a material adequacy condition (also referred to as 'Convention T'), in which he provides a definition for an elementary, primitive sentence x: 'x' is true if and only if x (where the enquoted symbol stands for belonging to the object language, and disquoted to the meta- one). The formula is later developed recursively by specifying rules of how the more complex sentences could be built from the elementary ones and how their truth or falsity depends on truth-values of their constituents (Tarski 189).

But Convention T was merely a criterion of adequacy. The definition itself became ultimately formulated through the notion of satisfaction in the following way: a true sentence is the one which is satisfied by an infinite sequence of classes (Tarski 195). 'Satisfying' could be understood as a process in which to a given sentence one assigns a series of appropriate objects, classes of individuals in a particular universe. Specifically, in Tarski's words, an object satisfies a sentence if it possesses a property expressed by the predicate. It is then apparent that satisfaction itself becomes a semantic term, since it relates sentences to elements in the world. In the end, it can be said that the definition assumes a form of template – a universal formula which, if applied to particular sentences, yields their truth value.

Finally, a point which must be underscored is that the outcome of his analysis remains valid not only for the formalised languages; Tarski notes that if his definition is applied to the natural language, one obtains a 'fragmentary definition', under which a smaller or greater number of sentences may be subsumed (Tarski 164).

The definition of truth as a symbol of translative change

As before, the analysis shall open with consideration of perhaps the most serious problems involved in the proposed model. The Tarskian legacy seems to prove that when assuming the goal of defining truth, a certain degree of give and take is unavoidable. There is naturally an objection of relativism, since on Tarski's view truth can be defined only for a particular language, with the construction of an all-embracing metalanguage being an impossible task. What follows, is that his analysis does not seem to be providing any universal meaning of truth or such that could be considered translinguistic. As Blackburn concludes, the definition is rather unhelpful if one was interested in the nature of truth as a general concept (Blackburn 1984: 266-7). Moreover, there is also a

spectre of vacuity, which Kirkham views as the most menacing for the theory. He points out that a potential weakness of Tarski's idea is its neutrality, in that it does not contradict its rivals (Kirkham 182). Put even more bluntly by Walker, if one interprets Tarskian scheme as ontologically neutral, he does not have a theory of truth at all (Walker 1989: 23-5).

And finally yet most significantly, there were objections against the crucial notion of satisfaction. Some suggested that the definition of the concept falls into a vicious circle, as it presupposes the idea of truth (an object satisfies an open sentence when its substitution yields a true sentence (Ziemińska 2014)). Notably, Field argued that in contrast to what was assumed in his initial program, Tarski did not in fact manage to reduce all semantic concepts in his theory to a physicalist basis, in particular the concept of satisfaction. He points out that in the proposed definition, equivalence between the sentences in the object and the metalanguage is merely extensional (equality based on their reference). While in order to obtain a definition correct in all possible worlds one would require a stronger, intensional equivalence (equality of the principle according to which the sentences come to refer to the same thing (Field 1972: 83).

In this section Field's idea will be further developed. It will be argued that translation – an unavoidably semantic concept itself – constitutes an inherent and irreducible kernel in his theory. Its presence does run counter to Tarski's principal goal and acknowledging it is not intended as a remedy to the above objections, yet when the concept becomes incorporated, their force indeed seems to be weakened.

Translation process manifests itself in the Tarskian model essentially on two levels, each time involving a similar activity.

Firstly, it is impossible not to recognise its role the moment when, with Tarski's explicit assent, the definition of truth becomes applied to the natural language. As he explains, this is when one obtains a 'fragmentary definition', such a formula as for example '*Schnee ist weiss* if and only if snow is white'. Quite obviously, in order to establish equivalence between these sentences, one has to translate the one formulated in the object language into the meta-one. The fact that the process has to take place is rather uncontroversial when the two languages are different.

Yet arguably, a similar activity has to be carried out also when both statements are expressed in the same language and, just as Tarski demanded, the metalanguage contains the object one. It should be observed that when the definition takes such a form as '*Snow is white* if and only if snow is white', the two sentences are not in fact the same and establishing equivalence does not consist in mere disquotation. Since the meaning of a given sentence is always to a certain degree influenced by the totality of semantic content comprised in the language in which it is formulated, when the language becomes enriched, the change in its overall semantic structure affects also the meaning of particular lexical items. With the metalanguage being stronger, the sense of phrases expressed in it would be different.

Richness is not the only factor which makes the two languages dissimilar. Following the Tarskian rules, for the individual who approaches the definition whatever is articulated in the object language should represent purely linguistic items – a certain abstract, linguistic entity. In contrast, what appears at the right-hand side of the formula should be considered as an entity referring to an actual state of affairs. Consequently, the ways in which the subject conceives the sense of the two sentences diverge – their understanding of the latter incorporates also the way they construe a relation between the given phrase and its corresponding fragment of reality. It must be

highlighted that the conceptions of statements in the object and the metalanguage are both certain mental constructs. Nevertheless, such mental constructs which would essentially always differ.

Summing up, a sentence on the left-hand side of the formula should be regarded as the original, and the other one as the target text. The individual translates the former into the latter, and the moment they ascertain correspondence between them, they validate their equivalence and acknowledge the initial sentence as true – a condition which is expressed by the logical functor 'iff'. It must be underscored that on this view, for translation to be taking place within the Tarskian formula there need not be any actual ontological commitment. The entire scheme is speculative, with transformation taking place on an abstract level. This is further confirmed by the fact that the definition has a conditional form; a reference to reality which it implies remains only potential.

So when the natural language is involved, the necessity of carrying out translation seems hardly questionable. Moreover, it consists in the process analogous to the one identified within models belonging to the correspondence theory. The subject is initially faced with an externally provided source text that is a 'truth candidate', which they construe in an individual way. Subsequently, on such a basis they create its equivalent, a target text that is a new mental representation of its meaning. The activity is partly constrained by a number of rules, inasmuch as the person is not free in the way they correlate meanings in the two languages, and the extension with which metalanguage is strengthened is pre-established. At the same time, the target text becomes also partly relativised to individual, since it involves their personal construal of the potential link between language and reality.

In this way, the entire 'fragmentary definition' becomes an explicitly formulated symbol of translation process – form the representation of language as language into the representation of language as a reference to reality.

Turning now to the intended area of application for Tarski's idea – the formal languages – a nonnegligible presence of translation in the proposed formula has already been pointed out (cf. e.g. Kirkham 1995, Milne 1997, Raatikainen 2008). It is however possible to argue that the process would be analogous to the one identified in the case of natural language, with the above arguments retaining their essential validity.

Translation is taking place in every instance of a T-schema. It starts with the individual approaching a given formula, that is the original. Even though the symbols are provided externally, they are subjected to the person's specific interpretation. Clearly, this interpretation would not be as free and diversified as it was the case with sentences belonging to the natural language. But it would still vary, since the meaning of symbols is acquired empirically, and this experiential process never runs along the same track.

With this initial conception of the source text in mind, the person proceeds to constructing the target one. Again, the activity is partially constrained by specific rules – as Tarski demanded, the metalanguage had to contain the object one, so the symbols on the right-hand side of the schema would remain the same. But with the language in which they were expressed being extended, their sense would also change. Now this sense would be a part of a wider horizon of abstraction, covering the individual's construal of language together with the frame of its description. Such a process of shift between two levels of symbolism would remain subjectivised, in that the acquired meaning of symbols and their mutual correlation always up to a degree remains person-specific.

All these translative acts inherent in the formulations of T-schema become ultimately summarised in the proper definition of truth, which becomes their universalised expression.

It is in the concept of satisfaction that multiple translative processes are implied. The definition states that the truth of a sentence can be realised when the sentence is satisfied by an infinite sequence of classes (with a given entity satisfying a sentence as long as it possesses the property expressed by the predicate). So the definition communicates in fact that truth is an endless process. In order to actualise it, one will be carrying out acts of substitution by choosing objects which they would consider as evincing the relevant property. So they will be translating the original – a sentence made 'open' by variables – creating a potentially infinite amount of particular, target ones. Thereby, creation of these target texts will be endlessly exploring the vacuity of variables in the formula, deriving still anew from the semantic potential of the original. The totality of these translative acts would constitute and exhaust the sentence' truth. This totality however, just as the translator's goal of reaching perfect equivalence, remains forever pursued yet never fully achieved.

If one accepts translation as an ineradicable semantic concept at the heart of Tarski's definition, what may be said in answer to the objections recalled above? Yes, truth becomes relativised to a given language, just as the nature of translational equivalence is relative to particular instances of the translator's work. But this does not invalidate such equivalences, and neither does this undermine truth. Just like reflections of the original, the plurality of definitions obtained from Tarski's formula are not mutually exclusive, but instead they testify to the concept's infinite semantic depth. As regards the notion of satisfaction, now it does not seems to be pushing the theory into a damning regress. If satisfaction consists essentially in the process of translating, then a given entity satisfies a sentence not when its substitution yields a true sentence (which would lead to circularity), but when the appropriateness of its substitution is approved by the translating subject, according to their chosen set of criteria (which leaves the choice open and individual-dependent). Finally and perhaps most crucially, the theory should not be viewed as vacuous. Admittedly, it does not disprove its competitors. But instead, it further bears out the translational foundation of truth. And it does so not only by sharing ground with other accounts of truth. In presenting his ultimate idea – the definition which yields infinite T-schemas, Tarski appears to have given an explicit articulation for truth as conditioned by the transformation carried out along the lines of Convention T – so for truth as being realised by translation process, for which a collective infinity of T-schemas becomes a universal symbol.

Davidson's appropriation of Tarski

It is in the insight of Davidson that the study arrives at its tipping point. With Tarski's formula as a formal affirmation of the link between translation and truth, if it turned out to be possible to graft his scheme onto the natural language as well, the translative foundation of the concept in its full philosophical depth would be ultimately proven. And it was precisely Davidson who recognised and extensively explored the applicability of Tarskian theory to the natural languages. He was also the one who openly acknowledged that Tarski assumed the notion of translation as primitive in order to explicate truth (Davidson 1973: 134). Yet at the same time, in his own analysis Davidson claims to have escaped this burdensome assumption, discarding the idea of translation and instead resting his theory on a broader term, namely interpretation. Thus the goal of the following part would be to revisit Davidson's analysis, demonstrating that his escape was merely apparent, and the theory needs to reclaim its translative core, thereby putting a seal on a the bond between translation and truth.

When intending to place the Davidsonian account in a broader context, it must be first observed that he differed from Tarski in terms of his initial objective. Davidson's aim was to propose not a theory of truth, but that of meaning. And since he considered them as fundamentally connected, in the end he constructed a combination of both; a mechanism generating the meaning propelled by the clogs of the Tarskian formula.

Davidson envisions the process of recreating from scratch an entire semantic structure of a potential language. His project straddles two approaches, semantic holism and semantic compositionality – the significance of a sentence depended for him both on its internal lexical components as well as on the meaning of all other sentences in that language. The analysis was supposed to enable a person to understand this meaning by offering a relevant formula. Additionally, the theory would be supplemented with a finite set of axioms, each for specifying semantic properties of every predicate in the language (although no actual example of such an axiom is actually provided) (Davidson 1973: 70).

But in the formula which was to generate meaning there lurked a threat of a vicious regress, and this is why Davidson turns to the concept of truth. In any instance of such a precept as 'S means p' the term itself had to be removed, so Davidson decides to replace the notion of meaning with truth conditions. Drawing on Tarski's idea, he suggests that the recipe should have in fact the same form as T-schema – 'S is true if and only if p'. In this way, he employs the concept of truth as primitive. He considers the idea of truth to be essentially undefinable, yet at the same time more intuitively graspable than that of meaning. Such an appeal to intuition clearly suggests that he understands truth in classical terms of correspondence. This in turn would be implicating him in assumptions just as problematic as those identified in other correspondence theories – a necessity which Davidson openly acknowledges (Davidson 1973: 134).

Accepting this supposedly undefinable kernel at the heart of his theory, he still realises that applying the formula for the natural language, with an unlimited intricacy of its semantic mechanisms, requires a considerable refinement. Therefore, he suggests that meaning should be analysed as a relation between a specific sentence, person and time. Hence the formula becomes modified to take these factors into account, and assumes the form 'Sentence *s* is true for speaker *u* at time *t* if and only if *p*' (Davidson 1969: 45). Thereby, the semantic relativity of statements from natural language becomes taken into account, and the sentence on the left-hand side of the conditional ceases to be a simple repetition of the one in the object language. Instead, as Kirkham explains, it is much more 'self-conscious' (Kirkham 235), inasmuch as it becomes now a meta-recognition of an initial sentence as a linguistic act. Most importantly, *p* now consists in a form of instruction how to recognise the reference of *s*. Attempting to avoid an appeal to another semantic concept, Davidson calls this instruction a way of 'demonstrating'; a term which in his view belonged to the category of pragmatics.

Each instance of applying the revised formula would constitute a step on the way of reconstructing an entire semantic spectrum of the language under analysis. Nevertheless, there still remained a problem of relativity inscribed in the above scheme, with a sentence being true *for* a given person at a given time. Moreover, each such ascription of meaning was in fact merely a hypothesis. That is why Davidson intended to entrench the technical core of his account within a larger theory concerned with how beliefs of others should be understood. To grant every such hypothesis a certain degree of validity, he maintained that a person should assume that speakers of other languages hold as true essentially the same as what the person would believe to be true themselves, according to a rule he called 'a principle of charity'. This conjecture was entirely radical, in a sense

of not being aided by any prior knowledge either of the language in question or the actual content of the speakers' beliefs.

Here Davidson derives from the work of Quine, who described a similar process of establishing the language meaning, and which he regarded as 'radical translation'. Inheriting Quine's famous claim, the Davidsonian venture is analogously 'indeterminate', in that there are many ways in which an entire semantics of a language can be 'understood', each of them equally plausible and coherent with empirical data on the basis of which the research was performed. With the Quinean legacy as a fundament, Davidson's theory becomes anchored in a project which is originally translative. Yet Davidson knowingly dispenses with the idea of translation, considering it a concept too narrow, and replaces it with a supposedly broader term 'interpretation', more suited to describe the scope of his analysis. His explicitly formulated goal was to embed the theory of truth in a larger one, such 'that includes the decision theory itself' (Davidson 1996:17). This crucial manoeuvre will be discussed more extensively in the following section, yet already now its significance must be pointed.

Ultimately, the theory describes a continuous interpretative endeavour involved in understanding a given language. By successive applications of the revised T-schema one would be gradually building its semantic structure, making hypothetical ascriptions of meaning to utterances of the speakers, whose validity would then be constantly verified against the speakers' behaviour and empirical data, remaining subjected to continual adjustments and corrections. The completion of the project, although providing a sufficiently operable account of language meaning, could not mark a definite closure to the process, since the proposed interpretation could always be contested by a new one, just as accurate.

Translation manual revisited

Davidson's analysis itself, with its Tarskian and Quinean affiliations, can be thought to invite re-examination in terms of its link with translation process convincingly enough. But the unobvious and undeniable connections were pointed also in critical response to the project, which should therefore be now briefly recalled.

A concern which arises perhaps most readily is that even with the formula amended as above, the theory is not able to provide axioms which would embrace infinitely complex properties of natural language, let alone explain how exactly these axioms would describe them. This point was taken up among others by Harman, who argued that the theorems postulated by Davidson are to be describing semantic properties of sentence components, yet the nature of these properties is in no way specified (Harman 1974). So Hartman seems to be materialising the threat which looms unavoidably over the accounts that appeal to correspondence. For these properties would have to involve some sort of relation of reference to reality, while Davidson concludes that what it is to refer to an object 'will not be analysed' (Davidson 1977: 213).

Another difficulty is connected with sentences which contain ambiguous terms or those whose surface grammar does not correspond with their deep structure. They would require background knowledge and experience to be properly interpreted, factors which are arguably impossible to contain in universalised theorems (see e.g. Parsons 1973). An analogous problem would concern terms whose meaning proved controversial, e.g. those belonging to the field of ethics (Kirkham 242).

Soams in turn contends that the project might not be sufficiently well-argued. If one takes the notion of truth for granted, then even if the speaker new all instances of T-schema, this would not necessarily give them any insight into meanings of sentences included in them. (Soams 1984: 413).

Yet the most extensive criticism was developed by Dummett. He not only suggested that Davidsonian holism precludes a possibility of gradual language learning, but most importantly, he argued his theory was precisely what Davidson did not mean it to be when he disowned the term 'translation'. Dummett claimed that the project was reducible to a mere 'translation manual' – a procedure which would enable to translate one language into another, without actually understanding any of them. While in order to explain the phenomenon of meaning, first an account of understanding had to be provided (Dummett 1975).

In view of the above, a key question arises – does Davidson manage to rise above the notion of translation in his theory? And if so, does it actually refine or cripple his account?

Dummett's argument does not appear to be sufficiently well-founded, in a sense that it was precisely the raw 'translation manual' that Davidson aimed to avoid by introducing the notion of interpretation. In their common revulsion towards translating they seem to hold a similarly narrow understanding of the concept, which in their view was reducible to a mechanical procedure allowing one to correlate meanings between two languages as if 'blindly'. When only such a limited meaning of the term is taken into consideration, it must be admitted that the Davidsonian project certainly involves more, with interpretation supposedly preceding the translative activity. But it has to be conceded to Dummett that the theory offers little in terms of explaining what the broader act of interpretation would actually consist in, and there is effectively no account of how understanding would come about.

That is why it will be argued here that translation is indeed taking place in the centre of Davidson's vision – not merely on one, but in fact on two levels. In order to appreciate both, a deepened sense of the process has to be recognised and acknowledged as part of the analysis. With such a proviso, the theory could be hopefully considered as more comprehensive.

Without doubt, there is a place in the model where one could identify a certain 'translation manual'. Inherited together with the Tarskian T-schema, the process is necessitated by the distinction into the object and the metalanguage. The way in which Davidson modifies the formula exposes a need for translation to take place even further. His left-hand side of the equation does not present only a sentence equivalent to the one on the right. Instead, it becomes more universalised, since it contains an actual instruction of how the object statement should be analysed, with possible relativity of its meaning taken into account – a schematic procedure of how it should be translated. This would be a surface level of translation in the project.

Yet in order for any relativity or ambiguity to be transferred into the metalanguage, they have to be first consciously recognised by the individual who is to perform the process. And that is why translation in its wider sense would have to occur also at an earlier stage, the moment when a person approached the object language statement. This would be the unexplained point of understanding demanded by Dummett, as well as that of applying the mysterious, speculative axioms.

Before truth conditions become ascribed to a given sentence, they need to be initially construed in the mind of the subject. Arguably, this activity has a translative nature.

A potential obscure utterance in the object language functions here as a source text. It is approached and apprehended by the individual in a way that is utterly unique for them; even if not yet understandable, it sparks a

reaction which is personalised in terms of associations and images it evokes as well as possible connections with other object language utterances, to which meaning has been previously assigned. Next, along the lines of Davidsonian theory, the subject is gathering empirical data, to be used as a basis for making their prospective hypothesis. Out of the repository of such data, they will go on to choose possible truth conditions of the statement.

This activity is in turn akin to constructing a target text. The experiential evidence collected by the person remains a part of their subjectively perceived reality, which in a sense constitutes a new, target medium. The data are subsequently processed, in that the subject will be selecting and combining elements which they consider as good candidates for truth conditions of the utterance. A mental construct thus created functions as the target text. It is an outcome of a series of choices regarding which items within the target medium should be used to best reflect the original statement. Decisions made on the way are largely indeterminate, motivated by intuition and previous practice. The activity is regulated by how the chosen ingredients will continue to successfully represent the source text, the extent to which they will agree with other meaning hypotheses as well as with the behaviour of speakers of the object language – constrains taken into account only with the translator's consent. Such a mental construct of truth conditions is naturally creative, since it is entirely novel, individually marked and effective in representing the original statement, with there simultaneously being no access to its equivalent in the foreign language speaker's mind.

Such a creative process may continue interminably. As Davidson himself suggests, the hypotheses are subject to constant adjustments and revisions, and it is only up to the person to decide which version should be taken as ultimate. Then they sanction validity of the truth conditions in the same way as the translator legitimises translational equivalence. It is when they regard the quality of the created representation sufficient and satisfying – and on such a basis they establish a relation between source statement and its truth conditions, between the original and the target text.

What is nevertheless most crucial, is exactly the same illusion to which both the translator and the individual fall pray – analogous to the one identified in all the previously analysed theories. The translator who declares reaching equivalence does so, since they believe that there is a certain similarity between the source and target text. In fact however, they consider them alike, because they are the creators of both. They have subjectively processed and shaped the image of the original, to reflect this shape later in their translation. In the same way, the individual comes to regard the construct of truth conditions as corresponding to the original sentence, since both constitute an outcome of their own perceptual work.

This form of translational equivalence can be logically identified with the mysterious relation inscribed in axioms of Davidsonian theory, binding semantic properties of sentence components with their reference. A relation spun and stipulated exclusively by the person who analyses them, which comes to be considered as independent merely in the ignorance of subjective contribution made to both – the preceding act of inconscient self-translation.

From such a perspective it is now clear why the translative process described above precedes Davidson's idea of interpretation. Instant, intuitive and inherent in perception itself, it seems to be taking place prior to any other more complex mental operations. Only in the aftermath of such a translation may one entertain any possibility of further conscious intellectual work. It is this translative impulse that paves the way of understanding.

Individuality of the act naturally reels out an infinite number of ways in which the process may be carried out – here realises itself the Quinean and Davidsonian indeterminacy, in multiple unique works of translation performed by all the people who approach a foreign language with the purpose of analysing its meaning. Each translation is valid in its own way; with the source text of experiential data having been structured by the translator themselves, there is always an impression of consistency which allows them to legitimise the ultimately proposed target text of truth conditions. With such an original translative activity taken into account, it may be argued that a theory of meaning for a language is always an architecture constructed out of building blocks of truth conditions, carved by the individual in their empirical environment. And they are the authors of its semantic content to the same extent as the translator authors the target text.

One may finally presume that it is this illusory similarity created by a self-translative activity which led Davidson to postulate that, despite semantic holism he embraced, there are in fact no such things as separate conceptual schemes of different languages, which its speakers could not mutually penetrate. After all, he advocated instead that the concepts held by various language users are essentially the same (Davidson 1974).

To conclude, the reasoning proposed above hopefully proved that in Davidson's theory the presence of a semantic notion of translation is unquestionable. Though dreaded by the author, its acceptance brings along not only an unwanted, vague relation with reality in the figure of a translating subject and their unpredictable creativity. The idea of translation can be taken as an evil lesser than that involved in other semantic terms. In contrast to such notions as meaning, truth, demonstration, synonymy, etc., it has its roots in a specific type of practice. And as such, although still to a certain degree indeterminate, it is nevertheless more easily analysable, for instance in terms of common features which all acts of translation uncontroversially share.

Now it also seems easier to neutralise objections recalled above. The theory might be applied to statements which are ambiguous, because the experience of translators would prevent against their incorrect 'blind' analysis. They would also be able to recognise a potential discrepancy between the sentence surface grammar and its deep structure. As for the argument which states that truth conditions supposedly give an insufficient insight into the language meaning, when translation is accepted as part of the project, the concept of truth is no longer taken fully for granted, since it is underpinned by translative procedure, which in turn can be analysed at least in terms of its primary characteristics. Translation equivalence which the person spins between statements and the construal of their truth conditions accounts for the relation contained in axioms of the theory, as well as one involved in every meaning hypothesis. Agreeing with Dummett, a 'translation manual' does constitute an element of the analysis, but it is not everything that the project amounts to, for there is an additional, more refined instance of the process taking place where Dummett would require an account of understanding. The involuntary, self-translation act would be the first step towards it, enabling a broader, conscious interpretative work to begin.

A final note should be made regarding a possibly idealist nature of the proposed reformulation. With truth conditions understood as a mental target text, the entire scheme seems to have been lifted from the ground of external world on the level of overly speculative, fleeting products of the mind. Admittedly, the translative shift revealed at the moment of making meaning ascriptions takes place in the mental dimension. Yet at the same time, the extent to which truth of sentences is rooted in the external reality becomes once again identified with the degree of access to the source text. Although unreachable in the form conceived by its author and never solidified into an intersubjective shape, the original nevertheless remains a necessary anchor – an external

substance, only such that is forever changing together with the cognitive motion of its reader, perfectly sensitive to the translators' creative, perceptual touch. And so is the material substructure for truth conditions.

Summary and conclusion

The accounts of truth analysed in the above sections were the most significant in terms of the goal assumed by the following study. Not only do they address the problem of truth in both formal and informal languages, but also the idea of translation being linked with truth is there most explicitly articulated.

First, in the model proposed by Tarski it was pointed that his distinction into the object and the metalanguage necessitated a translative process occurring at the moment of passage between them. It was further argued that even when the T-schema were applied to formal languages and the meta- contained the object one, this passage was not a mere rewriting. Instead, it involved a more complex transformation which accompanied the change of context and language richness. With all the instances of his formula brought together, translation process was also identified in the final definition of truth, in the activity of turning open sentences into their particularised equivalents.

Transition to Davidson was an ultimate probe for the hypothesis linking translation with truth, when the formal scheme was applied to natural languages. It was contended that Davidson's project should reclaim its translative roots, since in the analysis the process manifested itself twofold. On the surface, there was the Tarskian formula which Davidson refined so that it became a certain universalised translative principle. This prescription was however only a technical symbol for an instance of translation occurring on a more profound level. It was when the source text of experiential data surrounding a foreign language was used as a basis for mental construal of its truth conditions – a personalised reception of the original attempted to be rendered in a new medium, in the form of a comprehensible target text.

Identification of this process in the Davidsonian vision once again bears out the pattern identified in all the theories analysed so far. Each time, in the course of establishing truth or specifying its idea, the individual was performing a particular act of inconscient self-translation, attempting to create an accurate reflection of the way they experienced the world which surrounded them. In the end, with this phenomenon invariably accompanying the concept, it seems cogent, if not inevitable, to regard truth as one's translation of reality.

Towards a translational theory of truth

You are an aperture through
which the universe is looking at
and exploring itself
Alan Watts

The analysed texts prove that an intersemiotic translation takes place whenever the subject perceives reality as well as whenever they attempt to reconstruct their perceptions. It was possible to see that the process accompanied creating a meta-description of scientific languages (as in the Tarskian theory), it enabled unifying the vision of the world as a whole (the coherence theory), verifying the correctness of established theses (the pragmatic theory) as well as interpreting phenomena including human behaviour (the Davidsonian account of the semantic theory).

Since the link between translation and truth proved to be present in such a wide spectrum of texts, an inevitable conclusion which seems to follow is that indeed, it underlies every way in which one approaches the concept of truth. And because this idea itself may have such a wide application and such a broad scope of reference – it may be identified with being, with an attribute of judgements, with human conduct, with the ultimate goal of scientific research, etc. – one may plausibly assume that, as a backbone of truth, intersemiotic translation mediates an entire human experience of reality.

If this is the case, now I feel justified in doing the following:

1. characterising the subject as a translator and the reality which surrounds them as a multisemiotic text,
2. on such a basis, proposing a theory according to which truth consists in the process of intersemiotic translation.

Therefore, this final chapter will outline a philosophical landscape yielded by the foregoing analysis. I will attempt to elaborate what vision of reality, what profile of an individual as well as their place within the world emerges once the two lines of inquiries – the one into translation and the one into truth – turn out to coalesce. Eventually, it will also lead the reader towards the final characteristic of truth which might be tentatively drawn as a conclusion from the study. This will simultaneously explain how the aporia which prompted the research could be addressed.

1. An individual within the semiotic reality and their translative identity

The idea of intersemiotic translation as a mechanism which underlies reality may at first appear nothing less than startling. Yet with a broader picture which includes a proper hindsight, such a model may considerably gain in value.

I shall therefore start with a brief, retrospective look. In the ancient times, when the human philosophical thought was awakening, regardless of the cultural circle, the world was perceived as a creation permeated with religious significance. A space of mystery, riddled with divine activity and prophetic messages, all organised according to an unembraceable inviolable order, almost as fine as inscrutable. Every phenomenon

was imbued with ritualistic significance. Thus it was looked upon with awe and veneration. As a result, human gaze used to be open, acutely sensitive to its surroundings, and arguably also far less preconceiving than the modern eye. An individual travelled through the reality engaged in a continual interpretation of meaning with which nearly every element of the world was assumed to have been invested (cf. e.g. Cieszkowski 1838, Cassirer 1925, Collins 2008).

And so, despite how little could be at that time explained in scientific terms, the question about the nature of truth continually remained in sharp focus, as if immediately under the surface of things, actively attempted to be uncovered. Moreover, since it was the divine forces who were believed to be governing the universe, and it was them who simultaneously dictated the rules of proper conduct, the pursuit of truth as knowledge about the world and truth as a form of ethical attitude were essentially intertwined. One cannot find the strength of this mutual dependence expressed more explicitly than in Plato's passage from the famous allegory of the cave. Through the mouth of Socrates he states that 'in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be […] the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual'. (*The Republic* 507b-509c)

Such a perhaps obvious reflection was not offered to suggest that an inhabitant of the modern times ceased to search for the meaning of life or ask about the sense of truth. However, clearly the nature of this investigation, its dynamic and directions have quite dramatically changed. I will now attempt to explain the character of this change.

As it is inherent in its nature, also the contemporary human thought readily continues to make attempts at finding order in its existence. Yet the physical dimension to a large extent seems to have been expropriated by science. Emboldened by hundreds of years of progress, the scientific enquiry piece by piece furnished the tangible reality with strict, mechanical explanations. The study of the universe once fearful, turned into a curious fascination, reassured of its own unlimited potence. This has undeniably drained the world off its potentially ritualistic significance, with even the idea of god possible to become quite comfortably fitted into the overall scientific construction. It seems that as a result, a person started to take the perception of their surroundings for granted – as predictable and explainable in scientific terms – and instead directed their philosophical struggles into the sphere of abstractness.

An essentially similar transformation have already been grasped and extensively elaborated in Foucault's *The Order of Things*, where he argues that before the early modern period, the ontological paradigm was predominant, language was subjected to being, and being itself saturated with significance. The contemporary thought however, separated the sphere of matter from semiotic systems and turned to their investigation. Together with the classical age, epistemology – which Foucault calls *episteme* – realised a binary opposition of the sign and its object as well as an arbitrary connection between the two. Moreover, as the sphere of signification came to the fore, it entailed a certain implicit divergence as far as where it was localised – namely, in the dimension of thought, as investigated by classical scholars, and the dimension of language, which were to become a primary object of interest from the 19th century onwards (Foucault 1966).

It can be however argued that this reversal did not strip one's immediate environment of signification – only the nature of this signification has changed. Thanks to the scientific and technological advancements, natural phenomena became elaborately described with languages of science. Each explanation is followed by another, which may effectively dispel any uncertainties regarding the source or reason for the surrounding

events. A storm is a result of clashing fronts, rather than god's wrath, a disease is brought on by viruses, and not a revenge of evil spirits. But this reliance on scientific discoveries, although no longer ritualistic in nature, also spun over reality a tight grid of meaning – and its detailedness as well as dependability only add to its persuasiveness. Consequently, the individual seems to remain surrounded by a cloud of meaning echoing with the voice of scientific languages, in which their thought may move around with a comfort of clarity. And this movement can be plausibly considered as the modern semiotic thinking, as a contemporary semiotician and a follower of C.S. Peirce Floyd Merrell argues (Merrell 2000; 70).

From such a perspective, reality is far from transparent; on the contrary, it seems to be oversaturated with linguistic discourse, which introduces order in human perception, an order which is just as convincing as it is also conventional. Even though many questions are still acknowledged as unanswered, the vast complexity which surrounds every individual has become seemingly resolved, by accounts entrenched similarly to worn-out metaphors. In such conditions, the question whether truth should be considered and looked for as something located in the physical sphere is being paradoxically set aside, with the investigation of the environment left for respective branches of science.

The breakthrough in humanities which took place at the beginning of the 20th century played a spectacularly consequential role in reinforcing the above tendency. What characterised the beginning of the so-called linguistic turn was a divorce from metaphysics and an intense focus on the study of language (cf. Rorty 1967). Later, the metaphysical questions were addressed again, yet this time dissected with a blade of logic and grammar. An unequivocal outcome of the analyses seemed to have been prefigured by the idea of Wilhelm von Humboldt, who aptly grasped the influence of language upon human thought and reality. He described it as an abstract creation which, although originating from individuals, later was gaining independence and power to affect them back, entangling their perception in an inescapable net of influence (Humboldt 1835;26). With language as an expression of human intellectual development as well as reflection of human culture, it became impossible to study either the former or the latter in any other way than through the linguistic prism. And this insidious impact of language revealed itself precisely in the works which together came to be recognised as the analytic philosophy.

To see their enduring impact on the modern worldview, it is valuable to recall classic texts which opened the analytic tradition. First, Moore and Russel rejected the vague and obscure idiom of Hegelian idealism, instead calling for a clear, conceptual analysis which should have had a narrow focus and support in logic (cf. e.g. Moore 1925). Then Russell expounded the idea of logical atomism (e.g. Russell 1911), which was later embraced by other members of the Vienna Circle. Together with its basic assumptions, there began an almost ridiculously mechanical procedure of carving the world in accordance with linguistic structures, paring simple facts with its corresponding atomic propositions. And even though the strength with which it was later advocated lost its momentum, it nevertheless left a non-negligible impact on how the relation between language and reality was perceived.

From the perspective of the following study a highly important mark was also made by Ferdinand de Saussure. Clearly, an enormous legacy of the Swiss initiator of structuralism needs to be neither explained nor commanded. What should be merely stressed is the contribution which his analysis brought into the modern worldview and current conclusions.

As a father of semiotics, he described language as a system of signs, each of which would have a dual nature. It consisted of the signifier (a vocal manifestation of the sign) and the signified (a meaning which the sign referred to). With such an assumption, Sausurre's first crucial claim was the lack of any predetermined relationship between these two components; the way certain forms were chosen to represent things was essentially arbitrary. And the other decisive statement was that since the system of linguistic signs is used to organise and categorise the perceived phenomena, language not only describes, but in fact constitutes reality (Sausurre 1916; 231-40). Consequently, if one combines these claims, it becomes possible to see how a seemingly perspicuous objects of perception are actually a product of arrangement whose mechanism is strongly reliant on convention. Although de Saussure did not explicitly advocated linguistic relativism and maintained that language is historically anchored in physical reality, he emphasised that lexical items could be understood and defined only with the help of other elements of the system. Such a claim clearly makes the dependence on extra-linguistic dimension weaker.

Yet a truly profound argument in favour of an inescapably linguistic approach to the world came from a progenitor of the analytical movement, Ludwig Wittgenstein. In an early phase of his work, he famously pronounced all philosophical problems to be in fact a result of linguistic confusion, an incorrect, nonsensical use of language. Clarification of language would according to him entail clarity of thought, and this in turn the clarity of perception. Consequently, problems would dissolve on their own. Such should become in his view a philosopher's primary task – and this is what he undertook by drafting a text which became perhaps one of the finest riddles in the philosophical history; an interpretative diamond.

Even if his later works abandon a mystical, unobjectionable tone emanating from the *Tractatus* (1921), the impact of his early treatise proves unerasable. A seeming simplicity of Wittegnstein's theses spins an infinitely complex vision which aspired to become an explanation of reality's entire structure. Wittgenstein systematically dissected the world along the lines of an isomorphic relation which it retained with language, taking the principles of logic as a backbone of the scheme. Notwithstanding all the unresolved, interpretive challenges, one certain conclusion can be drawn from the ending of his text. The famous paradox of 'throwing away the ladder' – when in a sweeping gesture Wittgenstein negates the meaning of all that he has written so far – is a dramatic leap towards the limits of expression and a confirmation of their unconquerability. What he seems to be conveying is an essential futility of any attempt to escape the linguistic-logical structure in which the subject is immersed. In other words, it is impossible to describe the world as a certain system of elements, having only these elements as means of expression. Such a verdict leaves an individual both at the mercy and simultaneously in ignorance of the ultimate mechanism according to which their perception is being organised. In such conditions, truth as a possibility to reflect the universe becomes impossible to see or formulate.

Wittgenstein's equally influential *Investigations* (1953) and the concept of 'language games' imparted the above picture with an additional instability. Regardless of which interpretive approach is assumed – the one of continuity or contradiction – the idea that meaning of statements can be determined only in particular situations of their usage brings another unsettling realisation. The senses of linguistic expressions which are taken as clarifications of the world are essentially unstable.

The approach developed by Saussure, Wittgenstein and other structuralists sparked a response which collectively came to be regarded as post-structuralism (cf. e.g. Rosenau 1992). Yet this vast and complex movement was not a mere rejection of the structuralist ideas – it used them to elaborate a still more sophisticated

picture. A prime example of such work is Derrida, who revisited the Sausurre's scheme. In his vision the anchor which language content would retain with physicality becomes even more fragile.

Derrida imparted the above dual semiotic model with an elusive dynamism. The first significant point in his philosophical program which appears indispensable for the following line of argument is his famous critique of 'logocentrism'. Derrida strongly opposed the foregoing tradition of the Western philosophy which relied on an unfounded assumption that there exists an external reality, in the meaning of permanent, stable presence, serving as a basis for human expression. He questions the belief that 'there is a realm of 'truth' existing prior to and independent of its representation by linguistic signs. In his view, 'logocentrism encourages us to treat linguistic signs as distinct from and inessential to the phenomena they represent, rather than as inextricably bound up with them' (Derrida 1967:27).

He contrasts such a simplified model with one where boundaries are blurred and rather than speaking about the presence of entities, his metaphysics is characterised by absence. Specifically, the two dimensions of a linguistic sign gain an ideal nature. When every linguistic item can be defined only by reference to others, this creates an endless chain of signification where meaning can never be stably grasped and becomes a constantly motile difference between words. Additionally, the universal nature of language implies that word usage can take place in the absence of their addresser, their receiver and their ultimate physical form (Derrida 1967:35).

Although developed primarily as a form of explanation how meaning functions in language and texts, it is possible to draw from Derrida's deconstruction certain significant insights regarding the world and the pursuit of truth which may be undertaken within it. While he may not have made any firm stance regarding the existence of a separate, external reality as such, in view of his analysis the individual's access to the source of their perceptions is utterly mediated. Since fixing the meaning of any concept in language becomes impossible, so is a definite description of reality and hence also establishing truth understood as such a description. Moreover, because the medium of access to any original object of cognition is so volatile, similarly fluxional turns out to be the individual's general environment. Not being an act or method, deconstruction rather 'happens everywhere' around the subject (Turner 2016; 23). In such conditions, the quest for the meaning of truth in language is tantamount to searching for it as an ontological fundament, and both tasks remain relentlessly futile, as the references of concepts enmeshed with their abstract names forever elude one's grasp.

Let it be summarised what was so far posited. It was argued that as a result of influence of both the scientific progress and the legacy of major exponents of the linguistic turn, the phenomena which constitute the modern reality are extensively elaborated with systems of signification, whose dialectic and endlessly referential nature is so prevalent that it reaches the point of unquestionable transparency. But if there were merely chains of signifying relations, what would account for the dynamism of the entire semiotic amalgam? What would be the condition of its movement? The answer is naturally the role which the individual plays as a part of the amalgam. Below it will be demonstrated why understanding their role will simultaneously justify the use of translation as a framework for the subjects enquiry into truth.

To that end, now it seems fitting to draw on the work of the semiotics' pioneer – C.S. Peirce – and complete the picture with the help of his model. Although chronologically he precedes the scholars mentioned above, his legacy is particularly important for the foregoing argument, and therefore it is presented as the last one, to serve as a direct transition point to the translational model which will be presented here.

In the Peircean study, a sign does not have a dual, but triadic structure. Employing his own terminology, apart from 'the signifying element' (the sign itself) and its 'object' (that which is signified), there must also be a third component, which is 'the interpretant' of the sign. Naturally, in the course of developing his theory, Peirce proposed a detailed typology of each three elements. Here it seems particularly important to bring up his analysis of the 'interpretant'.

In Peirce's view, this element should be considered as a certain kind of understanding of the relation between the sign and its object, understanding which could be roughly identified with the human mind or consciousness. Unlike Saussure, he maintained that the way in which the three components were connected was not arbitrary. In fact, it was precisely the type of sign/object link which later determined the kind of interpretant. Initially then, he distinguished two sorts of objects – dynamic and immediate. The former was to be an entity in its real form, which triggered the signifying chain, and the latter was the way in which this entity at first appeared to the mind (*Collected Papers* Vol. 4. 536). Accordingly, there would be three types of interpretants: the immediate, the dynamic and the final one. The immediate understanding consisted in a general, definitional grasp of the sign/object relation. The dynamic one stood for what a given mind makes of this relation in specific circumstances, embedded in a particular context. The final interpretant was merely hypothetical. Achieving this stage of comprehension would be tantamount to the end of enquiry, reaching a complete and authentic conception of the object, in short – discovering the truth about it (*Collected Papers* Vol. 8. 315).

This classification was brought up here to serve as a balance point in the presently developed argument. In his model Peirce included the element of an active subject who, by becoming a sign themselves, enabled an infinite semiotic chain to unfold. Thereby, Peirce may account for the constant interpretative movement of semiotic relations. I intend to employ this feature of his scheme as a crucial ingredient of the ontological foundation which I attempt to sketch in the background of the research. I do so in a belief that, following a few notable commentators, the interpretative activity described by Peirce should be understood as translation.

Indeed, both Liszka and Seven suggest that instead of the 'interpretant' one should rather use a term 'translatant' (Liszka 1996, Savan 1988). It is the active mind who by assuming the identity of the translator triggers the dialectic exchange between semiotic systems. His role comes down to an incessant replacement of one meaning with another, in an unending attempt to reach the final object of signification. Such goal however is essentially unattainable, since it would mean arriving at the ultimately true knowledge about reality. And hence for Peirce it remained only a hypothetical ideal.

When it is however acknowledged that an inherent element of semiosis is the translator, then one may begin to fully realise the merit of applying translational framework to the characteristic of the subject's worldview, and later to analysing the concept of truth. For this translative identity which the subject assumes within the world permeated by semiosis becomes now their existential fundament.

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In order to see it even more clearly, let us contemplate the result of combining the legacies of Peirce and the those left by scholars who belonged to the linguistic turn. Peirce attempted to analyse the entire structure of reality and all its phenomena in terms of semiosis, including the natural, biological processes. Perhaps that is what made him claim that just as the sign was determined by its object, their relation later also determined the interpretant. In such conditions the deterministic mechanism of semiosis does not seem to necessitate any purposeful manipulation to be triggered; although there has to be the conscious mind, it becomes as if

automatically harnessed in the development of a semiotic chain. Sausurre in turn, who concentrated on the study of language, pointed that the relation between the sign and its object is arbitrary, inasmuch as the sign's meaning was derived already from the sphere of abstraction and defined only in terms of other abstract terms – a point to which Derrida gave an even greater saliency.

Now one can truly acknowledge both the ubiquity of signification processes and additionally the fact that the these processes are largely constituted by the linguistic convention. Then as a consequence, semiotic systems create a dimension of obscurity rather than transparency. In a situation when one intends to arrive at the original object, the sign can no longer be taken at face value. If its 'decoding' happens automatically, it does not guarantee that what was decoded was its original source, since it might as well be any of its conventional equivalents.

So a person who does not immediately question the conventional paths of signification may let oneself be supinely carried along the semiotic stream. But an individual who wishes to enquire about a certain ultimate nature of reality and at the same time realises the indeterminacy of semiosis knows the snare in which they have been entrapped. The more refined systems of explanations would be developed, the harder it seems to still ask about their justification. When a person acknowledges their perception as enmeshed in a semiotic amalgam governed by arbitrariness, they find themselves confronted with a choice. The subject discovers that in approaching the sign they may refuse to follow the immediate interpretation – if it happens to be arbitrary, it will take them nowhere near the original object, but merely further entrench the established convention. So instead, they may decide on a different meaning, seeing that they have in fact a multiplicity of further signs to opt for as the right signifier. And it is in the face this choice when they become a translator.

A realisation which immediately appears is that with the ubiquity of linguistic influence, the only thing which an enquiring person in fact does is gliding over the surface of signification, choosing paths between meanings.

Taking into account all the above reflections, the next step which must necessarily be taken is to rework the proposed schemes, combining them into a single model. I would suggest that in order to more accurately reflect the cognitive condition of the subject, the semiotic triad drawn by Peirce should be modified. Naturally, to reflect the complexity and dynamism of semiotic reality various metaphorical representations have already been proposed. For instance, Merrell evokes an inspiring image of a vortex (Merrell 2003:179), and at other times he brings up the idea of the Mobius strip (1998; 50), coming in the end to the conclusion that the process defies rules of logic. However, for the purpose of the following research, I would propose a simpler, hopefully adduceable scheme.

What Peirce viewed as a triangle, I would rather depict with a shape of a rhomb. The translating person is at the top corner of the figure, and the originally signified object at the opposite, bottom one. They are connected and at the same time separated with two other sides of the geometric shape, with two paths at the top of each there is a different sign. These two lines represent different meanings which the translator may choose in an attempt to decode the semiotic relation and get to the object. But naturally, the semiotic level is always present, so to the object there is in fact no direct access, other than through the prism of sign it is represented by.



Peirce's semiotic triangle



The rhomb of intersemiotic translation

This naturally does not aspire to be the ultimate depiction of an ontological scheme of semiosis. Yet presenting such a basic skeleton I have several goals. First, to demonstrate that everything which the individual has access to has the status of a sign. Subsequently, to propose possible answers to the questions which follow, such as: what is the nature of the subject within such a 'semiotised' reality, what is their relation to the signs, what is the object of signification, whether it can be accessed, etc. Hopefully, these goals can be achieved when the scheme is supplemented with a proper commentary.

I will attempt to address these problems in order.

1. One should start with clarifying the structure of semiosphere and the figure of the subject. How should their translative identity be understood? What is their relation to the level of signs?
2. What accounts for the similarities between respective translations – that is, what enables the conscious beings to communicate successfully? How come that there is a common element between their respective translations?
3. What accounts for differences between them?
4. What is the object of signification? Is the grasp of it ever possible? What is meant in the scheme by equating it with another individual?

1. What was outlined above as a heritage of past thinkers, I will now summarise and

present as a more detailed argument in favour of the present 'semiotisation' of reality. This will allow me subsequently to explain how it yields a particular profile of a translative subject.

Thanks to the studies of linguists and philosophers it was recognised that in the variety of incentives which constitute the subject's experience of the world, the component of language (both the natural one and those which belong to the sciences) has a dominating role, in that it significantly influences the way phenomena are perceived. It accompanies all kinds of data which surround the subject and structures them in a particular way.

What is a crucial, and arguably distinctive feature of language is that it is comprised of words, which have a referential, semiotic nature. There may be various types of theories which attempt to define word meaning – one may point to roughly three major groups: denotational, conceptualist and pragmatic. According to the first one, meaning consists in tying a word to its reference or establishing its truth conditions (cf. Gamut 1991). Conceptualist theories identify meaning with concepts or ideas connected with it (cf. Jackendoff 1983). The pragmatic group naturally makes meaning dependant on word usage (see e.g. Wittgensten's idea of language games (1953) or Austin's speech act project (1962)). Famously, all these insights were prefigured and captured already by Ogden and Richards in their seminal *The Meaning of Meaning* (1923). They proposed a semantic triangle, which shows the interconnectedness of words (symbols), concepts (the level of thought) and their references (entities or objects), additionally highlighting the continuous cognitive movement between them (Ogden and Richards 11). Upon considering these approaches to the elements of linguistic systems, regardless of which one is assumed, it seems undeniable that in order for words to have any meaning, they must certainly connect to something; otherwise they would be expressively empty. It means that elements of a semiotic system become ascribed to one another – importantly, they also become ascribed to other kinds of phenomena which the subject perceives.

These ascriptions are made largely in an arbitrary way; they are established by convention as well as an individual process of the subject's development. Additionally, elements of conceptual systems remain in constant evolution, because the scope of their mutual ascriptions remains underspecified and always open. Moreover, the subject acquires the knowledge about conceptual systems simultaneously with other types of data – one learns semiotic systems together with their growing experience of the world; develops the meaning of concepts in parallel with observing the phenomena which surround them. So in the end, as the ascriptive movement shown in the semantic triangle continues, all their perceptions gain referential status – they become an amalgamate of signs. In this sense, an individual finds himself in a world which can be described as a 'semiosphere' – a collection of endless semiotic chains. Each element within the such a reality has a semiotic nature, even though they may vary in structure. These may be objects, ideas, phenomena as well as all their possible aggregates.

By virtue of the above argument, the following study diverges from the models proposed by earlier semiotitians, for example such as the one outlined by Yuri Lotman. In his seminal *Universe of the Mind*, he proposes to divide reality into two realms – the 'semiosphere' and the 'biosphere'. While the former would be the dimension of semiotic codes and discourse, the latter was to be devoid of signification (Lotman 1991). Nonetheless, I aim to stress that the very nature of conceptual systems is their tenacity (in line with the model developed by Ogden and Richards)– they are inseparable from other dimensions of the subject's experience. This fact was acknowledged and given saliency not only by the linguistic turn and the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, but remains also a basic tenet of cognitive grammar – recently most influential approach to language, which assumes that this system does not merely accompany cognition, but actually enables it (cf. Langacker 1991, Tabakowska 1995 et.al).

What make it possible to exchange one sign into another is a channel of communication – an open, empty space between them. And this is precisely the nature of an ideal translator. By default, any substance which must become a catalyst for translation should be transparent, devoid of identity, present only through the result of its activity and itself absent. Ideally, it is not a positive entity, in a sense of holding any specific

attributes or qualities. It is merely a relation between two signs which appears on account of difference between them; a hiatus, distance or void which creates this difference and enables the switch. They should not hinder or in any way alter the change which is being made and does not deform the signs themselves. So ideally, they are a space filled with flowing semiotic chains; pathways, which they chart within the semiosphere. Various semiotic interplays which such a translator triggers can be effected only by changing the 'shape of its absence'.

In this respect the proposed model is akin very strongly to a recently published, extremely impactful work of Kobus Marais. In his *(Bio)Semiotic Theory of Translation* he spins a radical vision wherein the physical merges with the abstract, forming a unified, semiotic entirety which he calls a 'tradosphere'. Similarly to the approached assumed here, Marais takes the Peircean description of 'phaneron' as a starting point and elaborates it to create a more fine-grained picture, plausibly supported by the developments of the modern science. He considers the Jakobsonian typology as obsolete, claiming boldly that all translation is in fact an intersemiotic translation. The process is inherent in any movement or change within the spacetime (Marais 139).

Because of this strong affinity between his model and the one which is being elaborated here, I will take liberty of borrowing Marais term 'tradosphere' and hereinafter use it interchangeably with 'semiosphere'.

In this way, the model of reality becomes essentially dualist. It is a semiotic amalgam organised and dynamized through the channels of translating subjects.

To better illustrate this point, I would like to recall a passage from Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. He writes that 'the subject does not belong to the world; rather, it is the limit of the world' (Wittgenstein 5.632). The way in which one may interpret his statement is that the mind is the limit of semiosis. It is at the same time the source and the end of signification, a centre point of no further reference. It hints at no further meaning and it relates to nothing but itself – not because it is so inimitably subjective, but because it consists in ultimate purity, an ideal transparency, which only by virtue of its own existence divides and disaggregates the world around itself into a fragmentary, moving amalgam of signs.

In such conditions it becomes apparent that it is the translatory individual who enables the multiplication of semiotic systems. Hence when making cognitive attempts, the subject advances through the steps of semiosis; but it leads them only further away from their origin, and thereby also away from what might be their goal, if the intention was to explore the root cause of the reality's diverse structure. It seems that in order to penetrate it, they would have to reverse the process, and in a mirror-like fashion look upon itself – which does not appear possible, and which simultaneously makes their cognitive search run into infinity.

When delivering his scathing criticism of the *Tractatus*, Ernst Gellner mocked Wittgenstein saying that he is a man obsessed with the question what he looks like when he does not gaze in the mirror (Gellner 1959; 63). Demeaning as his words certainly are, one cannot fail to see in them a grain of truth, and an astute summary of Wittgenstein's juggling act – constructing a model whose possibility of seeing he himself in the end denied. Similarly futile can be regarded the study of the translator. It is a paradoxical attempt to characterise what lacks essential characteristic and is only accessible through its work – from which the subject themselves is nevertheless separate.

While the reference to Wittgenstein might still be viewed as insufficiently explanatory, due to the ambiguity of his thought, one may contemplate instead also how the model of semiosphere shaped by the translative channels relates to the classical vision proposed by John Locke. The reader need not be reminded of the meaning behind Locke's notion of a 'blank slate' proposed in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*

(1689/90). As a classic expression of empiricism, he argues how a blank sheet of an individual's mind – experientially empty upon the moment of birth – then gradually becomes written over by the knowledge of the external world. What step by step furnished one's mind were 'ideas'. In Locke's terminology they stood for what was perhaps a direct opposite of the term used by Plato; not the timeless, universal entities, but perceptual data (Locke 134).

The concept of 'tabula rasa' could be seen as an intriguing anticipation of the model in which the subject appears to have initially a vacuous nature. Analogously, the translative induvial should be considered an entirely vacuous channel only at the point of their origin. Just as 'a slate' becomes progressively covered with experience, the translator becomes filled with the flowing semiotic chains, which will come to constitute the degree of their difference from other subjects. At the same time, Locke's vision should be taken as merely preparatory, in that the image he used must be refined. Not all the memories remain etched in the mind, and the semiotic data are not layered upon the passively receptive person in a ready-made, crude form. The entire translation process is a constant, complex interplay between the moving signs and the space opened for this movement by the individual. Moreover, not all signs have the same nature and behave in the same way. It is not only the translative void which enables their movement. So now the picture must become more fine-grained when it comes to the identity of the translator, as well as how this identity relates to other inhabitants of the semiosphere.

Before I proceed, let me close the section which describes the vacuous individual by evoking a passage from of Carl Jung's writings. In a metaphorical, yet stunningly accurate way he grasps the image which was attempted to be painted here: 'Every man has a quiet place in his soul, where everything is self-evident and easily explainable, a place to which he likes to retire from the confusing possibilities of life, because there everything is simple and clear […] About nothing else in the world can a man say with the same conviction as he does of this place: "You are nothing but ... " and indeed he has said it. And even this place is a smooth surface, an everyday wall, nothing more than a snugly sheltered and frequently polished crust over the mystery of chaos. If you break through this most everyday of walls, the overwhelming stream of chaos will flood in' (Jung 2009:296).

2. If the translative individual is supposed to be vacuous, now it should be explained how their personal identity emerges and what accounts for the differences between their work.

Let me make here a smooth transition by following the insight of Jung which closed the previous section. In his quasi philosophical, quasi prophetic *The Red Book* he makes an extremely grave statement: 'Now two things remain to be discovered. The first is a bottomless abyss which separates one man from the other. The second is a bridge which might make two people connected (Jung 350)'. And it seems far from coincidental that the genius scholar formulates the above problems at the beginning of a vision in which him descends to hell.

Indeed, the author of the following study is about to face a comparable extent of torment. This excruciating suffering is essentially tripartite. First, it sems from a burdensome gravity of the age-old problem, which failed to be solved even by the greatest thinkers in history. Connected with it there is awareness of an unavoidable insufficiency of the answers which will be suggested, and finally the anticipated blade of scathing criticism to which the solution remains utterly vulnerable. But since from the very beginning the audacity of the research bordered on the insanity, there will also be an attempt to answer Jungian questions. Of the two

dilemmas, within the translational framework it is the former which seems easier to explain, hence it will be addressed in the first instance.

As was established above, the identity of a translator is originally a void, which makes the process of semiosis possible.

By enabling still new reference relations to be delineated, the subject constructs within themselves a growing set of associations. This gradually builds up their individual identity and at the same time shapes their semiotic surroundings. In this way, the subject themselves slowly turns into an aggregate of signs. How is it possible?

It is primarily the abstract, conceptual signs which contribute to the development of their identity; their referential character allows to connect experiential data not only in an arbitrary way, but also defying the direction of passing time – for example by associating present experiences with the past ones. Thereby, semiotic perceptions can be retained and amount into a growing complex. Analysing the structure of this dynamic aggregate and tracing one's translatorial decisions, for themselves the subject also becomes a sign, a potential object of interpretation. They do not however have any substantial nature apart from the semiotic material, the flow or cumulation of which they enable. Such a characteristic quite obviously explains the source of differences between how particular individuals modify the fragment of semiosphere which surrounds them, and consequently, how distinct their internal structure becomes. Each translator chooses and allows different intersemiotic changes, and diverse are also the semiotic chains which they purposefully or unwittingly choose to relive in the form of memory. Needless to say, they also originate in different points within the semiotic amalgam, and hence their subsequent paths unfold in varying directions.

Although grounded in a perhaps striking model of dynamic semiosphere, such an explanation of why identity becomes particularised is not in fact overly controversial or novel. It comes close to the profile of an individual sketched by Ricoeur in his hermeneutics of selfhood. Riceour proposes to view the nature of the subject essentially as an ongoing, accumulative narration. It comprises both the story which a person tells about themselves as well as their account told by others (Ricouer 1988). He argues that such a dialogic identity has two basic dimensions. The first one – which he called 'idem' – consisted in beliefs and traditions which a person becomes invested with and which remain relatively stable through time. Intertwined with 'idem' there was 'ipse', which referred to the an ability to act in the world and respond to change (Drwięga 20-21). Significantly, it should be pointed out that such an account of selfhood should be interpreted 'as a lived conviction rather than a scientific certainty' (Pellauer & Dauenhauer 5.). The translational approach aligns with Riceour's idea in terms of identity as a continuous semiotic flow of narration as well as in the fact that its substantiality is an illusion. The self remains a changeable passage of signification, whose content is incessantly drawn from and released into the semiosphere.

Such an explanation for interpersonal differences calls for an example.

Before I describe a real-life situation, I shall make a recourse to the assumptions articulated at the beginning of the study. As the reader surely remembers, the approach assumed here is strongly indebted to the ideas and postulates of cognitive grammar, proposed by Ronald Langacker. Using specific linguistic parameters, he analyses how a mental construal of the same phenomenon may differ depending on the sentence which is used to communicate it. Langacker shows how the mechanism functions when language is involved in conveying the message, so he focuses only on one semiotic system. However, I would like to argue that an

analogous differentiation occurs also when other semiotic codes are involved – and in the end contributes to growing differences between translative subjects. Therefore, I will start by recalling briefly Langacker's observations and evoke a very simple example which he provides, so that later my own, intersemiotic account can be better understood.

One may imagine a situation in which a boy hands a girl a bunch of flowers. Using language, naturally this can be articulated in many ways. But in order to grasp Langacker's idea, let us consider only two of many possible sentences. It might be said that (1): 'John gave Ann the flowers' or (2): 'John gave the flowers to Ann'. Although the activity which is being described remains the same, the two statements diverge in the way they present it; they structure the situation in a different way, and consequently, the images which are created in the mind of someone who reads or hears the sentences will also not be the same.

In both cases the scene involves essentially three elements – two agents and an object – as well as a performing a specific action which creates between the elements a specific relation. However, in the case of (1), the potential reader first sees the agent (John), then the action, next the recipient (Ann), and finally the object which was given (the flowers). Such a formulation is fairly neutral. Yet, on the assumption that whatever is stated at the end gains more prominence and is remembered better, what seems to be conveyed is the fact that Ann received the flowers – and not for instance any other present. Crucially, the flowers are important; they might be a compensation for an offence or an endearing gift. So in the mental construal made by the reader they gain salience, while other elements of the scene remain in the background. Now in the case of (2), the construal changes. The order in which elements are presented is different, and on the level of signs there is also one more element – the preposition 'to'. As a result of both linguistic addition and restructuring of the components, what becomes highlighted is the activity, its direction and its recipient. The second sentence might be followed for instance by an additional explanation '…and not to Martha or any other girl', in order to further emphasise the message. The reader then focuses on what is being done and towards whom (for a plenty of similar, more complex examples see Langacker 134-140).

What was described above, as well as in fact an entire Langackerian project, may strike as obvious if not even trivial. After all this is how the basic mechanism of understanding language works. And indeed, cognitive grammar is intended to give expression to the most fundamental linguistic intuitions and systematise the description of its effects on the mind of the users. As I intend to argue, the mechanism involved in translating the intersemiotic material is strongly akin to the regularities and differences demonstrated by Langacker and his followers. And it should be equally acceptable on the level of intuition, since it takes place at every moment of the subject's existence, remaining the principle of their operation within the semiosphere. So having shown how the construal of a situation conveyed by means of one semiotic system may vary, now I will try to show that the same happens when other codes are involved.

The reader may imagine two people who listen to the recording of the same musical composition – let it be a breath-taking finale of Tchaikovsky's *Swan Lake*. After the main theme resounds, sonority of the orchestra suddenly quietens down, leaving a fleeting, delicate sound of string instruments. For a brief, suspenseful moment, it is only them who carry the melody by a masterfully subtle *staccato*, in preparation for a strike of the majestic final chords. How does the difference in construal of the piece arise in the two listeners?

Let us further assume that they are spectators with two distinct personal histories – suppose one has witnessed a live performance of the ballet multiple times, and the other has not, but he is in turn a practising

violin player. Consequently, the past of each listener will influence the process in which they translate what they hear.

The sound made by bows passes through each individual translative channel. This sound represents a form of a semiotic complex. As a stream of notes it is a series of sound waves, which are accompanied by potentially an endless number of qualities – each of them also being a sign. These might be for example the pitch, the volume, the tone colour, but also abstract ones, such as the idea of lightness, the image of motion, the linguistic term 'music' or a picture of a swan descending on the lake, as suggested by Tchaikovsky himself through the title of the symphony.

Employing Langackerian terminology, for each translator, various elements within this semiotic complexity will gain different salience. The passage which the first listener opens will be shaped by a number of images he retained from the witnessed performances. Thus what they single out among the signs which they receive is perhaps the idea of lightness, prompted by the memorised movements of ballet dancers. Thereby, the initial semiotic chain becomes narrowed. What is given priority is this element within the semiotic stream which conveys the sense of lightness, and which may be perceived as the quality of volume. In this way, the reception of the melody already starts being personalised. Additionally, the sign which conveys the idea of 'lightness' changes the direction of signification process, turning it back towards the remembered image of a ballet dancers. Now this image becomes incorporated into the mental construal of the melody.

The second listener will translate the fragment differently. They have not seen the performance, yet as an experienced violin player, they know what it feels like to produce a similar melody. They are not only familiar with notes and capable of executing the proper movements, but they also have a long history of demanding practice; perhaps hours spent on perfecting articulation and physical pain which the practice entailed. So upon hearing the given melody, from the semiotic complexity they may single out a link which the players manage to execute with the bows to perform staccato. It is this link which draws their attention particularly, because they are aware of how difficult it is to achieve such an effect. Consequently, it is the connection between particular notes that becomes the centre of focus. This may also divert the semiotic stream towards the listener's own bow, reminding them that it needs more colophony for the sound to be better and closer to the perfect timbre which they have just heard.

In this way one may see how the original semiotic stream, although approached as the same, yet having passed through the translating channels of two individuals changed – and in each of them it was enriched, dispersed into more divergent semiotic relations. These two translations did not contradict each other, but rather developed the potential contained within the semiotic complexity even further.

Nevertheless, a momentous question arises – how is it possible that despite the divergencies which appeared later, the two subjects still translated the basic melody in the same way, and regardless of the impression it made on them, without any doubt they would agree that they both heard *Swan Lake*'s finale?

This takes the analysis to the next point which must be addressed, namely a highly intimidating attempt to account for the similarities between particular translative processes.

3. I am a firm believer in the idea that simplicity is a good indicator of how accurate is the solution proposed to the problem which is being considered. Simplicity however does not preclude radicality – not infrequently, one actually entails the other. And it is no mean feat to answer how it is possible that each

individual, if disabilities or abnormalities are excluded, shares their perceptions of the world with others. After all, philosophers have been forever attempting to provide a solution, arriving only at a partially satisfying outcomes. In the same way, scholars of translation now admit that it may be in fact more challenging to explain why translations are similar to one another, rather than why they differ (Marais 166:2018). Therefore, when these two questions coalesce, the difficulties superimpose and one must exercise extreme tentativeness in proposing a panacea, with full awareness that it cannot be entirely exhaustive.

I will propose three essential pillars which may be responsible for the stability and commonality of the semiosphere's structure.

The first preliminary yet fundamental factor which I would like to point to as the one which fulfils a unifying role is time. It must be observed that it is not merely the referential nature of concepts which imparts semiosphere with dynamism. Each phenomenon within the tradosphere is akin to a waterfall; at first glance seemingly static, it is in fact an incessant motion. All its constituents are subject to constant transformation – what accounts for it is the passage of time.

Time is movement which modifies the tradosphere together with the subjects. If what makes the intersemiotic shifts possible is empty space, time turns out to be this vacuity which together with the individuals grants energy to all semiotic systems. Simultaneously therefore, it turns out to be an integral element within every subject – it constitutes this part of vacuity which flows in the same way through each of them. This basis of their 'vacuous identity' which the individual shares with others. It can be therefore suggested that time is a factor which unifies all translative processes. Intuition and experience seem to confirm it – in other words, time flies for everybody in the same way.

The second pillar which I would like to present as a unifying factor requires an appeal to the most primal intuition of the fathers of translatology. I intend to argue that the crucial hint which allows one to understand what unites particular translations can be found at the very beginning of their theoretical reflection. Namely, one should draw on the most fundamental distinction recognised already by Ancient Greeks and later explicitly formulated by St. Jerome (see Chapter 2.), which until today remained perhaps the most basic, strategic ramification for every translator. And this is a choice between rendering the text word-for-word or sense-for-sense.

The word-for-word translation, or 'literal' as it is sometimes called, involves rendering every element of the source text separately. It does not take into account an entire sentence or the context in which a given term appears. Thus it is as if technical, mechanical, one might say 'blind'. Such a procedure need not be reflexive and therefore, in translation practice it is often a task which may be performed by a machine. It may often also lead to local mistakes, and as far as representing the broader, deeper sense of the text, it is usually unreliable. On the other hand, sense-for-sense rendition requires complex, cognitive processing of the original meaning in order to work out the best way in which it might be expressed in the target language. That is why it necessitates the a conscious individual, who could use their combined creativity and knowledge to convey the original message (Guo and Wan 2022:23).

Let us briefly contemplate a famous example of the distinction between the two strategies, provided by Eugene Nida in his work on the translation of the Bible. The central figure in the New Testament doctrine is the so-called 'Lamb of God', whose role is to redeem humanity by offering itself as an innocent sacrifice for the burden of the original sin. The text appeals to the image of a lamb, since in the cultural circle of the original the

animal used to be considered a symbol of innocence. Nida's goal was to construe a similar image in the target text. Because he worked on producing a version of the text in the Inuit language, a word-for-word strategy would mean using an equivalent of the word 'lamb' in Eskimo. However, taking into account the entire biblical story, the fact that the sacrificed creature was to be associated with innocence was of paramount importance. The Inuit naturally have no particular connotations with a lamb, or perhaps not even an image of it since the animal does not inhabit their surroundings. An animal which is however perceived as essentially innocent in the Eskimo culture is a seal. So attempting to better convey the New Testamentary message, Nida decides on a sense-for-sense strategy and translates the 'Lamb of God' as the 'Seal of God' (the choice also corresponds roughly to his distinction into formal and dynamic equivalence – see Chapter 2. for an extensive discussion of the two techniques).

One must however observe that these two strategies are in fact subject to a specific, necessary order. Before a given original could be translated in terms of sense, the word-for-word procedure must always take place. It seems to be a precondition and an essential, preliminary step towards understanding. Even though it would yield mistakes when left as an exclusive strategy, it is actually an activity which must be done in the same way by every translator. And on the word-for-word level, it is done by them in a largely similar manner. Of course, they may still encounter polysemous terms, yet every informed translator remains aware of the scope of polysemy, so they still remain in agreement as far as this scope is concerned. It can be demonstrated again using the biblical example above. Before a choice of any target expressions can be considered, the translator needs to identify the original term and its significance. Every person must then first understand the word in the source language – recognise that the noun 'lamb' may refer to an animal (as a young sheep), its meat (in the context of potential consumption) or a person (characterised by meek personality). And while they may differ as to which of these meanings comes to the fore in the original text, such a basic scope of reference should be embraced by every translator. Only having recognised it can they decide which meaning is applied in the text, and subsequently, what kind of the target expression should they look for.

I suggest that an analogous course of action must be obeyed when the intersemiotic translation of reality is being carried out.

First, there must be a precondition of the word-for-word processing. What exactly does it mean within the semiosphere? Similarly to the translator, the subject is faced with the original semiotic material which precedes and surrounds them. This plausibly corresponds to the way in which every conscious individual fins themselves in the world. They do no witness their own emergence – rather, gradually start recognising the things around them, such as objects, animals, people, natural phenomena, etc. Initially then, they observe and process the semiospehere by smaller chunks, portions which are immediately embraceable. Every individual observes and learns the structure and function of these smaller elements, before they can make upon them any further, more complex operations, such as viewing them as metaphors, grouping in abstract generalisations. Such a first step is taken by each subject alike, who in this way starts understanding – building the parts of semiosphere through their gradual perceptual-translative activity.

This should not be confused with the stages of language acquisition, as it happens in the case of children who learn their mother tongue. In this case, generalisations are known to come first, for instance when a child initially calls every animal as a 'dog', because it was told that their pet is a 'dog', and it is the only animal they have got to know (cf. Fenson 1996). In contrast, the phenomenon which is being described here refers to a more

primitive procedure – namely, the mechanism of observing and orientating oneself in the surrounding semiotic reality.

This should also be illustrated by an example.

Let us imagine two people who observe a bird. One may ask – how is it possible that despite obvious differences in their histories, experiences, imagination, etc. they nevertheless see the same animal and on such a basis are able to interact both with the creature and with each other in a synchronised way? As emphasised throughout the following study, the process of translation is not pure creativity, and hence, at its foundation, it must yield at least partially overlapping outcomes. When the two people notice the animal, they are faced with a certain amount of semiotic material, the original text. The identity of each of them is a translative passage which allows for the semiotic flow. So the first step must be a word-for-word translation. In the process of creating the common construct, the translative channel transmits these elements of the source material which are simpler, smaller and embraceable. In the case of a bird, these may be for example its colour, shape, the sound it makes or the texture of its feathers. These portions of semiotic data naturally remain essentially referential in that they are a basis for unfolding further chains of signification, yet in themselves they are finite portions of data. In this sense, one might also say that the process of construction is simply realised in a bottom-up fashion.

Having carried out the word-for-word procedure, the sense-for-sense translation may begin. So each person may open the way for those elements of a semiotic complex which spread much further in the semiosphere, in directions which are person-specific. These are for example all the associations which the bird may evoke connected with their individual, past experiences, its linguistic description, the knowledge which they may have gathered concerning the species, etc. All these semiotic chains are essentially infinite and constantly changeable. So when the subject lets them unfold, they will never be able to embrace them in extenso. They must naturally make certain choices as to which parts of the semiotic material they grant access. And this is where the divergencies between the two individual perceptions start to appear – at the level of translating sense-for-sense. Its results are infinitely complex, and utterly personalised target texts. Nevertheless, they must retain a common foundation, which was created thanks to word-for-word processing.

The reader is encouraged to appreciate how the proposed argument coincides again with the insight of another famous empirical thinker – George Berkeley. Above, I pointed out the similarity of a ‘void subject’ to Locke’s idea of blank slate. Now, also the Berkeleyan claim – *esse est percipi* – finds here a fitting confirmation.

According to Berkeley’s formula from the *Treatise Concerning Human Knowledge*, perception is what grants existence, and conversely, existence consists in the act of perceiving. When subjected to a radical interpretation, the overarching axiom of his subjective idealism may lead to such risky and questionable conclusions as a solipsistic vision of the world or, as critics mock, the disappearance of things once they are not looked at (see e.g. Roberts 2007). However, when Berkeley’s claim is applied within the intersemiotic framework, it gains an appealing clarity. As a product of an incessant translative activity, the phenomenon such as a bird is constructed and held within the channel of an individual – and there it is simultaneously realising the purpose of the translator’s existence, while at the same time being able to exist itself. The precondition of word-for-word analysis is something that might guarantee the same foundation of the construct whenever it is created through any other translative channel. This may enable one to account for the shared basis between the subjects who nevertheless, if I may put it this way, ‘support reality in their respective minds’.

At this point however, a valid question may be raised – in the end, are there actually two birds or one? If the translators are creating two distinct target texts which differ in terms of what is given focus and where the subsequent semiotic relations unfold (as it was demonstrated in the previous section), does it result in an endless proliferation of outcomes? Or is there at least a part of the target text which constitutes one entity created from a common semiotic source – an outcome of several translators' mutual effort?

If the reader was charitable enough to accept the line of reasoning offered so far, they should already suspect that it is the latter question which should receive a tentatively affirmative answer. In order to illuminate this perspective better, first I must address the question of the existence of other translators.

The legacy of Berkeley was not evoked without a reason. As mentioned above, his idealism was and remains vulnerable to the accusation of endorsing solipsism (cf. Thomas 2006). Even though he offers an argument in which he attempts to prove the existence of other minds, it may be viewed as unsatisfactory, and the conclusion which immediately follows is that the world exists only within a solitary perceiving mind, furnished by ideas whose origin is the Absolute. Similarly here, one may conclude that the vacuity within the translating subject is in fact the place through which the elements of tradosphere are constructed. Is the target text inside the translative channel? If so, then on what basis can one assume that there are also other translators?

It must be stated explicitly that the threat of solipsism can never be ultimately neutralised. From the perspective of a single translator – and this is the only perspective available – around them there is only the semiotic amalgamation and the structures they form within. To evoke once more the Jungian metaphor, the opposite edge of the abyss which separates one individual from the other one will always be out of sight, and their presence or absence remains an uneasy presupposition. One my only attempt to build a bridge towards this opposite edge using a fragile matter of speculation. Berkeley also admits that one cannot find ultimate evidence for the existence of other minds. What he offers instead is a tentative conjecture 'that there is a certain collection of ideas, as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion like until ourselves, accompanying and represented by it' (Berkeley 1710: Principle 148). Such an argument seems to be a reasoning by means of an analogy (Urmson 1982).

In addition, it is supposedly strengthened by a religious frame applied by the British philosopher, who embeds his system in an overarching scheme designed by God; in the end he was to be the creator of the reality and the origin of other spirits, whose bodies one could see. Such a reasoning however could hardly be considered satisfactory – the religious justification is naturally tainted by a serious bias. And while I would not dismiss resorting to analogy as an aid in reasoning, here such a point feels slightly too unreliable for the chosen purpose. After all, the similarity of bodies ceases to apply when one takes into account for example the members of other species or a potentially constructed artificial intelligence; and they all evince a behaviour which might testify to possessing some form of consciousness – being potential subjects within the semiosphere.

Clearly, the framework of the following research cannot and does not aspire to provide any ultimate proof regarding the existence of other subjects, who, unlike the Berkeleyan 'spirits', are here understood as translative channels. It is possible however to suggest a different line of reasoning. Disposing of the problematic religious explanation, I would argue to essentially reverse Berkeley's perspective. While he claims that one should observe the bodies of other people and from their similarity to one's own infer that they are also 'spirited' beings, I would rather suggest to look first at the rest of the semiotic material – and from its nature try to make a conjecture regarding the presence of other translators.

The argument might start from asking a ridiculously simple question: in everyday life, how does one translator know that there are other people who perform his practice? Among other things, they know because there are other translations which they can get to know. The same might be happening on the existential level.

The particularity of one's translation may remain paved over in silence and never be made accessible to other translators. The first listener of the *Swan Lake* discussed above may of course never learn about the recollection of pain which accompanied the music heard by the other person. But the moment one of them formulates a representation of their experience – make their target text manifest to the other listener, they find out about the limitations of their own translative work. They learn about the possibility of making other sense-for-sense translations. And what is highly significant about it is that they get to know that having carried out word-for word procedure, sense-for-sense translation can be conducted in a different way.

Even though the finite, non-abstract elements were translated in exactly the same way – both individuals heard sounds of the same pitch, volume, tone, etc. – when they exchange descriptions of their experiences, each of them realises that on the basis of the same foundation, further different semiotic relations were formed. And crucially, since they involved signs of abstract nature, these new semiotic chains were created indeterminately. Of course, they might still be the result of a random combination, and not a choice of the other conscious translator. But the fact that one can relate to the target text thus created serves as an indication that it was constructed by a subject similar to oneself.

Moreover, this leads one directly to the realisation that, given the indeterminacy of semiotic chains which other individuals share with oneself, the original semiotic material which they face has an infinite translative potential. In other words, it is the richness of the original text and seeing other translations of it that prompts one to surmise that these target texts were produced by other translators. In yet another words, it is the moment when translations are being made manifest and compared, the moment when against the background of similarities they share, suddenly the unexpected, utterly unpredictable differences come to light. So in the end, it is the point when the translator begins to create and share a representation of their initial translation – when they start to create their truth.

But this of course already encroaches on and prefigures the central aim of the next step in the following study – which is an attempt at explaining what truth means within a reality understood as the semiosphere. For now, let the above reasoning be accepted only as an argument in favour of the presence of other translators – whose existence might be inferred from the complexity of semiotic amalgam and the multiplicity of target texts.

I would like to support this point by making one more recourse to the Wittgensteinian legacy, since I believe it corresponds well to the perspective offered above. As an eminent interpreter of his works Wojciech Sady states, a fundamental thesis of the *Tractatus* is that a sentence is logical picture of a situation. He also claims that it is possible to carry out an exhaustive analysis of a sentence by decomposing it into its simplest parts; and if so, then it is also possible to relate such a decomposition to the structure of reality, which is supposed to consist of his mysterious, fundamental 'objects'. Later though, in *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein realises that conducting such an analysis in an exhaustive way is impossible, since meaning in the natural language remains infinitely adjustable to the context. Sentences then become not pictures, but rather tools in various 'language-games' (Sady 2.)

The philosopher provides an example of a seemingly simple statement: 'My broom is in the corner'. Attempting to examine all its possible meanings he shows that there is an endless number of senses which such

an utterance may convey (for instance 'Please, clean up the mess', 'I should keep my things tidy', 'This is not a proper place to keep a broom' etc.). The rules that govern the usage of even the most basic expressions are infinitely complex, and therefore remain beyond the scope of any exhaustive analysis (Wittgenstein 1958:60). As the reader knows, this paves the way for the theory of 'meaning as use', whereby what is being communicated depends crucially on the circumstances and the actions of language-game participants.

Wittgenstein's insights from the *Tractatus* and *Investigations* however do not necessarily stand in contradiction, and additionally both seem to have here an interesting application in the following research. In line with what is being argued here, reality would be indeed decomposable into certain basic elements – signs – whose forever chameleonic and volatile nature corresponds to the Wittgensteinian 'objects'. Furthermore, these elements become conjoined into structures according to specific rules which depend on a given semiotic system – in language words governed by grammar build up sentences, in physics the movement of waves builds up into sounds of a specific pitch, and so on. At the same time though, when the stage of this initial composition is passed, which was here presented as analogous to a preliminary, word-for-word translation, the structures created in this way may become subjected to sense-for-sense translative exchanges. And then the possible number of ways in which this might be done is endless. Just as it is impossible to conceive of all the language-games which can be played with one expression, the same melody can be heard – translated – in countless ways. When the first stage of translation is performed, the semiotic material possesses an inexhaustible combinatorial potential.

What Langacker demonstrated as perceptual changes resulting from structural shifts in syntax, Wittgenstein showed to be an inherent semantic richness of language which stems from its endless adjustability to the situation and its users. And within reality understood as the semiosphere the same joinability characterises every phenomenon, which may combine with all other signs and give rise to multiplicity of utterly random semiotic chains. How does it relate to the problem of the subjects' solipsistic loneliness? As argued above, I would claim that it is these arbitrary, indeterminate sense-for-sense translations and their multitude that one may consider as a trace of the existence of others. Such an argument in the end also uses an analogy; sense-for-sense translations are made creatively, just as I am able to create mine, so this perhaps allows me to suspect that there are other individuals. Yet it is not an analogy between the individuals' physical shape, but between the creative richness of the semiosphere which testifies to the fact that it is an outcome of their translative work.

Now, the aim of the reasoning developed so far was to point to these aspects of the semiotic reality which might allow one to believe that within the tradosphere there are also other subjects who act as its co-creators. If this argument can be accepted, one is ready to continue to reflect on what unifies particular target texts. Specifically, returning to the example of a bird suggested earlier, if there are indeed many translators, then are there many various different copies of the animal or is there only one? Taking into consideration everything which was as established above, the reader may now hopefully understand why the latter seems to be the case. Particular subjects perform word-for-word translation from the same semiotic material into the same basic target construct. But because of the infinite signifying potential which this common creation retains, they may each contribute more to its complexity. So in the end there is a basis which can be continually developed, extended by the sense-for-sense relations added through different individual channels.

An attempt to address the problem of the translator's existential loneliness may now serve as a direct transition point to the third factor to which I would like to point out as a constraint on the way in which

semiosphere is being processed. And this is because the third dimension steps in the field of ethics, which, as the reader is clearly aware, cannot be considered if the presence of others is not at least assumed.

I offer this point as the last one, since it seems to be the least binding from the perspective of a particular translator. What I mean here, is that adherence to any ethical rules remains a matter of choice and is always dependent on the subject's free will. Therefore, compared to the previous two factors (i.e. being steeped in time and having to translate word-for-word first) their influence on the individual's decision-making process is least powerful.

At the same time however, it is precisely the presence of other translators, their works as well as their reactions to one's own translation that affect the way in which one performs the process in translation practice as commonly understood. So on the cognitive level, this interaction and mutual concern will also determine the way particular subjects continue to shape their target text, once it is made manifest. Let us therefore consider the aspect of translational norms and their role in unifying the structure of semiosphere.

Within translation theory, the notion of norms has been extensively elaborated. It is the precisely defined principles which ensure that the nature of the activity will remain translative, and not entirely creative. One of the scholars who suggested a basic taxonomy of translational rules was Gideon Toury. He defines a norm as a 'performance instruction […] specifying what is prescribed and what is forbidden, as well as what is tolerated and permitted in a certain behavioural dimension' (Toury 1995: 65). He subsequently distinguishes three basic categories: the preliminary, initial and operational norms. It is useful to consider the significance of each, to see how they may be later referred to the sphere of translations within the semiosphere, and regarded as constraints which ensure social order.

Preliminary norms determine the choice of text as well as directness of translation; whether it is based on the original or treats any other translation as a source text. When applied to a potential subject and their task within the semiotic complexity, this would be the choice which determines the fragment of reality they focus on and the medium or media through which they access it.

Initial norms refer to the overall strategy chosen by the translator – whether his priority is appealing to the linguistic and rhetorical standards of the target culture (which will be later roughly identified with domestication) or rather if the goal is a very close adherence to the original (foreignization). In ontological terms this choice would be crucial. It would determine whether the overall task is to meet some practical, social goals and communicate effectively with the rest of the community or to challenge the cognitive conventions which they have set in order to achieve a potentially new discovery.

Lastly, the operational norms are strongly connected to which of the above strategies was adopted; in textual practice they dictate particular translative choices and organisation of the work. In broader, epistemological sense, they may refer to particular tools which one would apply for their investigation.

Last but not least, the discussion around principles regulating a translative activity could not be complete without taking the problem of evaluation into account. Since its very origin, translation theory has been replete with notions carrying a heavy axiological burden. Terms such as 'faithful', 'loyal', 'proper' or 'treacherous' are only some examples of a standard, merciless repository of expressions used to evaluate the translator and their product. Whatever changes the original undergoes, they are the saviours of its value in the eyes of the target audience, and at the same time the culprits of every loss. As it therefore turns out, the process

is also modulated by certain much more fundamental principles than those which are involved in the choice of available strategies.

In fact, it may be argued it is the ethical rules that underlie the translator's work and safeguard it from proliferating into unbridled creativity. An unquestionable authority in the field of translation norms, Andrew Chesterman, in his classic volume *On translation ethics* rightly points out that what precedes the idea of norm is actually the concept of value; a given principle would not start to be prescribed if it was not an embodiment of something perceived as good or proper (Chesterman 170). So according to him, when trying to specify what puts constraints on the act of translation one should determine what values it aims to uphold. I will now briefly recall Chesterman's typology, to subsequently show how it may be referred to the subject who attempts to comprehend fragments of their semiotic surroundings. His theory is also valuable, since it constitutes another interesting intersection point between theories of truth and translation.

Chesterman distinguished four fundamental translative values. The first and at the same time overarching idea is that of clarity. It is derived from awareness of the target reader who should be able to recognise the message intended while producing the work. Facilitating this recognition is therefore relativised both to the target culture as well as to the translator's knowledge of it. With respect to specific translative actions, such a constraint has a both productive and preventive effect. What should be avoided is confusion and obscurity, and what may be sought as a means of clarification is for instance iconicity – an attempt to reflect the meaning of a given message by its form (Chesterman 173-5).

When the value of clarity is acknowledged as a constraint on an intersemiotic translation, it requires from the individual to take into account the possible presence of other subjects; more specifically, they should consider how likely it is that the semiotic material which they chose (for example an original perception they had) resembles the original complex which is to be represented, and that it could be actually regarded as such by another person in the same circumstances.

The second value which should regulate the translator's work is truth. It may seem as if at this point the analysis begs the question – the research is supposed to help explain the concept of truth by putting it within the translative framework, and one of the principles of translation turns out to be truth. Yet this circularity is only apparent, since Chesterman evokes a very specific, quite narrow meaning of the concept. Although at first he recalls the idea of correspondence between the source and the target text, he quickly admits that this relation is largely relativised to the people who perform or order the task as well as their culture. In the end however, his understanding of truth comes down to honesty and maximum preservation of the source content. What it means for the translator to uphold this value is that they do not modify whatever does not have to be changed and that they do not wilfully deceive the target reader, instead making sure that they are using all the resources available to them in conveying the source message (Chesterman 177).

If these conditions are now related to a situation of the subject within the semiosphere, it should be assumed that their intention is to obtain a genuine knowledge of reality. When they are supposed to create its authentic representation for another person, they cannot intend to lie, and they should employ all the tools at their disposal to fulfil the task. Honouring the value of truth means also to be consciously prepared to face the nature of reality, no matter how crude or intimidating it may turn out to be.

The penultimate value which should guide the translator's behaviour is trust. In a paradigmatic situation, a person who was commissioned to carry out the translation should believe that the source text

embodies some sort of message, a meaning which is worth recovering. In the same way, their translation should later also convey an idea that is worth reading. For the translator both to have and inspire trust, it is necessary to possess such qualities as integrity, sincerity and authority. According to Chesterman together they can all be traced back to the Greek notion of 'ethos' – a virtue embraced by ideal rhetoricians (Chesterman 178). Exploring such origins further, it would certainly not be out of place to identify this translative trust with the concept of 'parrhesia'; a figure of speech extensively elaborated by Foucault, which denoted an intention to speak with honesty, and therefore truly (Foucault 1983).

A question may be raised, what would motivate an individual to make an effort of assuming such an honourable attitude. Here Chesterman draws on Anthony Pym, another eminent translation scholar who was mentioned in the following work already a few times. Pym points out that translators have always been torn between a choice whether to remain loyal to the original or to the target text. In the face of this dilemma, one solution was to believe in the existence of a higher, perhaps spiritual authority, to whom they would have to stay accountable. Meeting standards of such an authority would simultaneously make their work worthwhile. In practice however, it is more intuitive and common for translators to report to each other and be one another's quality criterion. In the end, establishing such bonds of professional trust might serve a higher purpose of improving general intercultural relations (Pym [in:] Chesterman 1992: 22).

How can these obligations be now applied to an intersemiotic translation of reality? Above all, the subject should be at least minimally non-sceptical to believe that they do not live in a solipsistic universe. Even though they are surrounded exclusively by signs, they must have faith that these signs do not remain a lifeless, chaotic illusion, but behind one of them there is another translator. This trust becomes a source of both motivation and restriction for their work. Awareness of the other's presence motivates the subject to seek a potential of meaning in the semiotic material which they encounter. They should assume that even if the semiotic systems were spun arbitrarily, by establishing relations between them it is possible to create an order, which is not merely liveable, but inspiring and worth continuous exploration.

At the same time, this sets a certain standard – the translator needs to bear in mind that the reality which they construct is not for their own benefit only, but it must also accommodate the other. It must be approved by them as an optimal dwelling place. This is how one may interpret Pym's claim that the translators become accountable to one another and ensure the maintenance of their work's quality. The individual might naturally conceive of a certain higher, spiritual being as the supervisor of the process and its judge. But such an assumption might be a weaker incentive, to the extent that there seems to be no tangible indication of such a being's existence; nothing which might serve as a foothold for constructing its image. In the case of other translating subjects however, their presence can be posited with much greater plausibility. Then whatever work is being done by one agent should be constantly compared to other translations – those areas of the 'tradosphere' which they find new or alien – so that finally the agent can regard them as benchmarks for his own choices.

The final value distinguished by Chesterman is understanding. In his own words, it is the aim to reduce 'communicative suffering' – exclusion or confusion. This may be achieved twofold: firstly, by maximising the number of readers who could comprehend the text, and secondly, by minimising the risk of the work being misunderstood. For example, whenever in the original there are culture-specific allusions, the translator should in one way or another supply their possibly most universal explanations (Chesterman 184).

When such a goal is assumed by a person within the semiotic amalgam, they should maximise the amount of contextual information which justify their choices. This means indicating that whenever they reshape their perception of a given phenomenon, they must strive to determine how this originally perceived semiotic complex was dependent on its circumstances, what preceding relations of signification might led to its emergence. They should try to enrich the target complex by the conception of its possible origins. In this sense, the new work should always be more extensive; this leaves a possibility for other subjects to further recreate and adjust it, which continually broadens and clarifies the scope of the common semiotic order. One's work cannot be thoroughly creative – if it is supposed to affirm its place and survive in the 'tradosphere', it must overlap and agree with as many existing chains of signification as possible.

In this way, it becomes transparent that taking into account the presence of other translators has a decisive impact on the final shape of one's target text. The work must be compared and consulted with them, passing through their test before any equivalence is affirmed and the individual can successfully act within the common 'semiosphere'. And this realisation serves as a transition point to the last problem which must be considered – namely, the nature of the original – for the presence of the other translator will turn out play there a key role.

4. Now I should address the question concerning the source of semiotic material; and
I would like to analyse it as analogous to the question about the status of the source text.

Translative identity of the subject – the fact that it is a channel which automatically modifies its surroundings – precludes their possibility of seeing the semiosphere without the changes they introduce. As the figure above shows, everything that they have access to are the semiotic chains which they themselves spin. So when faced with the problem of origins of the material, the individual should restrict oneself to a sceptical *epoché*.

Nevertheless, through observation one definitely notices that the semiosphere has an aggregative structure; signs are combined into complex objects and phenomena. As it was argued above, among all the semiotic systems it is the abstract, conceptual ones which possess the ability to converge with others. Serving as a binder, they enable the individual to connect signs which belong to other systems. So if there are aggregates, then their binder also appears to be nothing other than abstraction. Following this line of argument, the semiosphere's potential to assume certain forms and shapes would result from the fact that originally its substance consists in pure abstraction. And from this substance, through their translative activity, the subjects distil specific elements. Abstractness as a feature of concepts means that they can synthesise that which is common between separate phenomena. So essential abstraction I would understand as a maximum synthesis of all possible qualities or particular attributes.

This is merely a tentative, authorial argument which might be offered by way of explanation what is the ultimate 'substance' of the semiosphere and why I would identify it with abstraction. Yet the term itself is in philosophy heavily loaded and can be understood in various ways. That is why proposing such a postulate can hardly go without at least an attempt at further elaboration of its meaning, especially that the claim itself makes the model radically idealist and seems to be flying in the face of the subject's basic intuition, which recognises around itself the landscape of tangible phenomena, rather than a swirling cloud of ideas.

And yet, indeed, with elusiveness inherent in the very nature of the sign, I would strongly advocate to regard the foundations of the semiosphere as originally immaterialist. But what precisely could it mean? As it was observed, abstraction as such could be explained in various ways – it may signify a quality of remaining outside the spacetime, existing only in human thought, being ontologically dependant on something else, etc. (Rojek 2007:4). However, what all these different accounts of abstraction seem to share is that normally it is used with reference to something which has a derivative character; something that is 'abstracted', so drawn or detracted away from something else.

What may strike in the proposed model is that here abstraction is not posterior to the observed phenomena, but suggested to be their source. Is such a reversal indeed unacceptably shocking, illegitimate and devoid of support in philosophical history, with nothing but its clear adherence to the idealist tradition? I will try to point a few reason why it might not necessarily be the case.

First, such a solution seem ontologically frugal.

The human attempts at carrying out a form of metaphysical exegesis of reality used to begin with the perceivable surroundings, including objects and processes which comprise it. This was already a challenging task, given the fact that the observed phenomena had diverse nature and multiple qualities, all of which remaining changeable across time. On top of that, one could additionally recognise the sphere of ideas, concepts which possessed general, timeless meaning. Their ontological status has been the subject of investigations and arguments since the dawn of philosophy. It surfaced perhaps most vividly in the medieval period, later dubbed as the famous 'problem of universals', to which a plethora of solution was suggested, each under the pressure or influence of the authoritative position of religion (Moreland 2001). Age-old as the problem certainly is, the dilemma regarding ontological status of beings such as general concepts, terms denoting universal ideas or attributes as well as their relation to physical objects never seemed to have got off the stage. Frege himself proposed to divide reality into three realms – the dimension of physical objects, mental entities, and timeless, universal 'thoughts' (see Chapter 4. for an extensive discussion). Many of these attempts at introducing some kind of ontological order which take the physical dimension as a starting point end up with pluralist solutions, for the nature of phenomena which constitute it is most often incredibly complex. And while satisfying for some, nevertheless pluralist ontologies are certainly not characterised by simplicity.

If the order of understanding – and at the same time the ontological order – becomes reversed, the overall picture seems more unsophisticated and hence perhaps also more appealing, according to the rule of Ockham's razor. Above I attempted to argue that from experience once could see the 'binding' potential of abstract systems, which may serve as a premise to think that all structures which surround the subject are welded by means of abstraction, the latter being a sort of existential fundament which underlies the perceivable phenomena. In such case, the suggested abstract amalgam of qualities constitutes the basic texture of reality, out of which all other more complex compounds are build, which themselves do not have any tangible, primitive components; upon trying to decompose them, they remain divisible into infinitely elusive abstraction.

If such a perspective still seems unconvincing, one must observe that it finds a surprising agreement with the recently developed, intriguing theory of 'tropes', which lately has been gaining both philosophical attention and appreciation. The notion of a philosophical 'trope' was introduced in 1997 by D. C. Williams and defined as a 'particular, abstract quality' (Williams 1997). An inheritance of the reverent, Aristotle's ontological square and the categories he proposed within, there was a long tradition to regard that which is universal and

general as abstract, while singular, individual qualities as particular and concrete. The idea of a 'trope', impossible form the classical Aristotelian perspective, became a combination of the two – it was something abstract and individual at the same time. There are authors who also emphasise absolute simplicity of tropes (e.g. Maurin 2002).The theory then states in general that tropes are the ultimate building blocks of reality. Such a model is nowadays popular and frequently lauded, precisely for its ontological 'economy, elegance, asceticism, and amenability to clear formalisation' (Rojek 6).

The vision proposed in the following work aligns to a considerable extent with the above theory. Tradosphere would be similarly composed of certain basic elements, whose ultimate nature is abstract. Signs do not have any final shape or stable form. Their inherent function is to refer to something else, to send away from itself. In this sense, a sign is a purely abstract, 'natureless' idea, realising itself only by the function which it performs, namely that of indicating. At the same time, this function has an absolutely individual character, since each individual may read a given sign differently.

It is also interesting to note how the proposed order surprisingly brings to mind the biblical tradition – how it echoes with the momentous, enthralling statement 'In the beginning was the Word' (John 1:1). The following study however would be careful not to encroach on the territory of religion. Ascribing to the semiosphere an abstract foundation is here instead closely tied to the character of the original as a text which commences the translation process. This original, although naturally conceived by some author, even in their mind retains an idealist nature. It is then conveyed through a chosen medium, but assumes specific meaning again only in the mind of a particular reader, with its own essence being constantly elusive and thus inaccessible to the translator. One may of course argue that in practice, the translator may communicate with the author and consult their choices, to see the extent to which they reflect the original message. However, even upon such consultation, the source meaning still can only be expressed via a limited and distortive medium such as language, and therefore, in a primal form it remains private to its creator.

The arguments offered above hopefully justified the claim that the original semiotic material is at best inaccessible and unanalysable at worst. For this reason, what the following research suggests in the end is a certain shift of focus.

When individuals turn out to be the constructors of reality, although they are unable to see the original nature of the semiosphere – the essence of abstractness – they can make themselves a potential object of analysis – as the authors of tradosphere's observable structure. That is why, on the scheme presented above, the original object of signification is replaced by the second translator, another individual, who may become a goal of enquiry. Since it was argued that it is the translator's presence that gives rise to the proliferation of semiotic systems and enables their mutual dialogue, what logically follows is that it is only the other individual who can be regarded as an equal author of the reality's structure and its sole basis.

2. Truth as an act of intersemiotic self-translation

Risking a platitude – inevitable yet necessary to acknowledge – within the suggested framework truth may still be understood in various ways. It can be identified with the entire reality – then it is equalled with the totality of semiosphere driven by channels of translative subjects. Alternatively, truth may be taken as a source of changes within such reality and the mechanism of its organisation; the source of semiotic chains. Then it

should be the individual, similarly undergoing a constant evolution, through modifications which they introduce around themselves. In both cases truth has a dynamic, processual character which cannot be enclosed within any finite, static description, since its foundation remains an individualised decision process – the translative activity.

The goal of translation is to understand the original and construct its most faithful representation. If the question about the nature of truth has a translative backbone, then it should be understood as an attempt to get to know and reconstruct the semiosphere (or is chosen fragment) in possibly the most accurate way. In this sense, the translational approach to truth remains in the spirit of the correspondence theory; it is one of the ways in which this theory might be specified or refined.

So according to the proposed model, once a given initial semiotic chain is developed, truth consists in an attempt to recreate it by means of another one. Such a recreation is always a new structure, and the system which is used is different – otherwise it would be a mere repetition. That is why the activity should be considered as a form of intersemiotic translation.

Moreover, it also remains an act of self-translation. Why must that be the case?

The process begins when the subject gains a certain initial, unitary experience of reality, a representation of which they intend to create. As everything within the semiosphere this initial experience is a semiotic chain. For them it becomes a source text. Subsequently, the individual constructs a stream of semiotic relations within a new system – it becomes a target text, an outcome of translation process. Since the medium is different, the newly determined chain will never be identical to the original one. But crucially, both paths are charted by the same subject; so in the end, it always remains an act of self-translation. The equivalence which they later decide to establish between two semiotic chains – validation of the pursued truth – becomes thereby created by the translator.

Now one may attempt to specify several further insights which transpire once the translative character of truth is acknowledged – and how they help to address the aporia which motivated the foregoing research.

If truth consists in the process of an intersemiotic self-translation, it means that it is a derivative product; an outcome of one's cognitive reworking. As a constantly refined target text it is not only dynamic and changeable, but also necessarily imperfect, and the task of its improvement may continue interminably. Furthermore, it will always remain relativised to an individual who creates it. But this is a specific kind of relativism. Different translations of one original are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they testify to the semantic richness of the source text and an endless possibility to explore it. Similarly, truths constructed by different subjects do not undermine one another. Instead, they may be perceived as constant refinements of their collective worldview, and the divergencies which might occur between them only add finesse to the continually developed tradosphere.

The relation which such truths retain to the semiosphere is analogous to translational equivalence between the source and the target text. Validity of such equivalence depends strongly on the restrictions and requirements posed by other subjects, yet ultimately becomes affirmed only by the individual who performed a given translation process. Consequently, it is also the translator alone who will bear the consequences of holding the truth which they constructed. It may complement or enrich the visions of others. Yet if it drastically diverges from the tradosphere, it will impair both the individual's existence within the world and their communication with others, impelling thereby the translator to introduce certain revisions.

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The theoretical sketch proposed above remains at this point fairly speculative. It therefore behoves me to illustrate it with an example. To that end, I will make a recourse to the history of art, and suggest an analysis of what was perhaps one of the most moving contributions made to the field.

Before I start, in order to forestall the objections which perhaps already start to arise, I shall justify why this particular area was chosen to apply the theory. After all, as the stern, attentive reader may revolt, the artistic field is not where one typically expects or looks for the truth. It is commonly thought that works of art represent extremely personalised impressions of the world rather than aim to create its faithful representation. This is true.

However, throughout the following work, plenty of standard examples have been brought up and analysed, both in the chapters devoted to the examination of theories and in the subsequent sections where the 'semiotised' vision of reality was being outlined. Step by step, one could see various ways in which an act of intersemiotic translation was carried out in circumstances when the question of truth and its definition was arising. In the correspondence theory, the perceptual carving of facts was recreated in linguistic structures. In the coherence theory, one's beliefs were being reshaped into a language of the system of commonly shared knowledge. The pragmatic account served as a demonstration of translating beliefs into actions, the deflationary approaches used translation to 'paraphrase out' the term truth from the sentences which applied them. And finally, the semantic theory placed translation in the centre of not only the general definition of truth, but also all of its particular applications, at the moment of transition between languages of lower to higher order. Subsequently, in the part which presented the world as a 'tradosphere', one might reflect on what unifies and what differentiates translative acts of individuals based on simple situations such as hearing a musical piece or seeing a bird. So now, instead of applying yet another stereotypical example, I would like to dissect a little more unorthodox situation, in the hope that its specificity will allow me to demonstrate also an equally multifaceted and comprehensive view on truth which was suggested in this work.

And with such a goal in mind, the choice of artistic field should appear a little less striking. Furthermore, none other than Heidegger and Gadamer would be unanimous in a claim that there is a strong connection between artworks truth (Malpas 2.3). For it is precisely in the act of producing a work of art that one strives to reveal their most authentic experience of reality, the most immediate, direct and intimate. It is also an area where these experiences are being shared and subject to common evaluation. Of course, too far-reaching generalisations are misguided and naturally, artistic motivations and goals tend to be as diverse as the number of creators themselves. That is why I will narrow down the focus to an instance of expression which arguably represents an attempt to share the author's vision of the world as well as himself. Additionally, it involves a combination of various media; an interesting superposition of different semiotic codes. Finally, a fascinating story behind the work seems an ideal reflection of the evolutionary process, by means of which truth is being translationally created, how it is constantly improved by the subject, how it continues to change the semiosphere around them, its author themselves and finally other individuals across time.

In a perhaps slightly overblown tone, the work which I intend to evoke is one of the most iconic paintings in history – namely, Edvard Munch's *The Scream*. In case the reader is not closely familiar with the intricacies surrounding the creation, I will take liberty of summarising briefly certain key facts, to be used as a background for subsequent analysis.

An artist of Norwegian origin, since childhood Munch lived in fear of inheriting a psychological problems from his father. As if in a stroke of a fatal self-fulfilling prophecy, he indeed turned out to have a severe mental illness, which is thought to have been a form of bipolar personality disorder. Subjected to a long-term psychiatric treatment, he additionally struggled with severe anxiety and alcoholism (Aarkrog 1990).

According to his own account, the inspiration to create the famous work came to him during a walk, when he was admiring a sunset. As the confession in his diary reveals, suddenly, when the sky turned red, the artist felt an intense wave of dread, sensing what he described as 'an infinite scream passing through nature' (Stanska 2016). The painting was naturally to be a reflection of this profound experience, and that is why, among other reasons such as novelty of technique, it marked the beginning of expressionist movement.

Yet before it gained due recognition, it became involved in a dramatic story which saw its final closure as late as only in 2021. Painted in 1893, the work was first displayed in Berlin as one of elements in the artist's solo exhibition. In 1895 however, when it was presented again, this time in Norway, its reception was far from favourable. Munch is said to have been deeply hurt by the criticism (Gustavsen 2021). A few years later, it was noticed that the painting bears a hardly visible pencil inscription, which seems to be penned by a shaky, fainting hand. For a long time it was thought to have been scratched on the work by vandals. Yet a close inspection involving infrared photography as well as examination of the handwriting carried out in the recent years managed to prove that the words were in fact added by Munch himself – as it is now argued, as a result of the scathing criticism levelled against the piece. The inscription says: 'could only have been painted by a madman' (Siegal 2021).

Now that the reader is familiar with the background, I would like to show how the entire story reflects the process of creating and subsequent reworking of truth by means of intersemiotic translation.

The process begun when Munch had an intense sensation during his memorable walk. He saw redness of the sunset; so as a subject-translator he established a certain initial semiotic stream by translating word-for-word the signs that formed the perceived phenomenon. The next step enriched the construct by sense-for-sense translation – this was the moment when the entire red landscape became personified and Munch linked the surroundinga with an image of a screaming person. Thereby, the complexity of semiotic construct he created increased, and at the same time started to be individualised. Of course, what specified the cognitive-translative work even further was a number of other ideas, images or concepts he might have added, such as the sensation of trembling, the notion of fear, etc. Such a target text remained in his translative channel as a memory, adding more specificity to the shape of his identity as a translator.

This horrifying, intersemiotic complex becomes now an incentive to preserve it by creating its representation – a representation which is supposed to faithfully render the phenomenon he observed. In this sense, it is supposed to be an expression of truth about his experience. Unlike a simple statement which a speaker may use in an attempt to make a truthful reference to events – a situation that is most often analysed by truth theorists – this act has a much broader, deeper goal. Not only does it aim to present a perceived fragment of the world, but also convey in this portrayal a vast scope of emotions, impressions and associations which accompanied the perception. That is why it should be considered not only a narrow reference to events, but actually a communicate enriched with the subject's reception of it – a target text made on the basis of the original.

Thus the work starts to be created. As a painter, the artist uses a visual medium, in which he tries to contain as many elements of the original semiotic complexity as possible; the chosen colours are most likely supposed to stand for the intensity of emotions, the head of the man in the picture elongates almost to the shape of a skull, which evokes a moral dread, just as his mouth split open to the limit, unable to make a sound, his throat tight with crippling angst.

In this case, the production of the painting as an example of truth-translation is particularly illustrative. Firstly, because as one learns from Munch's journal and contrary to what is commonly thought, the titular 'scream' comes actually not from the person, but from nature that surrounds him, for which he only remains a channel of communication. So it seems an astounding, metaphorical representation of how it is the semiosphere that expresses itself through the individual. More importantly, the physical production of the work is a fitting illustration of a processual nature of translative truth-creating. It took place in stages and there are in fact four versions of the painting, showing how Munch gradually strived to pin down his vision, starting form a pencil sketch which might have been a preliminary step, and then subsequently going through three more creative attempts. Moreover, such caution is indicative of an awareness which every translator has – they will be absent once the outcome of their work is admired, so the translation must be good enough to defend itself.

The target text is finished when Munch considers it to be sufficiently equivalent to his original intersemiotic experience. At this point it becomes exposed to the public.

As pointed above, some reviews turn out to be strongly negative. Intuitively, a work of art is not usually evaluated in terms of its potential truthfulness or falsity. Yet within the proposed framework, the damning reaction of critics may indeed be interpreted as a form of such a judgement. Why? Of course, the purpose of artistic creation is always manifold, and it remains such also in the case of the *The Scream.* But rather undoubtedly, one of goals – if not the primary one, although this is always a matter of speculation and remains a secret perhaps even for the author himself – was to faithfully render the experienced phenomenon.

The judgement of its detractors could be negative for various reasons; after all, the technique and style which Munch applied was novel and the final outcome is certainly striking. They may have derided a seemingly child-like simplicity of the brush strokes as opposed to the subtle grace which characterised impressionism. The impact of the piece was so strong as to offend the ethical sense of the audience, causing a 'moral indignation within the community' (Prideaux 88). And while the artistic quality is always a matter of taste, one thing can be established for certain. If the *The Scream* failed to impress many members of the public and inspire them with awe (taken here in the entire spectrum of its meaning, including both fascination and fear), then it also failed to accurately represent Munch's original experience. Upon sharing it with other individuals, it turned out not to be sufficiently equivalent to the source text. In this respect, its truth was called into question.

Subsequently, the reviews affect Munch himself. He starts to reconsider the value of his creation – and apparently also of himself as an artist. Even if he views the work as satisfactory, when faced with criticism he undermines the quality of the target text he produced, seeing that it does not convey the depth and gravity of what he witnessed. Others did not affirm the validity of its equivalence with the source material. This stage in the painting's history aptly captures the moment when every individual who decides to speak their truth has to meet the challenge of judgement. Equivalence which they have proclaimed is put to the test, and this test may be failed. What happens then? Translation of one's reception of the world is an ongoing process. So the subject may decide to continue modify the work. They may try to change not only the expressed truth, but also their own

identity – so the way they translate the tradosphere. Of these two tasks, certainly the latter proves more difficult and painful.

And yet this is exactly what Munch seems to have done. On the canvas there appears a hazy scribble: 'could only have been painted by a madman'. Now, knowing that it was inscribed by the painter himself, one can see that in an extremely powerful move he was thereby transforming not only the message conveyed by the work, but also his regard for himself. The meaning which lies behind this momentous change is naturally open to endless interpretations. Was it an expression of despair and desperation? Maybe anger? Or perhaps an outburst of sarcasm directed towards those who failed to recognise his piece as valuable?

No matter which of these meanings aligns most closely with Munch's intentions, one can still fully appreciate how clearly his deed represents a twofold transformation involved in truth-creating and truth-sharing process. On the one hand, the target text becomes enriched. Being a part of an infinitely referential semiosphere, of course every work of art is necessarily intersemiotic. Yet in this case it becomes overtly intersemiotic – *The Scream* is now not only an image, but a picture with a superimposed linguistic text, when its author – the translator – questions the reliability of his own cognitive work, which might have been compromised by mental illness. So the target text encapsulates now not only a depiction of how the semiosphere 'pours through' an afflicted mind, but also a how this mind revisits the depiction and in an act of absolute self-denial, undermines the truth it has attempted to create.

Moreover, the fascinating process allows another feature of translative truth-making to transpire. As it was emphasised in the scheme proposed in the previous section, even if prompted by the interaction with others, a translative truth always consists in an act of self-translation. Accordingly, in the story of the artist one may clearly see that both his initial experience on the bridge and the painting, together with all its subsequent versions are produced by Munch himself. He was the one who construed the red landscape as a scream of nature, and he painted what was supposed to be its representation. Both the multi-semiotic original and its translation were subjected to his manipulation. Additionally, the process shows an expansive feature of translational truth, since it involved both the material of tradosphere as a source of the initial experience as well as producing its enrichment in the form of the painting.

Fast forward, as time passes, Munch's canvas slowly gains appreciation. What does it mean in terms of translational evolution of his target text as an expression of his truth? Upon viewing the work, more and more people begin to recognise a similarity between the image and the way in which they experience their own condition as human beings. It is all the semiotic complexity contained in the picture – among perhaps many other interpretative dimensions, its potential to masterfully signify an intensity of a profound, utterly paralysing, speech-bound dread of an individual faced with nature's overpowering enmity. All this turns out to be similar to other subjects perception of the world and feelings which accompany their vision. Thereby, with growing unanimity, they continue to validate the equivalence between their own construal of the original and the way it was represented in the painting. In this sense, Munch's artwork as a construction of truth becomes accepted, thanks to the fact that it manages to accurately capture the correspondence between a certain state of human condition and its representation. Commonly agreed relatability is one of priceless values of his work which clinches its legitimacy as truth.

The Scream becomes now acknowledged as a revolutionary forerunner of expressionist movement. In 2012 the painting commands the highest amount of money paid for an artwork during a public auction (Vogel 2012).

Let the purpose of the provided example not be misunderstood. By outlining such an analysis I neither intend to claim that every artistic activity means creating truth, that such is its conscious goal, nor even conversely, that truth is essentially a form of artistic creation; though as it was pointed out in many places of this work, the two phenomena do share certain common features. To be clear, as it was contended throughout the following study, when truth's translational backbone was exposed, it turned out that, just as the process of translation, the idea involves a risky balance between creating and recreating. Munch's example was chosen for its unique story, which indeed seems to be exceptional among other artworks. Its relevance for the foregoing research consists in the fact that the process which the painter underwent is a superb demonstration of what it means to translate the semiotic reality in an attempt to express truth – a demonstration both metaphorical and literal. Beginning with individual reception of the source text, the process led through the choices involved in producing the target text of truth, which in the end became an extension of the original, transforming at the same time the translator's view of himself.

Finally, there is perhaps one more value of the provided example, by no means insignificant. It shows how the subject may attempt to make a plausible inference about the existence of other translators in the way suggested in earlier sections of the work. Namely, one might perhaps look at Munch himself and try to draw analogies between his appearance, his words or his behaviour and one's own, and subsequently presume that behind this complex of signs there is a semiotic channel which constitutes another individual. Yet such a supposition remains a faint hope, rather than a ground for a firm belief. After all, not only the painter's apparition and actions may starkly differ from mine, but they might as well be directed merely by a machine, an artificial intelligence. However, if one looks at the work he produced, the image seems to be reflecting and aligning with such a deep, uniquely intimate piece of one's own experience within the semiosphere that, arguably, it serves as a much more reliable premise to assume that it was authored by a being whose constitution is similar to oneself.

An outcome of the individual's modifying effort, fleeting, changeable, vulnerable to rejection and forever the subject of an equally biased judgement of others, the translational truth is perhaps not what one might wish for the idea to be. Yet as the story of *The Scream* shows, equivalence which was captured by the artist in the end defended its validity, thanks to thousands of viewers who bore out its universal quality. While such truth still remains only a transient meeting between the signs, a fragile impression of similarity between them, in a precarious world of the tradosphere, where countless semiotic chains crisscross, running relentlessly from an unseen beginning towards an imperceptible end, such an idea of truth is the only beacon which one may hope for and cling to.

3. Falsity – a gauntlet thrown to the original

No ground for the theory of truth, even if a merely preparatory one, can be considered sufficiently stable if it does not suggest how the opposite idea – falsehood – should be understood. As a frequent rule, the meaning of falsity follows somehow logically from how the account of truth itself is explained. For instance, if a theory

holds that a true belief is such that allows an individual to practically achieve their goals, then a belief which fails to meet this condition would be considered false. If a theory suggests that the truth of a given claim consists in its coherence with other theses which belong to a common system of knowledge, then those claims which are contradictory, should simultaneously be regarded as false. Nevertheless, even in these two examples, the pragmatic and the coherence accounts, upon closer examination the sense of falsity turns out to be more refined, and the explanation I have just given may very likely be deemed a gross simplification.

Therefore, to be consistent, if the following work argues that truth consists in the process of translation, then attempting to understand what is falsity, one should look for something which might be considered as opposite to this process.

It should have become transparent that, in line with the proposed framework, it is certainly possible to speak of the degrees of truth. Various conditions which regulate the activity were provided, and they can be clearly fulfilled to a greater or lesser extent. Surely, there are better or worse translations – their assessment must remain inextricably tied to the conditions and purpose for which they were created. No translation can be deemed right or wrong when abstracted from the context, if the circumstances of its creation, such as the goal and target audience, are not taken into account. Accordingly, I would maintain that truth inherits these features. The degree of its equivalence to the original structure shaped within the semiosphere depends on who the translator is, with whom and why they share the truth about what they experienced.

In point 3. of the following part I have suggested three factors which may regulate and unify translators cognitive activity, and therefore, later also the act of producing the target text of truth. So to some extent it is possible to determine the appropriacy of this target text if as a criterion of evaluation one chooses the degree of adherence to these rules. Such a perspective would largely coalesce with the view according to which truthfulness is a matter of common consensus. To briefly remind the reader, I have pointed to the factor of time, the precondition of word-for-word translation and the professional-ethical norms as to three regulators of translational practice. Out of these three, obedience to time is essentially inescapable – everyone must be subjected to its passage in the same way (to be maximally precise, the reader is of course well aware that marginal differences occur when the subject starts to moves at an extremely high speed – yet I allow myself to set aside such marginal cases). Second was the necessary step of translating word-for-word, which should be carried out by every translator in largely the same way. Here the first divergences may occur. On the level of translation practice traditionally understood, they stem from the gaps in the knowledge of the source or target language. On the level of intersemiotic truth translation they would be a result of a certain specific dysfunction of the translating channel (which may be understood as a form of disability or impairment; for instance when a colour-blind person states that the grass is grey). But both in the case of traditional translation and when it is aimed at creating truth such failed target texts should be regarded as errors rather than an expression of falsity.

Thus it seems that the widest scope for divergencies, and therefore also space for what might be called ‘mistakes’, is the stage of sense-for-sense translating and the moment of choice to what extent the translator will adhere to norms as well as ethical rules.

So let us assume that all the rules discussed above are grossly violated. Could this lead to creating something like the opposite of translation? Something which violates basic norms of the procedure to such a degree that it actually goes directly against the very idea of translating? Phrasing the question in such a way should already prefigure the answer which will be given. In order to pinpoint what falsity is, one has to recognise

and acknowledge the basic, most fundamental and inviolable assumption which, granted a fully capable translator, must be upheld when embarking on the process. Breaching it would mean the creation of falsity.

In order to gain a wider perspective and a proper background, let me share a brief hindsight.

'Nothing new under the sun' (Ecclesiastes 1: 9), one may conclude dolefully. Indeed, a rather anticlimactic feature of the human intellect is a frequent cyclicality of its ideas. Before one proposes a supposedly novel solution, it must be checked against the historical repository, for its origins and expression – not infrequently in a better, more eloquent form – are more than likely to be found somewhere among the insights of past thinkers. So when attempting to explain what should be regarded as a false translation, the author of the following work will make a similar step. For in order to fully understand what falsity is within the translative framework, it is necessary to make a recourse to the very beginnings of the philosophy of translation. Which means going back as early as to the thought of Ancient Romans.

I will draw on the guidance of *Roman Theories of Translation. Surpassing the Source* – a comprehensive key to the translation theory in antiquity, penned by Siobhán McElduff. The title of McElduff's work already somehow gives away the gist of the research. Her focus being the Roman literary translations from Greek, throughout the work the author highlights that one of important goals of translating in the Ancient Rome was to practice language use, eloquence and oratory.

The key figure among theorists becomes Cicero, who developed a mature translation agenda. According to the philosopher, a precondition of becoming a translator, was to be an excellent orator. The practice of translation itself was aimed at improving one's proficiency in the target language and the command of style. Crucially, translating was also supposed to improve the target language itself; not only as a tool used by a single individual, but as a whole, enriching its idiom and structure. Controversy starts to arise when Cicero emphasises that during the process, personality of the translator themselves should come to the surface, and as they try to render the power of the original words, their own voice must resound with full confidence. (McElduff 60-89). And here lies the crux of the matter. Among the Ancient Romans there was a widespread view that the translator's task was to outdo the author of the original text. To grasp the idea expressed in the source text and express it in the target text – but in a better way. To be a translator meant to be a rival of the author.

Hence the title of McElduff's study. Ancient Romans consciously downplayed the importance of fidelity in favour of a supposed qualitative excellence. This crucial goal was both explicitly reiterated by thinkers such as Cicero, as well as clearly visible upon analysing Latin translations of Greek tragedies and poems, for which McElduff provides numerous examples (the comedies of Plautus in Chapter 3 or the poetry of Catullus, Horace and Lucretius in Chapter 5).

What conviction necessarily underlies such an approach to translation? First, it is a belief that one can understand the idea contained in the source text. Second, that one is capable of expressing it better – more accurately, more skilfully, more impressively.

Since antiquity, such a flippant, 'I can do it better' attitude to the practice and its purpose has not disappeared. In the 20th century, an excellent example is the legacy of Ezra Pound. His translation agenda was nothing short of arrogant. It was both explicitly advocated by him as well as visible in his translations of poetry that the procedure had to actually involve a form of criticism. What was commendable in the original should have been picked up as an inspiration, and what failed to impress should have been removed. He also advocated a highly extravagant claim that translation does not require a good (or even any!) command of the source

language. He produced ‘translations’ of Chinese poems, which he gathered in a collection entitled *Cathay* (Pound 1915), based on the notes made by another scholar, Ernest Fenollosa (Moody 2007:239). No wonder that it is widely debated whether his writings should be actually considered translations or perhaps rather an independent, literary contribution to the literature (Twitchell-Waas 2020:207).

Similar practices are still being undertaken. As a fitting example one may point to Jacek Dukaj and his treatment of Joseph Conrad. According to the Polish writer, Conrad have been suffering from the lack of due appreciation among the Polish readership – and the precise reason was to be an improper language in which his novels were translated. Dukaj maintained that Conrad’s prose was impressively mesmerizing, and managed to send the minds of his contemporary readers into an unforgettable, overpowering state of awe. Needless to say, such an effect was achieved by the Polish versions only to a lamentably small extent, if at all. Therefore, he attempted to render the iconic *Heart of Darkness* with the aim of – as he himself declared – providing the Polish readers with the same mental experience (Dukaj, during a meeting with fans, Cracow 2017). And so, he translates the text using an experimental syntax and phrasing, frequently resorting to such risky solutions as the usage of modern slang. A capstone of work becomes a radical severance with a long-running tradition of translating the title, which in his version turns out to be *Serce ciemności* (Dukaj 2017). However, all along, Dukaj was acutely aware of the controversy of his approach – thus in the end, he pronounces his text not to be a ‘translation’, but a ‘polonisation’.

Naturally, any such experimental literary practices spark a range of reactions, from outraged condemnation to worship. Reflecting only on the idea of translation *sensu structe*, perhaps if one squints, works such as those by Pound or Dukaj could be considered as certain peripheral, translational anomalies – admissible on the grounds of freshness which they bring into the field or attention which they surely manage to redraw to texts which may have lost it. The author of the following research is not in authority to pass about them any strong judgement.

The above phenomena, dating back to antiquity until the modern times, were however brough up because of the consequences which an attitude that pervades them has, when one begins to analyse the epistemological significance of translation. I would argue that it is precisely such an attitude that may lead to creating falsity, and therefore, in the act of translational creating of truth, should definitely be disowned.

Let it be reiterated what assumptions seem to lie behind adapting such a dangerous translation strategy. Unavoidably, there is a conviction of equality – if not even superiority – between the translator and the author. There also appears to be a belief in the lack of limits as far as creational choices are concerned, and confidence in being exempted from translational (including ethical) norms. All of which might sound sufficiently incriminating. Yet arguably, the most serious offence is committed when one proclaims: ‘I can do it better’.

Why would it be the case? After all, numerous times throughout the following work it was maintained that the target text of truth actually extends and enriches the tradosphere, by drawing from its limitless significatory potential. That is correct. But such an enrichment meant creating still new sign relations and thereby realising the potential of the original semiotic material. On the other hand, in order to say that ‘I can do it better’, I purport to know what ‘it’ actually is. In other words, what the above proclamation apparently assumes is knowing exactly the meaning contained in the source text. On the level of traditional, textual translation practice one could perhaps try to defend such a belief, supporting oneself on excellent familiarity with the work and its origins, knowledge of the context of its creation or personal acquaintance and consultation with the

author themselves (though even if these conditions be met, I would remain strongly hesitant to regard such an approach as translative. After all, even Dukaj who seems to be sufficiently diplomatic to call his work 'a polonisation', declares to know what happened to the minds of the public who read Conrad's books when they were first published – a risky conviction, to say the least).

However, when the original remains some element of the semiosphere, such knowledge is by default impossible. I think that this a claim does not require elaborate explanation, yet for clarity, I will bring up at least the most conspicuous reasons.

Point 4. in the foregoing chapter was brief – and therefore likely judged as unsatisfactory – but not unwarrantably. As it was argued in that section, the subject does not know the origin or ultimate purpose of the semiosphere. Still more absurd would be to maintain that the individual knows the context of its creation or anything that goes beyond. Moreover, neither of its elements can be exhaustively described; this is precluded by a forever elusive nature of the sign itself and an endless possibilities of its interpretation.

It must be emphasised that it is impossible to steek a sign within a finite description – or as I would even argue – any description at all. Regardless of which of the frameworks developed by the semioticians analysed earlier one assumes, this aspect of a signs appears both unchangeable and essential. Its very nature is to point to something else, to cross-refer, to indicate. To be something different from what its observable structure is. That is why previously I applied the metaphor of a semiosphere as a waterfall. The incessant flow of signs being exchanged within semiotic chains makes it impossible to grasp any of its elements and define what it essentially is, since each of them sends away from itself. Risking a philosophically strongly loaded statement, a sign itself is pure potentiality – because it realises itself by a function, the function of pointing, which can be performed by anything. When the structure of tradosphere turns out to be so unstable and prolific at the same time, one can never proclaim to have exhaustively embraced even the smallest of its fractions.

There are more reasons behind the brevity of section 4. and at same time more reasons to withhold any proclamation of complete knowledge about the tradosphere. As it was argued earlier, in his typology C.S. Peirce recognised that there were signs whose reference to its objects was determinate, and the person was compelled to their specific interpretation, as well as those which enabled a certain interpretative freedom (A person had no choice as to the colour of the sky which they saw, but they could connote this colour with various associations). Later, Yuri Lotman recognised the division of reality into biosphere and semiosphere, in a somewhat similar way noticing that indeterminacy of signification seems to belong only to a specific dimension of reality – the sphere of human cultural activity, in which various semiotic systems were developed. Personally, I was attempting to show that in fact all phenomena perceived by the subject have gained a status of a sign. Thanks to an inherent referentiality of conceptual systems, which permeate the entire surroundings and merge with all other cognitive data which one receives, reality turns into a semiotic amalgam comprised of moving sign chains that can be exchanged through the vacuous channel of the subject.

Yet none of these approaches manages to provide an explanation for what freed the sign from its determinate reference. Or rather, approaching the problem from the opposite perspective, what opened the void of the individual and granted them the agency of decision regarding what to choose as the sign's reference. How did the emergence of concepts themselves come about if it is them that allow for unconstricted assignments between various signs? I attempted to show that if it is abstract semiotic systems which can be built, developed and connected with others, then every construct within the semiosphere seems to have an abstract foundation.

But even if such argument is granted and abstraction can be with some degree of plausibility regarded as the original substance of tradosphere, then the question still remains, what is abstraction itself and how could it constitute the foundation of reality, if it used to be understood rather as something which derivative.

This stream of doubts clearly shows that one is far from knowing what the original actually is and how it yields the translating subjects. Therefore, approaching the source text of tradosphere with an assumption that one understands the scope of its meaning is of course seriously misguided. I cannot do 'it' better, since I can never fully know 'it'. And it is precisely this fatal belief which could arguably lead to creating something which might be deemed false.

If someone intends to create their representation of some aspect of the tradosphere – and still be entitled to call it translation – it seems that an essential precondition is to accept this cognitive limit, and hence also the limitation of one's work. One must accept their subordinate nature with regard to the original, the fragmentariness of their view, and finally the ancillary function which one plays, being a tool for the original's realisation. An attitude of the subject-translator must be therefore characterised by an exceptional humility.

And since such an attitude must be assumed by the translator of semiosphere, it must simultaneously be retained by them in the moment when they embark on further translation, aiming to create truth. That is why the approach of rivalry and creative pride which follows suit appears to be directly opposing the aim of faithful representation. Thus whatever outcome it leads to, might be considered as falsity.

At this point, the analysis resounds with an echo of the Heideggerian final insight into the notion of truth. In the end, the philosopher defined its essence as a form of freedom, understood as allowing things to be (see Chapter 2.). In this sense, one may find another point of intersection between his vision and the model suggested in the foregoing research. The ability of choice between various semiotic paths – such as spinning novel associations, attempting to construct images which have not existed before, experimenting artistically with combination of different semiotic systems – is what marks the subject's inherent freedom of choice. But conversely, the act of creating truth must involve disowning that freedom, and surrendering to what they saw in the original, consciously imposing a limit to their activity, whose aim becomes essentially re-creative.

Taking the above reflections into account, it must be noticed that what ultimately allows to categorise a given target text as an example of truth or falsity crucially depends on the approach and intention with which it was produced. An immediate and significant consideration which follows is that within the proposed scheme, while there are different degrees of truth on various creational levels, falsity could be recognised only on the ethical ground. It is possible that a certain target text happens to have outrivalled the source one, if in one's assessment one applies certain subjective, aesthetic criteria. But if it was construed with a view to presenting the original in the most accurate way, it should still be regarded as truth. No translation can be judged solely on the basis of its outcome, without considering the translator's motive as its inseparable part.

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Now that a preliminary sketch of both truth and falsity was outlined, it should be supplemented with an example, so that one may gain a still more firm grasp on how the framework could be applied.

The previous illustrations were often drawn from the field of art, and this might have seemed an odd choice to be analysed in the context of a discussion around truth. But all of them were selected for their

particular multidimensionality; the way they reflected many aspects involved in truth-translating process. But it does not mean that the framework is only applicable to such whimsical, creative mixtures of expressive media.

I would like the reader to observe that it allows also to comment on much more standard problems which are brought up during the debate around truth. One such example is nothing else but the famous 'liar paradox'. After all, it was precisely this dilemma which prompted Alfred Tarski to suggest his own theory of truth, and simultaneously, it was in the semantic theory that the claim defended by this thesis – a translative nature of truth – was most conspicuously visible. So if the sketch outlined above is to be taken seriously, it should also allow one to make a reference to this age-old problem. The model outlined here does not aspire to offer something which could be considered a resolution to the paradox – but I would like to show that it is rather the presence of paradox itself that bears out observations made in the following study.

As one clearly knows, the problem may have numerous formulations. But for the present purpose it seems enough to recall its perhaps simplest form, close to how it was articulated already by Eubulides. If a liar says that he is lying, then is he lying or telling the truth? At this point an obvious conflict appears: if they are lying, they are telling the truth – or the other way round (cf. e.g. Glanzberg 2020). The problem is said to be exposing contradictoriness and ambiguity inherent in the notion of truth.

So far, the antinomy has earned itself plenty of possible explanations (cf. e.g. Prior 1961, Mills 1998, Kripke 1975, Barwise and Etchemendy 1987, Irvine 1992 et al.). It would be a misguided and spectacularly too far-reaching goal to comment or contest even the most prominent of them. Instead, from the perspective of this work, it seems valuable to see how the framework accounts for the emergence of paradox.

According to the explanation provided here, truth is a process of translation. Specifically, as it was argued, a process of self-translation, wherein the subject transforms his own construal of the original text into its target version. This is exactly what seems to be happening when the antinomy is formulated. First, the part of the sentence: 'A man says that he is lying' becomes translated. It is the original, which thanks to the process of word-for-word translation, the subject understands as a situation when a given man expresses a fact that he is lying. Then the paradox arises when approaching the term truth, and forming a question whether at this point the man is truthful. So the concept of truth in fact triggers revisiting the sentence – recreating it into a target text. The target text involves sense-for-sense translation, which yields the meaning of the entire situation: a man expressing rightly what he is doing – which can be called expressing truth. So the entire sentence is initially the source text, where through word-for-word translation one sees the activity of uttering the word 'lying', and then, via sense-for-sense processing it becomes the target text, according to which the man's statement is true. The contradiction appears because the sense-for-sense becomes superimposed on word-for-word translation, and they happen to be contrasting. But the contradiction is misleading – instead, it seems to be showing that the concept of truth functions as a self-translative trigger (my analysis align thereby with those theories who argue that the paradox is in a way illusory).

Tarski understood the problem as stemming from the ability of language to be self-referential, which he intended to resolve by introducing the notions of meta- and object language (see Chapter 5. for an extensive discussion). And his solution, a passage between the two linguistic levels, borne out precisely the very nature of truth as it was presented here – being an incentive for self-translation. The reader is welcome to admit the above reflection not as an ultimate deconstruction of the paradox, but as it was highlighted, taking the antinomy as an example when the translative function of truth turns out to be particularly visible.

But in the last part of analysis I would like to take up a possibly neutral, everyday situation – drawn from neither the controversial world of art, nor form the forever-divisive repository of paradoxes.

Let us imagine a person who has never seen the Western Wall and wishes to know what it looks like. They ask a recent visitor to Jerusalem about the colour of the monument. Let us further imagine that the answer which they receive is as follows: 'The Western Wall is crimson red'. I will attempt to reflect, in view of the proposed model and depending on the circumstances of the exchange, how such an answer my present itself in terms of its potential truth or falsity.

First, it is necessary to establish what might be the possible reason for giving such a response – so it is necessary to consider what possible source text could serve as the trigger for translation. I suggest to analyse two possible situations. First, at the point when the monument was seen by the visitor it was covered with a red paint, which had been earlier splashed all over the Wall by antisemitic vandals. Second, when the visitor saw the monument untouched, in the same way as it most often presents itself to the onlookers.

In the first case then, the original semiotic complex is the Wall covered by the red paint. The visitor carries out a word-for-word translation, which means that they see a red monument. As a result of sense-for-sense procedure, they recognise that the cover is only a temporary effect of the vandalising act, and the hue underneath is perhaps some shade of white. When asked about its colour they produce a target semiotic complex, whose role is to represent the original – a linguistic expression 'The Western Wall is crimson red'. So they must have affirmed equivalence between the two constructs. To what extent is the answer true? Could it be false?

It seems to be easier to analyse the statement's potential falsehood. As it was argued, in order to evaluate it, one has to take into account the translator's approach and their intention regarding the status of his work against the original. So if the goal was to make the person who enquired about the colour conceive the monument as different – in any sense of this word, including better – than the way in which it presented itself to the actual visitor, then their answer is false. It remains a possibility contingent on the translator's purpose.

What about the degree of truth which might be contained in their answer? On the level of limited, word-for-word translation, accepting equivalence between the two semiotic complexes seems rightful. But as the reader has certainly recognised, it is more than likely that the enquirer wanted to know the colour of the monument in general, not merely in the temporary emergency state, which would soon be erased by the army of security. And yet, hearing such a terse answer the person might imagine the Wall as build of red stones. So the answer does not seem to be conveying the sense of the original to a considerable degree; it should have been supplemented with an explanation that the present appearance is only an effect of a destructive attempt, while the original colour is different. Additionally, the translative norms do not appear to be upheld, since the translator who consciously allows the interlocutor to make a construal of the original which misses its crucial features, clearly violates the value of trust, communication or understanding. Finally, consensus is unlikely to support such a target text either; if the provided translation is compared to other responses which might be given, it would most probably diverge from many of them. For all these reasons, the produced text does not appear to be an exhaustive translation, and hence also does not convey a major degree of truth.

Let now the second case be considered – when the visitor finds the Wall generally intact, as it has been standing throughout its entire turbulent history, with the colour of limestone faded, shabby, greyish. They perceive the monument which is their original intersemiotic text. So they construct its image gradually, beginning by translating word-for-word all the immediate, finite elements of the scene. What stands out form

them, as their gaze embraces the entire hill, is a large crowd of people gathered at the bottom of the Wall, with their heads propped against the old stone, bent by grief over countless individuals whose blood was shed in the name of values and ideas represented by the remains of the Temple. So when the onlooker proceeds to translate the view sense-by-sense, combining both the physical and the abstract, associative elements, the image which they have in mind is that of the Wall covered by the shadow of bloody sacrifice made it its name. It is such a construal that may prompt the visitor to formulate the linguistic target text as 'The Western Wall is crimson red'.

How should the potential truth or falsity of his articulation be assessed? Should the statement be considered as false? It does not seem so. Upon facing the original, the person chose a specific aspect of its semantic potential, and subsequently, they constructed a target structure which in their view best reflected the sense of the original. As stated above, in evaluating falsity the intention of the translator must be taken into account. So if the individual in the chosen example did not utter their statement with the aim of embellishing their original impression, but rather conveying its complexity in the most thorough and exhaustive way, equivalence which they established between the source and the target text seems justified. Naturally, still if they are aware that the question was about strictly technical features of the monument, this target text should be further improved – most intuitively, by adding some form of explanation along the lines: 'It is white, however if you see it through the prism of its entire history…'. Such an supplement should be added so as to remain in compliance with the translative norms, and upon reflection how the initial sentence would divert from other possible responses. But in the end, the proposed target structure could be assessed as a proper start of creating truth.

By the same token, having experienced the compelling view as it was described above, the visitor might have answered plainly 'The Wall is white'. But would it be genuine creation of truth in a translative sense? After all, the subject would have constructed a target text which lacks a substantial portion of the semiotic material of the original. Even they themselves would not like to validate the equivalence between the two complexes. And without the translator's own consent, equivalence cannot be establish, let alone assessed by others. Their answer would therefore not be true according to the rules of analysis in the proposed model. It might even turn out to be false – if the translator accepted the supposed equivalence, and the reduction of the original complexity was done with an intention to present it in a better way.

The example above and the two situations analysed within were provided in order to show how the framework might be applied. One might perhaps say, that the assessment comes down to whether the translator is honest or not. However, although this aspect indeed plays a substantial role, especially in assessment of falsity, the translative analysis aims to grasp as if the technical details of this honest rendition, putting the subsequent steps of the process – construal of the original, creation of the target text, checking its adherence to norms, and finally asserting the equivalence – within a semiotic grid, wherein it is possible to subsume both the traditionally understood 'objective' as well as 'subjective' experiential pieces. It is possible to show the continually refined translation created by the individual and how it later becomes part of the semiosphere, returning to the subject for further verification or improvement.

Examination of these two cases was intended to demonstrate on the one hand how the suggested model allows to explain the subtle complexity of the translative idea of truth. How unobvious may be the results which its application yields, results which nevertheless manage to express certain important, deep-reaching intuitions of

individuals involved in the process. At the same, the entire forgoing analysis hopefully shows that truth – as a phenomenon of a translative nature – evinces the same kind of controlled relativity as translation does.

I would like to finally point out that, to a considerable extent, translational truth can be understood by analogy to a musical or mathematical function. The process which it consists in yields outcomes which are necessarily relative to circumstances. It is a function from the source to the target text, where both the former and the latter are variables. There must be however a constant – a formula or principle which governs the transformation. Different theories of truth attempted to arrest this formula, providing its various accounts and definitions. And they all seem to be have described some fraction of it.

The above analysis proves that truth involved all the aspects which were crucial in five theories investigated here, such as action, coherence, transition between different sign systems, etc. But the place where this constant can be found is ultimately the subject themselves. It is the mysterious way in which the vacuous channel directs the stream of signs. Therein lies the key, the rule of change which determines particular translative choices; the long sought-after principle. This would be a stable value in the formula searched for by the theories of truth. But it remains particular and private to the individual, constant in themselves yet different among one another. And that is why, as long as unknown are the origins and the demise of the translative subject, and unknown are the reasons for their self-awareness, also the principle which determines the creation of truth is unknown – with the translator left inside the tradosphere, looking unavailingly for its own reflection among the restless sea of signs.

An answer to the aporia

At this point I may address the problem identified at the beginning of the study. Rather than hoping for an idealist objective truth while at the same time grieving over its multitude versions, it should be accepted that the concept is an inherently open-ended, personalised creation that reflects a multifaceted nature of the individual and the semiosphere. Whenever the idea is evoked, it should serve as a reminder of diverse complexity as well as endless depth of one's interpretative capabilities. It signifies the power of ongoing construction of the world, rather than blindness to see its 'true face'.

As one could clearly see, the proposed 'semiotic rhomb' is symmetrical. Therefore, it necessitates no valuation or hierarchisation. The original object of signification was removed, and replaced by another translating mind. In showing the other person as the origin of order and signification, the translator should consider them on a par with themselves. They are both (and all collectively) equal co-creators of balance between sameness and difference in the respective truths which they give rise to.

The following research having been concluded, one may now once again fully understand and appreciate Barbara Cassin's idea recalled in the opening chapter of this work, when she suggests to imagine the way in which truth develops as a pattern of 'arborescence'. Anchored in the common root of time and translational rules, and at the same time propelled by an infinitely originative potential of abstractness – the possible essence of semiosphere –individuals continue to spread the branches of semiotic reality, spinning out the fragile twigs of semiotic chains. Forging the ancient dream of a linear, univocal *logos*, they may venture into the freedom of polyphonic truth. And although the latter, as any freedom, entails the burden of responsibility for one's translative choices, it also bestows upon each subject the dignity of tradosphere's maker, a validator of one of its many dimensions.

This realisation allows us perhaps to make a volte-face reversal of perspective – it is not the people who explore the world and themselves by intersemiotic translation, but rather it is the universe which develops its own existence by translating itself through us.

No other words seem to be capturing this last reckoning better than those of Carl Jung himself, whose insight, if the reader allows, will be here once more recalled on account of its peerlessly evocative eloquence. When speaking about the truth, the Swiss thinker, pins down the essence of truth exactly in the same manner as it was being elaborated in the following study: 'We say that it is this way, and it is. We build roads by going on. Our life is the truth that we seek. Only my life is the truth, the truth above all. We create the truth by living it.' (Jung 2009:456). Later, one of the breath-taking passages from *The Red Book* becomes a stunning, metaphorical illustration:

> *Even the stones speak to you, and magical threads spin from you to things and from things to you. Far and near work within you and you work in a dark manner upon the near and the far […]. Things live their life, and they live off you: the rivers bear your life to the valley, one stone falls upon another with your force, plants and animals also grow through you and they are the cause of your death. A leaf dancing in the wind dances with you; the irrational animal guesses your thought and represents you. The whole earth sucks its life from you and everything reflects you again. […] Nothing happens in which you are not entangled in a secret manner; for everything has ordered itself around you and plays your innermost* (Jung 2009:273).

Conclusion

At this point the research may be suspended. Yet if the forgoing demonstration at least partially managed to prove its point, then it should have already transpired that there is no ultimate quietus to arrive at, just as there is no end to translative creation of truth; having set the wheels in motion and seeing the pattern sufficiently emergent, one steps back, releasing the work and sending it on a way to continue to affirm its message in still new forms. With all the examined theories exhibiting an element of translation, one may hopefully acknowledge it as a crucial semantic ingredient of truth. Let the key exposed features of the notion be summarised.

Truth stands for an ongoing, dynamic process of an intersemiotic translation. The meaning of the concept is a product of a subject who on the basis of an original text of their individual experience constructs a target text – a mental and later linguistic representation of this experience, which confronted with the cognitive works of others remains always open to further refinement. Therefore, truth is invariably person-specific, and although it takes infinitely different forms, they do not contradict one another. Instead, they serve as inspiration for mutual improvement and safeguard the multiplicity of version against diverging into excessive relativity. The relation which truth holds with reality is that of translation equivalence; any resemblance of the representation to its model is posited by the individual, whose largely inconscient contribution to both the latter and the former prompts them to recognise a satisfying similarity. As a source text, the external world in its actual shape remains beyond reach – its presence necessary to spark the process, yet its nature unrelentingly vulnerable to creative, perceptual renditions. The concept of truth reflects reality with all these still new renderings, just as all the acts of translation gradually reflect semantic depth of the original.

The account of falsity was developed on the basis of the idea which seems to be undermining the essential aim of the translation process – namely, outrivalling the original. It was therefore explained as consisting in creation of the target text which differs from the original, with full awareness of distortion introduced even in those elements which could remain similar, attempting to improve upon the source text according to the translator's own wish, and thereby betraying the all the norms regulating the process, such as trust, communication or understanding. Falsity therefore turned out to be grounded primarily in violating ethical principles.

The analysis began by pointing to a crucial tension which seems to be persistently involved in reflection on truth, an unsettling conflict which fuels the enquiry. It was the fact that the concept was somehow to refer to a mind-independent, hopefully intersubjective reality, and yet do so by such means as different languages or mental constructs – all of them being utterly individualised media of expression. Now, when truth is viewed as translation process, this inherent tension appears to be defused. The unavoidable divergence between what different people may hold as true can be accepted as translative variations; their multiplicity is natural, and each of them contributes to the fulfilment of a common goal – establishing an accurate reflection of the original. As a target text, it will always by definition differ from the source. But the difference merely testifies to the originality and richness of the translator's work, to the abundance of creative ways in which the reality may be read. And this is how the study proposes to address the aporia.

The mutual intertwinement of truth and translation, which was the central argument of this research, in the end turned out to be a form of crevice – an opening through which one might catch a glimpse of a broader

picture of reality. The discovered link was taken as a premise which allowed to outline a tentative vision of the world in which truth and an translation necessarily coexist. Taking the intersemiotic nature of the translative activity as a basis, the closing part of the work presented a model of reality as a semiosphere – an amalgam of semiotic systems which remain in constant dialectic, constituting all the observable and non-observable phenomena. As it was argued, this incessant interplay is enabled by the nature of individuals. Their translative, vacuous identity opens a space for movement and construction of semiotic chains. In this way, their cognitive work still contributes to maintaining a stable structure of the semiosphere, and at the same time constantly develops creative potential of the semiotic substance. It was posited that this substance must be in itself the source of all creation, so the essence of abstractness – a maximally unified concentration of all possible qualities or attributes, which, as every original remains impossible to comprehend in its entirety by a single, individual translator.

The foregoing research should be regarded merely as a preliminary step. It points towards further possible directions in which the investigation may now be carried on. Quite obviously, one may examine other, more nuanced theories of truth in terms of their possible translative affinities, in order to further confirm the proposed hypothesis. More importantly however, the translation process revealed here can be examined in greater detail. Although its inherent creativity would naturally defy enclosure within some form of a universal formula, it could be analysed for instance what factors tend to clinch translative choices in particular circumstances or the degree to which the process of cognitive, intersemiotic translation can be controlled. It may be analysed how the channel of a translative subject emerges, which means tracing the origins of consciousness, or how it dissipates itself back into the semiosphere – at the end of their existence. These discoveries could be systematically elaborated, so as to refine and finally develop a more mature, translational theory of truth.

Regardless of what degree of accuracy these insights into ‘truth creating process’ actually manage to attain, there is still a sense in which they can all be considered successful. Namely, each of them, being an act of translation, to an equal degree is a bow of respect – a tribute of dedication and awe – for the mystery of the original, for the diverse, arresting beauty of semiosphere, in service of which remains the life of every translator.

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Spinning Semiotic Chains.
Theories of Truth and Their Common
Translative Understructure

Abstract

Translation is a concept-catalyst; a thread leading through the labyrinth of the foreign, which bestows a key to the gates of understanding. In the following study, its synthesising potential will be proven once more. The idea will be grafted on the field of a philosophical debate, and specifically, on the history of philosophical enquiry into the sense of truth. The aim of the research is to demonstrate that each of the five major theories – the correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, deflationary and semantic one – all encapsulate an element which should be identified as translation process. Initially then, the procedure itself will be characterised with a set of typical features which allow one to classify a given activity as translative. Subsequently, this activity will be localised in texts which are considered to be the classical formulations of each theory, that is in Russell, Moore and Austin's for the correspondence, Joachim and Blanshard's for coherence, Peirce and James's for pragmatic, Frege and Ramsey's for deflationist, and Tarski and Davidson's for the semantic theory. The analysis leads to a reflection that a crucial ingredient in the idea of truth lies in the depth of the subject's consciousness, where a sensitive touch of perception for the first time encounters the foreign. Translation process which runs through this perimeter will be exposed and highlighted, so that its presence could be duly recognised – it seems indispensable in every situation which requires work of a translator, but perhaps especially when it is their role that determines the meaning of truth. The research is enwreathed with a model which may serve as a linchpin for constructing a new theory of truth, based entirely and explicitly on the idea of translation.

Splatając łańcuchy znaków.
Teorie prawdy i ich wspólny translacyjny fundament.

Abstrakt

Translacja to pojęcie-katalizator; nić, która wiedzie przez labirynt tego, co obce do bram zrozumienia. W niniejszej pracy syntezujący potencjał przekładu zostanie w szczególny sposób uwznioślony. Tłumaczenie będzie tu odnalezione na gruncie filozoficznym – w historii rozwoju filozoficznej refleksji nad sensem prawdy. Celem badania jest wykazanie, iż każda z głównych teorii prawdy – korespondencyjna, koherencyjna, pragmatyczna, deflacyjna oraz semantyczna – zawiera element, który należy utożsamiać z procesem przekładu. Na początku zatem, sam proces zostanie scharakteryzowany za pomocą cech, które pozwalają sklasyfikować daną czynność jako rodzaj translacji. Następnie obecność i rola owego procesu zostanie wykazana w tekstach, które stanowią klasyczne sformułowania każdej z wybranych teorii. Zatem do rekonstrukcji ujęcia korespondencyjnego wykorzystane zostaną prace B. Russella, J. L. Austina oraz G.E. Moore'a, w przypadku teorii koherencyjnej teksty H.H. Joachima oraz B. Blancharda, dla ujęcia pragmatycznego teksty C.S. Peirce'a oraz W. Jamesa, dla perspektywy deflacyjnej analizy G. Fregego oraz F. Ramseya, wreszcie prace A. Tarskiego oraz D. Davidsona jako twórców teorii semantycznej. Analiza prowadzi do refleksji, iż kluczowy element konieczny do zrozumienia pojęcia prawdy leży w głębi świadomości podmiotu, gdzie dotyk percepcji po raz pierwszy napotyka to, co nieznane. Przez granicę między nimi przebiega proces translacji, który zostanie w niniejszym badaniu wyeksponowany, tak aby jego znaczenie mogło zostać należycie docenione. To rozpoznanie wagi przekładu wydaje się konieczne nie tylko w każdej sytuacji, która wymaga obecności tłumacza, ale być może przede wszystkim wtedy, gdy to właśnie jego rola determinuje sens prawdy. Analiza zwieńczona jest konstrukcją modelu, który stanowi podstawę do sformułowania nowej teorii prawdy, w całości opartej na fundamencie translacyjnym.