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Mainstreamisation of Populist Radical Right Politics in Hungary.

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Introduction

The radical right uses current political opportunities and an increasingly unstable political environment to determine its political messages and strategies (Jackman and Volpert, 1996). Since the turn of the new century, an environment in which continuing troubles and identity insecurities have increased, coupled with the growing financial crisis and concerns over prosperity, has created a more fertile and acceptable space for the messages of the radical right. The successes in the European Parliament and national elections have strengthened the increasing trend of both existing and newly formed radical right movements. On average, radical right-wing parties rarely made a breakthrough in national elections between 1945-2000. However, the trend over the past 20 years shows that radical right-wing parties have made steady progress in the positive direction (Eatwell, 2000). Also, new radical right parties and movements have started to emerge in many European countries. The new emerging radical right parties and activities are trying to adapt to modern times in the best way by analysing the current political environment correctly. The new adaptation of the radical right triggered new radical policies and new radical ideas. This situation created the 'new' populist radical right as a genuine international and national political force (Mammone, Godin, and Jenkins, 2012).

However, beyond the election results, radical right-wing parties have been influencing mainstream society and mainstream parties politically and socio-culturally with their success in the polls. Radical right parties, which emerged as potential managing partners in countries such as Austria, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Italy, and Switzerland, are supported in government coalitions and even accepted as partners in these coalitions due to the dangerous concessions of the mainstream parties. These concessions made by the mainstream parties to the radical right led to the 'mainstreaming' of the radical right parties and later of radical right politics.

The 'mainstreaming' of the ideas put forward by the radical right can continue despite the 'cordon sanitaire', which separates the radical right from the mainstream parties and is still trying to survive. In this way, it is increasingly possible for the radical right to create an 'agenda' and participate in the political debates today (Price and Tewksbury, 1997). This situation is accompanied by the indirect ideological-political concessions made by the mainstream actors to the radical right. The political concessions made by mainstream parties to stabilise the state

in the short term, respond to growing electoral demands, and not lose their voters to radical right parties become much more frightening than measurable effects.

In this context, it is even more worrying that the masses support thoughts, discourses, and policies that are completely contrary to the 'mainstream' values based on universal human rights. According to some public opinion polls, the general attitude towards immigrants and certain minority groups (especially Muslims and Romani people) in Europe is gradually getting tougher. This suggests that, even if support for the radical right parties are not enough for them to win the elections, at least it increases the support for the pro-radical rhetoric. In other words, even if radical right parties are not successful in the elections, approaches to immigration, identity and security discourses advocated by radical right parties increase, and radical discourses become normalised (Kallis 2015, 21).

This situation demonstrates the disturbing reality of the attractiveness of the radical right in contemporary Europe. Rather than the significant differences between the radical right and 'mainstream' values, the success of the radical right in agenda setting, identity politics, redefining political issues and constructing crisis (Herman, 2015) and the radicalisation of current mainstream views and attitudes through elections and discourses should not be overlooked. In short, there is a significant social demand for many of the ideas advocated by the radical right. Worse still, the populist radical right ideas such as localism, nationalism, xenophobia, and insecurity demanded by European societies have become mainstream, making these policies more accessible and more attractive to the society.

In fact, it is not surprising that radical right parties are increasingly successful, given the degree of social support that mainstream politics gives to some views of the radical right. In this context, international terrorism, growing immigration numbers and the economic crisis are the main factors that increase the popularity of the radical right because these factors are critical in radicalising and legitimising the radical ideas that are already part of the mainstream voter consciousness and demands. Also, and more worryingly, the radical right has further growth potential, both in terms of electoral successes and its ability to set the agenda in mainstream political debate and influence public attitudes. The efforts of radical right parties to redefine democracy according to the ideal of anti-pluralism not only allows radical right parties to introduce new issues into public debate but also gives them the right to decide on 'what the issues are about' by reshaping the issues and interpretations behind these issues (Hobolt and de Vries, 2012; Pytlas 2015, 55).

These radical right policies consist of policies and discourses that can legitimise and make sense of the measures to be taken against the danger by stating what is at stake (Gamson, 2004). At this point, the increasing legitimacy of radical right politics is not only due to the ability of radical right parties to present themselves as part of the mainstream (Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn, 2016). It also stems from mainstream parties that adopt, legitimise and normalise radical right policies (Wagner and Meyer, 2017). In particular, the flawed and illiberal 'Frankenstate' (Scheppelle, 2013) reinforcements by mainstream parties that do not officially belong to the radical right party family reveals the tangible results of these developments. The increasing support for the discourse and policies of radical right parties shows that the ideas, discourses and policies that were considered taboo in the past are now more tolerantly accepted by society. This is not an anomalous challenge imposed by the radical right on Western democracy and human rights mainstream. Instead, it is the emergence of irrational beliefs, fears and prejudices emerging as an 'internal' radical alternative within the mainstream.

Central and Eastern European democracies present important cases in investigating the complex process of mainstreaming the populist radical right that has spread throughout Europe. Although the populist radical right parties in the region were weaker and more volatile in terms of elections than their counterparts in Western Europe in the 2010s (Minkenberg and Pytlas, 2012; Mudde, 2017), this situation has started to change since the 2020s. The alliances between the radical right parties in the region and with the mainstream right parties, and the fact that these parties attracted the attention of the voters in the region, enabled these parties to strengthen their place in the political spectrum. The discourses, policies, positions and narratives of the radical right parties, which have become more prominent by increasing their power in the political spectrum in the region, are primarily legitimised and become more acceptable by being included in mainstream politics. In this way, populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe increase and maintain their influence in the political arena (Pytlas, 2015).

Democratic erosions have been occurring in Hungary since 2010 despite Hungary's successful past performance of European Integration and successful institutional consolidation of democracy (Herman, 2015; Enyedi, 2016a). Even worse, Western European democracies have started to form a political space where the discourses and policies of the populist radical right become mainstream legitimised, and this situation becomes 'pathological normality' (Mudde, 2010). For this reason, investigating how the populist radical right policies and discourses, which vary in different regions and countries in Europe, have become mainstream and normalised in Hungary, one of the Central and Eastern European democracies will provide

us with important results that go beyond this region. In other words, investigating the effects of populist radical right policies and discourses in Hungary on the mainstreaming process in Hungary and on Hungarian democracy will contribute to a clearer understanding of the operation and consequences of radical right discourses and policies across Europe.

The first chapter begins by reviewing the characteristics of conservatism, taking into account right-wing thinking and perspective. Then, different forms of conservatism are summarised from the perspective of European countries. Afterwards, the radical right, populism and mainstreaming issues were discussed, and these issues were aimed to form the basis for the following chapters. The second part summarises the political lives, political backgrounds, election results, and democratisation processes of Hungary, Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia. The third chapter begins by outlining the political outline of Hungary, the selected case country of the study. Then, the analysis of the Fidesz party, which was chosen as the case in Hungary, was summarised with a critical approach based on its historical development, change and current situation.


1. Definition of Right-Wing

The right/rightist and left/leftist terms used in political science are short-cut methods to describe the ideological positions, political thoughts, and beliefs of politicians, political parties, and political movements. These terms are often used to refer to the poles of the political spectrum (Heywood 2016, 280). The linear political spectrum that moves from the right-wing to the left-wing, which appears in the figure of the right-wing/left-wing separation and forms the basis of this section, will be used in this thesis.



(Figure 1) The Traditional Linear Spectrum

In a narrow sense, the linear spectrum summarises different attitudes towards the economy and the role of the state (Heywood 2018, 339). However, the formation of the right/left traditional distinction presents many problems and deficiencies. Therefore, apart from the linear spectrum, the two-dimensional political spectrum and the horseshoe-shaped political spectrum have also been developed to provide a more explanatory picture of ideological positions.



(Figure 2) Horseshoe Political Spectrum – (Figure 3) Two-Dimensional Political Spectrum

The first spectrum was presented as an alternative to the linear spectrum. The horseshoe-shaped political spectrum was created to show the totalitarian and distinct tendencies common to fascism and communism in post-Second World War¹. The two-dimensional spectrum, created by Hans Eysenck and presented as a second alternative, tries to compensate for the inadequacy and stagnation of the linear right-left spectrum by adding a vertical authoritarian-libertarian dimension to the linear spectrum (Heywood 2018, 339). However, this thesis will use the traditional linear spectrum, which is believed to be more useful in terms of the subject and will make the thought defended in the thesis more understandable.

Knowing the historical developments and changes of the terms before making an in-depth analysis of the differences and features of the political right and left terms will provide some relief to this thesis because these terms emerged after the French Revolution and have undergone different evolutions from the 18th century to the present².

The historical origin of the terms right-wing and left-wing goes back to the French Revolution and the period when the French Legislature began to prepare the constitution after 1789. As the discussions about determining the king's constitutional authority deepened, the factions were divided into two, and they chose their own regions. The separated factions settled on the right and left of the parliament according to the seating arrangement established in the French Parliament. The anti-royal revolutionaries have chosen the left side of the assembly for themselves. Conservatives and aristocrats who supported the monarchy chose the right side of the assembly (Andrews, 2019). This event is known as the birth of the terms right and left (Goodsell, 1998; Linski 1984, 59; Clark 1998, 33-34).

The post-revolution debates in France took place between the secular left-wing who supported the republic and the Catholic right-wing who supported the monarchy (Clark 1998, 33-34). The right-wing policies³ that were created in France at that time were a reaction to left-wing policies. Right-wing policies, which were created in response to left-wing policies that

¹ It is possible to find commonalities between fascism and communism (Furet and Nolte, 2001).

² While the bourgeois class (closer to the right in the current system) represented the left after the French Revolution, today, the working class represents the left. Although nationalism was formed as a leftist thought, it later became a part of right thought. In Second World War, the ideologies of Fascism and Nazism belonged to the right as authoritarian regimes. Still, after the war, the authoritarian regime shifted to the socialist Soviet Union (left) and democracy to the capitalist USA (right). For these reasons, it is essential to make authoritarian-democrat distinctions when investigating right and left ideologies.

³ The most important figure of the right during this period was Joseph de Maistre, who defended authoritarian conservatism.

advocate raising the living standards of the people and changing the royal system that could not function, and therefore demand reforms and innovations, consist of policies that support traditional institutions such as hierarchy, monarchy, and the church that were damaged after the revolution (Carlisle, 2005).

Although this separation in the French parliament disappeared during the Napoleon Bonaparte period, with the Bourbon Restoration and the resumption of the constitutional monarchy in 1814, revolutionary and conservative groups took their places in the legislature again. In the mid-19th century, the terms right-wing and left-wing, politically representing the opposing poles, were included in the French language. Over time, political parties began to define themselves as right-wing and left-wing according to these terms (Andrews, 2019).

The expression of the term right in France came up with extreme royalists, especially during the restoration of the monarchy in 1815 (Knapp and Wright, 2006). However, in this period, the right group in the French Parliament began to experience divisions within itself. This distinction is outlined between ultra-royalists and Orleanists, who endorse the legitimate anti-revolutionary system. While the anti-revolutionary ultra-royalists defended the continuation of the existing monarchic system, the Orleanists accepted the existence of the royal family and argued that the system should be a constitutional monarchy. The masses and groups that made up the right-wing at that time mainly were conservatives, monarchists, clergy members and radicals. However, this situation started to change between 1830-1880 because social and economic changes in the West have opened the doors of a capitalist system (Watson and Lane 1973, 94).

Since this period, the changing economic system due to capitalism has started to affect the right-wing movements in Europe. British conservatives and American conservatives have been the most affected groups by this situation (McLean and McMillan 2009, 465; Kahan 2010, 88). The terms right-wing and left-wing did not appear in Anglo-Saxon politics until the 20th century (Gauchet, 1996). The political meaning of the terms right-wing and left-wing in the Anglo-Saxon countries first emerged due to the discussions during the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s (Kahan 2010, 184).

The changing world order after the Second World War also played a major role in countries' economic and political breakthroughs. Following the demolished ideologies of Nazism and fascism, the idea of democracy was adopted by many world countries, the differences between social classes decreased, the middle class gained power, the idea of nationalism weakened,

social state policies were developed, political stability was achieved and economic growth, welfare, quality of life and wealth increased. Although all these changes are seen as positive, according to Inglehart (1988), different expectations had occurred between the people who lived before the war and the generations who lived after the war. While the expectations of people living in the pre-war period were more concrete⁴, the expectations of people living in the post-war period became more abstract⁵ concepts. The changes and evolutions of the right-wing and the left-wing after 1945 and the Cold War, different social expectations, shrinkage of confrontational politics, demands of different periods and representation crises have expanded the meaning of right-wing and left-wing. As a result of the extended meaning, ‘new right’⁶ and ‘new left’ thoughts have been included in the political arena.

Recently, right-wing policies have successfully expanded their sphere of influence (Adams 2001, 57; Himmelstein, 1992; Kaplan and Koshar 2012, 7-8). Right-wing politics owe their present success to the political changes and the ideas they contain. Some of the most important ideas embodied and changed from time to time in right-wing politics are nationalism, anti-communism, economics, populism⁷, religion, and traditions.

According to various academicians, nationalism, which has different characteristics, is generally accepted as a doctrine in political science (Kedourie 1961, 9). In post-revolutionary France, nationalism was an ideology supported by leftists and republicans (Gregory, 2006). While nationalism, which has gone through various developments and changes, was mentioned

⁴ Such as economic developments, social state policies, health and education services and security.

⁵ Such as justice, social equality, anti-war politics and individual rights.

⁶ Partly due to the 1929 Great Depression, European countries adopted the ‘Welfare State’ idea. According to this model, the state takes responsibility for social solidarity itself, rather than leaving it in the hands of communities or religious groups. The participation of the welfare state in many areas of life, including public education and health, continued until the 1970s when a series of economic crises hit financial stability and eventually, the idea of the welfare state in Europe and the world was abandoned. Thatcher and Reagan’s realisation of neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism paved the way for the ‘new right’ thought in the late 1970s. The new right is an idea that was developed in the 1970s and 1980s and radicalised the ideas of neo-modern conservatism, especially based on anti-communism and anti-new left opposition (Dahl, 1996). The New Right is founded on two main principles. First is the rejection of the Keynesian model, which argues for the public sector’s heavy presence in the market. Second, neo-conservatism, which aims at a return to traditional values and demands the reunification of social authority around traditional institutions, including family, religion, and nation. Neo-conservatism predicts that ideological motives such as religion and family, as well as social authority and discipline, will fill the void created by the withdrawal of the state from the economy. In short, the New Right represents the politically challenged extremes and society (hierarchical and undemocratic) of the Neo-Modern Conservatism. These extremes are migration, xenophobia, socio-cultural and class problems, which the radical right and right-wing populism are also opposed to (Kadioğlu 1997, 66-68; Torsvik, 1982).

⁷ In the later chapters of the thesis, populism is examined.

together with the left-wing and progressive movements, after the Dreyfus incident⁸, it turned into a right-wing ideology (Heywood, 2017) and thus, turned into a separatist ideology (Hobsbawm, 2012; Doyle, 2002). After nationalism shifted ideologically from left-wing to right-wing, it also was mainly influenced by the romanticism of the right-wing ideology⁹.

As nationalism became a part of the right-wing politics, the right-wing began to advocate policies focusing on national identity politics (Clark, 1998) because, according to the right-wing ideology, nationalism, which forms the basis of social life, accepts that people are divided into nations with specific characteristics and differences (Kedourie 1961, 9). The identification and separating nationalism identity was used as a mobilisation tool by the fascist dictatorships, especially during the period between the two world wars. This situation has proven that nationalism can defend the supremacy of nations and races to promote social Darwinism and adapt it to radical roles (Winock, 1994).

The idea of nationalism shows different characteristics in different countries. However, it is important to understand French nationalism, which lays the foundations of contemporary nationalism, radical right, and populist right in Europe. French nationalism, which started to develop around 'Nouvelle Ecole' under the leadership of Alain de Benoist in the early 1970s, has been developed as an anti-communist and anti-immigration movement that defends the biological and cultural difference and the superiority of the white race. In addition, this movement also states that "an elite intellectual group consisting of whites (a right-wing intellectual group) should be formed. A structure that necessitates making distinctions by establishing cultural, psychological and physical dominance". Alain de Benoist's thought of nationalism also laid the foundations of the 'French New Right' and pioneered the spread of new right-wing ideas in Europe.

All ideas within the right-wing ideology firmly adopt an anti-communist policy. However, anti-communism becoming a right-wing term is also historically complex (Stanley 2018, 13). First, it should be noted that the first Marxist movements in Europe were in stark contrast to the monarchy, the system that ruled most states in Europe at that time. For this reason, it should not be forgotten that with the emergence of the first Marxist movements, Monarchist-Marxist, that is, right-wing-left-wing conflicts also started.

⁸ The Dreyfus incident caused the polarisation of the racist and anti-Semitist right-wing and the pro-Republican anti-militarist left. This event is also called the 'war of the two France' (Vardar 2004, 21).

⁹ The romanticism of the right-wing ideology aims to preserve the culture, language, race, religion, and traditions of the society it lives in.

With the emergence of Marxism, European monarchies initially prohibited the expression of this idea in social spheres. However, the ideas spread by the Communist Manifesto managed to frighten the monarchists. Especially before the First World War, the strongest monarchies of Europe, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Russian Empire and the German Empire prohibited the spread of communist thought (Bellamy, 2003). However, these bans were not successful, and the monarchies in Europe began to collapse one by one after the First World War. As of this period, different systems began to replace the changing monarchist systems. Changing systems made the rulers of monarchies less authoritarian, eradicated them or turned them into unauthorised figures.

The most important of these changes was the ‘Russian Communist Revolution’ that started in the Russian Empire, the most conservative monarchy in Europe during the First World War. This revolution destroyed the Russian Tsarism and replaced it with the communist Soviet Union (Kenez, 1980). The change and the changing system have inspired many people and societies in Europe. The communist revolution (Russian Revolution) that started in a monarchical state was not the only revolution in Europe during this period.

In Germany, which was affected by the freedom movements affecting European politics after the First World War, the system changed from monarchy to parliamentary democracy after the civil war between anti-communists and the communists¹⁰ (Jurado, 2001).

The 1920s and 1930s were a terrible time for traditional right-wing politics in Europe because the rise of the ultra-conservative and fascist movements has seriously damaged the traditional right-wing policies in Europe. With the strengthening of communist movements that spread worldwide, the colonial authorities began to become the most violent opposition of the communist movement. For this reason, the term right-wing has started to be used with exploitation. In these years, the only region where the right-wing ideology was successful was the USA, which adhered to conservative policies. On the other hand, it was possible to encounter extreme conservative policies and ideas even in the USA during these years (Powers, 1998).

With the bipolar world system that emerged after the Second World War, communism has become a phenomenon that must be resisted against in the West (Schmitz, 1999). For this

¹⁰ German Revolution/November Revolution 1918-1919.

reason, anti-communism has become an integral part of US and NATO policies in the post-Second World War period (Isby and Kamps, 1985; Gülstorff, 2015).

After the Second World War, essential transformations and changes took place in right-wing politics. The most important one is the separation of right-wing politics from the monarchist roots established in the past. In this period, the right-wing has become a thought that includes patriotism, protection of religious values and nationalism. With the Cold War that started after the Second World War, the states that were loyal to left-wing ideology began to change sides, because the countries of Asia, Africa and South America, which received economic and political support from the West, started to accept the thoughts of the West in this period (Foner, 2016). Communist movements and countries that did not change sides during this period never ended their hostility to the idea of capitalism, which they regarded as oppressing the people (Chautard, 2001). Therefore, US foreign policy focused entirely on anti-communist propaganda during this period and asked its citizens to support it (Evans, 2009; McNamara, 2005).

The right-wing thought that emerged in France after the French Revolution initially opposed the idea of social classes engaging in trade. It also opposed capitalism, enlightenment, individualism and developing industry (Hendershot, 2002). On the other hand, the post-revolutionary right-wing, which often exhibits different characteristics in today's right-wing movements, defends the traditional hierarchy and traditional institutions.

However, in the 19th century, right-wing policies that kept pace with the changing world began to structure themselves according to the policies of that period. The supporters of the capitalist system in Europe have had to seek political and economic support for themselves due to the conflicts against the working class since 1848. Meanwhile, the right-wing, which sought a rich group to support itself, began to support capitalists against the working class. In other words, the right-wing, which was in search of a wealthy group, responded to this search of the capitalists, and therefore an alliance was formed between the capitalists and the right-wing politics (Clark, 1998).

However, the Carlists¹¹ and some nationalist movements in Europe did not change their minds and continued their hostility towards the capitalist class. Movements such as French 'Nouvelle Droite' and Italian 'Caso Pound' still oppose the idea of capitalism because of the negative effects of capitalist thought on society (Holland 2003, 132).

¹¹ Traditionalist and royalist movement in Spain.

In the middle of the 20th century, the neo-liberal right became a term advocated by the Anglo-Saxon countries. Reagan and Thatcher, who pioneered the thought, have successfully combined neo-liberal right-wing thinking with traditional right-wing thinking by using free market and privatisation policies (Lukes, 2003). Right-wing libertarianism, which puts the free market and free economy as central politics, also aims at a decentralised economy.

The post-revolutionary French right-wing is directly related to its support for religion. According to Joseph de Maistre, one of the most important figures of the French right-wing, ‘only Catholic values could save constitutional monarchies from the disorder in Europe and the chaos created by the Enlightenment’ (Britannica.com).

Today, religious people want the governing governments to enact laws that protect religious principles and values (Hendershot, 2002). For example, the Christian right-wing in North America essentially rejects science that contradicts the Bible. Besides, the Christian right, in general, supports right-wing and religious government laws against acts deemed inappropriate by religion, such as abortion, extramarital cohabitation, same-sex marriage, euthanasia, and divorce (DeGette, 2008; Mooney, 2006).

The right-wing, which does not accept social equality, uses religion’s power to enable society to accept inequality unconditionally. Irving Kristol (1995, 94), one of the prominent supporters of right-wing thought, sought ways to legitimise social inequality and therefore said, “I find a commitment to the idea of equality problematic”. Legitimising social inequality¹²

¹² Even if there is social inequality, right-wing thought, which gives importance to the continuity of the system, order and stability resists change as much as it can, because according to the right-wing, changes lead society to insecurity. Right-wing thought sees the world as a threatening, uncertain, harsh, dangerous and unpredictable place. For this reason, right-wing demands a structure that is predictable, stable, secure, and defensive against threats (Hennes, Nam, Stern and Jost, 2012). Right-wing sympathises with and supports leaders, parties and regimes that meet these needs. According to the right-wing, predictability, stability and security are directly linked to the defensive nature of threats. The needs that arise against the threats caused or to be caused by others or outer groups cause the strengthening of right-wing thinking. For example, increased support for Bush after the September 11 attack (Moore, 2001) and the strengthening of right-wing movements in Europe after the migration movements in 2008. For this reason, societies that feel threatened and fearful are much more prone to right-wing (Jost, Stern, Rule and Sterling, 2017). The increase in the right-wing tendency of the society is usually manifested through a strong and charismatic leader (father figure) and as a result of the increase in the society’s belief in religion, because loyalty to a strong, charismatic leader and religious beliefs increases people’s sense of trust and security against threats and fears (Solomon, Greenberg and Pyszczynski, 1991). Right-wing displays a defensive, protective and alert structure as it sees the world as a dangerous place. Seeing the world as a dangerous place is one of the most important elements of the right-wing because, according to the right-wing, the factors that can keep the danger away are unconditional faith, obedience, loyalty and support to authority, tradition, order and the use of legal force. At this point, right-wing can apply social pressure on those who are not like them in order to oppose the danger. This practice of social pressure generally targets minorities and ‘others’ (those who are not like ‘us’ and those who do not think like ‘us’) with the help of conspiracy theories (right-wing is more prone to conspiracy theories due to feelings of insecurity, anxiety and fear) (Waal, 2018) and it brings those ‘like us’ closer together. The unity formed by ‘people like us’ getting closer to each other causes

through religion creates an excellent opportunity for the right-wing to practice the free market. In other words, economically created inequalities can be justified through religion.

The use of religion by the right-wing causes the Eurosceptic policies to gain power. Countries that react to the secular policies of the European Union generally have a Catholic belief. For example, Poland, a member of the European Union and has a strong Catholic faith, has exerted intense pressure to include religious statements in the EU constitution (Flood and Soborski 2011, 24). In other words, societies and political movements that adhere to right-wing thought largely depend on the religion and the values advocated by religion.

While the concepts of authority, loyalty¹³ and tradition all play vital roles in conservatism, it is extremely difficult to take them equally important. Since tradition is the most basic idea in conservatism, other concepts lose their power in its absence. Conservatives are concerned with any form of authority, the form of authority they provide through traditional symbols and the legitimation of authority. When conservatives discuss why the past should have an important place why established symbols or lifestyles should be preserved, they often speak of the 'test of time' (Honderich, 1991). For example, Scruton (2002) states that practices that are worth preserving and "something that develops must have a successful history".

To understand tradition, we must first try to understand where authority and loyalty come from. Tradition shows commitment to customs and habits and theoretical and practical knowledge, and these characteristics constitute the authority of tradition (Giddens, 1994). The essential thing is that the concept of tradition is not the past itself but the wisdom that tradition has created and generated over time. This kind of wisdom can be functionally or technically correct or false. However, this is not a criterion that determines its tradition. What makes something traditional is not just that it has been practised. Traditions must also carry a ceremonial past, and persons and institutions must preserve this past. For this reason, traditions should always have guardians such as priests, sages and elders.

After describing the historical development and changes of the term right-wing, it is necessary to briefly mention the views and ideas of the left-wing in this section. The left-wing

the prejudices against the 'others' to increase. The increase in prejudices enables feelings of danger, fear, and insecurity to grow and develop in a closed group. These increasing feelings create new demands in the society and radical movements that meet those demands emerge. This structure of right-wing is a kind of adaptation to the dangerous world. The defensive and protective nature of the right-wing thought makes it more sensitive to the perception of negative elements (Rozin and Royzman, 2001).

¹³ For conservatives, the concept of loyalty is not just a matter of belonging to any integrity. For them, the concept of loyalty also means establishing relationships with groups organised on the basis of tradition.

concept was initially used as a concept that brought together the advocates of progress called ‘Progressives’ (‘Progressistes’ in French). Originally founded on the ideas of freedom, equality, and fraternity (‘Liberte’, ‘Egalite’, ‘Fraternite’ in French), left-wing now includes concepts such as equality, progress, rights, fraternity, reforms, freedom and internationalism (Heywood 2016, 280-281). The left-wing also advocates state intervention, state-citizen solidarity, reform, and progressive ideas in economic and social programs (alloprof.qc.ca).

Social reforms and general economic transformation can characterise left-wing parties and views. These parties traditionally receive support from poor, disadvantaged groups and working classes in urban societies¹⁴ (Heywood 2018, 339).

The left-wing states that society is divided into classes by the ruling and wealthy upper class. It includes the left-wing view, green, socialist, worker, social democratic and communist parties and groups who think politics can provide solidarity, unification, justice, and freedom to society. The priority policies of these parties and groups focus on workers, women, children, animals and nature rights, ethnic minorities, other socially and economically excluded communities and minorities. Also, left-wing parties and groups put the income level of the people at the head of their economic policies to defend the rights of the poor and excluded communities and create economic equality in society. Also, this model does not entirely exclude capital owners, and it generally evaluates the capital owners based on their impact on the people’s living standards.

After a brief explanation of the left-wing’s ideas and policies, right-wing politics, which forms the basis of the thesis, will be analysed starting from this section.

According to ‘The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics’, in today’s liberal democracies, the right-wing ideology is defined as an opinion against socialism and social democracy. The ideas embodied by the right-wing ideology are liberalism, conservatism, nationalism and radical rightism (Gidron and Ziblatt, 2019; Augoustinos, Walker and Donaghue 2006, 320).

Right-wing policies argue that inequality, order and hierarchies devoted to society are legal (Johnson, 2005; Goldthorpe, 1985), natural and normal on economic and traditional foundations (Carlisle, 2005; Smith and Tatalovich, 2003, 30; Bobbio 1996, 37; Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990; Lukes, 2003; Clark, 2005). Right-wing also states that order and hierarchy consist of economic (Scruton, 2007; Goldthorpe, 1985) and cultural differences. For this reason,


¹⁴ However, this situation has changed recently. As will be seen in the following sections, classes that support the left movements are getting closer to the right movements today.

the right-wing thinks that state intervention should be limited in order to protect the economic freedom of the individuals in society.


LEFT-WING	RIGHT-WING
Freedom	Authority
Equality	Hierarchy
Brotherhood	Order
Rights	Task
Progress	Tradition
Reforms	Past Commitment
Internationalism	Nationalism

(Table 1) Differences between Left-Wing and Right-Wing Ideologies

(Heywood, 2013)



(Figure 4) Political Ideologies within the Political Spectrum



(Figure 5) Radical Equality and Radical Inequality within the Political Spectrum

(Celep 2009, 50)

The concepts of right-wing and left-wing in political science are used to summarise certain ideological stances and explain changes in systems, as explained above.

However, the unusual political developments in the recent period have forced the support groups of the political parties to make radical changes. Especially the election competition that occurs today has the effect of blurring the ideological identities of political parties. In other words, principles and values previously respected by the political parties are frequently violated during the search for votes (Heywood, 2018). Thus, the distinction between right-wing and left-wing can be expressed as an intelligent choice between the degree of equality created within society and the reaction to the revolution (Heywood 2016, 280).

If the subject is approached critically, the right/left distinction is more straightforward and more misleading. Although Chip Berlet defines different types of right-wing as responses to left-wing ideas that arose during the French Revolution (Davies, 2002), the terms right-wing and left-wing do not have a precise meaning (Heywood 2018, 339) because these concepts vary in themselves¹⁵ and even show similar characteristics from time to time¹⁶ (Cole 2005, 205). Therefore, many researchers think that the right-left distinction is not a meaningful definition (Alper and Yılmaz 2020, 2).

Furthermore, the meaning and political understanding of the right-wing concept may differ according to the society in which it exists and its historical content (Lukes, 2003). Therefore, the term right has changed and been updated many times. According to Roger Eatwell and Neal O'Sullivan (1992), these changes and updates consist of five stages.

- Reactionary Right (Maurrassian Right): Demands a return to the aristocracy and supports the restoration of religion's former importance.
- Moderate Right (Burkean Right): Limits the situation by making defenders and intellectuals unreliable.
- Radical Right (Spenglerian Right): Supports a romantic and aggressive nationalism.
- Extreme Right: Advocates anti-immigration policies and hidden racism.

¹⁵ The main diversity is that while left-wing policies represent the social state and social equality (socialist-social democratic structure), right-wing politics socially represent the continuity of traditions, the status quo and free-market economy (capitalist-conservative structure). The free market, capitalist system and neo-liberal economic policies accepted by the right-wing are directly integrated with the hierarchical and unequal structure of the right-wing.

¹⁶ For example, right-wing movements with left-wing characteristics (Nazism, which deals with left economic policy) and left-wing movements with the right-wing characteristics (authoritarian Soviet Union). Although the Soviet Union and the Stalin administration applied the authoritarian view of the right-wing, they did not oppose the values of the enlightenment and they supported the idea of enlightenment. At this point, the Soviet Union differs from the right-wing, which rejects the idea of enlightenment (Zizek, 2001).

- Neo-liberal Right: Seeks to combine the market economy and economic disorder with values such as patriotism, elitism, law, and order which are part of traditional right-wing.

To summarise the right-wing ideologies divided into five by Eatwell and O’Sullivan (1992), the ‘Reactionary Right’ wants to return to the past and longs for the past. This idea also has a religious and authoritarian nature that defends aristocracy. The ‘Moderate Right’ supports both nationalist and welfare policies and tolerates political, economic and institutional changes. ‘Radical Right’, another idea of the right-wing ideology, supports the group that lives within the state and constitutes the majority. The radical right idea advocates an absolute system of government, rejecting minority groups and minority beliefs as much as possible (Betz and Immerfall, 1998; Davies, Davies and Lynch, 2002; Durham, 2000; Merkl and Weinberg, 1993). The term ‘Extreme Right’ has become a term often used to describe ultranationalist, populist, and national conservative groups, formations, and parties after the Second World War.

However, Eatwell (1999) also noted that this term has major typological problems. For this reason, Eatwell focuses on four characteristics of radical right and right populism. According to Eatwell, these features are:

- Anti-Democracy
- Nationalism
- Racism
- Strong State

(Eatwell, 2004, 8).

Neo-liberalism consists of a conservative-liberal basis that supports downsizing of the state, free-market economy and individual risk-taking (Eatwell, 2004).

The right-wing ideology includes different ideas such as the centre-right (mainstream), liberalism, conservatism and the radical right.

Centre-Right: The centre-right, which constitutes an essential branch of the right-wing ideology, accepts liberal democracy, a capitalist economic model, private property and a limited state system. At the same time, this idea is politically conservative and liberal. The centre concept is a concept that accepts the values of both right-wing and left-wing politically. These

values create a middle zone between right-wing liberals and left-wing progressives, as they embody both the idea of individual freedom of the right-wing and the idea of sharing the wealth of the left-wing¹⁷.

Centre-right ideology attaches importance to values such as equality before the law, protection of the universal rights and individuals, fair and competitive elections and acceptance of democratic principles. However, economic equality is not an issue that the centre-right emphasises. The centre-right believes that economic inequality is the fault of individuals. Although the centre-right sometimes takes a negative attitude towards ‘others’, this attitude is more measured.

Liberalism: Defends the right to property and freedom of property. However, creating this freedom leads to the formation of a super-rich social class in the society. In this respect, it differs from the left-wing politics that defends economic sharing.

In the following sections, conservatism and radical view, which are the other ideas of right-wing politics, will be explained in-depth.


Conservatism: It constitutes a stricter version of economic liberalism. The capital group in the society occupies a significant place in this system and ensures the continuity of the system. While the system makes this rich population richer, it does not offer a solution for the poor population not to become poorer. In addition, the system attaches great importance to the continuity of stereotypes. In other words, conservative thinking is seriously defended and thus, the continuity of the system is preserved. The system aims to maintain and stabilise all issues related to religion, language, tradition, life and politics. Conservative politics appeal to a certain audience through these values.

Radical Right: The radical right, which is the extreme point of the right-wing in the political spectrum, is based on the doctrine of complete obedience. Leaders and values are defended without being questioned. According to the defended values, people start to see themselves as

¹⁷ Centre-left ideology accepts the classes brought by liberal economy and capitalism. However, it tries to create an egalitarian socio-economic model. It strives to establish and implement social policies such as education, health, state aids, and workers' rights. As centre-right and centre-left partners, it rejects racist discrimination and adopts the values that form the basis of democracy. Due to changing values and policies since the 1970s and 1980s, the meanings of the right and the left have changed and evolved. The evolution of right thinking will be described in detail in the following chapters.

superior and different from all other people. People show excessive devotion to values such as religion, race, language and life.

Today, the most important of the current political order debates is the change in the political spectrum. This situation is defined by actions such as the disruption of the political spectrum, de-centralisation, and the centre's shift to the radicals.



(Figure 6) Change of the Political Spectrum 1 (Source: Own Elaboration)

Some events and actions that are taking place today prove this situation. The first is the discrediting of the centre/mainstream right-wing and left-wing political parties and the loss of trust in left-wing ideology, especially in the eyes of the European people. The other reasons are directly related to the international developments, changes in the capital model, economic crises, and social crises (Timur, 1997).

Factors that increase right-wing radicalism such as nationalism, populism, migration movements, economic crises and unemployment, which will be mentioned in the rest of the thesis, are essential reasons why the mainstream-right and mainstream-left ideologies weaken in Europe. On the other hand, since left-wing ideology will not be dealt with in more detail in the thesis, analyses will be made not about why left-wing parties have lost their power but why right-wing ideologies are getting stronger.

1.1 Conservatism

Society is a dynamic structure that is constantly changing and developing. Although at times rather slow, social changes and developments can happen quite quickly, as in the industrial revolution or the French Revolution. However, rapid and radical changes can cause crises and social problems in societies. Of course, some different ideologies and opinions offer solutions to social problems and crises. At this point, the idea that crises, in general, are a necessary precondition for the emergence of new theories constitutes a real phenomenon (Kuhn 1996, 167). In other words, it is an irresistible fact that new, dynamic, different ideologies and ideas can respond to crises and social problems instead of ideologies and ideas that can no longer respond to crises or social issues.

For instance, liberalism, socialism, freedom, and equality emerged due to the effects of the French Revolution and the industrial revolution on societies. The inability of the existing social structures to adapt to new developments has led to the search for new models for a harmonious social structure. New models of society ideas are generally based on the idea that the institutions of the old social structure no longer function and that renewed institutions should replace these institutions. Against the idea of the revolutionary transformation of society and the renewal of institutions, some argue that since the old social institutions have a historical past, these institutions can solve social problems and keep the society together. The idea of change, which is a product of the idea of enlightenment, creates conservative thinking, an attitude against the concept of enlightenment. After the French Revolution, conservatives opposed the ideas of freedom, equality and progress led by the French Revolution with a Catholic, moral and traditional challenge. Conservatism opposes the 'new' and the thoughts created in this period with the thesis of endangering, the contrary effect thesis and the futility thesis (Hirschman, 1991). Conservatism, which attaches great value and importance to social order, traditions, authority, hierarchy and private property, tries to protect these values with religion, family, and traditions.

On the other hand, every political thought can be based on pre-Enlightenment. Conservative thinking is also based on pre-Enlightenment ideas. Some political scientists state that conservative thinking has a historical background that goes back to Aristotle and Cicero. Cicero took a conservative attitude in his period with his views on the continuation of the state, the existence of social classes, aristocratic tutelage, respect for traditions and adherence to historical experiences, emphasising the traditional conservative approach. However, in the 18th century

(1792), conservatism (classical conservatism¹⁸) became the subject of political philosophy, referring to Edmund Burke's 'Reflections on the Revolution in France' as an opposition to the French Revolution. Burke stated in his study that the revolution that took place in France would have negative consequences on the social structure in general. According to Burke, "radical changes will not only be limited to France, but they will also spread throughout Europe, and the revolution will lead to instability and chaos" (Roskin, Cord, Medeiros, and Jones, 2011). Burke also states that social and institutional changes should be made by focusing on society's history, traditions, and values. At this point, Burke showed England as an example.

Although the intellectual sources of conservatism went a little further, conservatism began to be distinguished as an ideological trend in the early 19th century¹⁹. Even though conservatism has had a significant impact on political life since it acquired this characteristic, the integrity and consistency of conservatism as an ideological structure has always been a matter of debate. Criticisms of both anti-conservatism and pro-conservatives revealed the desire of conservative thinkers to distance themselves from 'ideologies'. For this reason, some conservative thinkers, such as Oakeshott, have proposed conservatism as a trend, not a belief or doctrine (Oakeshott, 1956). Vincent (2009, 129) states that conservatism is not an ideology in the usual sense but a theory that rejects the ideological theories that emerged with the Enlightenment idea. Conservatism, which has a paradoxical ideological position, opposes rational and radical arrangements.

It is possible to define conservatism as a style or an attitude in many periods throughout the history of thought. However, conservatism as a political ideology was shaped by criticisms towards the Enlightenment's philosophical, social and political stance and the French Revolution. In this context, conservatism, which is a modern political ideology, has had different thought traditions, important political movements/parties and serious social

¹⁸ Hierarchical, statist and aristocratic structure of classic conservatism has gradually radicalised conservatism. As a kind of an ancestor of fascism, the radicalised old conservatism pioneered the laying of fascism's ideological foundations. However, with the disappearance of the fascist ideology, the old conservatism had to change its ideas to maintain its political existence. In other words, their ties with fascism brought the end of the old conservatism. However, the changes in old conservatism did not occur immediately. Former conservatism, by establishing relationships with some thoughts throughout the change process, both influenced and was influenced by them.

¹⁹ Conservative thinking has arisen in aristocratic, authoritarian and reactionary forms against the idea of reform in Continental Europe. Conservatism was the basis of the ideas formed under the leadership of the Austrian Prince Metternich, especially after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, to restore an aristocratic order. Conservatism found its first political expression in the conservative party founded in Britain in 1830 as 'Tory'. Later, Christian Democrats in Germany and Italy, Liberal Democrats in Japan and Republicans in the United States took their place in the political spectrum as the political expression of conservative thought.

foundations. Although the intellectual foundations of conservatism were laid in the 18th century, the use of the concept for a different political position or ideology took place in the first half of the 19th century.

It is known that conservatism rationally defends the tradition with evolutionist rhetoric against the disintegration of the enlightenment tradition by centring the revolutionary mind. However, conservatism is also often known only as a behavioural attitude partnership that draws attention to the overlap between nature and reality (Popper 2013, 81). This determination emphasises conservatism as an attitude rather than an ideology. Conservatism as a behaviour involves the tendency to think, act and prefer certain kinds of social conditions over others (Oakeshott, 1956). Certain circumstances or behaviours indicate that a person prefers to do what s/he is used to and refuses to try the unknown. However, conservatism is not a stand against change.

When conservatism is considered ‘conscious traditionalism’, conservatives universally support change by preserving traditions that persist despite the lost traditions. Therefore, conservatism is not a system of specific and unchangeable principles (Kirk 2001, 140). ‘Conscious traditionalism’, thus, accepts change by taking a rational attitude against rapid and radical changes. However, it has a structure that aims to control the speed of change. Conservatism has emerged as a warning against the idea of change and as an accumulation of experience against the idea that the vast majority of people can be completely free. In conservatism, traditions, rituals, morals and institutions are passed down from generation to generation (Crowther, 1992). Thus, change spreads across generations. The power of controlling and directing the change in social structures during change provides an opportunity to eliminate the negative consequences of change on society. Conservatism has the will and ability to maintain the continuity of the old, settled, traditional and sacred in modern conditions. Theoretically, conservatism, which defends the established order, tradition, experience and their constituent elements, can, in practice, lead to situational politics that may contradict or even conflict with this defence. The characteristic of conservatism, which defines itself with the past and establishes an instrumental relationship with the past, is to put aside the theoretical records and adapt itself practically to the current situation if the past loses its instrumentalism.

In this sense, as Oakeshott (1956) points out, being conservative is to prefer the known to the unknown, to prefer the tested to the untested, to prefer the truth to the mystery, to prefer the near to the far, to prefer the sufficient to the abundant and to prefer the appropriate to the perfect.

Conservatism has gone through a variety of processes that vary historically and spatially. In other words, conservatism shows different characteristics in different periods and different regions^{20,21}. In this respect, conservatism becomes meaningful when different understandings and practices are considered. For example, Anglo-American conservatism²² has a more liberal content, while Continental European conservatism²³ has gained more authoritarian content^{24,25}. In the 20th century, conservatism is divided into two; a patriarchal perspective advocating reformist and interventionist policies and a liberal view that accepts the free-market principles. The place of conservative political ideology on the scale of authoritarian-liberalism and totalitarianism-pluralism and the discussion of different intellectual currents emerging in this context continues today²⁶.

One of the most important and critical changes experienced by conservatism occurred in the USA after the Second World War. The classic conservatism, which disappeared with the fascist

²⁰ The classic distinction regarding the birth stage of conservative thought is directly related to the difference between the French conservatism (Francophone-European Conservatism) and the British conservatism (Anglo-Saxon Conservatism).

²¹ Although conservative thinking is against change, that the political thought is most changed and open to change. The most important reason for this is that conservative thinking accepts societies as original rather than general. In other words, conservatism means different things in every society and every period (Honderich 1991, 5).

²² British conservatism developed along a line that embraced the parliamentary revolution as a part of the historical tradition. The philosophical existence of conservatism, which was not part of the political discourse in England until the 1830s, was shaped by 'Reflections on the Revolution in France' written by Edmund Burke in 1790. In addition to this traditional binary distinction of conservatism, the 'neo-conservatism' originating from the USA aims to protect American values and thus individualism, human rights, protestant values, liberal democracy and free-market economy (Beneton, 1988). (Neo/modern conservatism is a mixture of Adam Smith's economic conception and Edmund Burke's political ideas (Roskin, Cord, Medeiros and Jones, 2011)).

²³ French conservatism carried the influence of the monarchist regime and the restoration movement, which aimed to rebuild life based on religious view, until the revolution of 1848 (February Revolution). In this sense, the French conservatism can be distinguished by its more radical, uncompromising and reactionary features. The French conservatives, especially reacting to the creations of the French Revolution, adopted an approach that rejected the idea of revolution by defending the traditions, monarchy and church-based community. Joseph de Maistre, Charles Maurras and Louis de Bonald, who were the pioneers of French conservatism, were the people who formed the 'authority' idea of French conservatism (Safi 2005, 20). Also, German conservatism that emerged alongside French conservatism in continental Europe began to be a conscious and consistent movement at the end of the 18th century due to its opposition to the Enlightenment and the French Revolution (German conservatism can be considered as the protection of the German status quo against the French Revolution).

²⁴ Conservatism also suggests the political influence of Christianity and Catholicism in many European countries (Giddens 1994, 22).

²⁵ In this context, there is a serious distinction between authoritarian Continental conservatism (Giddens 1994, 25-26) and liberal Anglo-American conservatism (Conservatism also differs within the Anglo-Saxon political structure (Devigne, 1994)).

²⁶ Conservative movements and politics aim to preserve the traditional values of society. Conservatism is an ideology within the framework of religion, national feelings, values, and cultural habits that includes traditional values. On the other hand, although conservatism is not an anti-democracy and anti-freedom ideology, it can evolve towards inequality and authoritarianism. Some evolvable conservative parties support and even collaborate with radical right-wing parties in their countries.

ideology that was defeated after the Second World War, had to make changes in its thoughts. Therefore, conservatism, which started to change with the end of the fascist ideology, showed similar characteristics with populism in the 1950s. Despite the liberal elements of American conservatism, after the Second World War, especially American conservatism began to be influenced by populist ideas. The populist characteristics of conservatism come from its tendency to glorify and defend religious beliefs, patriotism, communitarianism and anti-elitism (Kazin 1995, 251).

Conservative thought, which was far from showing populist tendencies at the end of the Second World War, started to establish its first connections with populism in the 1950s with the anti-communist policies created in the USA under the leadership of McCarthy (Laclau 2005, 136). The conservative movement initiated against communism established close ties with populism because of its hostile attitude towards communism. Anti-communist conservatism, which has begun to show populist features, has helped the populist thought to exist as a part of the right-wing. This period should be considered a critical period. This is because the way for populism to be re-included in politics with anti-communist thinking and to show the potential of populist radical ideas to affect mainstream politics was opened in this period. Even though McCarthy's political style collapsed without continuity in the USA, the foundations of the 'new right' thought that would continue the path he opened and fill the gap he created were laid in this period (Laclau 2005, 136). Especially in this period, the political inadequacy of the left-wing (Laclau 2005, 137) created an opportunity for the right-wing. According to Laclau (2005, 136-137), the first to follow the path opened by McCarthyism in the USA in the 1960s are George C. Wallace and Barry Goldwater. Wallace and Goldwater succeeded in closing the gap between the mainstream and populism with discourses that mixed racist, identity and populist discourses (Kazin 1995, 232-233). This influence created by Wallace continued to take place in the policies of Nixon and Reagan, who came after him and nowadays is undergoing minor changes with Trump and being assimilated by the Republicans.

The neo/modern conservatism²⁷, which tried to break its ties with the classic conservatism and to stay away from it due to its links with fascism, opposed individualism by adopting the

²⁷ Neo/modern conservatism is not a theory, and it is difficult to define it because the neo/modern conservatism, compared to the old conservatism, has a structure that does not exclude change and accepts the market economy. It is a society doctrine directed at solving problems and a political defence as a reaction. The cultural and social defence adopted by the neo/modern conservatism enables the new conservatism to be distinguished (Dubiel 1985, 13-14).

role of the family and religion combined with the perception of the enemy with a nationalist and strong statist emphasis in the 1960s with the idea of ‘formed society’. Conservative thought, which has taken on a sociological structure since the 1970s, has formed the neo/modern conservative thought that is against the bourgeoisie, romanticism, socialism and modernity. According to Giddens (1994, 34), neo/modern conservatism derives radical thoughts from the marketist and economic individualist ‘new right’²⁸. This idea expresses itself as liberal and is based on policies of turning away from socialist attitudes (Dubiel 1985, 10).

There is no doubt that this does not mean that there are no general principles uniting conservatives. It can easily be seen that conservatism tends to treat people as a part of an established social order from the past. Thus, the conflict between change and people’s search for stability and order creates the central tension of conservatism. This tension is why conservatism takes a distant, even a critical attitude to the concept of progress. However, it is not correct to consider this critical attitude of conservatism as absolute change or an uncompromising defence of the past. Conservative anxiety is a reaction to the uncertain future benefits that are expected to be better. Therefore, conservatives’ aim is to oppose the concept of progress, which advocates a necessary and one-way change.

For conservatives, the problem is not the troubles and shocks caused by change. The problem for conservatives is the overwhelming ruling classes, the shaken upper-class life loss of respect for specific values, the breakdown of order and the chaos created by these problems. In this context, conservatives believe in change and the necessity of change. However, they think that change should occur in a reasonable manner without upsetting the social structure, breaking everything up and causing excessive reactions. The act of containment, underlined by conservatives, is the preservation of the framework to prevent possible destruction and turmoil. This framework consists of social building blocks. According to conservatives, changes made to protect social hierarchies, institutions and cultural values will be more effective and permanent.

The distinguishing principle of conservatism is to doubt that the human mind can plan and build a just and egalitarian society because according to conservatism, society is a complex

²⁸ However, there are points where the new right and neo/modern conservatism diverge. The main point of this divergence is an authoritarian and reactionary anti-modernisation opposition based on the cultural struggle adopted by the new right (Dubiel 1985, 15). However, common features of classic conservatism and neo/modern conservatism also exist. The most important of these partnerships is to accept societies as original rather than general and to act according to this specificity.

structure that cannot be rationally planned. Social hierarchies should be considered a part of society's complex nature. A planning project that does not take this complexity into account will drag society into disaster (Mollaer 2011, 68).

The basic principles of the conservative view can be grouped under four headings:

- Believing that humans are flawed beings
- Organic society
- Political scepticism
- Traditionalism²⁹.

According to conservative thinking, man is a structure with both mental and moral weaknesses. Since social life is a complex structure shaped by many factors, the human mind does not have a holistic understanding to grasp it down to the finest detail. People who intervene in the social order for the ideals of freedom and equality in social life and shape their attitudes and behaviours accordingly will always be doomed to failure. No matter how good the intentions that motivate people are, each person's weaknesses will ultimately lead to the unwanted moral consequences of this process (Quinton 1978, 13-16).

According to Huntington (1957, 454), conservatism can be defined in three ways. First, conservatism in the elitist theory: Conservatism is the ideology of the feudal, aristocratic agrarian classes. It is a special and unique movement that contains the reaction of the first half of the 19th century to the French Revolution. In this sense, liberalism is the ideology of the bourgeoisie, socialism and Marxism are the ideology of the proletariat, and conservatism is the ideology of the aristocrats. Second, the autonomous definition of conservatism: Conservatism is neither in the interests of a particular group nor is it based on a particular historical formation of social forces. Conservatism is usually an autonomous system of good ideas and is based on universal values such as justice, order, balance and proportionality. The third definition is situational: Conservatism is seen as an ideology arising from change. This ideology is a fundamentalist challenge to the existing institutions and the ideology of their adopters.

²⁹ The difference between the definition and attitude of conservatism can be explained by the emphasis of conservatism on tradition. Although conservative thinking is certainly traditionalist, traditionalism does not mean to advocate the exact continuation of the existing system. Neo/modern conservatism, which is changing and open to change, applies change as a defence of a system (Blackwell and Seabrook 1993, 58). In other words, the perception of tradition, in this case, can be perceived as an effort to give the newly created institutions a traditionalist appearance. In other words, conservative beliefs that vary according to each society, order and period can bring new and different traditions, beliefs in societies (Scruton, 1991), orders and periods (Willett, 1992).

Therefore, the essence of conservatism is the scrupulous validation of the current institutional values.

Also, according to Heywood (2013, 66), conservatism consists of seven parts:

- Tradition
- Pragmatism
- Human beings' inability to achieve being perfect
- Organism
- Hierarchy
- Authority
- Property

According to this:

- The main theme of conservative thinking is closely related to the desire to 'conserve' traditions, virtues and respect for established institutions. Conservatism advocates those virtues, traditions and that established institutions should be preserved for both present people and future generations.
- Conservatism advocates the belief that experimental conditions and practical goals should shape the action.
- In the conservative understanding of human nature, people need to live in stable and organised communities. In addition to this situation, it is believed that individuals are morally corrupt, selfish, greedy and egoistic. Therefore, a strong state, sound laws and strict penalties protect the order.
- Conservatism sees society as an organic whole or a living entity rather than a society that is the product of individual creativity.
- Conservatism accepts social status and status ratings as natural and inevitable in an organic society.
- Conservatism thinks that authority should be carried out from top to bottom. This situation provides leadership, guidance and support to individuals who lack knowledge, experience and training.
- Conservatism encourages ownership of the property to respect the law and property of others.

In this context, it is important to understand the relationship and relevance between conservatism and society. Conservatives do not see society as a structure composed of individuals. For them, society is an organic combination in which unbreakable ties connect individuals. Therefore, they consider society as a living organism. Order in social life is established by mutual harmony and cooperation, similar to the complementary relationship of the organs that make up an organism. Conservatism, which sees society as an organism, advocates the preservation of basic institutions such as religion, family and tradition. In this respect, hierarchy and inequality are seen as the natural result of the order. In this way, individuals form a structure through institutions such as family, class and sect and are connected to each other in accordance with the requirements of the everyday life. Moreover, conservatism is based on the reaction of changing social and cultural structures, or more precisely, the continuity of meanings and values attributed to these structures.

In this case, political scepticism constitutes an indispensable component of the conservative approach. Conservatives think that people's collective experiences will shape what is politically correct and beneficial. Therefore, the political attitudes adopted must be based on the current experience rather than rational solutions. As a result conservative politics offers to take the social reality as a starting point based on a flexible and pragmatic approach. Otherwise, according to conservatives, political solutions that are incompatible with social reality will inevitably result in oppressive results.

As mentioned in the sections above, conservatism tends to show different characteristics in different places. For this reason, to understand conservatism better, the differences in conservatism will be analysed in more detail in the following section.

1.1.1 Continental Europe and Authoritarian Conservatism

Continental conservatism³⁰ was shaped based on the views of reactionary French thinkers such as Joseph de Maistre, Louis de Bonald, Barruel and Chateaubriand in response to the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. These thinkers rejected Enlightenment thought and advocated returning to faith and obedience—basing their criticism on the Enlightenment and

³⁰ In the literature, concepts such as 'theocratic conservatism' or 'religious conservatism' are also used to describe this tradition of thought.

the French Revolution. These thinkers based their views on scriptures³¹ and divine will. For example, de Maistre, who avoided 18th-century philosophy, uses the phrase ‘an evil rebellion against God’ for the idea of Enlightenment (Muller, 1997). This understanding is based on the idea of protecting the values that medieval religious references regarded as lofty and sacred.

Continental conservatives reflect a ‘counter-revolutionary’ and ‘reactive political attitude’ by defending the ‘Ancien Regime’, the traditional elite’s authority and the Middle Ages nostalgia. According to de Maistre, “both religious and monarchic authorities should be obeyed. Otherwise, chaos and irregularities will be inevitable” (Nisbet, 2001). Authoritarian conservatives refuse to associate with Enlightenment ideas and do not show any positive attitude towards liberal democratic principles. In this respect, authoritarian conservatives, who approach change with fear, adopt a reactive political approach.

Authoritarian conservatism continued to defend the autocratic rule despite the growing liberal, socialist and nationalist ideas³². Again, this thought rejects the limitation of political powers by constitutional and parliamentary institutions. However, different forms of the authoritarian regime have been created depending on the developments in the historical processes and some situations. For example, in France in 1848, Napoleon was first elected as the president but later declared himself the emperor. This form of power, called ‘Bonapartism’, also gained the support of the authoritarian conservatives at that time (Rich 1991, 81). Authoritarianism got developed significantly in Tsarist Russia, especially after the French Revolution. In Russia, Tsar Nicholas I (1825-1855) defended the principles of tradition, autocracy and nationality against the values of freedom, equality and fraternity that emerged in the French Revolution. Nicholas and his followers objected to the limitation of their power by the constitution or parliament. However, unlike the Orthodox Tsarist Russia, authoritarianism managed to remain strong, especially in Catholic countries, after Italy’s unification. In fact, in 1864, the Pope condemned all radical or progressive ideas about nationalism, liberalism, and socialism as false doctrines.

The unwillingness of continental conservatives to adopt reform and democratic values goes back to the 20th century. Authoritarian regimes associated with conservative thought adopted a

³¹ According to the Continental Conservatives, because the human mind cannot comprehend the truth, the truth can only be grasped with religious knowledge. In this context, revelations and holy books constitute the source of knowledge and truth. Enlightenment thinkers, who opposed this view, argued that all kinds of information and truth should be filtered through the mind, and that all information (including revelations and holy books) and facts that do not pass the mind filter are false and misleading.

³² Authoritarian conservatives supported hierarchical and autocratic structures in the 19th century.

kind of conservative nationalism, and popularly supported dictatorial regimes were established (Heywood, 2017). For example, conservative elites in Italy and Germany contributed significantly to Mussolini and Hitler's rise to power by supporting the abolition of parliamentary democracy and the growing fascist movements in the immediate aftermath of the First World War. At this point, the importance of the relationship between authoritarian conservatism and fascism should be emphasised because the radical wing of authoritarian conservatism had an intellectual framework that supported fascism or national socialism. Especially when considering the thinkers and arguments within the framework of the German conservative thought, an authoritarian conservatism is encountered, unlike the Anglo-American tradition. Although the development and classification of conservative thought in Germany is much more complex, it can be said that German conservatism is more appropriate in the context of authoritarian conservatism.

Unlike all conservatives who claim to respect authority, a few modern conservatives can accept their ideas as authoritarian. However, although contemporary conservatives are keen to demonstrate their commitment to democracy, especially to liberal and democratic principles, there is a conservative tradition that supports authoritarian governance, especially in Continental Europe. Similar regimes have emerged in Africa, Asia, and some parts of the Middle East in recent history. However, although such regimes have emerged out of a tendency to consolidate the positions of conservative elites, they generally adopt a conservative nationalist style.

1.1.2 Paternalist Conservatism

Paternalist conservatism is a type of conservatism that advocates and implements interventionist policies. In Britain, especially in the policies of Benjamin Disraeli and after the Second World War, it is a thought called 'moderate middle way' between liberalism and socialism. There are two main concepts within the context of paternalist conservatism.

- One-Nation Conservatism

The Anglo-American patriarchal tradition goes back to Benjamin Disraeli, who served as the British prime minister from 1874-1880. Disraeli clearly states his political thoughts in his books 'Coningsby' (1844 (2015)) and 'Sybil' (1845 (2013)), which he wrote to emphasise the

principles of social responsibility against extreme individualism³³. According to Disraeli, increasing social inequalities sow the seeds of revolution because according to Disraeli, the working class (poor) does not readily accept poverty³⁴.

Disraeli recognises that society is hierarchical in nature. However, he also thinks that wealth and social privileges lead to social inequality. According to Disraeli, the wealthy and socially privileged people should share the social responsibilities according to the 'feudal noble principle of necessity'. This idea is expressed with the slogan 'one nation'. Disraeli's ideas were later adopted as 'Conservative Democracy' by Lord Randolph Churchill in the late 19th century. As the meaning of democracy in England was expanding, Churchill highlighted the need for traditional institutions to benefit from broader social support. After Disraeli, the Conservative Party grew its social support by getting votes from the working class and gained political success by continuing the social reform policy led by Disraeli. Consequently, one-nation conservatism can be seen as a kind of 'Tory sense of welfare'.

The tradition of one-nation reached its peak in the 1950s and 1960s. This peak was reached due to the need for the economy to support the welfare system and provide employment. This understanding is based neither on the positive freedom principle of liberalism nor on the equality principle of parliamentary socialism. The critical point is to find the 'middle way'. Macmillan, who served as prime minister from 1957 to 1963, defended this view, which he called 'planned capitalism', as a 'mixed system'. One-nation conservatism, which Thatcher later rejected with the New Right thought, has been in the Conservative Party policies since the early 2000s.

- Christian Democracy

The idea of Christian Democracy first emerged in the 19th century to eliminate the divergences between the church and democracy and to create a different Christian style of democracy (Usta, 2005). After 1945 Christian democratic parties adopted different policies in various parts of Europe than the former Christian democratic parties. Especially after the Second World War, conservative parties in Europe abandoned/had to abandon their

³³ Disraeli wrote these books to understand the growing industrialisation, economic inequality and at least revolutionary uprisings and their history in Continental Europe. In these books, Disraeli draws attention to the danger of Britain splitting into two nations, the rich and the poor.

³⁴ Disraeli's thought came true with the 1830 and 1848 revolutions that broke out in Europe. The Revolutions of 1830 are the uprisings that started when the people adopted the idea of liberalism (Bridge and Bullen, 2004). The 1848 Revolution is the uprising against Louis-Philippe in France. At the end of the revolution, the king left his crown and fled to England and the second republic was established in France (Rich, 1991).

authoritarian views. Conservative parties in Europe, influenced by the social traditions of Christianity³⁵, adopted a new form of conservatism and accepted democracy politically.

However, as different religious forms influenced the conservative parties formed during this period, a distinction was formed between Protestants and Catholics. Protestant conservatism defines a more individualistic political style. In contrast, Catholic conservatism traditionally dictates a political style focused on the social group rather than the individual, emphasising organic harmony. However, after 1945, differences began to occur within conservative politics. The newly established Christian democratic parties started to emphasise the idea of ‘social partnership’ with the idea of democratic corporatism. Contrary to the traditional emphasis on the nation, Christian democracy supported a Catholic principle that decisions should be made by relevant individuals or entities, not by a group.

The positive attitude towards this principle paved the way for the Christian Democrats³⁶ to support Europeanisation and European integration. The willingness of Christian democratic parties to implement welfare policy is influenced by economists’ such as Friedrich List³⁷, flexible and pragmatic ideas. This understanding has led to the promotion of an effective ‘social market economy (Rhine Capitalism)³⁸’ idea in Continental Europe.

Most of today’s Christian democratic parties are in the position of ‘catch-all’ parties. Although these parties support European integration and EU formation, they are opposed to opinions contrary to religious values (such as abortion, euthanasia, same-sex marriage) due to their close relationship with the Catholic Church. Also, Christian Democrats³⁹, which constitute

³⁵ The most important Christian democratic party that emerged after 1945 were the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in Germany (Kaiser 2004, 129).

³⁶ Especially Christian democrats and national conservative parties are the right-wing parties that show the most similarities to the radical right. According to Laver and Hunt (1992), Christian democrats are the most authoritarian party structure after radical right-wing parties. There are also cases where some conservative mainstream-right parties are sympathetic to radical right-wing views regarding immigration, multiculturalism, and authoritarianism (Benoit and Laver, 2006).

³⁷ List (2013) emphasised the importance of the government's need to intervene in the economy to protect small industries from fierce foreign competition.

³⁸ The social market is an economic model built on market principles. Although it is a model-independent of government control to some extent, it is primarily driven by public services and an inclusive welfare system and operates in the context of social cohesion (Wrobel 2012, 48). This model differs from the Anglo-American model that advocates the freedom of the market economy. That is, this model is a well-being tool that must be created to achieve a broader set of social goals. This idea, which advocates partnership and cooperation in the market, has revealed a special capitalism model that is mostly adopted in the EU.

³⁹ Christian democratic parties with different characteristics from country to country can display right-wing-left-wing, authoritarian-libertarian, secular-anti-secular characteristics (Freston, 2004).

the largest group of the European Parliament today, support security, prosperity, and strong EU policies.

1.1.3 Neo-Conservatism and the Conservative New Right

Conservatives have been exposed to some policies caused by social liberal policies implemented in previous periods. This experience led to a new ideological response called the 'new right'. The new right has tried to resolve economic, political, and ideological crises by synthesising some elements of neo-liberal and neo-conservative approaches. The economic model of the new right is neo-liberalism, and its political model is neo-conservatism.

Neo-conservatism, which constitutes the political model of the new right thought, is called authoritarian populism by the British thinker Stuart Hall. The authoritarianism that emerged with the neo-conservative model in the late 1970s is due to the Thatcher government's policies shifting from consent to repressive. The hallmark of this authoritarianism is the moral panic created by international migration, youth subcultures and rises in crime rates (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson and Roberts, 1978). The primary practices of neo-conservatism are the adoption of law and order with strict legal measures and penalties, the development of family values to improve general morality, and the protection of national identity. In this process, neo-conservatism has been integrated with the ideas of neo-liberal market economy and economic efficiency. In addition, to ensure economic development and create a politically strong state structure, an affinity with concepts such as authority, tradition, national identity, law and order has been achieved⁴⁰.

According to the neo-conservatism developing on the criticism of the interventionist social-welfare state practices, the excessive crossing of the boundaries between the state and society causes the despotism of the majority, an understanding of equality and freedom contrary to human nature, increasing class conflicts, political impotence, and economic inefficiency. According to neo-conservatives, welfare state thought reveals a type of citizen dependent on

⁴⁰ Neo-conservatism equates social welfare economic practices with socialism. For this reason, advocates of neo-conservatism support the revival of traditional values and moral principles. In other words, neo-conservatives support policies that strengthen the family, increase penalties and support national identity ties by re-establishing law, order and discipline damaged by social welfare economic practices. According to the neo-conservatives who put the principles of order, stability and continuity at the political centre, the existence of a strong state is necessary to maintain the social order and balance. However, state intervention in society undermines the stability of natural hierarchies in the social structure.

the central state, passive, self-interested and irresponsible. For this reason, neo-conservative policies aim to create a type of community that is entrepreneurial, responsible, and law-abiding.

Neo-conservatives acknowledge the impact of capitalism and liberalism on democracy (Freyer, 1954). However, they think that the bourgeois order destroys the traditional symbols and practices on which a meaningful social existence is based. Although neo-conservatism seeks to preserve and revive traditions, it certainly acts independently of the longing for the past. Neo-conservatism does not challenge progressive thinking like classical conservative ideas. Instead, it wants to create a blend of the present and the future.

There are many different characteristics of neo-conservatism that Kristol (1983) advocates. “It is against most of the ideas of socialism, but not against liberalism, far from it. It is against romanticist thought. It sees economic growth not as an end but as a means of ensuring stability. It prefers moderate state intervention in the economy. It supports nationalism, not patriotism. It draws attention to the importance of family and religion”.

Appendix A focuses on the influence of conservative right parties in Europe on European politics and summarises the results of the post-2009 national elections. The research examined the rate of votes won by conservative parties in European countries in national elections.

Appendix A

National Election Results of the Conservative Parties of the European Union Countries

(Source: Own Elaboration based on PartiesandElections.eu (a))

1.2 Radical Right

It is possible to analyse the radical right, which is not a new phenomenon in ideological, political, and terminological terms since the end of the 19th century. Two ideological factors played an essential role in the emergence of nationalist and revolutionary radical right-wing thought as an ideological movement. The first is the organisational and operational consequences of the revolutionary left-wing movements in the 18th and 19th centuries. The second is the conservatives’ communitarian, identitarian, hierarchical and culturalist views that reject enlightenment, individualism, equality, and modernity (Sternhell, 2009). The radical right, which emerged with radical nationalist and revolutionary ideological propaganda, especially in Italy and France at the beginning of the 20th century, started to produce policies,

especially against conservative, communist, Marxist, democratic and liberal movements⁴¹. However, the radical right, which could not gain power in ideological and intellectual terms in this period, failed in the political arena of the period. Despite this, the radical right had the opportunity to develop as a rejection of the liberal order after the First World War, the period when the empires fell apart. As a product of the crisis of democratic representation, nationalism as a political alternative under the name of fascism started to come to the fore in this period (Sternhell, 2005; Griffin, 1993).

The ideology born in Italy in 1919, fascism (*fascismo*), has been successful not only in the European continent to establish a totalitarian dictatorship by destroying democracy based on ‘us’ and ‘them and enemies, but also has succeeded to be effective all over the world with its extreme nationalist, militarist, chauvinist, the racist its hierarchical, violent, anti-civil society and anti-majority, nation-statist, marginal, polarising, leader-oriented, sanctifying the state, corporatist, obedient, totalitarian, imperialist and anti-liberal ideas (Finchelstein 2017, 66; Girdner 2010, 73-74). Fascist ideology affected different world countries after Italy in Europe and was included in the politics under the name of ‘Nazism’ in Germany, ‘Falangism’ in Spain, ‘Nacionalismo’ in Argentina and ‘Integralismo’ in Brazil. The radical right, which took its initial power from the ideology, ideas, and institutions of the Italian and later the German radical right, managed to adapt itself to the political traditions of the other countries until the 1930s. Especially in Europe, right-wing and authoritarian governments who have adopted some radical right ideas have incorporated these ideas into their national policies in the period between the two world wars (Pinto and Kallis, 2014). Radical right movements, which have a totalitarian state thought, first hit the Weimar Republic and then the Italian democracy. Apart from these, the radical right remained in power in Spain, Portugal and Greece for a long time. The radical right movements rose with military support and established power in Hungary, Poland, and Romania between the two world wars.

However, the defeat experienced after the Second World War and the destruction and massacres caused by the fascist ideology made the radical right in European politics impossible to exist. The masses adopted the values of democracy, pluralism, peace, and tolerance. For these reasons, the post-1945 period has become a period of seclusion for the radical right. Facing with the consequences of the destruction, war, genocide, and massacres fascism caused during

⁴¹ The most important point that distinguishes conservative and radical right thought from each other is the relationship they establish with the political system.

this period, the radical right⁴² was greatly damaged by the acceptance of liberal democracy, the development of the welfare system, the loss of power of militarism and imperialism; especially with the power of anti-racist policies of the United States, the Soviet Union and international organisations like UNESCO and UN (Golder 2016, 481). The radical right, which received the support of marginal people and groups such as some neo-fascist and neo-Nazi⁴³ movements that tried to stay active in the post-war period, was associated with fascist ideology during the Cold War and remained outside of European politics. However, the radical right began to seek ways to take part in European politics again in this period (Griffin, 2000; Knigge 1998, 249; Rydgren 2005, 413; Ignazi, 2003).

Even though having been pushed out of the political sphere in Europe (Fraser 2001, 32), the radical right that was still trying to stay in the political life could not show its influence in the political sphere due to the social and political stability, economic developments, low social tension, and the increase in the welfare of the individual and states in Europe after 1945 (Betz 1993, 413). However, European politics, which was dragged into severe crises in the following period, enabled the existence of a new-looking and reformulated radical right in the political life. With the weakening of the democratic values adopted by the masses by the end of the Second World War, political discourses have been accepted as an exclusionary and authoritarian theme since the 1980s. Radical right's old core ideas such as extreme nationalism, anti-communism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia⁴⁴ and biological racism were more acceptable for the new period when they began to be more harmless, more sympathetic, newer⁴⁵ and more

⁴² The most important basic point that separating the radical right and populist right from the past (fascism) is the understanding of violence. Compared to the fascist movement, which advocates for violence and makes it an aim (Levi 1989, 105), today's radical right and populist right movements are farther from the understanding of violence. In addition, populism does not belong to any position (right-wing or left-wing), and for this reason it is more inclusive than fascism.

⁴³ The terms neo-Nazi and neo-fascist are used for movements that explicitly adopt the fascist ideology. The addition of 'neo' indicates the movements that emerged after 1945. The following movements can be given as an example; Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano, MSI) and later National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale, AN) (Mudde 1996, 232), Free German Workers' Party (Freiheitliche Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, FAP) (Banks, Müller, and Overstreet 2003, 421), and Socialist Reich Party (Sozialistische Reichspartei Deutschlands, SRP) (Winkler and Schumann 1998, 96).

⁴⁴ Hostility towards non-indigenous people within a community, hostility towards community and non-indigenous, hostility to diversity and difference (Aliboni, 2006).

⁴⁵ Racism and extreme nationalism do not guide radical right-wing voters who are primarily concerned with immigration and identity issues. On the contrary, these voters and parties are often excluded from politics because of radical nationalism and racist policies. This is the main reason why radical right-wing parties that want to be more successful try to soften their rhetoric to appear more respected in the political arena. The new radical right parties say, "We are not racist, nationalist or Islamophobic, we are the voice of the people, because the people want it, and we are moving on this path." In particular, the change of racist thought under the name of 'new racism' and the rejection of the old by the radical right is of great importance in terms of the radical right's permanence in the political scene (Kitschelt, 1995).

dynamic, because only in this way could the radical right return to the political life and be normalised⁴⁶ (Cole, 2005; Rydgren, 2005; Ignazi and Ysmal, 1992; Betz, 1994). The radical right, which has returned to the active political life with its upward trend, has managed to become influential, especially in Western European democracies, by convincing the mainstream public that it has abandoned its former fascist core⁴⁷ and by separating itself from the conservative right and even excluding itself from the current party systems⁴⁸ (Minkenberg, 2000; Ignazi 1992, 7). The new populist techniques and renewed ideas the radical right started to use in politics was proven to be successful between 1980 and 1990 (Allen, 2017).

The fact that the immigrants, who were accepted by the European states due to the labour shortage, especially after the Second World War, became permanent in these countries, caused this situation to turn into a political material. The economic recession after the oil crisis in the 1970s, the decline of societies' trust in politics and the onset of security concerns due to new immigrants created a unique opportunity for radical right parties in Europe (Rydgren 2005, 414).

Two events have undeniable importance in the development of radical right in Europe. These events are; the end of the Cold War (the collapse of the Soviet Union (socialism/communism), thus, the rise of nationalism and the rise of ethnic warfare) (Eatwell 2003b, 1-16; Lacquer, 1993) and September 11 (terrorist incidents and the resulting security-freedom dilemma). The wave of insecurity that emerged from these events affected all European politics (especially the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, England, Spain, Hungary⁴⁹ and Greece) and paved the way for

⁴⁶ The normalisation of the radical right shows not only qualitative but also quantitative characteristics. Examples of normalisation situations of the radical right are; the participation of the Danish People's Party (DF) and the True Finns Party (PS) in the conservative alliance after the European Parliament elections in 2014, the Swedish Democrats' (SD) removal of Gustav Kasselstrand and William Hahne from the party in April 2015 and the Hungarian Jobbik party's (Jobbik) reduction of anti-gypsy and anti-Jewish rhetoric. Radical right parties, which have normalised both politically and within the party, have succeeded in appealing to liberal voters with their new moderate appearance, the working class with their policies on immigration, the conservative voters with their traditionalist policies and the unstable voters with their protest views. Thus, radical right tries to create a new kind of 'right-wing catch-all party' style.

⁴⁷ Thus, the relationship of the radical right with the past and the legacy of the fascist dictatorship was tried to be destroyed. Although today's radical right movements present themselves as renewed and purified from their past, charismatic leaders' exclusionary attitudes and the styles of criticising the system (Van Der Brug and Mughan, 2007) still show similarities with their ancestors. The radical right's effort to break from the past is the aim of the radical right to free itself from the absolute evil, bad government, authoritarianism, and racism features of fascism (Finchelstein 2017, 25).

⁴⁸ In recent years, radical right candidates have had their best results in the presidential elections in Austria and France. In the parliamentary elections in Italy, the populist right Lega (LN) became the biggest party of the conservative coalition. Radical right parties entered coalition governments in Austria and Norway, and the radical right supported the mainstream-right government in Denmark. Radical right parties in Germany and the Netherlands achieved significant success in the parliamentary elections.

⁴⁹ The Hungarian issue will be analysed in detail in the upcoming chapters.

a new kind of radical right. The radical right that developed after September 11 will be especially discussed in depth in the following sections of the thesis.

The radical right and related issues have been popular research topics within political science. However, until the 1980s, research (until the rise of the modern radical right) mainly were related to the past experiences of the radical right. The new radical right trend that started to rise again in the 1980s with a different view and the unexpected success of the new radical right parties brought academicians closer to this issue. Research on the new radical right formations (parties and movements) in the early 1990s has led to the formation of a certain literature for the new radical right. The studies carried out questioned whether the revived radical right movement threatened democratic values and its relationship with the old fascist movements (Mudde, 1996). Therefore, democratic values constitute the main subjects of the literature created as a result of the research.

The visible success of the radical right in the 1990s and the fact that democratic values became debatable caused an increase in academic studies on this subject. Especially in Europe, the spread of xenophobia and violence, the rapid spread of the discourse 'Europe belongs to the Europeans', the crisis of legitimacy and democracy⁵⁰, a 'pathological normalisation' wave (Mudde, 2010), increase of the international migration, new industrialisation movements, income inequalities, economic crises, re-emergence of nationalism in post-Soviet countries, the problems in international organisations, radical right parties that gain strength with regional and national elections show that the radical right parties are permanent and rising in European politics (Gourevitch, 1978; Ignazi, 1992).

Although the radical right has once again become a popular research topic, it has not ensured its steady and fruitful development academically (Anastasakis 2000, 4). In particular, regional analyses, which are far from creating a general framework (Betz 2003, 75), studies that only about political parties which prevent the examination of groups and movements (Pedahzur and Weinberg 2001, 55), radical right movements' political and ideological differences⁵¹, the radical rights' flexible (this is because they do not belong to the right-wing or the left-wing), changeable (setting policies according to current issues) and inconsistent policies, the overlapping/similar policies of the radical right and other right-wing parties and sometimes even the left-wing parties, and the evolution of traditional right-wing-left-wing ideas cause this

⁵⁰ The greatest threats of radical right parties to democracy, which sometimes contradict democratic values, come from the authoritarianism and moralism values.

⁵¹ These differences usually occur in economic policies, welfare policies and determination of 'other' groups.

situation. The fact that studies could not create any general framework and the term radical right could not be based on a common definition (Betz 2003, 75) made the subject remain a kind of a discussion rather than a scientific one. However, since a standard definition cannot be made not only for the radical right but also for the mainstream right, it is not correct to interpret this situation as a special case for the radical right studies only. Radical right and mainstream right exhibit different structures far from generalisations and consist of historical, ideological, structural, and political features. For this reason, the mainstream right and the radical right should not be considered as one and only formations. For this reason, mainstream-right and radical right movements and ideas are considered as separate party families that show similarities.

The absence of a generally accepted definition creates terminological confusion on the radical right (Mudde 1996, 229; Anastasakis 2000, 4). For this reason, conducting research with acknowledgement of these differences can guide academics in overcoming the problem. When research began to focus on the radical right in the early years, 'there was a consensus about who was the radical right, but it was unclear what factors made them the radical right' (Von Beyme 1988, 3). These uncertainties have created more differences of opinion, and the consensus about who is the radical right has also vanished (Mudde 2000a, 7).

Due to the lack of consensus on the radical right, diversity, political heterogeneity, and organisational complexity (Griffin, 1993) have led scholars to find criteria that distinguish the radical right from the other forms rather than explain it. Therefore, many sources should be used to define radical right and understand its hypotheses. As it can be seen, these sources vary and seem very far from offering a common definition. For example, the radical right is; anti-democratic tendencies and initiatives according to Backes and Jesse (1993, 474), xenophobia, populism and authoritarianism according to Harrison and Bruter (2011), movements that against to current system and global equalities according to Ignazi (1992; 2003), limited empathy ring according to Singer (2011), powerful and strong state understanding that could restore the national glory according to Kühnl (1990, 184), anti-democratic thoughts according to Carter (2005), national history understanding and people's community according to Holzer (1993, 16-17), racism, xenophobia and nationalism according to Macridis (1989, 231), nationalism, exclusion, anti-liberalism and cultural pessimism according to Hagtvet (1994, 241), traditionalism, extreme nationalism and fascism according to d'Appollonia (1996) and Remond (1982), extreme nationalism, racism and xenophobia according to Carlisle (2005, 693), leadership and charisma according to Eatwell (2005), nationalism, xenophobia, anti-

establishment, populism and authoritativeness according to Rydgren (2005), nativity, exclusion and authoritarianism according to Rappaport (2017, 19), extreme nationalism, ethnocentrism, anticommunism, anti-parliamentary, anti-pluralism, militarism, law and order thought, strong leader request, anti-Americanism and cultural pessimism according to Falter and Schumann (1988), radicalism, populism and nationalism according to Golder (2016, 477-478), zero sum perspective according to Kallis (2013), nationalism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, strong state believe, authoritarian politics and welfare chauvinism according to Hainsworth (2000), nationalism, authoritarianism and xenophobia according to Minkenberg and Perrineau (2007, 30), social hierarchy according to Woshinsky (2007, 154), totalitarianism and fascism according to Von Beyme (1988), normal pathology according to Scheuch and Klingemann (1967), populism according to Hartleb (2011, 267), compliance problems between industrial society and democracy according to Sternhell, Sznajder and Asheri (1989), radical nativism, populism and exclusion according to Betz (1994), inequalities of people according to Fennema (2005), nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, strong state believe, welfare chauvinism, law and order, populism, nativism and authoritarianism according to Mudde (1995; 2000a, 177; 2007; 2009). Therefore, it is more useful to investigate the radical right with regional studies. For this reason, this thesis will try to analyse Hungarian policies by focusing on Hungary in the following sections.

In addition to all these explanations and definitions, according to Mudde (1995, 206), there are 58 different ideological features in the literature. Only five of these (nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and strong state defence) are used in half of the definitions. Moreover, nativism, essentialist nationalism, anti-immigration, and xenophobia, which are common to almost all radical right movements, can be included in the common features of the radical right (Grillo, 2003; Mudde, 2007). In the light of these definitions, radical right is defined by researchers as a formation against equality, multiculturalism, social peace, individual freedoms, and social justice.

Studies show conceptual differences as well as differing in ideological characteristics and definition of the radical right concept. Some of the conceptual frameworks are; far-right (Saull, Anievas, Davidson and Fabry, 2015), extreme-right and new extreme-right (Ignazi, 2003; Fennema, 1997), right-wing extremism (Mammone, Godin and Jenkins, 2013), populist radical right (Mudde, 2007), radical right-wing populism (Rydgren, 2002), populist parties of the right-wing (Betz, 2005), exclusion movements (Rydgren and van Holsteyn, 2005; Betz, 1994), anti-immigrant parties (Art, 2011), Neo-fascism (Goodwin, 2012), fascism and its derivatives

(Griffin, 1993; Cheles, 1991), extreme right and radical conservatism (Holzer, 1993), new-right (Minkenberg, 1997), radical right (Ramet, 1999), new radical right (Kitschelt, 1995), right-wing populism (Helms, 1997), new populism (Taggart, 1995), neo-populism (Immerfall, 1998), and national populism (Taguieff, 1995).

Although there is no commonality in the terminology, according to some scholars, there are no fundamental differences between the terms (Mudde, 2007). However, the term radical right will be preferred in this thesis because radical and extreme adjectives have a dilemma that can create critical theoretical problems. There are two reasons why this thesis uses radical right instead of extreme right. The first reason is that the topology proposed by Ignazi (1992; 2003) is becoming more and more obsolete. As academics agree, radical right party families are increasingly adapting to the mainstream political system. The new radical right parties of Western Europe are trying to put aside their old rhetoric and policies and are now avoiding representing the extreme point of the political system. In a sense, although radical right parties and politics did not leave their old ideological core altogether, they started to follow politics closer to the mainstream (Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn, 2016). The second reason is the rejection of democracy and the inclusion of violence in the concept of ‘extremism’, which Backer (2000) points out. However, this is not the case for Europe’s new ‘radical’ right. As Mudde (2007, 31) stated, “The radical right is symbolically democratic, albeit against some of the norms of liberal democracy”.

In other words, unlike the extreme right, which is openly anti-democratic, the radical right challenges the liberal values that underpin democracy. In short, the radical right makes politics on the meanings of national symbols and values. In this sense, the radical right politicises identity concepts such as nation, tradition, language, history, and religion, which are seen as a field of conflict, by blending with nationalism, polarisation policies and fictions such as threat and death (Pytlas, 2015; Mudde, 2007). Therefore, while the extreme right aims at a structure that is essentially anti-democratic and opposes the principle of popular sovereignty, the radical right poses a challenge within the framework of the principles and values that form the basis of democracy. The characteristics of the evolution of the radical right over time are reflected in almost all research on this subject. For example, Akkerman, de Lange, and Rooduijn (2016) state that many radical right-wing parties, ideas, and movements go through the mainstreaming process (breaking ties with extreme movements and abandoning the idea of anti-Semitism).

The Main Dichotomy in Extreme Right/Radical Right Terminology		
Extreme Right		Radical Right
Meaning	Party, thought, and ideology are defined according to their extreme position in the political system (Positional).	Party, thought, and ideology are defined according to their radical ideological characteristics, regardless of their position in the political system (Ideological).

(Table 2) The Main Dichotomy in Extreme Right/Radical Right Terminology

(Cavallaro 2017, 30).

The term radical right originates from American politics. While this term, which belongs to American politics in the 1950s, was used to denote racist, nationalist, anti-communist, hyper-religious, militarist and anti-foreign movements (Mudde 1996, 233), it gradually entered the other countries’ political languages in the 1960s (Von Beyme 1988, 2).

In German politics, there is a particular distinction between the terms ‘extreme’ and ‘radical’. The attitude that creates this distinction is directly related to the policies implemented against the democratic order. According to this distinction, ‘radicalism’ demands radical changes but does not oppose the democratic system and constitutional principles. On the other hand, ‘extremism’ refers to the ideologies that go beyond the determined political thought and oppose democratic values and constitutionalism. There are also examples of extremist movements and groups being closed. However, radical movements and groups have no such examples (Mudde 1996, 232). The literature also makes numerous references to the term populism, which the radical right began to use successfully in the 1990s. In the following sections of the thesis, a deep analysis will be made, emphasising on populism.

This chapter aims to examine the radical right closely by exploring the reasons and consequences of the increasing success of the radical right in recent years. It is essential to determine the place of the radical right in democracies, which has different structures from country to country since its existence and can adapt to different political structures and examine its development by focusing on countries because even if the analysis to be made at the national and/or regional level takes us away from making a general definition, it will enable us to fully understand the radical right nationally/regionally. Although the radical right has descriptive and methodological deficiencies as stated above, according to some general comments and analyses

of academicians, the radical right can be analysed according to four main approaches. These are;

Approaches	Radical Right
Historical	The Revival of the Fascist Era
Structural	Post-Industrial Changes
Political	Protest Policy
Ideological	Xenophobia

(Table 3) Approaches of the Radical Right

(Anastasakis 2000, 6).

Examining the historical and current situations of the radical right as an ideological structure is extremely important in terms of understanding both the existence of the radical right in current politics and the legacy that past ideas have transferred to today's radical right. For this reason, this chapter will focus on the post-1945.

The radical right ideology, which is responsible for the destructions and massacres of the war, waited for the right time after the war to re-join political life. Therefore, the historical development of the radical right can be analysed in three waves since 1945 (Von Beyme, 1988; Zimmermann and Saalfeld, 1993; Mudde, 1996). However, the first and second wave radical right movements were prevented by ‘cordon sanitaire’, one of the essential elements of the democratic and liberal wave that emerged after the Second World War. Thus, radical right was almost completely isolated from political life (Donselaar, 2003). Therefore, the first and second-wave movements are not clear as they contain a limited number of qualitative radical right examples. Moreover, the third wave movements, which show a clear break from their fascist traditions (Ignazi, 1992), show both qualitative and quantitative characteristics and can be distinguished more clearly (Von Beyme, 1988).

The first wave of the radical right after 1945 emerged when the political emphasis shifted from anti-fascism to anti-communism. The increasing wave of industrialisation in Europe after the Second World War and the population loss caused by the war led European states to recruit foreign workers (Castle, Hass, and Miller, 2013). Most of these migrations consisted of 15 million people who came to Western Europe (mainly Germany, England, France, Netherlands,

Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland) from Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany after the war. Due to this migration wave, the radical right, which tried to show its influence, especially in Germany, Italy, and Austria, was stuck at the end of the political spectrum due to the successful displacements, inclusions, economic and democratic development processes implemented by the centrist/mainstream parties. For this reason, the radical right did not achieve long-term success, popularity, and power in this period⁵². However, the mainstream movements, caught in the artificial complacency created by both the Second World War and the Cold War, could not analyse the wind of change in the society well and did not see the need for a change in the party system that has been going on since the 1920s (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Even worse, mainstream movements failed to analyse the radical right politically, and even if they did, they did not make significant interventions to block the rise of the radical right⁵³.

For this reason, the second wave of the radical right emerged representing specific masses of people who were unhappy with the liberal capitalist model that developed in the 1950s. The second wave movement was strengthened, especially by the radical changes in party systems after 1960 (Dalton, 2002) and the distrust of politics and institutions, protests, and complaints in the 1970s (Betz, 1994). Therefore, the radical right movements of the second wave are of a protest nature. According to Vural (2005), the second wave of the radical right has emerged to represent a radical opposition to the welfare state⁵⁴ based on the principles of the Keynesian economic model and social solidarity, established political and bureaucratic structures and tax policies. The second radical right wave that emerged with these thoughts managed to get support from middle-class citizens. Especially the immigrant population, whose number

⁵² One of the examples that can be given to the exclusion of radical right by the mainstream occurred in Sweden in 1988. The Swedish Democrats Party (Sverigedemokraterna, SD), which started its political life as conservative but then moved to the radical right, was rejected by the Swedish mainstream politicians due to its racist and xenophobic policies. However, in the 2017 elections, the mainstream right used the support of the SD to achieve success against the mainstream left. The mainstream right showed its support for SD in November 2017 by supporting SD's plan to build a pool for Swedish citizens instead of spending money on education and health care for immigrants.

⁵³ The mainstream represented by the right-wing and left-wing parties in Europe did not need intra-party reform and change movements as it did not see a rival ideology in the political arena. However, during this period, the radical right managed to make a place for itself in today's political arena through active politics, which it gradually became involved in. Between 1965-1995, 19 radical right-wing parties were formed in Western Europe (Minkenberg 2011, 42). However, they did not have any significant success (Öner 2014, 166-167). The most important early period radical right parties are; 1946 Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano, MSI) (Italy) and 1955 Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) (Austria).

⁵⁴ The concept of welfare state was presented as a solution to the structural impasse in the economy that came to the fore after the Great Depression in 1929. However, the welfare state model has lost ground due to the rising unemployment, high inflation, and recurrent oil crises in the 1970s. It was later replaced by alternative recipes of the New Right.

increased to 10 million due to the immigration between 1950-1980, the immigrant opposition that started to develop and got politicised in this period, and the economic recession caused by the Oil Crisis in 1973 caused European countries to stop immigration (Stalker 2002, 153). However, the movement to stop immigration has failed, and the immigrant population in Europe has increased even more (Castle, Hass, and Miller 2013, 110). As a result of the understanding that immigrants are permanent in European countries, the issue of migration has become a part of politics (Hansen, 2004). The politicisation of the immigration issue has enabled the radical right to manifest itself politically. In other words, the increasing number of immigrants, the economic stagnation, the 1974 Oil Crisis, the decrease in society's trust in politics and politicians, the rising wave of unemployment and unrest ensured the politicisation of immigration and the participation of radical right parties in the European politics⁵⁵.

With the deterioration of the cordon sanitaire, which kept the radical right away from politics since the 1980s, the radical right took on a different appearance by adopting a nationalist-populist discourse, national identity policies and migration policies with the leadership of charismatic leaders. Numerous radical right movements (especially political movements, civil societies, and political parties) and their charismatic leaders that have emerged since the 1980s (Pedahzur and Weinberg, 2001) have made successful political initiatives and have permanently included the third wave of the radical right in European politics. Notably, the liberalisation policies of the Soviet Union and the increasing waves of immigration from the East to the West⁵⁶ after the collapse of the Berlin Wall (Dustmann, Bentolila and Faini, 1996; Garson and Salt, 2011; Castle, Hass, and Miller 2013, 112) brought together the groups that were not satisfied with this situation and these groups formed a large radical right sub-base. In particular, the inability of the mainstream right and left parties to produce adequate politics and to create party programs that are like each other has shaken the public's trust in the mainstream right and left parties⁵⁷. In particular, the distrust of the mainstream right and left voters towards politics

⁵⁵ The radical right parties established during this period are: 1964 National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD) and 1971 German People's Union (Deutsche Volksunion, DVU) (Germany), 1978 Flemish Block (Vlaams Blok, VB) (Belgium), 1975 Federal Democratic Union of Switzerland (Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union, ED-U), 1971 Swiss People's Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei, SV), 1971 Swiss Democrats (Schweizer Demokraten, NA/SD) (Switzerland), 1976 Christian Labour Party (Partido Trabalhista Cristao, PTC) (Portugal), 1967 National Front, NF (England), 1972 National Front (Front National, FN) (France).

⁵⁶ In 1990, the number of immigrants in Europe reached 16 million.

⁵⁷ Left-wing parties suffered the most from the political and discursive differentiation. Left-wing failed to adapt to the processes such as Marx's error in historical predictions, radical right's success in meeting left-wing demands (as the ancestors of the radical right parties today), the wave of globalisation, economic crises, the transformation of social classes and the endangerment of the welfare state understanding. The mainstream left, which has lost its social umbrella features, has also been extremely unsuccessful in economic policies for these reasons (an important point here is that the left-wing accepted the neo-liberal economy of right-wing origin and

and mainstream parties, the crisis of representation, the lack of conciliatory politics⁵⁸ and political language pushed the mainstream voters to the parties at the far of the political spectrum⁵⁹ (Karapın 1998, 214). Radical right parties, which managed to get the support of dissatisfied groups and began to compete with the mainstream parties, started to emerge as indispensable and inevitable actors on the political scene (Rydgren, 2005; Allen, 2017).

Economic pessimism was one of the main reasons how radical right-wing parties emerged and gained power during this period as political protest parties (Rydgren 2007, 251; Fennema, 1997). Especially the social security deficit that developed in societies, the capitalist economic model and the crisis of the Keynesian system has rendered the order of politics difunctional. The defunctionalisation of politics has caused the economic and cultural gaps between the lower and upper classes not to be closed. Although the mainstream right-wing and left-wing parties tried to take the necessary measures when they realised this situation, the radical right movements that filled the gaps left by the mainstream parties in the political spectrum helped the third wave begin. Until the beginning of the third wave movements, the mainstream could not find a solution against the radical right. The radical right, which responded to insecurity, pessimism, and abandonment common in societies, with nationalism, identity, belonging, and cultural politics, has included itself in political discourse.

Third-wave radical right movements consolidated their place in European politics with xenophobia, crisis perception and populism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, the only obstacle for the radical right to become stronger was the identification of the marginalised/excluded groups and crisis⁶⁰. Anti-Semitism was no longer valued as much as it used to be, and anti-communism was far from being an ideology supported only by radical right. For this reason, the radical right has targeted immigrants, foreigners and minorities in national

could not create an alternative economic system (Worth, 2012)). Irving Kristol (1995, 94) explained this failure by saying, "The left-wing has been defeated in the field of its choice, in the field of economy". Left-wing, which lost its pro-workers image and adopted the neo-liberal economy, suffered great losses in workers' votes. Using the damaged economic policies of the mainstream left, the radical right has managed to attract the voters of the mainstream left who were unemployed during these processes. In addition, the radical right, which shows itself as the 'defender of Western values' (such as gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of expression), has in some way taken away the ideology of the left-wing. The main problem of left-wing is not closing the political difference between right-wing and left-wing, but the orientation of left-wing on politics, which is no different from the right-wing.

⁵⁸ As a result of the insufficient conciliation discourse, the political enemy has taken the place of the political opponent (Mouffe 1995, 502).

⁵⁹ These voters either gravitate towards radical parties (electoral volatility) or prefer not to vote in an apolitical way. The excess of groups that chose not to vote caused a 'representation crisis' in some countries.

⁶⁰ This feature of the radical right is the most important trend that separates the radical right from the mainstream right.

politics, and finally targeted Muslims living in Europe as a common policy. The radical right, which offers the most influential politics to economic, cultural, and social insecurity, has managed to create a strong current on communities by using the cultural and economic exclusion formula (Stockemer, 2017). Especially the identity politics (national identity in particular – European identity in general) implemented by the third wave radical right has been very effective. Later, the radical right, which combined these policies with populism, succeeded in introducing itself as an idealist, anti-elite⁶¹, patriot, and politician who understand the people's language. In this period, anti-mainstream and xenophobic voters, and the working class, who were afraid of losing their jobs, social security, education and health services to immigrants and foreigners due to economic and political insecurity (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas, 2015), were influenced by the welfare chauvinism with the rhetoric of 'the welfare state is ours' and became the vote bank of the radical right (Mudde, 2007; Kitschelt, 1995; Bale, 2003; Zaslove, 2004).

⁶¹ The main reason for the anti-elite opposition stems from the fact that liberalism is an elitist thought.

First Level: Personal Security	Second Level: Economic Factors	Second Level: Cultural Factors	Second Level: State	Third Level: Global System
Negative perception and fear of minorities and refugees	Real and perceptual unemployment	Islamophobia	Perception of power loss of state sovereignty	Euroscepticism
	Economic deprivation perception			International migration waves
	Deindustrialisation	Creating a perception of Islamisation and frightening with it	The mainstream left's lack of discourse	Negative perception towards Schengen
	Social security issues	Xenophobia	The radical right begins to take over the mainstream right	New industrial revolution and automation process
	Economic inequalities	Perception of national and European culture being eroded	Anger against political corruptions	The empowerment of authoritarian and nationalist ideologies
	Impoverishment		Scapegoating cultural and national minorities	Increasing interest in Asian models
	Blockage in the employment of uneducated and unskilled labour			
	Access to education and competence			

(Table 4) Levels, Factors and Changes of the Radical Right

(Aslan 2018, 54).

The radical right movements that have permanently settled in European politics continue to display different characteristics even today as they did in the past. According to Kallis (2014), radical right movements have different characteristics in terms of their mode of action and ideological origin:

In Terms of Their Effects			
Organised Political Parties	Social Movements	Small Groups	Lone Wolves
Structures that consistently participate in elections can influence mainstream politics and be represented in national assemblies and/or European Parliament.	Structures that organise demonstrations, marches, street protests. English Defence League	Structures that participate in violent acts, radically anti-systemic and show neo-fascist / Neo-Nazi profile. Casa Pound, National Socialist Underground Groups	Activists who prone to violence, not affiliated with official parties or movements. Anders Breivik, Brenton Tarrant Thomas Mair Gianluca Casseri Pavlo Lapshyn Zack Davies Timothy McVeigh David Copeland

(Table 5) Effects of Radical Right Parties, Movements, Groups and Individuals
(Kallis 2014, 11).

In Terms of Ideological Origin			
Politically Mutating Movements	Movements Seeking Autonomy / State	Protest Movements	New Radical Movements
<p>Movements that emerged on the radical right and became suitable for mainstream politics.</p> <p>Republicans and National Democratic Party, NPD (Germany)</p> <p>Sweden Democrats, SD (Sweden)</p> <p>National Rally, RN (France)</p> <p>British National Party, BNP (UK)</p> <p>Golden Dawn, XA (Greece)</p>	<p>Movements that want autonomy or a new state with their nationalist essence and profile.</p> <p>Northern League, LN (Italy)</p> <p>Flemish Block, VB (Belgium)</p> <p>Platform for Catalonia, PxC (Spain)</p>	<p>Movements that arise around a certain issue.</p> <p>Protest immigration: Party for Freedom, PVV (the Netherland)</p> <p>Swiss People’s Party, SVP (Switzerland)</p> <p>True Finns, PS (Finland)</p> <p>Protest taxes: Danish People’s Party, DF (Denmark)</p> <p>Progress Party, FrP (Norway)</p> <p>Protest EU: UK Independence Party, UKIP (UK)</p>	<p>Aggressive, ultra-nationalist and authoritarian movements emerging in post-Communist countries.</p> <p>Jobbik (?) (Hungary)</p> <p>People’s Movement for Latvia, ZP (Latvia)</p> <p>Greater Romania Party, PRM (Romania)</p>

(Table 6) Varieties of Radical Right Movements

(Kallis 2014, 12-13).

Although these graphs partially present the radical right view, it is more complicated and challenging to explain and categorise radical right movements. However, it is a fact that the policies implemented by the radical right movements that are successful today generally have

the same features. These features are evidence of the disconnection from the fascist past, not being against democracy but criticising it, and most importantly, the ability to identify the people's current problems and bring them into mainstream politics by blending them with a populist discourse.

Although the third wave radical right started to rise after 1980 and achieved success, the radical right caught its real breakthrough because of the September 11, 2001 attack. That is because this event has fully reinforced the feeling of insecurity and anti-immigrant tendencies within societies. In particular, the ethnic and religious identities of the perpetrators strengthened the prejudice against Islam and Muslims, created a new turning point in radical right politics, and made the picture of the 'other' official⁶² (Mudde 2012, 9-10). After the attack, the thoughts of the radical right and the populist right, which were previously considered taboo, began to be accepted more and more. September 11 has provided significant support for the mainstreaming Islamophobic policies of the radical right by triggering social concerns and fears. The September 11 attack also marked the beginning of the war waged by the neo-conservatives in the USA and the European radical right against Islam, which they see as the 'new authoritarianism'. The attacks in Madrid (2004), London (2005), Brussels (2014 and 2016), Paris (2015 and 2016), Istanbul (2016 and 2017) and Barcelona (2017) following the September 11 attack caused an increase in insecurity and fear in European societies. This situation has created unmatched opportunities for radical right by accelerating the rigidity in social exclusion policies, elections, and discourses against Islam (RTE.ie, 2017).

Mainstream media also played a significant role in increasing insecurities and fears in this period. The media, which was transformed in the 1980s, started to lose their readers to a great extent. The media, which has lost its readers, has made headlines about migration, culture, and security issues and produced sensational news on these issues to regain their readers. Sensations created by the mainstream media have been most beneficial to the radical right because the media, which increased its circulation with the win-win formula⁶³, started to normalise the discourses of the radical right. Especially after 9/11, the media made radical right leaders mediatic who use the language of exclusion, marginalisation, and humiliation. This attitude of the media has led the radical right's 'in any case security and Muslim equals violence' strategy

⁶² The prejudice against Islam was prevalent in Europe even before September 11. For example, in France in the 1990s, Jean-Marie Le Pen used the concepts of white and Christian when describing 'European' (Betz and Meret, 2009). However, after September 11, cultural exclusion policies came to the fore.

⁶³ The mainstream media's win-win formula stems from both the increase in circulation and the ability to re-influence politics.

to be perceived as an idea which states that all measures to be taken against marginalised groups, non-democratic states, and Islam is the self-defence of nations (d'Appollonia and Reich, 2008). As a result of these events, the notion that Muslims will not/cannot adapt to European culture (Ansari and Hafez, 2012), rising concerns about security, identity and welfare due to the global economic crisis (Mudde, 2012), increasing anti-EU sentiment (including post-communist countries) (Vasilopoulou, 2009), rising nationalism due to non-EU migration, the 'last straw' panic (Kallis 2014, 17), multiculturalism and Islamophobia, have become the current policies of the radical right. Especially today, the increasing use of social media and the internet⁶⁴ contributes to the radical right movements to gain a more radical appearance and to the spread of radical thoughts (Littler, 2018; Littler and Feldman, 2017).

The most important reason for the significant changes is the loss of influence of cordon sanitaire, which has kept radical right politics away from mainstream politics for a long time. With the loss of the cordon sanitaire influence, the mainstream, in order not to lose voters to the radical right, embraced the radical right policies (especially populism) and ensured the inclusion of radical right ideas in mainstream politics. The frightening situation is the mainstreaming⁶⁵ and serious support of the radical right's policies that contradict democratic principles because of the concessions made by the mainstream parties to radical right parties in order not to lose voters.

Radical right-wing movements that have started to sprout up again in Europe have not been taken seriously by mainstream politics. Neither the media nor mainstream politics have addressed the issue. The mainstream movements and the media defined these movements only as Eurosceptic⁶⁶ and marginal and ignored this movement. Before the European Parliament elections in 2014, the European media expressed concerns that radical right and sceptical European parties would receive much more support compared to the 2009 elections. This prediction of the European media and the success of the radical rights' messages came true in the 2014 European Parliament elections. Until then, mainstream politics could not take any

⁶⁴ The radical right, which determines its strategy according to the current social concerns (Jackman and Volpert, 1996), has achieved a suitable space to convey its messages with successful propaganda programs to society by following social concerns and fears, especially through social media channels and technology (Simpson, 2016). In addition, social media activities are one of the important differences that distinguish radical right from the mainstream. The most crucial power of social media is that it allows new, unrecognised, radical, and populist politicians to communicate directly and without intermediaries with their voters and that these politicians can become popular within a day via social media.

⁶⁵ Mainstreaming is the support of broad sections of the political mainstream or society without becoming compatible with radical parties that support radical ideas or attitudes in the loudest way (Kallis, 2014).

⁶⁶ Partial or complete opposition to the European integration process (Taggart 1998, 366).

measure against the radical right messages that successfully affected societies, and the mainstream parties included radical right parties in their coalitions and made them have a say in the administration. This situation reveals the steady and successful rise of the radical right (the new radical right movements that have had their influence in many countries) that have changed and transformed itself (Eatwell, 2000). The radical right, which has managed to increase its votes, especially in Western and Eastern European countries in recent years, has recently normalised 'old' marginal ideas (with the help of the mainstream right) such as extreme nationalism and anti-immigrantism and succeeded in integrating these ideas into mainstream politics. In fact, the radical right has succeeded in attracting the mainstream by influencing the structure of the mainstream⁶⁷ (Rooduijn, van der Brug, and de Lange, 2016). The most important reason for this is that the radical right parties, which were successful in the national elections, gave the mainstream two options. The first is that the mainstream has to cooperate with radical right-wing parties. The second is that the mainstream must accept radical ideas to win back the voters it lost to the radical right. Both possibilities have become great ways to mainstream and normalise radical right parties and their policies.

Today, the reasons for the rise of the radical right, which has opinions contradicting democracy, can be grouped under many headings. The first thought is the 'one issue' thesis that claims there is a direct proportion between the radical right and immigrants (Mudde, 1999). According to this thought, the increasing number of immigrants harms the unity and homogeneity of the society and increases the xenophobia in the society (McLaren, 2003). Xenophobia combined with the fluid populist identity⁶⁸ and crisis policies of the radical right empowers the radical right that creates the 'other' under the umbrella (Danielson 2016, 25-26) of cultural racism (Van der Valk, 2003; Barker, 1981) and nationalism⁶⁹ (Mendelsohn 2017, 165). In this case, the multiculturalism caused by immigrants is presented as a kind of crisis

⁶⁷ Like Sarkozy's Le Pen-themed election campaign in the 2012 French Presidential elections (Chrisafis, 2012). However, this campaign did not bring the voters closer to Sarkozy, on the contrary, it made him lose both the voters and the election. More importantly, Sarkozy's campaign brought Le Pen to success in the presidential election in 2017. 2012 Le Pen: 17.9% - 2017 Le Pen: 21.3%.

<http://electionresources.org/fr/president.php?election=2012®ion=FR> and
<http://electionresources.org/fr/president.php?election=2017®ion=FR>.

⁶⁸ One of the best examples of the fluidity of the populist identity of the radical right is Hungary. The Fidesz party, led by Viktor Orbán, who is now considered authoritarian, was established as an anti-communist movement, and ruled Hungary as a conservative party in the early 2000s. However, today, many political scientists accept Viktor Orbán and Fidesz as populists because of the policies of Viktor Orbán and his party Fidesz.

⁶⁹ The wave of modern nationalism is a trend that gets stronger, especially against globalisation. Those who think that the nation-state and national culture are damaged by globalisation believe that they can oppose globalisation with nationalism (Mudde 2007, 52-53).

linking the radical right with cultural racism. The term cultural racism⁷⁰ used here is based on the concept of ‘cultural superiority’, which is formed because of the change of biological racism (classical racism) ideas. Cultural racism refers to cultural, ethnic, and religious discrimination, which legitimises the ideology of racism with a populist strategy, and mostly targets immigrants from third world countries⁷¹ (Sajid 2005, 31-32; Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, 32; Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995). The second thought is the ‘protest thesis’, which reveals the public’s discontent, frustration, despair and disappointment towards mainstream politics (Betz, 2002). According to this thought, the public that is influenced by the populist discourse of the radical right and protesting the mainstream politics sympathises with the radical right policies. The third thought that fully reinforces these two thoughts is the ‘winning formula’ (Eatwell, 2000). According to this thought, voters who find the language of mainstream politics complex and incomprehensible prefer the simple and understandable language of the radical right. The fourth thought is ‘economic victims’ (Minckenberg 2000, 181). According to this thought, the victims of the changing economic structure and the unemployed people support the radical right. The fifth thought is the ‘deterioration in social structure’ (Eatwell 2003a, 52). According to this thought, multiculturalism and globalisation⁷² cause serious damage to the moral values of the society, democratic harmonisation processes and lifestyle (such as family, society, religion, language, solidarity, and culture). For this reason, society is turning to the radical right, which is anti-multicultural and anti-globalisation and attaches importance to moral values. The sixth thought is ‘political displacements’⁷³ (Kitschelt, 1995). This thought works according to the displacement of the mainstream parties. In other words, if a mainstream party moves further to the centre, the right-wing of the political spectrum remains empty, and the radical right fills this gap. On the other hand, if the mainstream party moves towards the right of the political

⁷⁰ Although the idea of race emerged in the 16th century to explain a population with the same origin and history (Miles and Brown, 1989), the term ‘cultural racism’ (new racism, disguised racism, indirect racism) existed in Europe in the 18th century. The discourses of ‘national character’ and ‘national spirit’ created by Johann Gottfried von Herder are associated with cultural racism. This term plays an important role in expressing the superiority of Western civilisation and ‘othering’, especially in policies of the nationalist and populist movement. The most prominent features of cultural racism are substituting the ideas of ‘cultural segregation’ and ‘cultural purification’ instead of ‘racial segregation’ and ‘racial purification’, which are advocated by biological racism. The point to note here is that biological racism and cultural racism share ideas such as segregation and purification.

⁷¹ The term ‘biological racism’, created in the 19th century by conservative Boulainvilliers, Gobineau, Huston Chamberlain, and Lapouge, advocates an unequal and hierarchical structure that differentiates human groups (Gobineau, 2013). The structure of conservative thought, which rejects the individual and accepts the society as a single structure, also forms the basis of racism.

⁷² “Globalisation is the emergence of the tendency of traditional political borders defined by the nation-state to be permeable” (Heywood 2017, 38).

⁷³ The displacement movements of the parties to attract the most voters are directly related to the voters’ stance. That is, all parties can be politically, discursively, and ideologically flexible and changeable (Downs 1957, 96-101), but a party that constantly shifts to attract the most voters may lose its continuity and credibility.

spectrum, radical right will be normalised, and again the radical right will seize this opportunity. The seventh thought focuses on ‘the past of national political traditions’ (Karapın, 1998). According to this thought, nations’ past experiences with the radical right affect the political culture, and the radical right does not feel foreign in this environment. The last two considerations focus on ‘power of the media’ and ‘leader’s influence’. According to this view, the media, which no one can deny its influence, creates a strong prejudice against the immigrants in society (Ford, 1992) and presents the radical right leaders to the public. Leaders who are integrated with their parties successfully use this opportunity by using their charisma, contemporary white man profile⁷⁴ and populist discourses. The attitude of the radical right, which does not restrict its discourse in the media and claims to speak the language of the people, makes the mainstream parties boring in the eyes of the public by keeping their speeches and discourses within a certain framework. In addition to all this, the Russian influence on the European radical right is indisputable. Russia, which has been collaborating with some radical right movements in Europe since 2008, is trying to bring these movements under its control (Petkova, 2017). Russia’s ties with the Italian NL, the French NF, the Austrian FPÖ and the Hungarian Jobbik are irresistibly clear after the Crimean referendum⁷⁵.

1.2.1 Voters’ Support and Political Parties

The radical right, which has been re-involved in European politics since the 1980s, gained its first most effective successes with Le Pen (FN)⁷⁶ in the 1984 European Parliament elections and with the FPÖ⁷⁷ in the 1999 Austrian national elections. Haider’s party, FPÖ, which entered the Austrian Parliament in October 1999 with the support of the nationalist wing by increasing its votes steadily since 1986, achieved great successes in the elections. In 2000, the cabinet

⁷⁴ The concept of ‘contemporary/superior white man’ has been going on since the 19th century. In addition, this concept laid the foundations of the eugenics approach (the idea of improving races) and social Darwinism (Gossett 1963, 72).

⁷⁵ Jobbik, NF and FPÖ tried to legitimise the referendum by sending representatives to the region during the referendum (Orenstein, 2014). In addition, Le Pen made a statement saying, “I admire Putin” (Faye, Mestre and Monnot, 2011).

⁷⁶ In the 1984 elections, Le Pen (NF) managed to get 11% of the votes. Le Pen's first national success was in the 1986 elections. According to the election results, the NF, which managed to get 35 members of the French Parliament, was not included in politics by the French mainstream parties despite this success. However, on the other hand, Le Pen's nationalist and anti-immigrant policies have managed to affect the French central parties politically (Betz, 1994).

⁷⁷ Although the party approached the mainstream right in the 1970s, it became a radical right again in 1986, when Haider came to the head of the party. Haider, one of the most important representatives of the radical right in Europe, is described by many researchers as a ‘Nazi’. Haider owes his success to his sentimental politics and protest voters.

coalition of the FPÖ with the mainstream right-wing ÖVP was perceived as a threat to democracy by European states⁷⁸ (Betz, 1994). For this reason, the coalition has become the focus of criticism of the European Union countries. So much so that this coalition caused the EU countries to suspend their relations with Austria (Howard 2000, 25). After these developments, Austrian citizens organised protests in Vienna, many European states took joint decisions not to include the radical right in their policies, and even Israel withdrew its Austria ambassador from Vienna⁷⁹ (Müller, 2000; Cole, 2005). Until the year it was successful in the elections, the FPÖ was ostracised by the mainstream from politics as the heir/defender of Nazi values (Öner, 2014). However, the Austrian voters, who lost their confidence and enthusiasm in mainstream politics, began to show interest in radical right-wing ideas.

Apart from the FPÖ, many radical right-wing parties, for instance, FN in France, REP in the past and now AfD in Germany, VB in Belgium and LN in Italy started to influence European politics have started to succeed by combining current issues such as xenophobia, anti-elite, and security anxiety, which have become widespread in Europe, with a populist discourse⁸⁰. When we look at the period between 1990 and 2010, it is seen that the radical right parties in Europe increased their vote rates by 100% (Stockemer, 2017). The reasons for this increase in votes are the mainstream parties' unsuccessful implemented policies, scandals, and failure to fulfil the voters' expectations. In short, it is the voters' lost trust in the mainstream parties (Betz and Immerfall, 1998). The radical right, which responds to the problems felt by the voters with charismatic leaders (Van der Brug and Mughan, 2007), authoritarian and protesting attitudes (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2002; Bordignon and Ceccarini, 2013), anti-immigrant policies (Fennema, 1997) and a simple/understandable language, succeeds in expanding its electorate.

The voter rate of the radical right, which is 'new' in the current political arena, is fluctuating. Therefore, to analyse the radical right voters, it is necessary to consider both the innovations of the current radical right and the loyalty of the radical right voters. Like all movements in the

⁷⁸ However, the European Union did not react to the conservative government, which was established in Italy in 1994 and included the radical right-wing Lega Nord (LN). This situation reveals two situations. First, until 1999, the European Union was unaware of the existence of the radical right or did not take its policies seriously. Second, the European Union was not against the radical right. Although the first situation seems more harmless and innocent, it has played a serious role in the rise of the radical right today. The second situation is much more dangerous than the first situation because if the European Union is/was not against the radical right, it can/could create a structure that contradicts the EU's own policies, which may lead to the formation of hypocritical policies.

⁷⁹ On the other hand, in the following period, especially after 2010, Christian-Jewish rapprochements supported by FPÖ took place (Jerusalem Declaration) (Backes 2018, 461).

⁸⁰ FN defends the view that "the French have a superior cultural level and this situation should not be harmed by foreigners from lower cultures" (Grillo, 2003). In fact, another discourse that developed in France and Germany (Sarrazin, 2010) is intelligence racism (Bourdieu, 1993).

system, both radical right movements and radical right voters are also rational. In other words, radical right movements supported by voters who are aware of the politics and radical right's thoughts ensure their legitimacy in the political system. Alongside a core electorate that embraces the radical right ideologically and rationally, the radical right receives most of its votes from protest votes (Betz and Immerfall, 1998). In other words, voters who do not feel loyal to the radical right but want to show their political protests towards the mainstream movements and the system vote for the radical right (Rose, 2000).

Over the years, the strengthening of the radical right has begun to be felt not only in national elections, but also in European Parliament elections⁸¹. The radical right, which made the most important breakthrough in the European Parliament elections because of the decrease in trust in European institutions and the European Union⁸², won 31 deputies with EFD in 2009, 42 deputies with EFDD in 2014 and 73 deputies with ID in 2019. The radical right's breakthrough, especially after the 2014 election, caused political earthquakes in many European countries (Shoichet and Boulden, 2014).

In addition to all these, the most significant effects of the radical right in the international arena were felt with the Brexit referendum in June 2016 and the election of Trump to the US presidency in November 2016. These two developments have excited the radical right politicians and encouraged them to succeed in their own countries. However, the share of the mainstream parties' unsuccessful policies should not be overlooked in this rise of the radical right because the mainstream movements are reluctant to intervene, ignoring the anti-EU, anti-immigrant, anti-Islamic (Halliday, 1999) and nationalist policies of the radical right, and excluding these ideas for declarative purposes only. Mainstream movements that internalise and adopt the nationalist, anti-establishment and anti-modernisation ideas of the radical right have contributed to the free diffusion and normalisation of radical right ideas in European


⁸¹ One of the most important reasons for the radical right to gain power in the European Parliament is the alliances these parties have established in the Parliament.

⁸² As a matter of fact, according to Eurobarometer surveys, the trust of European citizens in the European Union decreased from 47% in 2009 to 31% in 2014. On the other hand, European citizens' confidence in the European Union has been increasing since 2017 (33% in 2016, 42% in 2017, 42% in 2018 and 44% in 2019). However, confusingly, with the increasing confidence in the European Union, the vote rates of radical right parties are also increasing.

countries^{83,84}. With the help of this, the radical right, which has been growing stronger, extensionally, making its voice heard and ambitiously coming into the political arena since the 2000s, has succeeded in placing itself on the agenda of politics.

Two main factors can explain the spread of the radical right ideas; first, the uncertainty of cordon sanitaire’s existence and second, the increase of social-economic problems faced by societies. The impact and importance of the first factor can be summarised as follows:

The radical right ideology after 1945 represented the radical part of the right in the political spectrum. During this period, representation of the radical right could be kept under control by cordon sanitaire, mainstream and established ideologies. However, the obscurity of the cordon sanitaire has blurred the ideologies, politics, and place of the radical right in the political spectrum. So, the political spectrum under the effect of cordon sanitaire after 1945 is the following:



(Figure 7) Change of the Political Spectrum 2 (Source: Own Elaboration)

It came to this situation because of the obscurity of cordon sanitaire after the 1980s. This change in the political spectrum centralises radical politics and radicalises central politics. While this situation helps the normalisation of radical right parties, it enables radical right

⁸³ In other words, the only reason for the increase in the votes of the radical right parties is not the lack of trust felt by society towards the mainstream. The rising wave of nationalism in Europe is another important reason. However, it is important to understand whether the slow but steady growth of the radical right in Europe is linked to the allegations of xenophobia and racism in the European Union or not. The reason for the rising radical right in Europe is not the strong radical right parties but the weakening liberal mainstream democratic parties and movements.

⁸⁴ Worse, mainstream parties that internalise and adopt the policies and discourses of the radical right, when they come to power, use these policies and discourses to justify the abolition of constitutional checks and balances.

parties to politically agree with the conservative right parties, the Christian democratic parties, and the nationalist conservative parties much more comfortably than before. This also makes it easier for radical right parties to attract voters from the mainstream.

Considering the threats posed by the radical right parties, it is possible to say that these parties have shifted the positions of their mainstream rivals to the right. Worse still, liberal parties and mainstream left parties, the other rivals of the radical right parties, have also started to shift to the right, polarising their socio-cultural positions. Mainstream right, liberal, and mainstream left parties polarising and shifting to the right cause the party system in their countries to become 'right-skewed' (Pytlas and Kossack, 2015). On the other hand, the mainstream's shift to the right does not mean that the mainstream and the radical right are converging. At this point, there are two different strategies that the radical right can implement. The first strategy is for radical right-wing parties to move further to the right in the political spectrum, increasing their distance from the mainstream parties. The second strategy is that radical right-wing parties distinguish themselves from their old ancestors, make room for their policies and discourses by decreasing the gap between right-wing policies rather than approaching the right in the spectrum of political parties. So, in any case, the radical right can transform the right-wing of the political spectrum in European politics.

In addition, socio-economic problems also have essential effects on the radical right's voters. The economic impact includes unemployed, poor people or people with low-income (Betz, 1994), uneducated people (Ivarsflaten, 2005), people despairing of mainstream parties and affected by the passionate and ambitious policies and rhetoric of the radical right (Lordon 2016, 11-12), people who lost their jobs due to globalisation (Betz, 1994), people who need government assistance, blue-collar, white-skinned, young, or middle-aged people (Franklin, 1992), white males (Kitschelt, 1995), and excluded people (Fassin, 2017). Besides that, social impact includes the well-educated and mainstream left people who have no economic problems but are isolated and experience cultural anxiety with the effect of globalisation, feel foreign in their own country (Goodwin, Ramalingam and Briggs 2012, 31). In other words, today, the radical right could appeal to a certain segment both through economic impact and to a certain segment (including the mainstream left voters) through social influence. One reason for this is that the differences between right and left voters have become increasingly blurred, especially after the collapse of communism (Laclau 2005, 87). The blurring of the difference between right-wing and left-wing voters has caused the working class, which previously supported social democrats and left-wing, to leave the democratic and left-wing parties and become protest

voters. Taking advantage of this ambiguity and making progress in a blurry political environment, the radical right has become the next stop for workers who have moved away from Democrats and left-wing parties and been alienated from the political climate (Mudde 2011, 10; Rydgren, 2003; Mayer, 1987). Thus, the radical right has succeeded in attracting those voters who have voted for both the mainstream left and the mainstream right in the past. This strategy has turned ordinary men and women into radical right voters, who had previously voted for mainstream parties but were later forgotten by the political elite.

The list below shows the radical right parties of the European Union member states. It also summarises the radical right parties' vote changes in Europe in the last five elections.

Appendix B

National Election Results of the Radical Right Parties of the European Union Countries

(Source: Own Elaboration based on PartiesandElections.eu(a)).

Based on the national elections, European Union countries are seriously affected by right-wing politics, right-wing parties, and right-wing ideologies. The extent to which European countries are affected by this reality and that radical right parties are not a temporary phenomenon can be easily seen through the graphs, the voting rates of the parties, and the data shown above. In countries where the radical right is not strong, the votes of the radical right parties are not the only determining factor. If the radical right can reach enough power in countries where it is not strong, it can always find the opportunity to set the agenda, attract the attention of the media and get involved in politics (Rydgren, 2005). Additionally, populism, one of the most important elements used by the radical right for being mainstream, that affects societies and mainstream politics, requires detailed research. For this reason, populism will constitute the continuation of this issue.

1.3 Populism

Populism and populist movements have an older history than the radical right. Populism, which emerged in the middle of the 19th century as a movement initiated by the Americans who were against the domination of big capital in the United States, were emphasising the

working class (Toprak, 2013) and were against Catholic Irish and German immigrants (Stuart, 2016), first appeared in the policies of the 'Know Nothings' party. Founded in 1849, the 'Know-Nothings' party changed its name to the 'American Party' in 1854 and joined the 'Republican Party' in 1860 (Hurt, 1930). The 'People's Party', founded in 1892 by American farmers, was in the political arena in the USA until 1908 (Canovan, 1981). The populist parties, which managed to increase their power in various parts of the world, managed to stay in power for a long time through charismatic leaders who supported the proletariat in many countries in South America (Peron⁸⁵ in Argentina and Vargas in Brazil).

Furthermore, the first example of populist movements in Europe emerged in Russia (Kindleberger 1975, 1). The 'Narodnik' (populist groups), which derives from the Russian word 'narod' meaning people, was born in the 1870s as a Russian peasant movement that developed against the authoritarian Tsarist regime and the bourgeoisie in Russia. The 'Narodnik' movement, which advocated the idea of distributing the land to the Russian peasants and believed that the revolution would be realised by the Russian peasants, not by the proletariat, who, unlike the Marxists, were the wage-labourers of the capitalist class, started as a rebellion against the Tsarist regime due to the agrarian reform that the Russian intellectuals wanted to initiate to protect the Russian peasants (Taggart, 2000; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 30-43; Toprak, 2013).

Populism in Central and Eastern Europe started with peasant movements. Populism, which emerged as a left-wing in Europe at that time, accepted the keyword as 'caring'. At that time, populism was a movement that especially wanted to raise the workers' living standards. Even today, populist movements supported by communities and individuals who feel excluded, ignored, and left alone, have become a part of right-wing and left-wing politics by confronting its differences (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014).

After the Second World War, the increase of democratic regimes -especially in the West-, the period of international peace and production, the expansion of trade areas, the existence of mutual tolerance, control of politics and politicians (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2019), the partial reduction of polarisation, the increase of integration, the creation of a more peaceful and compromising environment of prosperity and freedom provided a controlled and democratic

⁸⁵ The first populist leader to come to power. Populist regimes first emerged in South America after the Second World War.

atmosphere. For this reason, the radical right and populist movements that were defeated after the Second World War⁸⁶ could not enter the political arena in Europe for a long time.

During the European integration in the 1950s, European politics dominated by mainstream-right, mainstream-left, and liberal parties were supported by European voters. However, the parties found this support from the public sufficient and did not feel the need to consult the public on any issue during the integration process. For this reason, populist movements, which were not seen in Europe until the 1960s, had the opportunity to present themselves as a ‘third way/alternative’ in response to the bipolar world order (liberalism versus communism) and the globalisation wave caused by the Cold War (Finchelstein 2017, 160). Populism in Europe re-emerged and started to gain power due to rising nationalism, waves of immigration, conservatism, polarisation, economic and social insecurity, and the unsuccessful integration processes implemented by mainstream parties after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, because after the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, liberal democracy in the newly democratised countries began to decline and turn into a hybrid and authoritarian (Collier and Levitsky, 1997).

The regression wave of liberal democracy is experienced in the new post-Soviet democracies and in the first countries that accepted and institutionalised democracy. In other words, a structure formed by leaders who mixed illiberal, hybrid and authoritarian features into democracy and who deformed liberal democracy by claiming to be the representative of ‘real people’ has started to show its influence in European politics today. This structure creates a great medium and long-term challenge in today’s liberal democracy (Zakaria, 1997; Mudde, 2004). This challenge manifests itself in the populism wave that targets liberal values and institutions⁸⁷.

⁸⁶ Populism that changed and developed after the Second World War can be investigated in four stages: ‘classical populism’ that covered populist experiences after the Second World War. ‘Neo-liberal populism’ that continued until the 2000s. ‘Neo-classical left populism’, which has been the subject of discussion recently. ‘Right-wing and radical right neo-classical populism’ that has managed to increase its power especially in Europe today (Finchelstein, 2017).

⁸⁷ On the other hand, there are also opinions opposing this situation. In fact, some European politicians consider the achievements of the radical right and the populist right to be overrated. As a matter of fact, the loss of Le Pen to Macron in France, the suppression of the threatening structure of the German AfD, the failure of the PVV in the Netherlands and the FPÖ in Austria to achieve the expected success presents a positive outlook for European politics. However, given the current influence of the radical right, we can say that European politicians are clearly wrong. European politicians claim that the radical right and the populist right are exaggerated because they cannot ask questions openly.

1-) What are the success criteria of these parties?

2-) To what extent did the discourses and policies of these parties affect the mainstream parties?

Populism can show itself as a tool that can be added to both political parties and social movements. Social movements formed by people coming together around a certain thought and belief can organise actions for specific purposes and can support political parties that share the same ideas with them. The damage of the neo-liberalism victory and the dream of establishing a 'new world order'⁸⁸ in developing and developed countries has led to the re-existence of populist parties and movements in Europe that radicalised the people using radical discourses. Especially in this period, the Vietnam, Gulf, Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, oil crises, increasing migration movements, the disappearance of political borders, the inability to find an alternative system to the system that caused the economic crisis, and the unsuccessful policies of mainstream parties triggered this situation (Çakır 2011, 13; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 45; Rupert, 2000). Populism, which gains strength, supports separatist, protectionist, interventionist, and introverted economy discourses, particularly in countries where cultural, political, identity, and economic problems are chronic, where economic damage is experienced due to financial and refugee crises and where the 'us/them' discourse is formed by a mass that thinks they are not represented, populists, who believe that the 'will of the people' should directly affect the state policies, see the state as a means of fulfilling the demands of the people⁸⁹.

For this reason, populists, who attach great importance to elections and referendums, are attentive to gaining legitimacy through democratic means. However, the existence and development of populism in the world bring along regional differences. So much so that the history and policies of populist movements in Central and Eastern Europe⁹⁰ and Western Europe differ significantly.

Politicians who evaluate the success criteria of the radical right solely based on the election results should turn their faces to the European elections and the discourses and policies of the national mainstream parties because the radical right does not have to win an election to enforce its policies and spread its political style. These parties can easily achieve their goals by using the mainstream electorate.

⁸⁸ The idea of 'welfare within the state, capitalism in the international system' (Ferrera 2006, 111).

⁸⁹ It should be noted at this point that demand is a democratic act and cannot be reduced to a position. For this reason, the relationship between populism and demand is the position to which demand will be added. The demands can be added to an autocratic position or a democratic position. For example, a person who does not feel safe may say 'the state does not use enough security cameras'. On the other hand, a person may say 'I don't feel safe because of immigrants'. Health claims, education demands, unemployment demands, and economic demands can be added to these demands. All these demands can be added to both autocratic and democratic positions in terms of cause and effect.

⁹⁰ Like the peasant movements that emerged with the 'Green Uprising' in Central and Eastern Europe (Canovan, 1981).

Just as there is no standard definition defining the radical right, there is no common definition of populism^{91,92} (Müller 2017, 2; Laclau 2005, 15; Schedler, 1996), because populism does not adhere to any thought or ideology, and no political party or movement describes itself as populist. Populism, which specialises in taking advantage of social and democratic difficulties, shows an uncertain and ambiguous structure from region to region (Laclau 2005, 85). For this reason, it can be added to different political positions as it shows different features in different places⁹³. In fact, to understand and define populism, a conference titled 'To Define Populism' was held at the London School of Economics in 1967 to 'illuminate the basic dimensions of an effective concept' (Ionescu and Gellner 1969, 5). In the conference which was attended by 43 influential academics such as Isaiah Berlin, Peter Worsley, Alain Touraine, Ernest Gellner, Ghita Ionescu, Kenneth Minogue, Hugh Seton-Watson and Franco Venturi, Isaiah Berlin's (1967, 6) speech was one of the most important results of the conference in terms of understanding populism. 'We can probably agree that one formula covering all populisms everywhere is not very useful'. Therefore, Berlin explains that populism has six characteristics (Berlin, Hofstadter, MacRae, Schapiro, Seton-Watson, Touraine, Venturi, Walicki and Worsley 1968, 173-178). Although the general definition of populism in the current political science literature is not much different from the 1960s, it consists of a combination of historical and current events. This construct is extremely complex to conceptualise (Taguieff 1995, 17; Ionescu and Gellner, 1969). So much so that Wiles (1969, 167-171) mentions 24 different characteristics of populism. For this reason, research has focused not on the conceptualisation of populism but on emphasising its different aspects (Canovan, 1981; Laclau, 1977).

⁹¹ Because of populism has a useful structure for both right-wing and left-wing parties and the thesis focuses on radical right politics, the concept of populism is used instead of right-wing populism in this thesis. On the other hand, the differences and similarities of right-wing populism and left-wing populism can be briefly explained for the reader. Left-wing populism defends the public against the elites like right-wing populism, but this defence is often based on economic and social dissatisfactions. Right-wing populism, on the other hand, defends the public against the elites, Muslims, immigrants, and 'others' in a more nationalistic and cultural context. So, right populism has three layers (lower-middle, elites and others defended by elites), whereas left-wing populism has two layers (lower-middle and elites) (Judis 2016, 18-71).

⁹² Although there is no common definition of populism, populist leaders are easier to define than defining populism.

⁹³ Populism is used to describe leaders and parties in South America that advocate protectionist policies, positive policies towards despised indigenous people, and policies that include ethnic and religious minorities in decision-making; to identify leaders and parties in Europe advocating anti-immigration, xenophobic, anti-ethnic and religious minority, exclusionary and discriminatory policies (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 11-12). For this reason, populism cannot be classified into right-wing or left-wing (Germani 1978, 88). American right-wing populism formed a certain basis for the creation of right-wing populism in Europe. In this way, the American right-wing populism that Hofstadter (1955) defined has become a way of describing neo-fascist and radical right movements in Europe today (Ateş 2018, 57; Finchelstein 2017, 205).

With its many different definitions and features, populism continues to be one of the popular topics of political science. Populism, according to some scholars who define populism, is: an ideology without a single definition and a multi-faceted phenomenon linked to tensions between the elite and the provinces (Shils, 1960, 1996; Mudde, 2007), a weakly centred ideology that threatens liberal democracy (Mudde, 2004), rural radicalism, anti-elitism, the member and opposite of democracy (Canovan 1981, 12-104; 2005), style, strategy or discourse that can be added to the main ideologies (Kaya, 2020), elite's ideology, the construction and production of the people and political identity, political logic and public building, a meaning beyond ideologies (Laclau 1977, 173; 2005, 29), the radical point of anti-politics (Rosanvallon 2007, 262-264), the 'shadow', the 'spectre', that haunts liberal democracy (Canovan, 2002; Ardit, 2004), a challenge to liberal democratic practice to create an imaginary 'democratic ideal' (Meny and Surel, 2002a), a promise that upholds a uniform 'will of the people' above and beyond constitutional balance and law (Pappas, 2014), the body of claims with its inner logic, the shadow of democracy, holism⁹⁴, identity politics and a threat to democracy (Müller 2017, 10-102), the leader's unmediated relationship with the excluded people and a strategy that leaders use to come to power (Weyland, 2001), reaction against industrialisation and rules (Kitching, 2011), rhetoric without ideology (Minogue 1969, 208), strategy (Barr, 2009), an ideology that glorifies the will of the people (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 51), form of politics (Skolkay 2000, 2), united people against the minorities' state (Berlin 1967, 175), political culture dimension and political culture (Worsley 1969, 245), a tactical tool, a style used in communicating with the electorate (Jagers and Walgrave, 2003), the good, the bad and the ugly (Vorlander, 2011), a new opposition that produces national alternatives (Streeck 2017, 11-12), the desire of the oligarchy (Fukuyama, 2016), politicisation of the people (Balibar, 2011), a weapon (Collovald 2004, 18), a discursive phenomenon (Wodak, 2015), radical right-wing parties (Bryder 2010, 4), the result of the influence of fascism after the Second World War, an authoritarian form of democracy and the most serious challenge to liberal democracy (Finchelstein 2017, 18-23), systematic resource set (Meny and Surel, 2000), a hierarchical political style (Ostiguy, 2017; Knight, 1998), the most destructive corruption for democracy (Urbinati, 2013), political movement (Di Tella 1997, 197), an offensive term (Ranciere, 2006), analytical qualification (Panizza 2005, 1), the paranoid style of politics, the distinction between the public and the elite (Hofstadter, 1955; Mudde, 2004), an authoritarian electoral democracy

⁹⁴ The idea that the people and their representatives should be one (Rosenblum, 2008).

(Borges 1946, 114), the understanding of the homeland and a reaction to liberalism (Taggart 2000, 4-148), and a political style (Moffitt, 2016).

It is extremely difficult to accept populism as an ideology⁹⁵ due to its different regional and national characteristics, its adaptability to everywhere, its lack of a common denominator (Judis, 2016; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 29) and definition, and its reluctance to participate in politics (Taggart 2000, 4). For this reason, in this thesis, populism is mentioned as a tool, not an ideology⁹⁶. The ambiguity of populism and its inability to hold itself within any concept (right-wing or left-wing) (Sternhell, 1995) causes populism to be used as a chameleon-like tool. In other words, all kinds of political views, leaders and positions can benefit from populism, shape and implement it according to their own views (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 13).

One of the reasons why every political view, leader and position can shape populism is that populism can adapt to every opinion, leader, and position. So, populism can be shaped because it can take any form⁹⁷. After all, “populism has an empty heart and has no core” (Taggart 2000, 5). Populism, with its ‘empty heart’ and ‘lack of core’, gains the power to revive and influence society, especially in times of crisis⁹⁸. For this reason, populism keeps itself out of the current political structure and the current party system and presents itself as a protest structure. This is why populism is not used as the core idea of a particular political structure and ideology but is a simple political⁹⁹ protest movement¹⁰⁰ that can appeal to all the political spectrum areas (Müller 2017, 14-15; Taggart 2000, 97).

⁹⁵ Because ideology is a set of coherent thoughts (Heywood, 2013).

⁹⁶ The main reason populism is cited as a tool is that it is not tied to any trend. Populist thought can be associated with authoritarian or even totalitarian regimes. However, the reason why regimes are authoritarian or totalitarian is not populism. It is the political opinion of the authoritarian or totalitarian regime founders. For this reason, the rising radical right movements in Europe do not make populism radical. Their own programs, anti-immigration, anti-minority, and ideology make them radical. For this reason, it is not useful to call the radical right movements simply 'populist'. It is best to call the radical movement radical and accept it as such. Otherwise, a radical right movement calling itself a 'populist party' will legitimise its own ideologies and thoughts in a much more comfortable and innocent way.

⁹⁷ Isaiah Berlin deals with this situation of populism with the 'Cinderella complex'. In other words, according to Berlin, populism is a shoe, and this shoe can fit many feet (Berlin 1967, 5-6).

⁹⁸ Although all political actors and formations have a 'representation claim' (Saward, 2010), populists try to legitimise their own politics by believing that only moral and symbolic politics can represent the 'real people'. However, legitimated populist policies are generally defined by a certain social class and only a part of the society is seen as the 'real people' (Müller 2017, 3-22). For example, “This is the real victory of the people” (Nigel Farage) or “The only thing that matters is the unification of the people, the rest is not important” (Donald Trump).

⁹⁹ Populists think that there is one truth to the people and that only the populist leader can achieve this. A single thought of truth simplifies populist politics.

¹⁰⁰ The reason populism is a protest movement is because of people who feel excluded. The support and respect that populist movements give to excluded people reflect the appeal of populism.

Scholars such as Mudde, Katsambekis, Stavrakakis, Taggart and Müller, who work on the standard definition of populism and its characteristics, state that the most important feature of populism is its power to divide the society; such as public vs elites and below vs above¹⁰¹ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017; Katsambekis, 2016; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014; Taggart, 2000; Müller, 2016; Laclau 2005, 101). This division of populism has created/wants to create is between pure, innocents, good, cleans, exploited, virtuous, righteous, and real people and corrupted elites, immoral and bad people, sinners, sneaky people, exploiters, political opposition, public enemies (Müller 2017, 2-3; Brubaker, 2020), vulgars, minorities¹⁰² and wicked ones. The creation of the concepts of 'the people' and 'the enemy' (Moises, 2017), the emergence of social needs for the emergence of the populist tendency, the determination of the parties and the creation of 'crisis'¹⁰³ (Moffitt, 2015), 'collapse' (Winock, 2000), and 'enemy' perceptions, the creation of an identity and crisis environment, the loss or decrease of trust in social and political institutions, the problem of representation, damage to voter-party ties, conspiracy theories, polarisation¹⁰⁴, distrust and nepotism are extremely important for populism (Berlin, 1967, 16; Müller 2017, 4; Laclau 2005, 197; Betz 1994, 108; Zaslove 2004, 100-104; Inglehart and Norris 2016, 5-8) because populism produces its policies

¹⁰¹ Anti-rationalism, one of the conservative thought parts, forms the basis of the pure human/corrupt elite distinction. The policy of dividing society into two is one of the radical right policies. This distinction is a protest against the existing order. Populists are applying this distinction as a successful strategy that can easily mobilise the masses, claiming that existing institutions and politicians are incapable of solving problems. On the other hand, populist policies that divide the society into 'us' and 'them' divide the 'us' community into two; 'more privileged' and 'non-privileged'. For this reason, the radical right, which adjusts its policies according to the current political life and uses populism, is still far from defending democratic values. However, it should not be forgotten that every administration and regime try to form its own elite, institutions and people and uses the power of populism in this struggle. When populist governments, like other governments, create their own elites, institutions and people or pull the existing elites, institutions and peoples to their side, attitudes towards elites, institutions and people can change and become positive. The accused elites, institutions, and people (others) are often cited as the culprits for the failures of populist movements. All parties that started to make policies to establish their own order after coming to power are oligarchic. However, this oligarchy stamp changes according to how the people's demands are evaluated. A regime that listens to the people's demands at the institutional level and a regime opposing the opposition and democratic demands cannot be categorised in the same category.

¹⁰² Policies against minorities have become a more common discourse used by populists today. Populist leaders directly target the social minority identities they determine with socio-political policies.

¹⁰³ Creating a perception of crisis, creating a crisis, or turning an event into a crisis is a critical process and an opportunity for populists because crisis times provide populists with opportunities to take free, swift, and legal actions. It also silences criticism against them, facilitates enemy production, promotes national security, and weakens political rivals. In this way, both the power is concentrated around the populist leader and the public and opposition, and judicial organs are forced to unite around the leader (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2019). In other words, while periods of crisis are very important to populists, they are equally dangerous to democracy.

¹⁰⁴ Social polarisations caused by the polarisation of the political system create social camps and can shake the society because social camps can turn into party polarisation, religious belief polarisation, geographical polarisation, racial polarisation, and economic polarisation.

by taking advantage of these perceptions and fears and aims to get the support of large masses of people by marginalising the society (Prislin, Shaffer and Crowder, 2012).

Policies created with the perception of crisis are served to the society as urgent and important by populists and the media. At this point, movements, political parties and leaders that reveal the political side of populism and tend to show authoritarian tendencies emerge. These movements, parties and leaders claim to be ‘one of the people, from the street’ and ‘the voice of the unrepresented people (vox populi)’. In addition, these structures attach importance to the concept of identity, socio-economic and socio-political changes; they simplify problems, oppose liberal democracy¹⁰⁵, elites, democratic institutions¹⁰⁶, the rule of law and pluralism, use moral and emotional language and claim to oppose mainstream structures by creating a real alternative (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 27-53; Müller, 2017). Politicised populism varies according to the self-embracing movement, society, party, and charismatic leader and develops by focusing on issues and crises that divide the society. In other words, politicised populism can show different characteristics wherever it is politicised; because of these differences, a standard definition and explanation for populism is useless (Canovan, 1981; Taguieff, 1995). However, the most important common value that defines populism is the people. The glorification of the people, the claim to represent the people (Westlind, 1996), the positive evaluation of the motivation, hopes, desires and feelings of the people, the idea of being the voice of the silent community, and the idea of saving the people from the corrupt are seen as the most important common values among populists.

According to the populists, saving the people from the corrupt is directly related to the referendum, a new people, a new constitution^{107,108}, new institutions, and new media. While populists are in opposition, they retain their protest structure by associating what the central politics do and what they do not do with the people, saying ‘not doing what the people want for the people’. However, when populists come to power, they change their protest images and take

¹⁰⁵ Policies and discourses against democratic values and institutions are like a frog thrown into hot water. In other words, if democratic values and institutions are changed rapidly, society can react suddenly. However, slow changes delay the public reaction.

¹⁰⁶ Since populists are against liberal democracy, they also oppose all the institutions it has created (Albertazzi and Mueller, 2013) because populists claim to be the sole representatives of the people.

¹⁰⁷ Populism is against the constitution's order, balance mechanisms and the separation of powers. According to many scholars, these features are common to populists because democratic constitutions and controls try to prevent the concentration of all power in one hand or a party. However, no constitution alone can protect democracy. At this point, the duty to protect democracy rests with the institutions (especially the courts and parliament), the opposition and the people themselves.

¹⁰⁸ Populists advocate constitutionalism that can provide a direct relationship between the people and the populist leader (Loughlin, 2015).

different forms. Populists, who come to power through elections in democratic countries, take their decisions by creating a political battlefield against the opposition and elites (Diehl, 2019) based on the authority and binding power of the elections. But once the populists come to power, the critical importance of public opinion becomes meaningless because authoritarian populist leaders can use the authority and binding power given to them through elections by making decisions on behalf of the people. Referendums held on behalf of the people on issues deemed appropriate by the leader, a new constitution created with laws reflecting the leader's ideology and reinforcing the power of the populist party (the newly made constitutions have a character that enhances the power of the populists) (Sartori, 1962), audited institutions and the establishment of a new media are the main features of populist politics¹⁰⁹. All the policies implemented by the populists emphasise mass favouritism and legal discrimination. At this point, few structures can oppose the populist leader who is anti-elitist, anti-status quo and considers himself the embodiment of the national will (Brubaker, 2017). Some of the structures that may oppose the populist leader are: Members of the populist party because party members may be loyal to the populist leader or oppose his policies and rhetoric. Public¹¹⁰ and non-governmental organisations¹¹¹, because when there is no effective structure that can oppose the policies of the populists, the public and non-governmental organisations become the biggest enemy of the populists since they can damage the populism the most (Finchelstein 2017, 24). For this reason, specific segments of the public and non-governmental organisations are strongly criticised, blamed, and discredited by the populist leaders.

The politicisation of populism by the urban and exclusionary European radical right (Taggart 2000, 9) since the 1980s (with the radical right regaining strength in European politics) has made many new policies applicable. These policies are implemented by populists as 'an

¹⁰⁹ Populists have no problems with the constitutions, institutions, media, and elites they have created because if populists can take over the constitution, institutions, media, and elites, all the institutions that control the populists lose their value and begin to serve the person (leader) and the party who created them. Populists seize the constitution, institutions, media, and elites through people placed in critical areas. The most important function of institutions and media organisations seized by populists is to decide what the public will hear and how they will react. Institutions and media organs controlled by the populist leader or party can easily manage these policies under the will of the people by presenting the policies created by the populist leader and the party to the public. That is, the populist leader and party can use the institutions and media organs under their control to create their own public opinion and legitimise their policies. This situation may end with the damage to democracy, the corruption of democracy and even the collapse of democracy.

¹¹⁰ The most important influence of the people can be measured by the support they give to the populist leader. A populist leader with a high level of support from the public can carry out his/her movements much more easily. However, if public support for the populist leader falls, institutions, media outlets, opposition movements, and judicial bodies that can resist the populist leader may act more courageously (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2019).

¹¹¹ Civic-based protests pose a significant challenge to populist parties and leaders who define themselves as the 'will of the people' and the 'voice of the people'.

unliberal democratic response to undemocratic liberalism' (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013), potential corrective and popular wishes. The most important of these policies are: anti-immigration, the nostalgia of the golden age and holy, anti-elite, the thought of material and spiritual corruption, the idea that national culture and religious structure should be preserved, anti-globalisation, anti-EU, Islamophobia, anti-Semitism¹¹² (Dukanovic, 2014; Winock, 2000), anti-minority and strong leader desire (Mudde 2004, 546). Radical right populism, which combines the radical right's ideas of authoritarianism, identity politics and nativism with populist discourse¹¹³ (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 45), politicised and turned into a great power, is neo-populism according to Taggart (1995) and Immerfall (1998), neo-fascism according to Cheles, Ferguson and Vaughan (1995) and the current radical right according to Merkl and Weinberg (1993). This 'new populist' wave has succeeded in creating alternatives to mainstream politics by influencing both radical right-wing and left-wing politics (Syriza and Podemos), neo-liberals (FI and UKIP) and non-populist mainstream parties (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 49-71). Particularly, the populist transformations of non-populist parties, their political style and the leaders who implement this style achieve great success (FPÖ, SVP, Die Linke and Fidesz¹¹⁴).

However, the main question in current research is how radical right-wing parties, which increase their power and achieve unity by using populism, can affect the voters so much and why the voters are close to these parties. Current research reveals many reasons for the rising populist wave today. These reasons include economic crises, corruption, unemployment, inequality in income distribution, increasing terrorist incidents, sense of threat, personal failures, multiculturalism, increasing cultural and ethnic diversity, lack of understanding of current issues by old institutions and mainstream movements, decreased trust in institutions and politicians, disappointments created by liberal democracies¹¹⁵, crisis of representation and

¹¹² "A special situation of prejudice, oppression and hatred towards Jews" (Lewis, 2004). The most important source of this thought is the 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion', which is still used by the radical right today. <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/protocols-of-the-elders-of-zion-key-dates>. (Online at 25.11.2020). However, the anti-Semitic policies used by the radical right in the past have been replaced by Islamophobia. For this reason, it is not surprising to see that radical right movements produce discourses that support Israeli policies today (Mayer, 2004).

¹¹³ The French FN is the first radical right party to politicise populism, incorporate it into its ideology and set an example for other parties in this regard (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 45).

¹¹⁴ When populist movements that show a rising trend in Europe are examined, the example of Hungary is significant in terms of both effectiveness and political power. Populism, which has different characteristics in power and opposition, prioritises the examination of Fidesz, which displays populist features. Fidesz's populist features will be analysed in-depth in the following sections of the thesis.

¹¹⁵ The relationship of liberal democracy between constitutionality and popular sovereignty creates an independent but consistent 'two-pillar model' (Abts and Rummens, 2007; Merkel, 2004). These 'two aspects' of

discontent in society can be counted (Berezin 2009, 43-44; Müller 2017, 12; Lipset 1963, 178; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 31). The increase in the issues that the masses live and worry about and the voters who think that they are not represented creates the supply-demand relationship, which is very important for the existence of the populist movements (Laclau 2005, 92). In other words, the fact that the demands of the people become directly related to the party, movement and leader creates an environment that makes it easier for populist messages to be conveyed to the public.

The analysis of regional differences according to populism's ability to set an agenda and influence policy (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 117) is extremely important because the effects and use of populism differ in European countries and regions. For example, Western European populists appeal to voters who have lost their jobs due to globalisation, are financially and morally excluded from society, are anti-immigrant and are opposed to mainstream politics (Fennema, 2004). In other words, Western European populism considers socio-economic and nativist factors and tries to conduct politics on these issues. On the other hand, Middle and Eastern European populists appeal to voters who believe in external threats and enemies, nationalists against globalisation and Islam, who are pro-traditional, romantic nationalist, religious and against ethnic diversity (Laclau 2005, 214). In other words, Middle and Eastern European populism uses socio-cultural¹¹⁶ factors such as history, religion, and ethnicity more¹¹⁷. Of course, these differences are not the stigma attached to Western and Middle and Eastern European populists. In other words, these differences can also be used for the populists of the two regions. The differences may vary according to the degree of influence, the excess

liberal democracy are based on governing power and interdependence that guarantees free elections, political rights, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and the meaningfulness of elections (Merkel, 2004). These principles increase the ability of liberal democracy to protect the 'sovereignty of the people'. That is, liberal democracy refers to regimes where sovereignty, freedom of expression, minority rights and fundamental rights are protected by democracy and democratic institutions (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 98). However, liberal democracy cannot produce class enthusiasm because it is far from identity politics. For this reason, liberal democracy and populism cannot get along with each other and are in constant conflict. In other words, populism, which tries to gain its legitimacy through democratic means, tries to extract liberal values from democracies. On the other hand, populism develops and becomes stronger in places where liberal democracy does not work well. The most important reason for this is that liberal democracy should be controlled by democratic and independent institutions. A liberal democracy that is not controlled by democratic and independent institutions can be easily influenced by populist waves, become oligarchic or technocratic.

¹¹⁶ The socio-cultural conflicts brought to the agenda by the populist radical right parties in Eastern and Central Europe are also becoming evident in Western Europe today (Pytlas and Kossack, 2015). This situation creates a favourable political environment for the spread of populist radical right policies in mainstream politics in connection with the acceptance of the socio-cultural policies of the populist radical right by mainstream parties in both Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe (Pytlas 2015, 6).

¹¹⁷ One of the reasons for this is the convergence of suppressed nationalist sentiments with religious values, conservatism, and the Catholic church (Sofos 1996, 268-269; Rydgren, 2007).

usage, the policies followed by the party and the leader, traditional, historical, and cultural values. Populist policies differ according to traditional and cultural values and can manifest themselves in different ways even in different European countries:

Countries which criticise high taxes and immigration policies (Nordic countries) (Taggart 2000, 97), countries which try to gain power through racist, exclusionary and authoritarian policies with their Nazi and fascist backgrounds (Hungary (Jobbik(?)), Slovakia (SNS and L'SNS), Romania, Germany, Italy, Austria, Spain (VOX)) (Akkerman 2005, 337; Stockemer, 2017), countries which perceive Islam as a threat, fear feeling foreign in their own country due to cultural erosion that may occur with immigration waves, and accuse immigrants as scapegoats (Poland (PiS, Konfederacja, Kukiz'15) (Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2019, 13), Denmark, Sweden (SD), Hungary (Fidesz), Germany (AfD), France (FN), Austria (FPÖ), Netherlands (PVV and FvD), Switzerland) (Green, 2017), countries which focusing on regional and ethnic identities (Belgium, Italy (Lega), Switzerland) (Taggart 2000, 97), and countries which try to gain support with Eurosceptic and anti-Euro policies (Greece (Syriza), Spain (Podemos), France (La France Insoumise)) (Wodak 2015, 2).

1.3.1 Populism's Impact on Conservatism

Conservative accumulation continues to develop in the 21st century. The reactionary attitude based on rejecting the development and culture of the modern world has led to the search for a third way against Marxism and liberalism. The tendency of people who feel alienated by the effect of individualisation to seek a new ethnic and cultural identity has created an environment that allows the radical right parties to develop. In this case, conservative accumulation created the necessary space for the emergence of the populist radical right, which took itself as an example and emerged as a reaction to the change process created by modernisation (Uluçakar 2018, 358).

One of the critical points where conservative thought and populism meet is the anti-elite opposition of populism and the rationality of conservative thought. Based on this basic approach, some discourses such as a common tradition, exaltation of family life, corrupt elites, and political corruption integrate conservatism and populism. Themes such as fatalism, ethnic/religious origin, and instinctive commitment constitute conservative-populist resources. In addition, populist right-wing parties have recently created a conservative and moderate image that embodies solidarity communities, fundamentalist Catholics, identity politics, the

preservation of the ethnic and religious heritage of the community, anti-rationalism, charismatic leader type and royalist-reactionary conservatism (Uluçakar 2018, 358-364; Çakır 2011, 79; Vardar, 2002).

Similarly, the tendency to seek common sense symbolises a conservative form of populist hegemony. In conservatism, people are the keepers of tradition as an organic community and social subjects. The people's common sense, expressed in the language of populist politics, is essential to create a source of political legitimacy (Bora and Erdoğan, 2003). In other words, both concepts emphasise the integration of ordinary people and the continuation of their mediocrity.

The strategy of privilege (exclusion of certain classes), dominated by discourse, forms the ideological language of the 'New Right' with the articulation of conservative, neo-liberal and populist elements. The transformation of society is achieved by selecting specific segments and highlighting the preferred segments (Köksal 2006, 182). In this context, at first glance, conservative discourse overlaps with populist and nationalist discourses at many points.

On the other hand, many political science scholars consider conservatism and populism to have many common ways of thinking in the same people at different times. On the other hand, populists apply policies like conservatives, especially in Europe. Some of these policies are: preserving the traditional family structure, patriarchy, obedience and respect, racism (social, cultural and biological), exploiting European heritage and European values, positive views on the colonial past, oppressive politics (law and order, zero-tolerance principle), creating fear of the 'others and enemy' (Islamophobia, xenophobia, homophobia) (Merkel, 2004), being against abortion and euthanasia. Although these policies are the common ideas of populist thought and conservatism, conservative ideology can tolerate these ideas more in some cases (Patroons, 2018). The populist and conservative parties implementing these policies succeed in gaining the support of lower, middle, and poor groups by emphasising the themes adopted by right-wing groups.

1.3.2 Populism, Democracy and Illiberal Democracy

The concepts of populism and democracy are closely related to the political representation of the people, as populism does not have a determining theory. There is no meaningful criterion for when political actors should be called populists because every politician in representative

democracies wants to be able to attract people to his/her side, appeal to as many citizens as possible, and get as many votes as possible. For this reason, the relationship between populism and democracy should be examined separately.

Since populist parties want to gain political legitimacy, they want to be elected. For this reason, democracy creates the most suitable political environment for populism (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2019). However, it should not be forgotten that everything is not going well for democracy in many countries today. The danger democracy faces today does not arise from holistic ideologies that systematically oppose democratic ideals. The danger stems from a corrupt democracy understanding that promises to realise the high ideals of democracy (Müller 2017, 6).

In particular, the fact that representative democracy is facing a profound crisis today and the spread of the idea that it is necessary to apply directly to the people to overcome this crisis (Canovan, 1999) causes the political elites, institutions, and parties to be questioned. In other words, with the rise of representative democracy around the world, populism has also started to rise because democracy is basically the reflection of the national will to the government. In this context, democracy does not differ from populism. For this reason, democracy and populism can be used interchangeably from time to time. The most important fundamental difference that separates democracy from populism is the ideological use of 'the people' concept. In other words, in a sense, populism constitutes the 'shadow of representative democracy' (Müller 2017, 20; Mudde 2004, 560).

Populism can emerge more easily and develop more quickly in representative democracies (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2019). However, the fact that all politicians can apply populist politics and that populism can be both a friend and an enemy of democracy does not create conceptual chaos (Müller 2017, 24). According to Yetkin (2016, 70), populism can emerge more easily in systems where democratic demands are not met; there is inequality of democratic representation and democracy cannot be fully established.

Populist parties that emerged in representative democracies advocate simple and direct politics by emphasising the wishes and desires of the people because populists tend to communicate directly with the public and want the communication with the public to be unmediated. For this reason, populists generally support direct democracy (Bozoğlu 2017, 73).

According to the populists, the most direct way to determine the people's wishes are the methods of democracy that can be applied directly, such as referendums¹¹⁸ (Yetkin 2016, 76; Jacobs, Akkerman and Zaslove, 2018). Populism is directly related to democracy as it uses the tools of direct democracy to reach the people. The means of direct democracy increase the people's participation rate in representative democracy (Taggart 2000, 129). Although populists defend the principle of direct democracy, this situation does not always mean the establishment of a democratic environment and will because populists want to use the legitimacy gained by referendum and public approval to implement their populist policies. Therefore, according to Müller (2017, 102), the principle of direct democracy advocated by populists does not mean more participation in politics because populism wants to communicate directly with the public but opposes the principles of compromise and negotiation that can prolong this process (Yılmaz, 2017). That is, populists use the model of direct democracy to make their own decisions, implement them, and give them legitimacy.

According to Arditì (2004, 142), the most important reason why populists want to gain legitimacy through elections is that non-democratic policies can be presented as the 'will of the people'. In this way, populist parties do not have to pay for their undemocratic behaviour. For these reasons, when populist movements come to power, they give the impression that they will lead to a 'dictatorship of legitimacy'. Therefore, according to Mudde (2004, 561), populism can also be called 'democratic extremism'.

In populism, the call for direct democracy and the frequent use of direct democracy methods causes political parties to be criticised, especially opposing parties, and even be excluded from the political arena (Yetkin, 2016). However, political parties criticised by populism cannot be completely excluded from political life because the political party structure is the mechanism by which populists can be elected and legitimate. Political parties should be used in the political arena for the success and legitimacy of populist discourses.

As Müller (2017, 27) emphasised, according to the populists, the reason for the lost elections is that most of the people have not broken the silence yet. Populists are like any other political movement participating in the political struggle by forming their own political parties in a representative democracy. For this reason, populism must go through certain processes found

¹¹⁸ In referendums organised by populists, voters are usually presented with two options, 'yes' and 'no'. Populists can thus divide public opinion into two poles, the elite, and the public.

in representative democracies to take the political scene (Taggart, 2000). But despite this, populists see themselves as the only true representative of the people.

Despite all these negativities, it is incorrect to say that populism is an enemy of democracy¹¹⁹. Nevertheless, on the other hand, ‘populism conflicts with liberal democracy’ (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 113) because populism is directly linked to representational democracy¹²⁰ (Müller 2017, 73). Populist leaders and movements attach great importance to both coming to power through elections and holding referendums, and populism can be regarded as a democratising force with the claim that it represents segments who think that the mainstream does not represent them. So, “populism is both a friend and an enemy of democracy. This complexity varies depending on the stage of the development of democracy”¹²¹ (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 9-29). According to populists, the suspension of democracy, or worse, the complete disappearance of democracy, causes a massive loss of reputation in the international arena (Müller 2017, 50-51).

Populists can exist much more easily where the party system is weak or destroyed (Müller 2017, 79). For this reason, countries that need to avoid authoritarian tendencies due to their populist policies introduce themselves as ‘illiberal democracies’¹²² or ‘electoral autocracies’. This situation allows countries that use populist policies and tend to become authoritarian¹²³ to say that they are still democratic. The created illiberal democracies, unlike liberal democracy and the liberal majority, appeal to the society with the motto ‘we are the people and are more

¹¹⁹ Populism rising in South America after the Second World War posed a threat to dictatorships rather than democracy because it has increased the people’s participation in the elections. However, later, with the influence of populism, anti-democratic policies were also implemented in South America (Finchelstein, 2017). The most important factor in undemocratic policies is the willingness and success of South American populist leaders in obtaining the executive branch. While the South American populist leaders easily control the executive branch, this situation seems very rare in North America and Western Europe (Sözen, 2017).

¹²⁰ There are also researchers who approach negatively to the relationship between populism and representative democracy, and even directly criticise the democracy regime. For example, Schumpeter and Dahl. According to these researchers, representative democracy is the competition of elites, democracy is limited to elite election only, and citizen participation does not matter.

¹²¹ This is one of the most important points that distinguish populism from fascism. Fascism aims to marginalise the group it sees as an enemy and to remove it from politics and society completely. On the other hand, populism does not remove the group that it defines as an enemy from politics and society. Populists want to gain legitimacy by victory in elections in line with the values of democracy. In other words, while fascism is totally against democratic values, populism conflicts with democratic values. However, populists do not try to destroy democracy and give importance to democratic elections.

¹²² This term was used in the 1990s to describe the regimes in which the balance and control mechanisms of democracy were not used properly and were damaged (Müller 2017, 51). Today, it is used for regimes where the principle of separation of powers, checks, and balances, the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, freedom of expression and media and civil society are damaged (Nas 2018, 183).

¹²³ Showing a tendency to authoritarianism is one of the dangerous aspects of populist thought (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 27).

national' and try to transform liberal and democratic values. However, in an illiberal democracy with populist policies, the anti-pluralist interpretation of the 'democratic ideal' does not serve as a democratic corrective because illiberal democracy has a flawed structure against both constitutionalism and the principle of 'equal freedom of individuals' (Merkel 2004, 49). Mainstream parties that cannot resist illiberal democracy, which has a structure that can affect liberal democracy so much, come to the point of losing their legitimacy to represent the people in a political environment where populists come to power and standardise the 'people' (Abts and Rummens, 2007). This situation causes the discourses and policies of illiberal democracy, which implements populist policies, to turn into 'volonte de tous' (the good of the majority) (Allen 1961, 265). This situation results in free and independent courts, freedom of the press, and democratic institutions becoming anti-pluralist because the legitimation and implementation of the populist policies in illiberal democracy leads to the establishment of a 'tyranny of the majority' that puts itself above the law (Urbinati, 1998).

In summary, the 'popular sovereignty principle' of liberal democracy cannot be accepted as an ideal within populism because applying populism as a democratic concept result in the opposition to pluralism that forms the basis of 'popular sovereignty' and the legitimacy of constitutional checks and balances. That is, the acceptance of a 'standardised' popular will over the rule of law poses a challenge both to the constitutional foundations of liberal democracy and to the free expression of popular sovereignty. For this reason, the concept of illiberal democracy, which populist leaders and populist parties include in their policies and discourses, constitutes a way to challenge the legitimacy of constitutional liberal democracy (Isaac, 2017). Therefore, the real danger of illiberal democracy is that leaders and movements that mainly threaten democracy and are prone to authoritarianism can maintain the definition of democracy in their regimes, despite using undemocratic policies and discourses.

Apart from illiberal democracies, populism as a threat to democracy targets democratic values in three ways: according to Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017, 108-109), these are erosion, destruction, and pressure. Erosion manifests itself in situations where judicial independence, minority rights, institutions and the rule of law are damaged. Erosion shows itself particularly clearly in Hungary. The destruction manifests itself in places of regime change. On the other hand, pressure is a situation that has not been encountered before.

1.3.3 Populism, Migration and Islamophobia

Although the multiculturalism policy, one of the aims of the EU, aims at solidarity and universality, populists manage to turn the multicultural crisis into a political opportunity with the discourse that “Europe belongs to Europeans and the elites put the interests of the EU before the countries” (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 22). Thanks to these discourses, populists succeed in influencing mainstream politics, which lost votes, by being the voice of groups that are dissatisfied with the policies of mainstream politics (those against immigration, social, cultural, and religious diversity) (Wallerstein 2018, 162). Mainstream politics, which started to erode, especially by being influenced by populism’s ideas of multiculturalism and anti-Islamism, affects many European politicians’ discourses. Some politicians influenced by the populism discourse are former German Chancellor Angela Merkel; former German CSU party leader, former German Minister of Internal Affairs, Reconstruction and Homeland and former German President Horst Seehofer; former British Prime Minister David Cameron; leader of the Dutch PvdA party (social democrat) Lodewijk Asscher; former French President Nicolas Sarkozy; Austrian Prime Minister Sebastian Kurz and former Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski (Kaya, 2012; Müller 2017, 56; Connolly, 2018). Apart from multiculturalism, populists also successfully use the increasing unemployment, poverty, unfair income distribution and indifference to mainstream politics in Europe. The populists, who succeeded in addressing the society with a plain language the public can understand, have become, in the eyes of some, people and parties, reliable, saviours and problem solvers that make politics according to the will of the people (Wodak 2015, 11).

Multiculturalism and anti-Islamism, which have become a problem due to the immigration wave, are among the central populist policies adopted by European mainstream politics. For this reason, it is of great importance to understand anti-Islamism/Islamophobia. The idea of Islamophobia, which has increased significantly after September 11 and the terrorist attacks in Europe, has increased due to the increasing waves of immigration from Islamic countries to Europe. These events have caused a bad stigma of Islam among European citizens and prejudice against Islam. Prejudice and fear formed in societies caused Islamophobia, one of the core ideas of populism, to turn into mainstream politics in Europe (Kaya, 2011). For this reason, Islam has become the new scapegoat for populist politics, which always needs the concept of 'others'. In this way, populists have gained an environment where they can easily blame ‘Islam’ and ‘others’ for all the troubles in Europe. However, today, it is not just the populists who benefit from this scapegoat.

The mainstream, which produces unsuccessful policies economically, socially, politically, and culturally, is trying to cover up its own failures by showing this scapegoat as a target and trying to draw the people's focus to the other side¹²⁴. Hostility towards Jews before and after the Second World War turned into Soviet hostility with the rise of communism, and into Islamophobia after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Ahmed 2004, 125). Interest in Islamophobia has increased with the prejudices against Islam and successful targeting nowadays. Islamophobia, which previously attracted the Christian white male population (Kaya and Kayaoğlu, 2017), is now supported by many women and LGBTI+ members (Mondon and Winter 2017, 2164-2168). As Lipset (1963) points out, "economic and political failures can lead people to antisemitism, racism and nationalism".

Islamophobia has existed in Europe for a long time and is still active today. In fact, John Demescen's work 'De Haeresibus' written in the 6th century blames Islam on many issues and constitutes one of the primary sources of Islamophobic writings even today. Apart from that, people like Dante (Divine Comedy) (Johnson 2000, 336-338), Martin Luther (Vom Kriege wider die Türken / On War Against the Turk) (Grislis 1974, 181), Erasmus, Voltaire (Le Fanatisme ou Mahomet le Prophete / Fanaticism, or Mahomet the Prophet) and Pascal, who use various arguments against Islam and Turkophobia successfully, managed to influence the masses (Hidir 2015, 175). In addition to these thoughts, Islamophobic feelings deepened during the Crusades that continued unceasingly.

Furthermore, current Islamophobia research started with the report titled 'Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All' published in 1997 by the Runnymede Trust think tank in England¹²⁵ (Güngörmez and Bayraklı 2018, 120). Islamophobia was described as 'anti-Muslim racism' in a study named 'Islamophobia: Still a Challenge for Us All' published by the same think tank in 2017 (Elahi and Khan, 2017). What is frightening is that the point Islamophobia reached in Europe today does not seem very different from historical anti-Semitism (Weaver, 2013). These oppositions continue with the same accusations from the past, especially in the context of cultural racism (Schiffer and Wagner, 2011) and marginalisation: 'Fear that the political and cultural structure in Europe will be changed by these minorities' (Master and Roy 2000, 425).

¹²⁴ The mainstream is very good at blaming populists and populism for their failed policies. So, according to the mainstream, scapegoats are populists. According to the mainstream, 'if there were no populists, the world would be a much better place today.' In other words, mainstream politics choose populists as scapegoats, and populists choose 'others' as scapegoats. At this point, populism can become a term used by the mainstream to cover up its own failures.

¹²⁵ Nick Griffin, who became the head of the British BNP party in 1999, changed the party's policy from anti-Semitism to Islamophobia after this publication.

Historically, culturally and politically, Islamophobic perception, which has existed since the past, continues to play an important role in the creation of the ‘other’ that stands against the ‘pure people’ in Europe today (Bunzl, 2005; Topolski, 2013). However, what is even more frightening today is that European conservative and mainstream movements are increasingly finding these policies acceptable.

Islamophobia today represents medieval Islamophobia, anti-Turkism in the 16th and 17th centuries, anti-Russians in the 19th century, anti-Nazism in the 20th century, and anti-Soviet Unionism in the recent past because the only way for European states to act together since the Middle Ages is to identify a common enemy. Collaborating against a common enemy implies political unity in European politics, just like how nationalism and nationalist ideologies are used to build the European identity (Dupre, 2004). Populists, who started to use the rhetoric ‘Islam is the enemy of the West’ after the Cold War (Von Beyme 1988, 1-18), became stronger after September 11 and began to be influential in Western politics by combining Islamophobic discourses with racial, religious, and cultural discrimination (Mitts 2017, 12-14; Sheridan, 2006). Islamophobia, which has become an ideology today, has also become a policy that administrators use to cover up their failed policies (Danielson 2016, 25-26). The fact that Muslims are held responsible for all the evils in Europe (Castles, Hass and Miller, 2013) and that Muslims who migrate to Europe are seen as radicals, terrorists, and criminals contribute significantly to radicalisation of Muslims (Van Zeller). Worse still, the most important factor that strengthens these views is the legitimisation of the Islamophobic view by the mainstream (prohibitions on turbans, burqas, and minarets). European policies, which see Islam as the cause of all evil things, cause the radicalisation of Muslims who oppose these policies and feel trapped (Mitts 2017, 17). This situation increases the support for the anti-Islamic populist parties, which creates a kind of vicious circle.

1.4 Mainstreamisation

The radical right’s recent election victories have triggered the political alarm bells across Europe. For this reason, many researchers have begun to question whether radical right parties have had a new and unprecedented influence on European politics. This question focuses on the influence of the existing radical right parties in Europe. What are the effects of the radical right on mainstream politics? Is the mainstream right shifting to the radical right, or is the radical

right going mainstream? In any case, the problem of migration and national identity, which the radical right has been defending for years, now occupies the agenda of all European states.

Despite the efforts of Europe's mainstream politics to prevent the re-emergence of Nazism and Fascism on the continent, we witness radical right parties, movements and ideas becoming a part of mainstream politics in Europe¹²⁶. For this reason, there has been a lot of research on the influence of the radical right on mainstream parties. After the victories of Trump in America, Freedom Party in Austria, FN in France, Lega in Italy and Brexit in England, the debates started to increase. However, although the mainstream and the radical right concepts have a general connotation, it is challenging to make a complete definition. So, there is no fixed mainstream or radical politics because the mainstream and radical right could act depending on the circumstances.

Racist, sexist, and homophobic ideas that were once considered mainstream are nowadays rejected. However, such actions or ideas (together with the people and institutions that support them) may not disappear or even adapt and change. These thoughts and revivals can arise at any time. Therefore, it should not be surprising to explain the rise of the radical right in Europe in terms of electoral performance and election results. However, in some cases, just focusing on parties and elections can lead us to ignore some important events. Therefore, to understand how the radical right ideas have spread and become mainstream, it is necessary to go beyond electoral politics.

The middle class, which emerged and got stronger in Europe after the Second World War, remained between the globalisation movements and the shrinking business areas since the 1980s and became a structure that was hollowed out, and the gap between it and the rich population was increased. The weakening of the middle class and the economic and social gaps between rich and poor communities has led to inequality in European societies and the obstruction of welfare policies and social state practices. This situation caused the radical right movements to shift to the centre, the radical right to approach the middle-class voters by using a softer conservative discourse¹²⁷ and the social fabric of Europe to get damaged (Rosanvallon 1992, 36).

¹²⁶ Mainstream parties can compete with their political rivals in three ways. These are: ignoring newly politicised issues, adapting to the policies, discourses, and positions of the challenger, and taking an oppositional stance (Meguid, 2008; Stanley, Markowski and Czesnik 2019, 2).

¹²⁷ If radical right movements present a more explicit discursive stance and program than their elections and actions, they can come up with a policy that will encompass all right-wing politics. In addition, the radical right

The shift of central politics in Europe to the right began in England in the 1970s under the thought leadership of Friedrich von Hayek¹²⁸ and Leo Strauss¹²⁹ and the political leadership of Thatcher and Reagan. The support of the neoconservatives (neo-cons (especially Ronald Reagan and Reaganism in the 1980s)) (Ignazi, 1992), who are the new anti-left and the pioneer of today's radical right (Celep 2009, 243), has been one of the most important factors that created this situation. The economic changes, neo-liberalism and the globalisation wave that affected the whole world in this period made England (Anglo-Saxon politics) a region where a new right-wing thought was tried and experienced¹³⁰ (Cox, 1987). Moreover, although privatisation movements, cutting state subsidies, rising unemployment and income inequality have stirred up society, Thatcher has adopted policies that focus on family values, chauvinism, nationalism, and authoritarianism (Prasad, 2006). Thatcher, who reinforced these policies with her speech in 1978¹³¹, moved the Conservative Party from its traditional line to the right-wing and succeeded in creating a culture-oriented policy for the first time in the immigration issue. Thatcher has made not only economic but also socio-cultural changes (Hall 1988, 91). These policies started a kind of a conservative revolution in England.

The emerging neo-conservative thought has become a capitalist, exclusionary, authoritarian, strict, law and order supporter, moralist¹³², social hierarchy defending and severe punishment system under Thatcher's leadership (Ignazi, 2003). Strictness and strong state understanding¹³³, one of the most important policies of neo-conservatism, showed itself first against the Soviet

can become 'radical' again by giving up its mainstream discourses and programs, or more dangerously, it can radicalise the mainstream by changing mainstream policies.

¹²⁸ The book 'The Road to Serfdom', written by Friedrich von Hayek, became the guidebook of neoliberals and new right supporters at that time. According to Hayek (2001, 50-60), "any intervention of the state in the economy would harm freedom". Over time, the book managed to find an important place, especially in the anti-Soviet structure.

¹²⁹ According to Strauss (1965), "the power of sovereigns should be based on the virtue of their wisdom. Such a policy of virtue is needed to counter tyranny and oppression. The main premise here is the belief that it is inevitable to do whatever virtue requires to oppose persecution".

¹³⁰ Free market, capitalist system and neoliberal economic policies are among the most important causes of income inequality in societies after 1980 (Weeks, 2005). Inequalities have created a very fertile environment for the radical right and right-wing populism (Finchelstein 2017, 31).

¹³¹ "Now, that is an awful lot and, I think it means that people are really rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture and, you know, the British character has done so much for democracy, for law and done so much throughout the world that if there is any fear that it might be swamped people are going to react and be rather hostile to those coming in". (<https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103485>).

¹³² Law and order and moralism policies are the common policies of the radical right and the mainstream right (Ignazi 1997, 301).

¹³³ Neo-conservatives, who advocate the establishment of authoritarian practices, laws, and order to strengthen the state, also advocate interventions against other states in the international arena for similar reasons. At this point, neo-conservatism supports interventionist and imperial policies, especially in the USA. In this respect, neoconservatism differs from classical conservatism and has a narrow nationalist perspective.

Union and then against Argentina in the Falkland. In this period, the notion of strictness in neo-conservatism evolved into a policy targeting the totalitarian states. Evolving policies and neo-conservatives tended to find a new enemy that threatened the Western civilisation after the collapse of the Soviets and the transition of the totalitarian countries to democracy. This tendency of neo-conservatives played a major role in spreading the discourses and ideas of “Islam is the enemy of the West”, “Islam has no place in Europe”, “Muslims are invaders” in Europe. Worse is the acceptance of the radical right’s rhetoric of the ‘enemy’ by the mainstream¹³⁴. The most important role in determining the new enemy was played by Bernard Lewis’s (1990) ‘The Roots of Muslim Rage’ and Samuel P. Huntington’s (1993) ‘The Clash of Civilizations’ (religion-culture link/relationship). According to these two academicians, there is a possibility that Western civilisation will conflict with China and Islam, and modern hostilities/conflicts will be shaped by culture, not economy and politics. In other words, the determination of the ‘other’ concept that Huntington stated in his work is now realised through culture. September 11, on the other hand, started to justify all interventions - by ensuring that this policy is fully cantered -. Regardless of the opposition of international organisations, neo-conservatives have started to wage a war that includes the countries they define as the 'axis of evil' under the name of the 'war on terror'.

Reagan and Thatcher undoubtedly played an important role in reshaping the approaches of the mainstream right and mainstream right parties in Europe towards the radical right. In fact, the slogan “love it or leave it” used by Reagan was adopted by the leader of the French radical right National Front, Jean-Marie Le Pen, and the slogan 'France First/French First'¹³⁵ became one of the symbol terms of the radical right (Atikkan 2014, 31). On the other hand, Thatcher, which ignited the change in the mainstream right of Europe, has also been the harbinger of the

¹³⁴ This discourse has caused populists and radical right supporters to add their identity, xenophobic, anti-immigrant, and nationalist policies to neo-conservatism. This situation expanded the constituency of the populists and the radical right. In fact, the biggest effect here is the pressure of radical right parties on mainstream parties. These pressures are that mainstream parties should take more restrictive measures against immigrants. Mainstream right parties have recently thought that they can use this pressure in their favour. Mainstream right parties have begun to adopt policies to form a broad and effective right-wing bloc, which includes voters of the radical right and the radical right parties. The success of the radical right parties in the elections and their potential to attract voters seem to have put the mainstream right on this path. Mainstream ideas most affected by the radical right are the policies of anti-ethnic minority and anti-multiculturalism, and anti-immigration. In other words, mainstream right parties follow an increasingly radical path in minority policies, multiculturalism policies and immigration policies. Although mainstream policies, which vary depending on the policies of the radical right, satisfy the mainstream by gaining elections and voters in the short term, it may also result in the mainstream losing its position in the long run. That is, the ability of the radical right to influence the mainstream can put an end to mainstream politics.

¹³⁵ Slogans such as ‘France first’, ‘America first’ have a long history. Such slogans were first used as tools of fascist propaganda in the United States (Finchelstein 2017, 258).

change in European countries¹³⁶. Mitterrand¹³⁷, Chirac¹³⁸ and especially Sarkozy^{139,140} in France since the 1980s; Berlusconi¹⁴¹ in Italy since the 1990s and Aznar¹⁴² in Spain since the 1980s has been influenced by these views. Especially after the 2000s, the change in the views of central governments on multiculturalism in Europe and their tendency to see multiculturalism as an obstacle to integration have brought mainstream politics to the radical right and the radical right to mainstream politics¹⁴³.

For example; in Germany, Merkel's statement "the multicultural society in Germany has gone collapse" (BBC, 2010), Stoiber's statement "we are committed to Christian values" and Koch statement, "we showed strangely too much understanding of some ethnic minorities" (Ellinas, 2010); in UK, Cameron's statements "multiculturalism feeds extreme ideologies and embraces Islamic terrorism" (BBC, 2011a) and "we should give priority to our citizens regarding social rights" (France 24, 2013); in Austria, Johanna Mikl-Leitner's statement "a European fortress must be built. If the EU does not protect its external borders better, the situation will be out of control" (DW, 2016); in France, Sarkozy's statement "we do not want a society where different communities live side by side" (Liberation, 2011); in the Netherland, Donner's statement "the government is abandoning the multicultural model of society because it creates discontent in our people" (Steyn, 2012); and Balkenende's statement "Moroccan street thugs, rude men" clearly prove that mainstream politics benefit from the populist discourse of

¹³⁶ Like every change, this change has developed differently according to the political and social differences of the countries.

¹³⁷ Muslims were detained for no reason, and mosques were banned during the reign of Mitterrand and former French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua (Mercan 2018, 73).

¹³⁸ In the presidential elections of 2002, Jean-Marie Le Pen got ahead of Lionel Jospin and won 16.9% of the votes. However, Chirac won this election.

¹³⁹ Cultural elements that attracted attention during the Mitterrand period, efforts to break with the de Gaulle tradition and establish a Western identity during the Chirac period, the 'Ministry of National Identity' promise during the Sarkozy period, the rise of cultural racism, expulsion of Roman citizens, Le Pen-like policies, the division of immigrants into elected and exposed, national identity politics and defence of nations' Europe (Fassin, 2017; Müller 2017, 82-83).

¹⁴⁰ The transformation process of the mainstream right in France started with the 'New Right' (Nouvelle Droite) movement in the 1960s. This movement has emerged as a new movement with the promise to liberate the radical right in France from the Nazi remnants of the past. In fact, this idea was in favour of differences, but on the condition that each difference and culture remain in its own country (Camus 2006, 24). This thought has played an important role in the formation of the new racism that is based on 'identity' and 'cultural' separation.

¹⁴¹ Authority policies during the Berlusconi period, the normalisation of Mussolini and the coalition he made with Fini (Italian Social Movement).

¹⁴² Culture and identity politics in the Aznar period, proximity to Franco and immigration policies.

¹⁴³ The liberal-authoritarian view of the ideological core of the radical right parties will help us to understand the relationship between the mainstream and the radical right. According to researchers, both left-wing and right-wing mainstream parties have become much more authoritarian since 1980.

the radical right¹⁴⁴. So much so that the Dutch radical rightist Dion Graus, who was aware that the mainstream uses the ideas of the radical right, said that “the mainstream, which tried to keep us out of politics until recently, has started to imitate the language we use these days”.

Thatcher has proven that she moves side by side with populism by calling the Conservative Party ‘on the side of the people’ and the Labour Party ‘on the side of the state’. Thatcher’s policies targeting the left-wing politics caused the left-wing in England to lose support and change. Under the leadership of Blair and Brown, the leaders of the Labour Party in Britain, the changed left-wing policies have strengthened the foundation of the new right, guided the governments in Germany, France and Spain, and shifted the electorate from the working class to the middle class.

The wave of globalisation, economic competition, social changes, economic crises, the power of the internet, the desire for new politics in the electorate and new political areas have exceeded the political boundaries of mainstream parties (conservatives and social democrats). For this reason, mainstream politics could not manage the change in society and economy, and they blamed immigrants for their failures. For this reason, political actors (such as Greens¹⁴⁵ and Micro-nationalists) who recently joined politics in the 1970s and 1980s began to gain popularity by bringing new issues to politics. However, the new political movements that emerged as a reaction to the left-wing politics and fed from the reaction votes have lost the reaction voters to the right-wing parties since the late 1980s and early 1990s. The voters who moved away from the newly formed movements and approached the right-wing movements undoubtedly played an active role in strengthening the radical right. Economic crises, resentments and diminishing confidence in EU policies have led European voters to anti-EU populist parties/politics that make understandable and straightforward policies. This situation paved the way for a new political structuring process, causing the mainstream right and mainstream left to lose voters and brought the radical right to success.

The radical right, which changes its identity and appearance in today’s politics, presents itself to society as an alternative. The fact that the radical right presents itself as an alternative

¹⁴⁴ Such trends are not limited to centre-right parties, which are more conservative in terms of morality and identity. The mainstream left also occasionally joins this trend. For example, in 2005, the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), one of the Austrian opposition parties, approved more difficult immigration and asylum policies in the Aliens Law Package initiated by the right-wing coalition ÖVP-FPÖ government. Thus, the SPÖ thought that this approval would be useful for the next election.

¹⁴⁵ The Greens have been a party family that emerged with the ‘new-left’ that met the expectations of people living in the post-war period.

ensures that radical right politics are produced without expressing an opinion. For this reason, radical right movements succeed in adding liberal policies such as secularism, equality, freedom of expression and LGBTI+ rights¹⁴⁶, which represent Europe's secular values, to their radical policies.

Neo-conservative movements and policies that started in England in the 1970s classical conservative movements and policies have difficulty in producing policies against the current problems. Worse still, conservative politics use the authoritarian and nationalist policies of the radical right more frequently to get out of the crisis environment and to find solutions to these problems.

The crisis of political representation that began in democracies in the 1980s has been an important turning point for the centralisation of radical right policies. The main reasons for this approach are the voter's attitude towards the mainstream and the mainstream's use of discriminatory language against 'others'¹⁴⁷. Voters, who are bored with the politics of the mainstream parties whose political position is uncertain, stop voting for the mainstream, causing the radical right to succeed in national elections first and then the radical right to shift to the mainstream. The most crucial factor in this situation is that the mainstream does not want to lose voters who ideologically are drawn to the radical right. For this reason, the mainstream tends to regain the voters lost to the radical right by shifting to the right.

For this reason, the radical right, which was accepted at the ends of the political spectrum until the 1980s, managed to get close to the mainstream nowadays because the mainstream has started to lose voters, shift to the right-wing, and give legitimacy to radical ideas. Turning this situation into an opportunity, the radical right has succeeded in taking important steps towards mainstreaming with its image of being the protector of democratic values and not being able to push the policies it supports out of the system. Especially in countries where the radical right is strong in terms of votes, the radical right and the mainstream right have started to compete to win more voters. This competition enables the mainstream right to take a more authoritarian attitude towards immigrants and multiculturalism by influencing the mainstream right's strategies, policies, and discourses. The mainstream right sometimes imitates radical right policies, makes radical right parties coalition partners and in this way legitimises the ideas of the radical right (Bale, 2003). Strategies implemented by the mainstream in order not to lose

¹⁴⁶ With the message "we protect European values against the 'others'" created in the policies of the radical right.

¹⁴⁷ The separatist language of the mainstream is less aggressive and abrasive, unlike the radical right.

votes to the radical right or to get back the lost votes often fail. In other words, the mainstream cannot get back the votes it lost to the radical right, which causes the radical right to increase its vote rates even more and normalises the shift of its policies to the right-wing in the long run.

The radical right owes its success in shifting the mainstream to the right mainly to the 'populist bridge/permeable border' formed between conservative leaders and the radical right (Minkenberg 2018, 374; Traverso, 2011). The radical right, which bridges the conservative values and the radical right, continues to make its politics on this bridge today. The building blocks of this bridge are anti-multiculturalism, return to roots, neo-liberalism¹⁴⁸, populism, security¹⁴⁹, and Islamophobia, which are generally accepted both by the conservative right and the radical right. The reason for these ideas to be accepted by conservatives is the mainstream losing votes to the radical right, as mentioned before. However, the mainstream, which includes radical right policies in its own policies, does not see a positive result from this convergence; on the contrary, it loses more votes to the radical right.

For this reason, the mainstream's adoption and acceptance of Islamophobia and anti-multiculturalism play a serious role in the rise of the radical right (Atikkan 2014, 177; BBC, 2017). The turning point of the radical right's shift towards the mainstream was the success of the National Front in the 1984 European Parliament elections in France. The shift of the radical right to the mainstream continued to be experienced in Italy in 1994¹⁵⁰, Austria in 2000 and Denmark in 2001¹⁵¹, with the ideas of Islamophobia, Anti-Semitism, and anti-immigration¹⁵².

¹⁴⁸ "Neo-liberalism rejects both the people and democracy", "Race politics is the dark side of neo-liberalism" and "Neo-liberalism is getting closer to authoritarian regimes every day" (Fassin, 2017). "Populism is a weapon in the service of neo-liberalism" (Hall 2008, 37-44). The situation that causes these comments is the ideas of inequality, anti-democracy, imperialism, and religious discrimination that neo-liberalism contains. However, perhaps the most important of the gains of neo-liberal thought is the inability to form an opinion against it. For this reason, neo-liberal policies can continue their way (Worth 2013, 19; Held and Kaya, 2007).

¹⁴⁹ Especially after September 11, the security discourse, and policies of conservatives, which are based on pressure rather than consent, can easily be added to the security discourse of the populist radical right (George W. Bush example) (Gramsci 1971, 12). However, the increase in militancy because of Bush's security policies and the failure to maintain order led to questioning the legitimacy of neo-liberalism (Worth, 2013).

¹⁵⁰ The government in which the radical right joined the coalition for the first time after the Second World War. The radical right National Alliance and Northern League parties joined in coalition in Berlusconi's conservative government.

¹⁵¹ Venstre party made the biggest right-wing shift in Denmark. In fact, Venstre, which started to produce anti-immigrant, anti-foreign and discrimination/exclusion policies in the 2001 elections, brought its policies closer to the radical right, despite being a mainstream right-wing party.

¹⁵² One of the success criteria of the radical right is the election system and political regime in the country. In other words, in two-party systems (Westminster), the radical right cannot have a direct win and does not show enough power in the political arena. On the other hand, in countries with a multi-party system, the radical right can achieve significant success with the polarisation and political conflicts that arise because of the increase in ideological differences (Sartori, 1971; 1982). While radical right parties gain more power in a presidential system, it is much more difficult for them to gain power in parliamentary systems because of the coalitions they need to

Radical right parties, which determine their mainstreaming strategies in line with these developments in Western European countries, follow a different method in Central and Eastern Europe. So much so that the mainstreaming strategies of the radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe consist of increasing the influence of the romantic and ultranationalist 'counter-modernisation' discourses of nation-building on the mainstream and using this attempt to re-interpret modern politics (Pytlas, 2013). In this context, radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe accuse left-liberal elites as opponents of a historical struggle.

The first section summarises different forms of conservatism, such as authoritarian conservatism, paternalist conservatism, one-nation conservatism, Christian democracy, neo-conservatism, and neo-right, resulting from conservatism and its divisions, after the historical and current analysis of the right-wing. The first chapter also includes summaries of radical right, populism, illiberal democracy and mainstreaming to shed light on the following chapters. In particular, the rise of illiberal democracy, populism and radical right can be seen as a decline in democracies in Europe. The impact of the radical right and populist political systems on understanding democracy in the Visegrad region will be answered in the next section.

form. On the other hand, if the radical right succeeds in the election by gaining the parliamentary majority in the parliamentary system, radical right policies may tend to restrict the regime. These constraints directly affect the check and balance systems because the radical right party wants fewer checks and balances that can limit itself (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 112).

2. The Origins of the Right-Wing Politics in Hungary

The end of communism and the collapse of the Berlin Wall brought the end of the bipolar world order. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the independence of 15 countries. Seven of the Central and Eastern European states (Hungary, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia (satellite states), Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia), which gained national and political independence with the collapse of the Soviet Union, became members of the European Union in 2004. However, the expectation that countries with different political, historical, economic, and cultural differences would adopt democratic principles in the same way as Western countries created an extremely difficult situation. For this reason, both the transition to democracy and EU membership of Central and Eastern European states should be analysed in detail.

2.1 Radical Right in Visegrad Countries¹⁵³ - Historical Overview

The lack of a standard explanation of populism, a political reality in Central and Eastern European countries, and the differences it shows from region to region make it difficult to explain populism to Central and Eastern European countries. The most important reasons for this are the different factors of populism and its unequal prevalence in Central and Eastern European countries. For example, populism, historically, emerged as a peasant-socialist movement in the Russian Narodniks and was shaped primarily as an anti-urban bourgeois, anti-capitalist, and anti-liberal farmer-poor-small landowner-nationalist movement in Hungary (Krucic 1991, 75). The democratic representation crisis between the two world wars was also felt in these countries. In this period, the problem of representation of democracy resulted in the disappearance of democratic regimes and the replacement of democratic regimes by fascists and dictators. Fascism, which collapsed after the Second World War, was replaced by populism as a vertical and intolerant form of democracy.

With the end of the Soviet influence, right-wing populism, and populist parties, which developed and matured over phobias such as occupation, looting and violence in Visegrad countries, began to develop and gain power in this region. In addition, strong modernisation movements and globalisation experienced in the society and economy after the 1990s also

¹⁵³ Hungary, Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia, which have cultural, historical, and religious partnerships, established the Visegrad Group in 1991 to strengthen their economic and cultural relations, to work in common areas within European integration and to strengthen cooperation (Slovakia joined the group in 1993) (Dangerfield 2009, 1737).

created other threats for the Visegrad countries. After the democratic transition, Western European countries entered the market of Visegrad countries and made them dependent on them, Western European countries turned Visegrad countries into a consumer society, EU integration policies, the disappearance of borders, the change of customs policies and currency exchange policy, laid the foundation of anti-globalisation, anti-EU and EU-sceptical policies that emerged in the economic and cultural sense in Visegrad countries. Apart from this, the ‘local minority problem’, which is one of the main problems of the Visegrad countries, is one of the most important reasons of the rise of right-wing populism in the region with the discourses of ‘internal and external enemies’ and ‘minority problem’. At this point, the basic policies and enemy typologies of the populist parties in the Visegrad countries can be examined in four different categories according to Mudde (2007).

- Enemies in the State and the Nation: According to this category, ‘the enemy’ is within both the nation and the state. These enemies are elites who are ‘betrayers’, ‘selling their country's natural resources to the West’, ‘supporting immigrants’, and ‘corrupting their own people’.
- Enemies Inside the State but Outside the Nation: According to this category, ‘the enemy’ is ethnic minorities working only for their own kin (especially common in Slovakia).
- Enemies Outside the State but Inside the Nation: ‘Enemies’ in this category are divided into two groups. The first group is the elites who are the citizens of the country but settled abroad, accused of ‘treason’, ‘corruption’, and supporting the ‘left-wing’. The second group is people who live abroad but reject their own ancestry (especially common in Hungary).
- Enemies Outside Both the State and the Nation: ‘The enemy’ in this category are other countries that are perceived as enemies (for example, the hostility of the countries in the Visegrad region towards the Russians and Germans due to the past events) (Mudde 2007, 65-78).

However, the development of populism in Visegrad countries is not limited to the problems these countries experience in their internal dynamics. The cultural and economic globalisation policies experienced in Visegrad countries, especially after the democratic transition, are also critical in terms of understanding populism in the region. In fact, during the transition to democracy, populism, which emerged as an important trend with the discourses stating “transition to democracy in the Visegrad region did not happen with the expected speed and

effect”, “the dream of being a European state, European citizen was destroyed”, and “the idea that prosperity would be achieved quickly like the West was unrealistic”, developed and strengthened in the context of ‘fundamentally unrealistic expectations’ and ‘disappointments’. In other words, the failure of the democratisation movements, economic and social reforms¹⁵⁴ and system changes that started in the region with the end of the Cold War, and the rapid transition to the free market that could not act together with the democratisation movements created populism in the region. Populists in the region benefited from this situation by placing the illiberal understanding of democracy and anti-Western discourses on the political agenda holding the West responsible for these failures and stating that the old regime has not yet ended, so the struggle for ‘revolution’ must continue.

At this point, the populists, who define themselves as an alternative to the mainstream, anti-elite, a representative of the oppressed people, an anti-pluralist and as movements that reject liberal pluralism, have succeeded in increasing their power in the region. As a result, citizens of Visegrad countries, who are nationalists and uniform culture fans, have turned to right-wing populist and radical right parties that produce authoritarian, nationalist, single-nationalist, anti-minority, anti-Semitic, racist, anti-EU, anti-NATO and anti-foreign rhetoric and policies.

Populism in the Visegrad region is divided into two in terms of its application and prevalence. With the end of the Soviet influence, the populist differences in the Visegrad countries got split into two. Slovakia and Czechia, where populist policies appeared less, and Poland and Hungary, where populism heavily influenced the state policies after the democratic transition (McManus-Czubinska, Miller, Markowski and Wasilewski 2002, 10-11). The effect of populist policies was - until 2010-2013 - /is low, especially in the stable political culture of Czechia (Kopecek and Svacinova 2016, 133). The most important reasons for this are; the regime change was made by the legal context, the Czechs had a democratic background, the political violence was minimal, and the communist rulers eagerly welcomed the transition to democracy. However, the interest in populist politics is more evident in the example of Slovakia than Czech. The most important reason for this is the fascist and anti-Semitic policies this country was involved in during the Second World War. Especially in Slovakia, the policies

¹⁵⁴ The rapid economic and social reforms in the transition period to democracy led to an increase in unemployment, poverty and future concerns in the region and made the social order in the region pay a heavy price (Smolar, 2006). The globalisation of economies, especially because of rapid economic and social reforms, revealed the ‘losers’ of the people in the region, caused distrust and dissatisfaction with liberal democracy, and therefore, the rise of populism in the region was triggered by the elites of the transition period to democracy (Herman, 2012; Agh 1998, 51).

implemented during the Jozef Tiso period succeeded in creating a political culture for populism by laying the foundations of populist thought in this region (Krucic 1991,76-78). As a continuation of this political culture, the populist policies implemented by Vladimír Mečiar in the post-Cold War democratisation process influenced Slovakia politics for a long time.

These countries, which have democratic systems and democratic political life today, avoid facing the past periods when the foundations of populist policies were laid. Therefore, modern versions of the parties that laid the foundations of populist ideas and radical right politics in the past may call themselves democrats, mainstream, or Christian democrats today.

Especially the populist attitudes of Lech Wałęsa¹⁵⁵ and József Antall¹⁵⁶ played an important role in making populism a political phenomenon in these countries. Other signs that show populism is a prominent phenomenon in these countries are the 25% vote rate¹⁵⁷ of Stanisław Tymiński, the founder of Party X (Partia X), which has populist characteristics, in the 1990 Presidential elections and the formation of xenophobic media outlets.

The challenges and responses to the transition to liberal democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, which combines the values of popular sovereignty and the rule of law, the uncertainty and inconsistency that emerged with the collapse of the communist regime, challenges to the representation functions of parties that have developed with post-industrial modernisation, the impotence of the mainstream parties in the elections, mainstream parties losing their members, the emergence of democracies in Central and Eastern Europe as ‘hollow cores’ (Bohle and Greskovits 2012, 239), the weakening of the party-voter link after the post-communist transformation and the emergence of ‘catch-all’ and ‘cartel’ parties formed the basis of the formation process of populist movements in this region. At the same time, although the institutionalisation expected to take place in both official and civil institutions in the young democracies of Central and Eastern European countries took place in the official institutions, it did not occur in the civil institutions. The asymmetrical intersection of non-institutionalised civil institutions and institutionalised official institutions has caused internal tensions of

¹⁵⁵ Lech Wałęsa's chief attitude and Wałęsa's preparation for the elections by targeting Tadeusz Mazowiecki's economic policy and then applying the economic policies determined by Mazowiecki.

¹⁵⁶ The press kept the Christian Hungarian theme alive. For this reason, József Antall declared himself the prime minister of all Hungarians (meaning the Hungarians living as a minority in other countries) and accused some opposition media of being communist and radical-liberal.

¹⁵⁷ Separating himself from a certain political position and presenting himself as a third-way political figure, Tymiński succeeded in the first round of the 1990 Presidential elections. However, Tymiński lost the election against Lech Wałęsa in the second round due to the lack of a specific political program and the uncertainty of the electoral base.

democracy in Central and Eastern European countries (Agh 2016, 277-278). The tensions experienced by the young democracies in the region and the erosion of institutions caused the authoritarian and populist tendencies in the region to find a response. In addition, economic, political, and social changes, the technocratic stances and idle political styles of the mainstream parties, the main competition focus of the parties in the region turning into the race to win the variable voters, and the formation of the ‘takeover race’ between the parties (Pytlas, 2015) have shaped the populism in the region. For this reason, the formation and development of a charismatic power that gains political legitimacy can easily enable anti-democratic shifts in this region. Especially in this region, the legitimacy crises of liberal democracy cause populist ideas and policies to replace liberal values easily. In other words, populism in Central and Eastern Europe was reshaped and developed in a process where a new political tradition, institutions and law were not yet formed with the collapse of communism. This populist wave that developed in Central and Eastern Europe became a part of politics¹⁵⁸ in Visegrad countries¹⁵⁹ with the influence of religion¹⁶⁰.

The radical right formed in Central and Eastern Europe developed differently from Western Europe. The radical right in Western Europe first developed with fascist ideologies and then adopted a counter-reaction phenomenon called ‘silent counter-revolution’ (Inglehart, 1977) created by the post-materialist revolution and left-liberal parties. Afterwards, they developed in the context of policies that set the agenda on migration and integration issues and ensure the politicisation of the socio-cultural conflict dimension (Rydgren, 2004; Ignazi, 1992; 2003). The radical right in Central and Eastern European countries has developed as a phenomenon related to the intense value wars between the modernisation supporters and traditionalists since the beginning of the post-communist transformation (Mudde 2000b, 44; Agh, 2001; Minkenberg 2002, 335). In other words, the radical right also shows a socio-cultural structure just like the

¹⁵⁸ At this point, it should be noted that different factors strengthen the radical right and populism in the Visegrad countries. For example, populist movements and radical right parties in Poland shape their policies and discourses on the need to protect and defend historical Catholic values against ‘others’. Populist movements and radical right parties in Slovakia shape their policies and discourses as a defence strategy against ‘Hungarianisation’ in Slovakia. Populist movements and radical right parties in Hungary shape their policies and discourses to end the traumas created by the 1920 Trianon Treaty in Hungary and to reshape the Hungarian nation culturally and economically.

¹⁵⁹ Populism developed over Catholic values in Hungary and Poland and secular divisions in Czechia. For this reason, it has become a difficult situation to disappear easily. On the other hand, populism has developed in Slovakia over ethnic values (Deegan-Krause 2013, 831).

¹⁶⁰ The main populist purpose in making religious ideas a part of politics is to ensure that the will of the people and the will of God have the same meaning (Finchelstein, 2017).

populism developed in Visegrad countries¹⁶¹ (Minkenberg and Beichelt, 2001). In addition, radical right parties in Eastern and Central Europe, which are increasingly professionalising their party organisations and election campaigns, continue to support more radical, racist, anti-semitic, and anti-Roman ideas than their counterparts in Western Europe (Minkenberg, 2013). For this reason, populist radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe are increasingly seizing and using nation-building narratives to legitimise their exclusionary and ultranationalist policies regarding contemporary politics. Worse still, the mainstream parties in Central and Eastern Europe, unlike their counterparts in Western Europe, have shifted to the right-wing in the political spectrum to a greater extent, adopting the policies of the radical right to determine 'nation', 'threat to the nation', 'national identity', and 'enemy determination'¹⁶² (Pytlas, 2015). Another important point that differentiates the Western European mainstream parties from the Central and Eastern European mainstream parties is that the Central and Eastern European mainstream parties adopt ultra-nationalist, anti-local domestic minority, and anti-establishment-modernisation policies (Pytlas, 2015). In fact, this situation is quite evident in Poland¹⁶³ and Hungary¹⁶⁴, where party system polarisation and socio-cultural divisions have been experienced for a while¹⁶⁵ (Enyedi, 2016b). The basis of these problems lies in the economic transition, political transition, and the transition to globalisation, which were tried to be implemented without internalisation after the democratic transition.

¹⁶¹ So much so that national identity, romance, nationalism, culture, and belonging come to the fore in this region. These values have offered important opportunities for radical and populist ideas as a kind of discourse provider. This situation has led mainstream/centre parties in the Visegrad countries to adopt the radical right ideas more easily (Mudde 2000b, 45). Socio-cultural structure plays an important role in the formation and initial success of a radical right party. On the other hand, for the mainstream/centre that embraces and maintains the socio-cultural structure that constitutes the radical right, this situation brings a new position.

¹⁶² The processes and methods of adopting the rhetoric and policies of the radical right of mainstream parties in Central and Eastern Europe differ. So much so that while the mainstream parties in Slovakia use the discourse and policies of the radical right more selectively and opportunistically, the mainstream parties in Poland and Hungary use the discourse and policies of the radical right in a more inclusive and long-term way.

¹⁶³ Prior to the 2015 election, Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) had defined itself as the enemy of the Civic Platform's (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) pro-liberal-conservative ideas, the last stronghold defending traditional 'Polishism', and the party that would rebuild independent Poland in a free and solidaristic order (Polskie Radio 24, 2012).

¹⁶⁴ Fidesz adopted the anti-left liberal policies of Hungarian Justice and Life Party (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja, MIEP) and then Movement for Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, Jobbik) and directed the anti-establishment policies of these parties to its social-democratic rivals (Kreko and Mayer, 2015).

¹⁶⁵ Although the term 'populist zeitgeist' used by Cas Mudde (2004) describe the problematic of the mainstream using selective elements of populism in Western Europe, it does not represent the selective use by the mainstream ultranationalist and anti-establishment discourses in Poland and Hungary; it is based on the adoption and internalisation of an inclusive opposition to modernisation. In fact, due to these developments and Fidesz damaging the constitutional checks and balances in Hungary since 2010 and PiS causing the same damage in Poland since 2015, caused the principle of the rule of law to be (Agh, 2016; Herman, 2015; Markowski 2018, 2).

These developments reveal that the radical right in Central and Eastern Europe has been strengthened not only by the mainstreaming of radical right policies and discourses but also by the mainstream parties who legitimise these policies by normalising radical right policies and discourses in politics, public debates, and society. Radical right parties, which enabled the re-emergence of hidden socio-cultural conflicts in societies with their agenda-setting ability, succeeded in reconstructing the socio-cultural conflict they started against ‘others’ within the framework of ‘national identity’ and ‘national values’. The most important reasons for the revival of these socio-cultural conflicts by the radical right are undoubtedly the inability of liberal democracy and mainstream parties with liberal democratic ideology to produce concrete opposition policies against the radical right (Akkerman, 2012) and the ‘liberal mirage’ effect created by liberal-progressive parties in society after the transition to democracy (Dawson and Hanley, 2016).

Radical politics in Central and Eastern Europe, although it is a context-specific phenomenon, can be functionally comparable to the emergence of the radical right in Western Europe because although the policies and radicalism dimensions of radical right parties in Western Europe differ with the policies and radicalism dimensions of radical right parties in Eastern and Central European countries (Pirro, 2015), the radical right, which is a ‘dialectical countermovement against the modernisation process’ (Minkenberg 1998, 37; Pirro, 2015), cannot be limited to Western Europe only. The radical right aims to oppose the principles of pluralism and universalism that form the basis and collective understanding of liberal democracy in both Western and Eastern and Central Europe. In addition, the radical right in both regions has mythised and romanticised extreme nationalism against individual freedoms and universal rights (Minkenberg, 2000) and contains a common narrative that believes it represents the ‘general will’ of the homogeneous pure people. However, the intensity of the interaction between the populist radical right parties and actors in Central and Eastern Europe and the mainstream is functionally compatible with the populist radical right parties in the West because, like the mainstream parties in the West, the reaction of the mainstream parties in Central and Eastern Europe to the agenda-setting success of the radical right consists of a mixture of caring inaction and a conciliatory strategy (Minkenberg, 2017). At this point, the context of the post-communist transformation compared to the post-industrial revolution produces a specific and harmonious set of conditions for the mainstreaming of radical politics (Pytlas 2018, 6-7).

2.1.1 Visegrad Countries before 1989

The wave of socialism, which started to affect the whole world ideologically after the victory against fascism, also affected the Central and Eastern European countries militarily, economically, and politically. In particular, the Western powers that wanted the war to end allowed the Soviets to advance in Central and Eastern Europe, which enabled the communist parties and leaders in these countries to regain power.

Visegrad countries, which came under the political control of the Soviet Union due to the ideological polarisation at the end of the Second World War, did not benefit from the Marshall Plan proposed by the USA because of the Soviet Union seeing this plan as a means of pressure. This situation clearly revealed the division between pro-communist and pro-Western democracy in the Visegrad countries. However, due to the Soviet influence and the widespread left-wing in Visegrad countries, these countries shifted towards the Communist regime.

The separation between communism and liberalism after the Moscow Conference prompted both groups to take specific measures. This situation was most evident in Czechoslovakia. As a result of the 'People's Revolution/Prague Coup' led by Klement Gottwald in 1948 in the country, which had an established democratic tradition, the country switched to the Communist regime (Paraf 1962, 27-28).

The most important determining point for Central and Eastern European economies is the division of Central and Eastern European and Western European countries into collectives and capitalists because Western European countries have politically accepted parliamentary democracy, economically accepted the 'Bretton Woods Agreement' and have taken steps towards economic integration. On the other hand, the political and economic differences between the Visegrad countries and Western Europe have increased due to the political and economic acceptance of the one-party administration and the public ownership system of the Visegrad countries.

The new constitutions, which were made as a result of the political influence of the Visegrad countries from communism, entered into force in Poland temporarily in 1947, permanently in 1952 (with this constitution, the name of the country was changed to the People's Republic of Poland (Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa)), in Czechoslovakia temporarily in 1948, permanently in 1960 (with this constitution, the name of the country was changed to the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia (Československá Socialistická Republika)) and permanently in Hungary in


1949¹⁶⁶ (with the new constitution named Magyar Népköztársaság Alkotmánya, the name of the country was changed to the People's Republic of Hungary (Magyar Népköztársaság))¹⁶⁷.

The new regime formed in Visegrad countries also affected the party system in these countries. Although the multi-party system continued in these countries, all these parties were able to conduct politics under the rule/control of the Communist Party. In Hungary, the 'Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party' (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, MSZMP), non-party/independent people, and members of former opposition parties were included in the list of the Communist Party. In Czechoslovakia, 'Czechoslovak Socialist Party' (Československá Strana Socialistická, CSS) represented the middle class, the 'Czechoslovak People's Party' (Československá Strana Lidová, CSL) represented the peasants, the 'Slovak Freedom Party' (Strana Slobody) and the 'Czech and Slovak National Front Parties' (Národní fronta Čechů a Slováků (Czech) and Národní front Čechov a Slovákov (Slovak), NF). In Poland, people were organised between three parties. The 'Polish United Workers Party' (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR) represented the working class, the 'Peasant Party' (Stronnictwo Chłopskie) represented the property-owning peasants, and the 'Democratic Party' represented the artisans and craftsmen. Apart from these, there were Catholic 'Znak' group and non-party/independent people (Paraf 1962, 36-37; Holmes 1997, 258).

The Visegrad countries entered the Soviet hegemony not only politically but also economically at the end of the Second World War. With the establishment of the dominant statist socialist system in the region by the Soviets, the single-party system and the statist planned economic system implemented under the control of the communist party began to be implemented in the region. The system based on the communist party has created an authoritarian regime by putting pressure on dissidents, elites, non-governmental organisations, media, and freedom of criticism in the region. Citizens of the Visegrad countries that joined the Warsaw Pact and acted under the Moscow administration in foreign policy started anti-communist revolutions against this system in Czechoslovakia in 1953 and 1968, in Hungary in 1956 and in Poland in 1956, 1970-71, 1976, 1980-81. At this point;

¹⁶⁶ The constitutional development process in Hungary has operated differently compared to the other Visegrad countries. This difference is that when there is a need for a change in the constitution, changes have been made in the old one instead of writing a new constitution. The tradition of changing the old one instead of writing a new constitution continued in the post-socialist period in Hungary.

¹⁶⁷ Another reason why these countries easily came under the control of the communist regime is the lack of a deep-rooted and solid democratic tradition in these countries (except Czechoslovakia). Countries that did not have a democratic tradition and were ruled by a dictatorial regime, especially after the First World War, were easily taken under the control of the communist regime by the Soviets (Armaoğlu 1992, 24).



However, the Soviet armies (Warsaw Pact armies) suppressed these revolts that started in the Visegrad countries, and the system continued to exist in the region¹⁶⁸. On the other hand, although the statist socialism model exhibited an authoritarian political structure in the region, the countries in the region benefited positively from the economic structure of this model for a while. In fact, there was a developing economical structure and industrialisation moves in the region until the 1980s (Sancaktar 2019, 40).

2.1.2 Post-Communist Developments

Economic regressions, foreign borrowings, and the existence of authoritarian regimes in Visegrad countries in the 1980s decreased the confidence in statist socialist policies and triggered social and political crises. As a result of the unchanged continuation of these situations, the increasing crises and the liberal and conservative opposition supporting economic reforms and capitalism with the support of the West in the region since the 1980s prepared the environment that led to the collapse of the socialist regime in the Visegrad countries at the end of the 1980s (Sancaktar 2019, 41).

¹⁶⁸ Protecting communist regimes with military force, when necessary, became a doctrine during the Brezhnev period. The concept of 'limited sovereignty' adopted by this doctrine has legitimised the right of military intervention if necessary, emphasising that no country can disrupt the socialist camp. This concept was already used in the 'Hungarian Uprising' in 1956 (before Brezhnev) (Armaoğlu 2020, 411).

The disintegration process of the Soviet Union started with the ‘transformation and innovation movement’ initiated in 1985 by Mikhail Gorbachev’s election as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (d’Encausse, 2015). ‘Glasnost’ and ‘Demokratizatsiya’, which indicated the need for a political reform were added to the ‘Perestroika’ and ‘Uskoreni’ programs that was initiated to repair, renew, and modernise the economic change and the bad Soviet economy. They clearly contradicted the principles underlying the Soviet regime’s as they included freedom of the press, individual freedoms, private property, and transition to a multiparty system¹⁶⁹ (Galeotti 1995, 106; Heuvel and Cohen, 2009; Kotkin, 2001; Hewett and Winston, 1991; Hunt, 2016). The restructuring movement that started in the 1980s profoundly affected the political structure of the socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, leading to changes¹⁷⁰ because although Gorbachev’s desire to innovate was made to bring a new dynamism to the Soviets, it revealed all the economic and political weaknesses within the Soviets. In other words, these reforms revealed that the structures of the Soviet Union and the socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe were being shaken (Armaoğlu 2020, 686). In addition, the renewal movements played an important role in destroying the monopoly of the communist parties in Central and Eastern European countries and in the formation of the multi-party system and parliamentary democracy in the region. However, economic and political reforms could not show the expected and desired effects. For these reasons, the Berlin Wall collapsed on November 9, 1989, the Socialist Bloc was dissolved¹⁷¹, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union on December 25,

¹⁶⁹ Gorbachev’s reforms in the Soviet Union both reduced tensions with the West and led to the strengthening of independence policies in countries that were members of the Warsaw Pact. With the 1989 elections in Hungary and the victory of Wałęsa in Poland, the Soviet Union announced that it would respect the choices made and ‘Sinatra Doctrine’ emerged as a new policy. Following the announcement of ‘Sinatra Doctrine’, the Marxist regime in the Warsaw Pact countries started to be abandoned, and the Soviet Union declared that it would not interfere in the internal affairs of the Warsaw Pact countries. In addition, it has been announced that countries that want to get out of the Soviet control will not be interfered, and free elections will be allowed in Warsaw Pact countries. Following these developments, a peaceful democratisation of regimes occurred in the Warsaw Park countries, the ‘Brezhnev Approach’ disappeared, and the Warsaw Pact was dissolved in 1991 (Galeotti 1995, 121).

¹⁷⁰ It should be noted that when Gorbachev’s reform ideas emerged, the communist parties in Central and Eastern European countries had a problem of legitimacy and lost their popularity in the eyes of the public. Especially the liberal effects of ‘Perestroika’ and ‘Glasnost’, the declining Soviet military presence in Central and Eastern European countries and the rising opposition movements in these countries created a ‘snowball effect’ and brought the end of the Soviet-influenced regime in Central and Eastern Europe (Elster 1991, 448; Sunstein, 1991).

¹⁷¹ There are 14 main reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Communist power. These are: Gorbachev factor, economic failures and poor living standards, loss of mass control, opposition movements, economic and political disappointments of the masses and elites, mass protests and civil society, economic and military competition with the West, weakening of trust in communist ideologues, the increase in the influence and power of the Western media, anti-communist revolutions, the imperial destiny of the Soviets, the loss of political legitimacy of the leaders, the effort to provide legitimacy by economic means (Holmes, 1997).

1991, ideological polarisation and the Cold War came to an end¹⁷² (Johnston, 2020; Longley, 2020).

At this point, it is necessary to understand post-communism and post-communist transformation to understand and make sense of the democratic transitions of the Visegrad countries. Post-communism emerged as a reaction to communism and the rejection of the communist power system. However, there is no common definition, and it is unclear what it means because collective phenomena are different and uncertain. In addition, post-communism has different forms in the countries where it exists, and although it has an articulated and formulated predecessor, it has no distinctive feature. At this point, to understand post-communism, it is necessary to determine the situations in which post-communism reacts. On the other hand, the opposition to communism as a post-communist power system in Visegrad countries, its opposition to foreign domination due to the USSR and its anti-communist features are apparent. However, despite the unique nature of post-communism, there are three main factors with which post-communist countries show similarities. These are:

- Starting point and Legacy
- Intervention Scope of Transition
- Global Context of Initiatives

¹⁷² In the process of the disintegration of the socialist bloc, three important events in Central and Eastern European countries are noteworthy. These were: peaceful transition process, unification of East Germany and West Germany and the partition of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, the disintegration of Yugoslavia was a very bloody process.

At this point, post-communism was influenced by two main ideas.



After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Berlin Wall, and the statist socialist system, in Visegrad countries, where democratisation movements and the capitalist economic model¹⁷³ began to be accepted in line with neo-liberal policies and privatisations, multi-party policies

¹⁷³ This process was carried out with neo-liberal economic policies supported by the West. In particular, the economic reforms proposed by the IMF, World Bank and Western countries affected both the political structure and the economic structure in the region.

and policies of convergence with the West¹⁷⁴ began to be implemented^{175,176,177}. Civil society, which was restructured with the 'self-limiting socialism doctrine' developed by the opposition in Hungary and Poland against the oppressive policies of the Soviet-backed parties, was effective in the change process and proved this effect in the 'Round Table Meetings' (Arato, 2006; Sokolewicz, 1992). However, after the collapse of communism, the promise of the West to transform and develop Central and Eastern Europe was not realised (Meny and Surel, 2002b), and the liberal democratic values and free-market economy that were expected to become widespread in the Visegrad countries after this period did not reach the expected level in the region (Jackson, Mach and Markowski, 2005). For this reason, situations such as

¹⁷⁴ The processes of accession to the European Union and NATO, the decrease of Russian influence in the region and the increase of US-German influence show the increasing Western influence in the Visegrad countries.

¹⁷⁵ Although different results have emerged in Central and Eastern European countries; the authoritarian regime-transitional-democratic regime model shows an almost unchangeable structure. Countries that have undergone regime changes have gone through nearly the same stages. These stages are:

1-) The destruction of the authoritarian regime and the liberalisation of political and economic policies

2-) The emergence of institutional democracy

3-) 'Non-Consolidated Democracy' phase

4-) The formation of liberal democracy (Gel'man, 2001; Wesolowski, 1990; Cameron and Orenstein, 2013; Bova, 1991).

¹⁷⁶ Constitution making is one of the most important parts of the transition to democracy. Although the regime change does not start with the constitutional process, the new constitution is of great importance in forming democratic institutions and the continuation of the new order. In addition, a constitution made by taking the views of all political groups and society (legitimacy, consent, common good and compromise) can prevent future problems that may arise in regimes that have passed to democracy and gained independence. Civic Forum 'OF' (Czechia), Public Against Violence 'VPN' (Slovakia), Solidarity 'Solidarność' (Poland) and Democratic Forum 'MDF' (Hungary), which were formed in Central and Eastern European countries after 1989, developed rapidly and were able to negotiate with the political power created by the communist regime. Although these opposition movements lost power or even disappeared after the transformation, they played a vital role in establishing the democratic regime. In addition, non-governmental organisations played an important role in the transition period of Central and Eastern European countries to democracy. After Gorbachev's reforms, non-governmental organisations, which became more widespread (Gonenc 2002, 117), took part in the policies of the transition period and post-transition period in Central and Eastern European countries.

¹⁷⁷ In the transition to democracy process, first, the words 'Socialist' and 'People' in the names of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe were removed, and the state symbols were changed. Later, the political monopolies of communist parties, which were the symbols of communist ideology, were abolished. Then these parties were either closed or radically changed. For example, the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, MSZMP), a successor of the Hungarian Labour Party (Magyar Dolgozók Pártja, MDP), dissolved itself in 1989 and turned into the socially oriented Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSZP). On the other hand, the Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR), which had a party monopoly in Poland, was dissolved in 1990. Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická Strana Československa, KSC), which also had a party monopoly in Czechoslovakia, was divided into two as Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy, KSCM) in Czechia and Party of the Democratic Left in Slovakia (Strana Demokratickej ľavice, SDL) (this party was dissolved in 1992) (Jackson, Mach and Markowski 2005, 7-9). However, the multi-party system adopted during the transition to democracy caused 'party inflation' in these countries. So much so that nearly 100 parties were established in Hungary at the end of 1989 (however, only 12 parties were able to participate in the elections) (Pozsgay 1990, 59). In Czechoslovakia, this number was 66 (however, only 23 parties were able to participate in the elections. Only 11 of these parties could participate in national elections, while others were able to participate in regional elections) (Jehlicka, Kostecky and Sykora 1993, 239). In Poland, 69 parties participated in the 1991 elections (NationsEncyclopedia).

unemployment, economic recession, impoverishment of the middle class, polarisation, inequality, and the increase in the problems of low-income citizens have emerged in the region. Decreased GDP rate and production capacity, inadequate public and social services, increasing inflation, unemployment, poverty, and economic inequalities in the transition to capitalism in Visegrad countries increased the economic dependence of the countries in this region to the West¹⁷⁸. This situation led to the development of the radical and populist right parties in the region. Citizens of Visegrad, who migrated to Western Europe due to this economic situation in Visegrad countries, became rivals to Western workers by providing cheap labour. This situation both led to the rise of anti-foreigner opinion against the citizens of Visegrad in Western European countries and caused the increase of the nationalism thought.


At this point, six different features of post-communism in Visegrad countries can be mentioned¹⁷⁹. These are:

- The defence of independence, the rise of nationalism and sovereignty (Rejection of foreign domination)
- Lack of consensus culture and liberal democracy experience (Lack of democratic culture)
- Excessive expectations from the leader (The search for a charismatic leader at the beginning of the post-communist era. The disappointments caused by the fact that the changes did not happen as fast as expected, the parliament-competition environment and the limited power reality of democracy)
- Lack of trust in institutions created after communism, problems of legitimacy, fear of unemployment and uncertainty about property ownership (The problem of the society politically being 'babyish' (Schöpflin 1993a, 24) and inexperienced since it was accustomed to the fact that the state was taking all important decisions in the communist system)
- Fear of theories that explain everything (Fears about grand theories and rejection of the communist system, where party elites were regarded as 'vanguards')

¹⁷⁸ The change in political power and the collapse of statist socialism in the Visegrad countries in 1989-1990 constituted an important crossroads in the history of the region. In other words, the Visegrad countries, which were economically dependent on the USSR during the statist socialism period, became economically dependent on Western countries during the transition to capitalism.

¹⁷⁹ Although a general evaluation of post-communism and Visegrad countries that have transitioned to democracy has been made in this section, this model and countries have their own problems and limitations. The 'singular' variables in the region make the post-communist countries in the region and this model 'unique'.

- Ideological emptiness and spiritual confusion (The social layer's, which was afraid of losing its identity, tendency to turn to nationalism. The spiritual void that occurs in people who could not relate to religion)



The Visegrad countries, which completed the socialist transition period in a moderate and peaceful way, had difficulty in achieving the same success in adapting to the West¹⁸⁰. During the transition to capitalism, the Visegrad countries, which turned to West and NATO, started to determine their foreign policies according to these policies. According to their changing foreign policies, Visegrad countries joined NATO in 1999 and 2004¹⁸¹, and the EU in 2004.

The party system in Visegrad countries also developed differently from Western European countries during the transition period. The basis of this difference is the right-wing - left-wing political spectrum that forms the Western European party system and varies depending on economic factors. Unlike the Western European party system, the party system in the Visegrad countries contains mainstream and radical movements that are socio-cultural-based and focused on the transition period from socialism to democracy rather than economic differences. For this reason, conservative-mainstream-right-origin parties in Visegrad countries can exhibit political characteristics shifting from the mainstream to radicalism.

The following section includes the elections held in Poland (Appendix C), Czechoslovakia (Appendix E), Czechia (Appendix F) and Slovakia (Appendix H), election results, political parties, and democracy scores of Poland (Appendix D), Czechia (Appendix G) and Slovakia (Appendix I). All the data of the countries are organised based on the democratic transition period.

¹⁸⁰ So much so that the phases and problems of the transition from communism to post-communism for the Visegrad countries were as follows: Leadership crisis, Round Table Discussions, loss of the leading role of the Communist Party, legalisation of opposition parties, major changes in Communist Parties, competitive parliamentary elections, name changes of states and adoption of a new or amended constitution.

¹⁸¹ Poland, Hungary, and Czechia joined NATO in 1999 and Slovakia in 2004.

2.2 Hungarian Right-Wing Politics: Past and Present

The main purpose of this section is to analyse the changing structure of populist and radical right politics in Hungary in detail and according to the historical context. Populism and the radical right, which first emerged in Hungary as a reaction against Western capitalism and the defeat in the First World War, later turned into movements against the single-party period and the dimensions of the democratic regime. In other words, the relationship between the historical context and the characteristics of populist and radical right movements has developed in direct relation to the regime. At this point, populism and the radical right in Hungary developed as an anti-capitalist and anti-bourgeois movement during the imperial period and took on a nationalist appearance in the communist regime. Populism and radical right, which first became a part of the political, intellectual discourse with Hungary's transition to democracy, then gained an anti-liberal and nationalist appearance. In this context, populism and the radical right in Hungary were examined in three different categories.

- Hungary before Communism
- Soviet Era Hungary
- Hungarian Politics after the Collapse of Communism

2.2.1 Hungary before Communism

Hungary, whose history dates back to the Hungarian Kingdom founded by King Stephen I (I. István) in 1000, remained under the Ottoman rule until 1686 and then came under Habsburg rule. In this period, the Habsburg Empire, which started to create a 'Germanic' effect on the Hungarian culture, succeeded in dominating Hungary to a certain extent. The establishment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which emerged after the Habsburgs recognised autonomy, constituted the first stage of the Hungarian nationalism and the Hungarian independence struggle, which developed under the influence of the nationalism movement created by the 1789 French Revolution. After the establishment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1867, the rapid economic transformation in Hungary and Hungary's independence in its internal affairs prepared the social conditions for the birth of the first populist movement in Hungary. Especially Budapest has become a centre of attraction for the Western and Jewish merchants in this process. As a result of the capitalist transformation that started in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the increasing economic and social gap between the newly born urban bourgeoisie and the peasants turned into a reaction against the Jews, who constitute an important part of the

bourgeois class in Hungary, and laid the foundations of anti-Semitism in Hungary. That is, the cultural crisis caused by the class differentiation between the urban bourgeois and the peasant classes formed the basic characteristics of both early populism and anti-Semitism in Hungary. Especially at the end of the 1800s, the populist 'rural political' movement that developed among socialist and conservative farmers, poor peasants and small landowners who opposed the urban bourgeois class, could not turn into an organised movement despite these developments (Bozoki 2012a, 2).

At the end of the First World War, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which received economic and political blows due to the effect of rising nationalism, collapsed (Jambor 2000, 35), Poland was re-established in the lands dominated by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Czechs claimed a large part of the Hungarian lands and declared their own state, and the Hungarian lands in the south has been annexed by Serbia (Lendvai 2001, 352-360). The losses suffered by Hungary in the First World War led to targeting liberalism as an ideology that 'disrupted the collective structure of the society'. The idea of individualisation created by liberalism in Hungary caused cultural and social conflicts in Hungarian society, and socialist movements began to gain strength after the war. After these developments, the national council (Magyar Nemzeti Tanács), led by Mihály Károlyi, declared the republic in Hungary on 16 November 1918. Although the goals of the new republic contain democratic policies, seeing the agreement to be made after the war as a solution brought the end of this social-liberal new republic.

After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, socialist movements in Hungary began to gain power under the leadership of Béla Kun. As a result, the Hungarian Communist Party, which united with the Social Democratic Party (Valaczka 2002, 85), declared the establishment of the Soviet Republic in Hungary (Hungarian Soviet/Council Republic- Magyarországi Tanácsköztársaság) on March 21, 1919, which would last for six months. This government was a proletarian dictatorship and wanted to rule the country without elections and a parliament. In fact, in Hungary, where the Catholic class was strong, this government provoked people against the clergy members and oppressed the churches. Dissatisfied with these developments, politicians and military officers formed a conservative government in 1919 under the leadership of Admiral Miklós Horthy. The government had revanchist nationalist, anti-liberal and authoritarian qualities, was against the Soviet government and was seeking revenge for the defeat in the First World War. Horthy, who became the head of the Hungarian army as the commander in chief of the counter government, succeeded in seizing power by making a coup against the Soviet government on 19th November 1919 with the help of the Romanian and

French armies (Halmos, 1994). Horthy temporarily assumed the status of the King of Hungary, which was re-established after the coup, and established a fascist regime in Hungary before Mussolini. Horthy created an anti-Semitic and anti-communist political order in Hungary and succeeded in establishing a fascist, feudal and patriarchal regime close to Hitler as a political partner¹⁸² (Paraf 1962, 22-23).

Hungary, which declared its independence after the First World War, suffered great destruction with the Treaty of Trianon signed on June 4, 1920, as one of the losing parties of the war. The main reasons for this destruction were as follows: while Hungary owned 325,000 square meters of land before the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary's lands fell to 93,000 square meters after the treaty; after the loss of land, Hungary's population fell from 18.2 million to 7.6 million. In other words, 67.3% of Hungary's lands, 58.4% of its population and underground and aboveground wealth have been under the sovereignty of the neighbouring countries (Güngörmüş 2010, 67; Jeszenszky 2006, 101; Wolin 2011, 58). Having lost a large part of its land and population with the Treaty of Trianon¹⁸³, Hungary developed its policies within the framework of Trianon until the Second World War. Hungary had a limited democracy experience in this period. Although it made a great modernisation breakthrough in the period between the First World War and the Second World War¹⁸⁴, it could not achieve the same success in terms of democratisation. Hungary, which carried out policies to reclaim the lands it lost to Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia and to remove the army restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Trianon (Oral 2006, 404), got closer to Italy and Germany and fought alongside Germany in the Second World War to achieve its goals¹⁸⁵. Hungary, which was occupied by

¹⁸² The main aim of populism in this period was to form a social alliance between the unrepresented Hungarian peasants and the nationalist middle class with national consciousness. In this way, the populist movements, which thought that both the support of the Hungarian peasants would be obtained, and the transformation of the nationalist middle class would save Hungary from the urban bourgeoisie, undertook the task of establishing 'a new middle class' in Hungary. Although the populist movements in Hungary were organised under the umbrella of the National Peasant Party (Nemzeti Parasztpárt - NPP), which was founded in 1939, the effectiveness of this party was very limited in this period. After the start of the Second World War, the NPP was split between the communists who wanted to carry out a socialist revolution with the working class and peasants and the radical right supporters who wanted to act with the Hungarian peasants against the bourgeoisie. Following this development, the NPP started to act together with the communists as a political party in 1944 (Bozoki 2012a, 3).

¹⁸³ The Treaty of Trianon and its consequences are still used by Hungarian populists today.

¹⁸⁴ During this period, populist movements in Hungary moved away from the conservative ideology and approached national socialism.

¹⁸⁵ However, in 1942, with the change of the course of the war, Germany invaded Hungary thinking that Hungary would leave the alliance (Sunar and Yolcu, 2012). During the reign of Ferenc Szálasi, who came to power after the Horthy regime collapsed in October 1944, Hungary passed to the Hungarian Nazi regime. After the failed coup attempt of the temporary communist government established in Debrecen in December, the Soviet Union,

Nazi Germany in 1942, got rid of the occupation after the Soviets took over Central and Eastern Europe and experienced democratic politics with the first government established after 1945¹⁸⁶. However, after the Yalta Conference and the Paris Peace Treaties, the Soviet era, which would last until 1989, began in Hungary.

2.2.2 Hungary before 1989

Ferenc Szálasi, leader of the Arrow Cross Party-Hungarist Movement (Nyilaskeresztes Párt – Hungarista Mozgalom, NYKP), took the lead with the collapse of the Horthy regime in Hungary in 1944. However, after the Soviet occupation of Budapest, the provisional government established by the Hungarian communists in Debrecen in 1945 overthrew the Nazi regime of the NYKP and ensured the establishment of communism in Hungary. After the political developments in Hungary -despite the communists starting to gain power- and the elections held in 1945 a four-party coalition government was formed by the Independent Small Landowners, Agricultural Workers and Citizens Party (Független Kisgazda-, Földmunkás- és Polgári Párt, FKgP). However, the Hungarian Communist Party (Magyar Kommunista Párt, MKP) won the elections held in 1947 due to Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy, who felt the political risk and was afraid of being arrested, fleeing the country. MKP, which merged with the Social Democratic Party of Hungary (Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Párt, MSZDP) in the 1949 elections and established the Hungarian Working People's Party (Magyar Dolgozók Pártja, MDP), succeeded in winning the 1949 elections (Holmes 1997, 139-140). After the MDP's victory in 1949, Hungary became a 'People's Republic' under communist control. In other words, there was a democratic populist revolution between 1945-1946 and a socialist revolution between 1947-1948 in Hungary.

Two important factors distinguished Hungarian populism after the Second World War from the previous period. The first was the social traumas and democratic changes created by the war on the Hungarian people. So much so that the peasant and middle class, which formed the basis of the populist movements of the previous period, lost their lives in the war. The elites and the bourgeois class opposed by the Hungarian populist movements left Hungary. In other words, at

which entered Hungary in 1945, ended the Hungarian Nazi rule, and the communist government in Debrecen settled in Budapest.

¹⁸⁶ Independent Smallholders' Party (Független Kisgazdapárt, FKgP) won the election held in Hungary in November 1945, but after the election, Hungary started to be governed by a four-party coalition in which the communists were increasingly active.

the end of the war, the Hungarian populist movements lost their base and the object of their opposition. The second was the regime change in Hungary after the war. Although the MDP government led by Mátyás Rákosi, who came to power after the beginning of the communist era, distributed lands to the Hungarian peasants by supporting them with the land reform, the new industrialisation program became a challenge for the Hungarian peasants and working classes. After the transition to communism, the collectivisation of agricultural production in Hungary, the decrease in product and labour prices, and the famine caused the Hungarian peasants and working classes to become restless and it laid the foundations of the 1956 Uprising.

However, the Soviet political pressure experienced in this period did not allow the Hungarian populism to criticise the regime by adopting the peasant-people identification. So much so that, although there was a populist opposition to the economic and social model dictated by the Soviet administration to Hungary, these dissenting opinions could not be expressed. The political Soviet pressure in Hungary caused the Hungarian populist discourse to take on a structure that criticised Western modernism through cultural, literary, and historical narratives. In addition, other focal points of Hungarian populism in this period were the emergence of old Hungarian traditions and the situation of Hungarian minorities living outside Hungary. At this point, it can be said that the nationalist interpretation of the problem of Hungarian minorities living outside Hungary, which is still important for today's Hungarian populists, emerged in this period.

After the death of Stalin, the workers in Hungary rose and made economic and social demands from the government. Concerned about this situation, Soviet leaders Georgy Malenkov and Lavrentiy Beria appointed Imre Nagy as prime minister, replacing MDP leader and Hungarian Prime Minister Mátyás Rákosi (Armaoğlu, 2020; Hungarian National Archive, 1953; Wilson Center Digital Archive). With Nagy becoming prime minister, decisions were taken that would wear down/soften the communist regime in Hungary¹⁸⁷. The most important of these were: Hungary's intention to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and Hungary's application to the United Nations for independence (Holmes 1997, 140). However, upon these developments, the dismissal of Imre Nagy¹⁸⁸ by the Soviet Union led to popular uprisings in Hungary. In 1956, when Hungary's Anti-Soviet events reached grave proportions, Hungary was

¹⁸⁷ Like the granting of peasants, the right to land ownership and greater tolerance for religion.

¹⁸⁸ He was executed in 1958.

occupied by the Soviet Union. During the ‘first anti-totalitarian revolution’ in Hungary, many Hungarian civilians lost their lives, and János Kádár was appointed as prime minister.

Imprisoned for his nationalist ideas during the Rákosi era, Kádár strengthened his image within Hungary and became one of the most popular leaders in the Visegrad region. In particular, the 'New Economic Mechanism' (Új Gazdasági Mechanizmus), which is the radical economic reform package that Kádár put into effect in 1968, further increased the recognition of Kádár in the region.

2.2.3 Hungarian Politics after the Collapse of Communism

In Hungary, which started to show liberalisation movements since the 1980s with the acceptance of rights such as traveling abroad and criticising the regime, leaders and ideas that advocated more radical reforms began to emerge at the end of the 1980s¹⁸⁹.

The Hungarian People's Republic (Magyar Népköztársaság) was the first country to adapt to the capitalist economy among the Visegrad countries. So much so that, with the economic reform decisions taken by the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, MSZMP) in its 13th congress in 1985 to create alternative sources, Hungary has started both an economic and political transformation by allowing private property, private enterprises, and capital-labour relations since the 1980s (Csillag 1995, 89; Sancaktar 2019, 41). The Hungarian People's Republic, which became a member of the IMF in 1982, signed the Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement with the European Community in 1988 and abolished the state monopoly in trade, began to literally fall under the economic influence of the West after its separation from the Soviet Union (Sezer and Çeşmecioğlu, 1998; Buzogany 2017, 1307).

This environment, in which the effects of the West began to be felt economically, has also been the harbinger of political changes in the Hungarian People's Republic. Since the 1980s, the dynamic structure of the civil society movements¹⁹⁰ and the spread of opposition movements¹⁹¹ have enabled independent candidates who are not members of the MSZMP to

¹⁸⁹ The most important of these leaders was the radical reformist Imre Poszgay. So much so that Poszgay publicly defended a new constitution that guaranteed freedom of expression.

¹⁹⁰ In this period, although the opposition generally came from nationalist and liberal circles, environmental movements also managed to create a significant opposition wave (Glied, 2014).

¹⁹¹ When the opposition movements during the democratic transition in Hungary are examined, it is seen that the church did not play an active opposition role. In fact, the church in Hungary had a fragmented structure and

enter the national parliament and led to the strengthening of the opposition movements in the country (Lewis 2001, 42). Since 1988, the political structures that have been established by the opposition movements have started to organise demonstrations against MSZMP, especially under the leadership of the League of Young Democrats (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége, Fidesz), Hungarian Democratic Forum¹⁹² (Magyar Demokrata Fórum, MDF), Alliance of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége, SZDSZ), Independent Smallholders' Party (Független Kisgazdapárt, FKgP) and Christian Democratic People's Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, KDNP) (Valaczka 2002, 104). The political pressures created by the opposition shook the Hungarian People's Republic, causing János Kádár¹⁹³ to be dismissed and replaced by Károly Grósz. Grósz¹⁹⁴, being more reformist and liberal than Kadar, took important decisions affecting the Hungarian People's Republic and the MSZMP¹⁹⁵ (Judt 2006, 608-610).

In Hungary, which carried out the transition to democracy and restructuring process with a 'contract', the government and the opposition took important decisions because of the negotiations held until the end of 1989. Some of the most important decisions were: establishing a unicameral parliament, changing the single-party system and enacting the multi-party system, expanding human rights and freedoms, strengthening freedom of expression, accepting a free market economy, realising the democratic transformation through political elites and giving the law liberal qualifications (Armaoğlu 2020, 688; Tökes, 1996). After the negotiations between

the Hungarian society followed the intellectuals in the big cities instead of the clergymen in the transformation process (Palonen, 2009).

¹⁹² Especially the MDF established by politicians who left the MSZMP played important roles in Hungarian politics during and after the transition period. Established as a democratic, mainstreamist and market economy party, MDF has become a conservative party by shifting to the right-wing in the political spectrum with the nationalism it has included in its policies over time. Especially during the reign of Jozsef Antall, the party was divided into two main wings. Radical right politicians who came closer to radical ideas, adopted Christian, anti-Semitic, xenophobic ideas, and separated from the MDF because of the increasing political distance with the moderate wing and founded the MIEP under the leadership of István Csurka (MIEP gained strength by using xenophobia against the Romani minority in Hungary. The MIEP has reintroduced nationalist, romantic, xenophobic, anti-Semitic, and anti-immigrant ideas into Hungarian politics (Karsai 1999, 135-137)). However, the clashes between different-minded politicians within the MDF caused significant damage to the political life of the party (Lewis and Mansfeldova 2007, 64). So much so that the party managed to survive thanks to the alliance it established with Fidesz.

¹⁹³ General Secretariat of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.

¹⁹⁴ Apart from Grósz, other important reformists during this period were people such as Imre Poszgay, Rezső Nyers and Miklós Németh.

¹⁹⁵ Grósz implemented many reforms during his presidency. The most important of these were: Allowing new parties in 1988, removing the term 'worker' in the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (the new name of the party was changed to Hungarian Socialist Party, Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSZP), transition to a multi-party parliamentary system, transition to a free market economy, development of the social state ideas and most importantly changing the name of the Hungarian People's Republic to the Hungarian Republic (Barany 1992, 450-453; Völgyes 1990, 171).

the government and the opposition, 94 amendments were made to the 1949 Constitution, but a new constitution was not created¹⁹⁶. In 1990, after the Soviet influence, a democratic and independent Hungary emerged, the Third Hungarian Republic was established, the first multi-party democratic elections were held¹⁹⁷, and Hungary transitioned to a modern parliamentary government system¹⁹⁸.

Populist thought in Hungary was formed because of the elite-intellectual movement that emerged from the civil society that was revived by the transition to liberal democracy and capitalist economic system in the early post-communist period. Especially Hungarian intellectuals organised under the roof of MDF, their desire for national independence, their desire to determine the conditions for transition to democracy and their focus on welfare policies brought the main issues focusing on the 'Hungarian national culture' to the agenda. In fact, the blending of nationalism with moral values and traditionalism by Hungarian populists in this period enabled both Hungarian populists to be reborn and Hungarian populists to gain more popular support. The fact that Hungarian intellectuals under the roof of MDF have a softer language than the previous Hungarian populists shows that this movement distances itself from radical movements and that cooperation with mainstream right movements has increased the trust in both MDF and Hungarian populists. So much so that MDF, which won the love and trust of the people during the transition to democracy, became a political party after Hungary's transition to liberal democracy and succeeded in becoming the ruling party in the 1990 elections.

MDF won the first multi-party independent election in 1990, winning 24.73% of the votes and 165 members, in Hungary, where political life was mobilised by the socialist, nationalist, conservative and liberal mainstream parties that were established after the transition to

¹⁹⁶ Although several governments attempted to make a new constitution after the transition to democracy, this did not happen. Although the SZDSZ-MSZP, which was in the government between 1994-1998, provided the necessary majority to make a new constitution, there was no change. In 2010, the Fidesz-KDNP government amended the constitution by obtaining the required majority in the parliament. However, the opposition was not included in this process, and the new Hungarian Constitution was adopted in 2012, which directly embodied conservative-Christian values.

¹⁹⁷ According to the accepted election system, the elections had two rounds, in the first round the candidates had to have the absolute majority and in the second round, the success condition was sought according to the proportional election system (Armaoğlu 2020, 688; Pittaway 2003, 63).

¹⁹⁸ Hungary's parliamentary history dates back to the 13th century. With the acceptance of the 'Golden Bull' (Aranybulla), in 1222 (1222-1687) which was accepted as the 'Magna Charta' of Hungary, the basic rules regarding the king's powers and society were determined. Following this development, the Hungarian Parliament convened for the first time in 1277 (Rady 2013, 89). In Hungary, where a bicameral and representation system was formed between 1608-1949, a representative parliament was formed in 1848, and in 1867 Hungary became an autonomous state in internal affairs (Bayar 2012, 93-94).

democracy¹⁹⁹. MSZP, which ruled Hungary as a single party for a long time²⁰⁰, gained 33 members by getting 10.89% of the votes. After these results, the power of the Socialist Party, which had been ruling Hungary since 1947, came to an end and the anti-communist, intellectual centred and liberal MDF government was established under the leadership of József Antall. After winning the elections, MDF accelerated Hungary's transition to capitalism and started to implement policies including economic and political reforms^{201,202} (Csillag 1995, 97). However, the failure of the implemented reforms and economic policies and the increase in unemployment, inflation and poverty led Hungarian voters to MSZP again in the 1994 elections²⁰³. Winning the 1994 elections with 32.99% of the votes, MSZP and its coalition partner SZDSZ continued Hungary's transition to capitalism.

However, the failure of the socialist government and the inability of the new regime to fully meet the expectations of the Hungarian people, selling the country's resources to foreign companies during the international expansion of Hungary, and the corruption in the privatisation processes have reduced the Hungarian people's trust in the capitalist model and the socialist government. This process resulted in Fidesz coming to power in 1998. Understanding the period between 1998 and 2002, which is called the 'first Orbán period', is extremely important in terms of understanding the populist content of power relations in today's Hungary (Bozoki 2008, 198). So much so that FKgP, with which Fidesz formed a coalition partnership after the election, represented the lower-middle class that was forcibly created due to capitalist transformation in Hungary. In this respect, the political picture that emerged in Hungary after the 1998 election reflected the situation where the losers of the capitalist transition did not give up on liberal democracy and westernisation but criticised the disruptions

¹⁹⁹ With the elections in 1990, the single-party regime that lasted 40 years in Hungary came to an end (Visegrady 1992, 246-248).

²⁰⁰ With the democratisation movements, the MSZMP has changed its policies by compromising its communist attitude and changed its name to MSZP.

²⁰¹ The transition process to capitalism has been handled within the MDF's 'Ownership and Privatisation' program. The economic reform agreement signed with the IMF in 1991 and the 'Association Agreement' signed with the EU made it compulsory for Hungary to implement neo-liberal policies (Sancaktar 2019, 42).

²⁰² After the election, Hungary reached post-communism in 1990. During this period, the Hungarian people did not feel the need to go out into the streets en masse for change. For this reason, the post-communist revolution in Hungary is defined as a 'melancholic' (Simon, 1993) or a 'revolution through negotiation' (Bruszt, 1990).

²⁰³ MDF, which was intellectual centred and composed of an alliance of different populist movements, failed to maintain its stability and internal dynamics after coming to power in Hungary. In particular, the social and economic uneasiness caused by the transition to a capitalist economy was recorded as minus points in MDF's book. After this development, the MDF began to lose its credibility in the eyes of the society and was split into two when István Csurka left the party and founded MIEP. The split of MDF also led to the split of the Hungarian populist movement. So much so that after the establishment of MIEP, another anti-liberal, anti-Semitic, anti-communist, anti-elitist and radical right-wing populist group was formed in Hungary.

experienced in the transition period. The second very important characteristic of this period is that the foundations of the populist discourse and policies of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz were laid in this period. So much so that the confrontational policies Fidesz started to create in this period focused on creating a new right-wing populist base based on the polarisation of society and politics (Bozoki 2008, 215). In this way, Viktor Orbán, who determined the strategy of the ‘second revolution’ by trying to create two opposing forces competing for political power and emphasising the Hungarians as a cultural unit²⁰⁴, began to realise his goal of creating a new political elite that could stand against the left-wing elites. However, the fact that the Fidesz government-granted privileges to some groups, that public tenders were held far from equality and impartiality, that those who supported Fidesz were defined as ‘good Hungarians’, and that ‘good Hungarians’ were more supported and favoured led to criticism of Fidesz, which was chosen for solving the problems in Hungary. These developments resulted in Fidesz losing the 2002 election.

Hungary, which became one of the pioneers of the democratisation movement in the region until the mid-2000s, succeeded to become a member of the EU in 2004 and became one of the countries where democracy has ‘consolidated’ with its stable government system, healthy electoral system, and the economic structure that international capital has shown interest (Magyar, 2016).

However, over time, especially after the 2008 economic crisis, political crises, instability, the difference in living standards between the city and the village, and the allegations of corruption, the representation feature of Hungarian politics started to exhibit a structure that gradually shifted to the right-wing. Viktor Orbán, who determined populism as the central strategy of the right-wing bloc in Hungary, succeeded in regaining power in 2010 by turning these developments in Hungary into a political opportunity. Thus, Viktor Orbán was able to initiate a new Hungarian political life based on populism under the control of anti-elitist, nationalist, and ‘new right-wing’ politics. In fact, in the 2010 and 2014 elections, the two right-wing parties Fidesz-KDNP²⁰⁵ coalition and Jobbik, managed to get 65-70% of the votes. This

²⁰⁴ Including Hungarians that living outside Hungary in this cultural unit, Viktor Orbán has tried to identify the cultural community with the political community. However, this situation was evaluated as a deviation from liberal democratic values.

²⁰⁵ KDNP was first established on 13 October 1944 by the Hungarian Catholic politicians and intellectuals as a continuation of the United Christian Party (Egyesült Keresztény Párt). However, after the war ended, KDNP, which was banned by the communist authorities who dominated Hungarian politics and was not included in the elections, changed its name to Democratic People’s Party (Demokratikus Néppárt-DNP) in 1945 and won 60 seats in the 411-seat parliament in the 1947 election (Hungarian Spectrum, 2014). However, with the Communist Party's seizure of power in Hungary, members of the DNP were imprisoned, and party leader István Baranovics

situation shows that Hungary has begun to evolve from a multi-party system to a two-party system (Agh, 2016; Lewis and Mansfeldova 2007, 64; Kovalek and Soos, 2016). Democratisation scores shown after the election chart indicate the problems Hungary has had in its democracy since 2009 (Appendix K). So much so that the entry of the radical right Jobbik to the Hungarian Parliament, the political practices of Fidesz and the rhetoric of Jobbik have turned the political direction of Hungary to the radical right. As of this period, the strong stance of Hungarian populism in Hungary, which developed within the framework of the policies of 'we-them', anti-liberal democracy, anti-EU, anti-communism, xenophobia, anti-immigration, and Islamophobia continues.

Socialists, conservatives, liberals, and populist parties played important roles in the Hungarian parliament. For this reason, different political groups gained the power to become a government in Hungary, which politically turned to the West after the democratic transition²⁰⁶ (Millard 2013, 24). Following the democratic transition, in Hungary, where a total of eight elections were held in 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2018²⁰⁷ (Appendix J)

2.3 European Union and Visegrad Countries

Hungary, Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia, which are the countries of the Visegrad Group established for economic integration and cooperation in 1991, became members of the EU in 2004. However, the Euro crisis that started in 2008 and affected the EU, the immigration crisis in Europe after the Arab Spring started in 2010, and the Brexit decision have created important concerns in the Visegrad countries. The most important source of these concerns for Visegrad countries is the idea that the economic and political gap in the EU after Brexit will be filled directly by Germany and the idea that the stabilities within the EU will change. Apart from this,

was forced to leave Hungary. The party, which remained closed until 1989, was re-established in 1989 as KDNP. KDNP, which managed to enter the Hungarian Parliament between 1990-1998, started to get closer to other right-wing parties after its failure in the 1998 election and signed a cooperation agreement with Fidesz in 2005. Although it is an independent party today, KDNP, which is defined as the satellite party of Fidesz (Adam and Bozoki 2016, 111; Kovarek and Soos 2016, 185), is an anti-immigrant, homophobic, conservative, and defending the values of Christianity.

²⁰⁶ The idea of political integration with the West has also been accepted based on parties. In fact, Hungary joined the EU in 2004 during the MSZP government.

²⁰⁷ The elections examined are the elections for the parliament in Hungary, which has a unicameral form of government. In Hungary, which has a parliament with 199 deputies today, the election threshold for a single party is 5%. General elections are held every four years, and local elections are held every five years.

the idea of exclusion from the European Reforms and new integration models²⁰⁸, which are being discussed again, and the idea of distributing EU resources according to the national interests of the powerful countries of the EU, increase the concerns of the Visegrad countries. In other words, Visegrad countries think that their country's national interests can be neglected in the EU²⁰⁹. In addition, the idea that 'Euro-zone countries will form the core of the EU' further increases the anxiety in Visegrad countries except Slovakia²¹⁰. The Brexit decision of the UK, which has close political and economic relations with the Visegrad countries, is seen as a balancing factor against Germany in the EU and is accepted as a political-economic guarantor, has greatly affected the EU policies of the Visegrad countries. Considering that a different power distribution will be/is determined in the EU after the Brexit decision, it is not strange that Visegrad countries have started to implement different EU policies²¹¹ (Gotev, 2016). Possible economic and political changes within the EU, the uneasiness of the economic situation in Europe, distrust in European institutions and the idea of European integration (Kneuer 2019, 2)

²⁰⁸ After Brexit, the EU was split into two as 'core members' (particularly Eurozone countries) that support full integration and 'light members' that support partial integration (Lorenzmeier 2017, 30; Tauber, Schiltz and Zschaplitz, 2016).

²⁰⁹ The rapprochement of Germany and France with Italy after Brexit has been the harbinger of new solidarity in the EU. However, after the Paris Summit, this new solidarity was overshadowed (Tauber, 2016). Although Merkel stated that "alternative solidarities that are/will be established differently from the solidarity within the EU will pose a great threat to the EU", the 'Red Axis Solidarity', which the Italian-Greek-Austrian populist left-wing parties tried to create against the austerity policies implemented by Germany, is a remarkable development (Hekimler 2017, 15-16; Vytiska, 2016).

²¹⁰ The Brexit decision has increased the concern of the Visegrad countries being left alone in the EU. The most important reason for this is that the UK, which is not in the Euro zone, creates a balance in the EU and supports other countries such as Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic that do not use the Euro. The explanation of Ryszard Petru, who describes the EU as a three-layered structure, better explains the concerns of the Visegrad countries. In fact, according to Petru, the first tier of the EU is composed of developed countries that use Euro, the second tier of developed countries that do not use the Euro, and the third tier of developing countries that do not use the Euro (Kellermann, 2016).

²¹¹ The Brexit decision is also of great importance for the population that has migrated to the UK from the Visegrad region because of the UK's decision to leave the EU, where approximately 1,000,000 Poles and many Hungarians, Czech and Slovak citizens immigrated, raises questions about what these immigrants will do (Kopka, 2016). In the UK, where Visegrad citizens migrated, the xenophobia that started to increase after Brexit and the citizens of the Visegrad countries not wanting to return to their own countries constitute the main subject of the policies between the UK and the Visegrad countries. In this case, these citizens, who pose a problem for both the UK and Visegrad countries, are perceived as undesirable people because the Visegrad countries think that the national employment of their own countries will suffer if the citizens who immigrated to UK return. On the other hand, if these citizens stay in the UK, the UK thinks that its national employment and social security system will be damaged (Jens and Marquardt, 2014; Schubert, Kafsack and Theurer, 2016). This situation makes the citizens of Visegrad countries living in England a problem contrary to the opinions of Poland and Hungary, which are against the policies determined by the EU for refugees from the Middle East.

have led to the start of a new nationalisation and anti-EU trends (Krouwel and Abts 2007, 253) in Visegrad countries^{212,213} (Hekimler 2017, 2-4).

After the Brexit decision, the Visegrad countries have entered closer solidarity to play a more active role in the EU. The close solidarity policy of the Visegrad countries proved the political existence concerns of the Visegrad countries against the powerful countries in the EU and paved the way for the formation of a new solidarity model (Jarzyk, Ozsvath and Lange, 2016). The purpose of this solidarity model, which the Visegrad countries, that lost the support of the UK after Brexit, tried to create, is to express the common concerns, expectations, and solution proposals of the Visegrad countries to the EU more effectively and powerfully. On the other hand, this solidarity and political unity between the Visegrad countries brings along the democratic regression in these countries (Kelemen 2017, 211).

The Visegrad Group, which was established in 1991 by Czechoslovakia²¹⁴, Poland, and Hungary (Szabadsag, 2011) to provide economic, cultural, and military cooperation (archive.org, 2011), did not receive much credit due to the countries' inability to produce and establish a common policy for a long time. In particular, the desire of each country to protect their own national interests and to be the leader of the group played an important role in reducing the interest in the Visegrad Group. However, this situation has started to change with the refugee crisis experienced in recent years.

Germany tried to reorganise the EU policies, which got stuck with the start of the refugee crisis and acted in cooperation with the European Commission in this direction, and put forward the idea of the 'immigrant quota', which advocates the distribution of equal numbers of refugees to every EU country. However, Hungary and Poland, which oppose this idea and argue that

²¹² In addition, the fact that only the members of the European Economic Community were invited to the Berlin Summit to discuss the Brexit decision increased the concerns of the Visegrad countries. For this reason, Poland, and Hungary, where nationalist and conservative politics take a large place, are trying to create a new balance mechanism against Germany in order not to be excluded from the EU in the absence of the UK. The balance mechanism that was tried to be created by Poland and Hungary became even more evident after the Berlin Summit. So much so that the countries that were not invited to the Berlin Summit came together at the Warsaw Summit and discussed the issues discussed at the Berlin Summit, which clearly reveals the 'alternative solidarity' that is being tried to be created (Hekimler 2017, 16).

²¹³ Visegrad countries do not want to accept the policies that Germany wants to impose on them, especially in regarding the refugee crisis. Visegrad countries state that, they will accept the practices to be made in line with the policies to be developed within the framework of the cooperation and national will of the countries (Lang, 2016). Again, according to the Visegrad countries, the transformation of the refugee policies into a kind of imposition will threaten the future of Europe and cause the formation of 'new blocs' in the EU.

²¹⁴ Established in 1991 with the partnership of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, the Visegrad Trio Group became the Visegrad Quadruple Group with Czechia and Slovakia in 1993 after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia.

refugees should not enter the EU borders, have started to show effective anti-refugee solidarity²¹⁵ (Hekimler 2018, 27).

Despite this difference, Hungary, which is politically closer to the East, and Poland, which is politically closer to the West, see each other as political opportunities. On the other hand, other Visegrad countries, Czechia, and Slovakia have a different opinions than Poland and Hungary. Although EU membership is an indisputable issue for Czechia and Slovakia, which are politically closer to the USA and the EU, both countries have started to approach Germany's EU policies more critically after the refugee crisis. EU membership is an fundamental issue, especially for Slovakia, which finances 86% of its public investments with EU funds (Jarzyk, Ozsvath and Lange, 2016). However, the increasing anti-refugee sentiment in Slovakia and the fear of political humiliation within the EU cause the rise of anti-EU sentiments in Slovakia. In other words, the Visegrad countries, which became a member of the EU later, suffer from not being accepted by the former member countries. This situation increases the political gap and anti-EU sentiments between the old and new members of the EU. The recent refugee crisis exacerbates this situation because the Visegrad countries, which do not have a great political influence in the EU, do not want to accept and share the burden of the refugee problem imposed on them (Hekimler 2017, 5).

Poland and Hungary, which think that European integration weakens the nation state, have started to produce policies against Germany and the EU due to the refugee problem. In addition, the Brexit decision has brought these countries closer to each other and has led to an increase in intra-EU ruptures. Visegrad countries, which give importance to their own national policies rather than the common policies of the EU, showed this situation best in the crisis between Russia and Ukraine. Visegrad countries, which have been under Russia's political and military pressure for a long time, acted together with the EU against Russia since it is their common concern²¹⁶. In other words, Visegrad countries, which look for strong partners when their national interests and national security are in danger, and act together with the EU in crises like

²¹⁵ Visegrad countries, which oppose the 'quota system' advocated by Germany, also support the closure of the Bulgaria, Serbia, and Macedonia borders and argue that Greece should be removed from Schengen. Worse still, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's definitions of immigrants as 'poison' and 'unnecessary' and associating refugees with terrorism and rape crimes cause anti-immigrant sentiments to spread and gain strength among the Hungarian people (Quackenbush, 2016).

²¹⁶ Despite this crisis, Viktor Orbán did not want to break the political and economic relations between Hungary and Russia and gave important efforts for this (Mitrovits, 2016). This attitude of Hungary can also be seen as Hungary's response to the EU, which criticises Hungary for anti-democratic developments.

this, are defending themselves against the EU by opposing the refugee policy, which is an internal problem of the EU.

Therefore, this solidarity formed by the Visegrad countries has turned into a kind of effort of the countries that feel excluded from the EU to exist in the EU (Hekimler 2017, 6). Poland and Hungary, which try to create an effective opposition to the EU because of the changing political and economic balances within the EU, also show an inconsistent approach to EU policies (Jarzyk, Ozsvath and Lange, 2016) because these countries do not want to be excluded from the EU policies and want to be at the centre of the EU without taking responsibility for the EU policies. Political developments in the migrant crisis reveal these inconsistent policies.

Another aspect of Brexit that worries Visegrad countries is the security concerns. According to Visegrad countries, the absence of Britain, which is a NATO member but will not be included in NATO's planning processes after Brexit (Şahin and Ceran, 2016), is another factor that increases Germany's power in the EU. Today, the Visegrad countries, which still feel the political and military pressure of Russia (especially Poland), faced Germany, which opposed the shift of NATO troops to the east, unlike the UK. The Visegrad countries felt alone in the face of the Russian threat and started to express the 'Three Seas Initiative' more (Baltic, Adriatic, Black Sea, BABS Initiative) (3seas.eu; Estonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs) because the wide-scale cooperation of the countries forming the eastern corridor of the EU²¹⁷ is seen both as a deterrent measure against the Russian threat and as a tool to strengthen the EU's security policies. The BABS Initiative supported at the Warsaw Summit in 2016, and the proposal to monitor the maritime borders supported by Hungary both increased the prestige of the Visegrad countries in NATO and motivated NATO to cooperate more with the Visegrad countries (Hekimler 2017, 11-12).

One of the most important reasons for the increasing opposition to the EU in Visegrad countries is undoubtedly the politicians in the Visegrad countries and their discourses. For example, according to Beata Szydło, 'European elites have been cut off from the people and EU institutions have lost their legitimacy'. In addition, Beata Szydło stated that "the EU has been damaged by the elites and institutions and the Brexit decision was taken for these reasons", and stated that "the future of the EU depends on the solidarity of nation-states, the defence of citizens' interests and the limitation of the EU Commission powers" (Gotev, 2016). According to Viktor Orbán and Václav Havel, who support Szydło's rhetoric, "Brexit decision has

²¹⁷ Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovenia.

overshadowed the EU's global activism” (Winterbauer and Vegh, 2016; Jarzyk, Ozsyath and Lange, 2016; Hekimler 2017, 17-18). Discussing these problems at the Visegrad Summit held in Warsaw in 2016 and declaring that the powers of national parliaments should be increased with the declaration of the ‘EU Based on Mutual Trust’, Visegrad countries also drew attention to the sense of trust that needs to be rebuilt and strengthened between citizens and the state (Gotev, 2016).

The legal regulations discussed and adopted in Hungary and Poland recently prove that these countries are in a nationalisation trend. Conservative parties in Poland and Hungary government - Fidesz and PiS - focus on nationalisation policies that are sometimes anti-EU²¹⁸. So much so that both Poland and Hungary think that national governments should have more power in the EU's refugee crisis policies²¹⁹. In other words, in a sense, Hungary and Poland support and defend each other against the EU.

The second part briefly covers the political systems and political lives of Hungary, Poland, Czechia and Slovakia. The historical and current political experiences of Hungary, Poland, Czechia and Slovakia are explained before and after the accession to the EU. The third chapter includes a critical analysis of the country and party, focusing on the main case of the research, Hungarian democracy, its political experiences, the conditions of democracy and the impact of the Fidesz party on Hungarian democracy.

²¹⁸ The decisions taken against media independence and the constitutional court both in Poland and Hungary prove this situation.

²¹⁹ Poland and Hungary state that immigration policies should not be under the jurisdiction of the EU alone, and that the opinions of nations on these policies should also be sought because, according to Poland and Hungary, the damaged relations and sense of trust between the EU elites and the public can only be repaired and strengthened in this way (Kellermann, 2016).

3. Ideological and Organisational Evolution of Fidesz

Founded in 1988 by 36 university students, Fidesz began politics as an opposition and an avant-garde youth movement²²⁰ (Lendvai, 2019a; Kiss 2002, 750). The party participated in the first Hungarian free election in 1990 as a radical-liberal supporter of European integration and the anti-communist movement. Their policies included advocating private property, collective leadership²²¹, minority rights, representative democracy, liberal democracy, market economy, and the minimal role of the state in the economic structure²²². Fidesz participated in the 1990 elections, which was won by the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum, MDF), with radical-liberal and anti-communist policies, emphasising human rights, freedoms, and secularisation (separation of state and church) (Kiss 2002, 741). Fidesz won 22 seats in the 366-seat Hungarian Parliament with 8.95% of the votes in this election and became a small but prominent party in the opposition. Although the number of deputies in the parliament was low after the 1990 election, Fidesz's relentless and radical criticisms and opposition to the MDF government drew great attention. The basis of Fidesz's criticism of MDF was the nationalist and religious policies that MDF, a right-wing party, tried to impose on the people and the anti-Semitism prevalent in Hungary (Lendvai, 2019b). So much so that Viktor Orbán, who was the leader of Fidesz in the parliament at that time, criticised MDF and MDF's policies as “rotten and decaying” and “the representative of the world that Hungary does not want to return to again” in his speech in 1992 (Kiss 2002, 741). Attracting attention in this period with his effective opposition and successful leadership, Viktor Orbán was elected as the chairman of Fidesz in 1993.

²²⁰ Fidesz did not accept people over the age of 35 as party members until 1993.

²²¹ In the party congress held in Debrecen in 1993, Fidesz abandoned the understanding of collective leadership and positioned the understanding of individual management instead (Buzogany and Varga, 2018).

²²² Although the parties in Hungary have right-wing and left-wing identities, no party in the Hungarian political spectrum has right-wing capitalist-liberal views in their economic policies. Parties in Hungary are located close to each other on the left-wing side of socio-economic policies (Karacsony and Rona, 2009; Fabian, 2005). So much so that Fidesz, which was positioned in the Hungarian political spectrum with the right-wing economic model between 1990-1998, gave up its right-wing economic policy and changed its attitude to gain more voters in the following years (Nogradi 2011, 2). Moreover, the right-wing economic model policies that the left-wing SZDSZ, which is no longer involved in Hungarian politics, tried to implement through cultural liberalism and the right-wing MDF through moderate cultural conservatism (capitalism, free market, international market) failed. Therefore, when evaluating the parties in the Hungarian political spectrum as right-wing or left-wing, other determinants should be used instead of the economic model. These determinants for right-wing parties are conservatism, relationship with authority, national identity, materialist order, security, anti-communism, national unity, and religion. These determinants are shaped by liberalism, freedom of expression, pluralism, and secularism for left-wing parties (Inglehart, 1989).

Despite Fidesz's radical liberal stance in Hungarian politics, Viktor Orbán began to think that Fidesz's pragmatic shift to the right-wing would strengthen the party's position in the Hungarian political spectrum after he became the head of the party. However, the basis of this transformation idea was the crisis that MDF entered after the death of MDF leader József Antall²²³ in 1993. The first goal of Orbán, who started to shift his party to the right-wing by taking advantage of the crisis the MDF was in, was to attract the conservative and right-wing voters who had previously voted for the MDF to Fidesz. For this reason, Fidesz rearranged its national, religious, and economic policies to appeal to conservative and right-wing voters. The most important factor that facilitated Fidesz's political shift to the right-wing and accelerated this process was undoubtedly the resignation of names such as Gábor Fodor, Péter Molnár, and Klára Ungár due to the conflicts within the party. The resignations of names such as Fodor, Molnár and Ungár, who represented the modern, secular, and liberal aspects of Fidesz, facilitated and accelerated the transformation of Fidesz, which was a radical liberal party, into a conservative party (Kiss 2002, 742). After its political transformation, Fidesz started to appeal to conservative and right-wing voters and to organise its election campaigns according to these voters.

Fidesz's shifting election campaigns have targeted voters living in small towns and villages in Western and Central Hungary and wealthy middle-class voters living in the capital. Having changed politically, Fidesz has succeeded in getting a lot in return for this change. So much so that, despite losing the 2006 elections, Fidesz managed to get almost twice as many votes as the MDF, which won the 1990 elections²²⁴. The most important feature of Fidesz's voters in the 2006 elections was the religious profile of the voters. In fact, in the 2006 election, only the Christian Democratic People's Party voters (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, KDNP) displayed a more religious profile than the voters of Fidesz²²⁵ (Meszaros, Solymosi and Speiser 2007).

Having suffered a significant defeat in the 1994 election, Fidesz started to reconsider its political stance and decided to change especially after this election. Fidesz completed its political transformation between 1994-1998, when the coalition of the Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSZP) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (Szabad

²²³ József Antall was Hungary's first democratically elected prime minister.

²²⁴ The MDF received 24.73% of the votes in the 1990 elections and won (archive.ipu.org (d)). Fidesz received 42.0% of the votes in the 2006 elections and lost (partiesandelections.eu (d)).

²²⁵ Today, KDNP is part of the Fidesz-KDNP alliance, which forms Hungary's political right-wing and government.

Demokraták Szövetsége, SZDSZ) formed the government²²⁶, and started a fierce opposition to the left-liberal bloc and elites with its renewed political identity. However, Fidesz started to move away from the mainstream and liberal view with its new political identity and could not achieve a completely conservative appearance. After the name change in 1995, Fidesz continued its conservative and authoritarian political transformation in the Hungarian political spectrum (Batory 2016, 286)²²⁷. The political change that Fidesz went through not only distanced it from the MSZP and its former liberal ally, SZDSZ, but also contributed to Fidesz's policies of being a pioneer of the Christian-nationalist right. Fidesz has adopted the Christian-democratic policies and discourses of the MDF²²⁸, especially due to its goal of being the pioneer of the Christian-nationalist right. From this period, Fidesz started to use conservative, nationalist, traditionalist, and religious policies and succeeded in influencing conservative and right-wing voters by using anti-communist policies against the socialist government (Kiss 2002, 758).

After its political change, Fidesz added 'supporting the family structure and strengthening the weakening national fabric' to the party manifesto. As a result of this change, Fidesz, which added the phrase 'Hungarian Civic Party' (Magyar Polgári Párt) to its name in 1995, caused fractures within the party and lost many non-conservative members in this period. The party also ended its membership in the Liberal International with the document 'For a Civic Hungary' published in December 1995 and became a member of the EPP in November 2000.

Fidesz's political change also directly affected the party's social and human rights policies. In addition, Fidesz, which shifted its economic policy to a populist direction during the change process, started to support strong state support and started to change its social policies in line with conservative Catholic thought. This way, it also managed to use the urban-rural distinction successfully. Undoubtedly, one of the most important factors that brought success to Fidesz was its ability to pragmatically formulate the policies and discourses that it started to implement during the period of change (Kiss 2002, 756). So much so that, the right shift experienced by the party brought success to Fidesz in the 1998 elections. Fidesz, which managed to become

²²⁶ Between 1990 and 2010, there was the political dominance of left-liberal parties in Hungary. So much so that left-liberal parties remained in power for 12 years between 1990 and 2010 (Wilkin, 2016).

²²⁷ While the name of the party was League of Young Democrat - Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége in 1988, the name of the party changed to Fidesz-MPP (Hungarian Civic Party - Magyar Polgári Párt) in 1995.

²²⁸ Embracing the political legacy of MDF on October 4, 2007, Orbán stated that "Hungary's 20-year-old East-West struggle still continues" and "the struggle that started in Lakitelek is not over yet" (Debreczeni, 2007). (Lakitelek is the place where MDF was established on September 27, 1987). MDF was the first independent political party established in Hungary after the 1956 revolution.

the second party in the general ranking with 29.4% of the votes in the 1998 election, succeeded in forming a coalition government with FKgP (13.2%) and MDF (2.8%). The victory in this election undoubtedly helped Viktor Orbán increase his power and credibility within the party. The 1998 election was also the election in which Hungarian political parties resorted to populist promises to win the election, and Hungarian politics began to be organised by the populist parties (Palonen, 2009).

From a political perspective, it can be said that Fidesz's political transformation yielded highly successful results. In fact, Fidesz has been defining itself as the 'sole guardian of the Hungarian national consciousness' since 2000²²⁹ (Kiss 2002, 754). Fidesz, which succeeded in analysing the messages of the Hungarian voters during the political transformation process, managed to quadruple its votes in the 1998 elections²³⁰. In addition, Fidesz, which assumed the representation of the majority of conservative and right-wing voters with the political transformation, was able to get votes from all voters except those who voted for the Left Bloc. On the other hand, this political change that Fidesz went through had some bad consequences as well as good consequences. One of these bad results is undoubtedly that Fidesz lost its originally represented voter base. So much so that Fidesz, which was initially founded as a radical-liberal political movement and supported by secular-liberal voters, had to shift its electoral base to the right-wing after the political change it experienced. Perhaps the biggest reason for Fidesz's defeat in the 2002 election, which started to be supported by conservative and religious voters after the political change (Meszaros, Solymosi, and Speiser, 2007), was the alienation of Fidesz's core voters from the party.

The 2002 election split the Hungarian voters sharply between the left-wing coalition MSZP and SZDSZ and the right bloc's 'Civil' parties Fidesz-MDF²³¹. Using nationalist rhetoric in this

²²⁹ So much so that former President László Kövér, one of the founders of Fidesz and who was also the leader of Fidesz for a short time, said, "Only the nation is important to us. We are the only party that cares about the nation" (Kiss 2002, 754).

²³⁰ Fidesz received 8,95% of the votes in the 1990 election, 7,02% in the 1994 election, and 28,48% in the 1998 election (archive.ipu.org(d)).

²³¹ In the early 2000s, one of the most important political actions of Viktor Orbán, who had ideologies such as the creation of civil Hungary, the acquisition of conservative elites to strengthen Christian and national values, and the one flag-one camp, the 'Civic Circles' (Polgári Körök) led to the revival of the right-wing Hungarian voters and to the merger of fragmented right-wing party factions. In this sense, the 'Civic Circles' established by Viktor Orbán in 2002 with the motto of 'alliance for the nation' (szövetség a nemzetért), influenced the national, religious, and cultural understanding of the right-wing Hungarian voters, created new areas of thought and action for right-wing policies, and laid the foundations of right-wing hegemony in Hungary (Greskovits 2017, 2; Bozoki, 2008). So much so that, this movement ensured the reunification of the Hungarian right-wing and the strong establishment of the right-wing in Hungarian politics by building a bridge between the right-wing actors (such as professionals, priests, experts and politicians) and movements that were disconnected from each other. Another

election, Fidesz managed to attract right-wing parties and right-wing voters to itself. In addition, Fidesz, which supports the policy of advancing European integration in line with Hungary's interests and values, included the mission of supporting the EU in case Hungary complies with its national policies (Benoit 2002, 120-123). The most important reason why the Hungarian voters were sharply split into two in this election is the inclusion of religious officials in this election²³². The fact that the Hungarian Catholic Bishops and the Hungarian Reformed Church became a part of the election campaigns divided the Hungarian voters into religious and non-religious, causing a cultural and social conflict in Hungary.

Despite these policies, Fidesz could not win the 2002 election and the right-wing bloc Fidesz-MDF was defeated by the left-wing bloc MSZP-SZDSZ coalition. However, this defeat in the 2002 election was a turning point for Fidesz. So much so that, after losing the election against the left-wing bloc, Fidesz broke away from its past and started to turn into a populist right-wing party (Böcskei 2016, 419). The same situations were also experienced in the 2006 elections, in which the voters were divided into secular-religious, progressive-traditionalist and right-wing-left-wing (Uitz 2008, 61), and resulted in the defeat of the Fidesz-KDNP parties, which also formed the right-wing, to the MSZP-SZDSZ parties that formed the left-wing block.

Fidesz, which suffered consecutive defeats in the 2002 and 2006 elections, derived three main lessons from these defeats. The first lesson was the need for strong media that support the party, the second lesson was to maintain stronger nationalist and conservative policies, and the third lesson was to focus on mass organisations. However, these decisions Fidesz took after the elections, which was a defeat, caused the party to shift even more to the right-wing. On the other hand, the decisions taken by the party after the lost elections and the successful results in the European Parliament played an important role in Fidesz's coming to power in the 2010 election. However, the reasons why Fidesz came to power in the 2010 election were not limited to these. The meeting speeches of Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány that leaked to the press in 2006²³³ and the protests organised after the government's failure to find a solution to the 2008 economic crisis also played an active role in Fidesz's success. In addition, with the increasing

important political move of Orbán was to replace the concept of 'bourgeoisie' with the concept of 'people'. Thus, Fidesz and Orbán, declaring themselves to be the protectors of Hungarian voters who felt excluded by the system, started to implement tougher policies against the left-liberal elite by strengthening their voter base.

²³² The Church declared that "programs that preserve the sanctity of marriage, value the multi-child family structure, respect Hungarian culture and Hungarian values, and attach importance to the building of national consciousness should be supported" (Buda and Gabor, 2007).

²³³ "Evidently, we lied throughout the last year and a half, two years. It was totally clear that what we are saying is not true. We lied in the morning; we lied in the evening" (The Guardian, 2006).

economic competition and decreasing agricultural production, the Hungarian voters chose the 'Romani minority living in Hungary' as a scapegoat, and this view began to gain strength in Hungary. Although economic and minority policies are different from each other, these issues have become directly related to the 'Europeanisation' policies in Hungary. The fact that the left-wing bloc government could not find a solution to all these problems affecting the Hungarian voters and the absence of a left-wing alternative that could find a solution to these problems led the Hungarian voters to the right-wing parties and put the Hungarian politics on a new path.

52.7% of the votes and 263 deputies won by the Fidesz-KDNP alliance in the 2010 election enabled this alliance to create a 'super majority'²³⁴ in the Hungarian Parliament. In this election, especially benefiting from the effects of the economic crisis in 2008, Fidesz successfully managed to reduce the increasing state debts between 2002-2010 when the socialist coalition was in government, initiated the economic development movement of Hungary and increased the minimum wage. The Fidesz government managed to reduce the unemployment rate in Hungary by 67%, to increase its power and the number of voters thanks to its successful economic policies between 2010 and 2014 (Kingsley and Novak, 2018). The 2010 election, won by the Fidesz-KDNP alliance, accelerated the transformation of these coalition government parties into third wave right movements. After the 2010 election, the first steps of the transition to the 'authoritarian statism' model, which was developed with the economic and political crises (especially class conflicts and social divisions), were taken in Hungary, and the political power was centralised. Combining national identity with cultural unity and successfully blending policies oriented towards immigrants, foreigners, minorities, and elites with populist rhetoric, the Fidesz-KDNP coalition achieved a significant success in Hungary. These policies created by blending the populist discourse with all national and sacred values²³⁵ enabled Fidesz to complete its political change and political legitimacy (Enyedi 2005, 705).

Defining itself as 'Hungary's only chance for survival' after the 2010 elections, Fidesz produced and adopted the 'National Cooperation System' (Nemzeti Együttműködés Rendszere) formula that appeals to Hungarian voters with the motto of 'work, home, family, health, and order'. 'The National Cooperation System'²³⁶, produced and adopted by Fidesz with the claim

²³⁴ As a result of the 2010 election, the Fidesz-KDNP coalition government, which formed a 'super majority', gained the right to amend the constitution without a referendum.

²³⁵ Like family, homeland, religion (Körösenyi 2018, 11).

²³⁶ Another important feature of the 2010 election in Hungary is undoubtedly that all political parties except the MSZP were prepared for the election with anti-system and anti-establishment policies (Becker, 2010). For this reason, Viktor Orbán announced the 'National Cooperation System' two months after his success in the 2010 election and could easily declare that the Hungarian society would reach a 'new social contract' with this system.

of ‘representing all Hungarians’, and the ‘Manifesto and Law of National Coherence’²³⁷, which is related to nationalism and Christianity, have become two of the most important elements that describe the populist character of Fidesz.

The political change of Fidesz, which represents almost all the Hungarian right today, can be examined in four stages.

- First stage (1988-1993): The establishment of Fidesz as a radical-liberal party and the party's participation in the first election in 1990.
- Second stage (1994-2002): Fidesz's conservative right-wing transformation and changes in the party's policies.
- Third stage (2003-2010): Administrative restorations in the party after the election failures and the party's adoption of nationalist, conservative, religious and populist policies. (Tremlett and Messing, 2015).
- Fourth stage (2011-2020): Fidesz's parliamentary majority in the 2010, 2014²³⁸ and 2018²³⁹ elections and the political changes in the party.

In the following sections of the thesis, the policies implemented by Fidesz since 2010 will be analysed in detail.

Fidesz, led by Viktor Orbán, which won the ‘super majority’ in the parliament in 2010, started to implement and legitimise policies that transform the state, society, and politics, almost as ‘if it were a revolution’²⁴⁰. Fidesz's and Viktor Orbán's policies that transform the state, society and politics are mainly changing the electoral system, making a new constitution, regulations made in the media, regulations in the field of education, amendments to the scope of institutions that protect the constitution and human rights, regulations on the right to assemble and demonstrate, regulations on the autonomy of courts, trade union rights and

Although this system has been described as a ‘social contract’ by Fidesz and Viktor Orbán, it is essentially an attempt to eliminate the pluralistic structure of the Hungarian society.

²³⁷ The decision to grant Hungarian citizenship to the Hungarians living abroad due to the Trianon Treaty, and the first legal document that structured the god-politics relationship by establishing the nation-identity-religion relationship.

²³⁸ 2014: Fidesz-KDNP 44.9% voting rate. Fidesz 117 deputies, KDNP 16 deputies. Left-wing Bloc: MSZP, MLP, EGYÜTT, DK, PARBESZED 25.6% voting rate and 38 deputies. Jobbik 20.2% voting rate and 23 deputies (Györi, 2015).

²³⁹ 2018: Fidesz-KDNP 49.3% voting rate. Fidesz 117 deputies, KDNP 16 deputies. Left-wing Bloc: MSZP, PARBESZED, MLP 11.9% voting rate and 20 deputies. Jobbik 19.1% voting rate and 26 deputies.

²⁴⁰ After the victory in 2010, Fidesz's authoritarian and illiberal tendencies increased.

regulations on civil society, regulations in EU policies and starting to use the migrant crisis as a political tool. In fact, these changes and regulations implemented by Fidesz became a form of feudalisation in which bureaucracy, institutions and the current system were integrated into one place, beyond a reform movement that would shake the Hungarian society and liberal democratic values in Hungary.

Viktor Orbán consolidates his power in Hungary with the legal-rational legitimacy he gained through democratic elections, his charisma, and the traditional legitimacy he gained through the lower-middle class voters in the countryside (Weber, 1969). Viktor Orbán also increases and consolidates his power within the party with the oppressive and discriminatory administration he established within Fidesz. Fidesz, which has won every national election in every Hungary since 2010, has been politically transformed and succeeded in changing society, carries out policies based on eight main strategies. The first of these strategies is to make anti-immigration, exclusionary identity politics, xenophobia, and security issues a political phenomenon. In this way, Fidesz can easily include voters who are afraid of losing their culture, language, and religion. The second strategy is to use the emotions of the voters against the left-wing parties. In this way, voters who previously voted for left-wing parties but were later disappointed and protested left-wing parties can be included. The third strategy is to combine simple and effective rhetoric that the public can understand with populism. The fourth strategy is to influence social classes that are negatively affected by multiculturalism and globalisation waves. In other words, it is to make both the voters who attach importance to moral values (like brotherhood, family, national solidarity) and the working class the voters of the party. The fifth strategy is the desire to seize and control the media. In this way, voters can only get information about the issues determined and desired by the party, and voters can be easily guided. The sixth strategy is to have the power to influence democratic institutions. In this way, democratic institutions (constitutional court, legislative power, executive power, judiciary power, bureaucratic functioning of institutions and civil servants) are shaped depending on the party, the leader, and the ideology and act in accordance with them. The seventh strategy is to have a leader who is integrated with the party. The eighth and most important strategy is the party's ability to 'disguise' very successfully.

Viktor Orbán created a neo-classical populist political form in Hungary after 2010. So much so that, Viktor Orbán has managed to blend conservatism, Christianity²⁴¹, anti-communism,

²⁴¹ Christianity, one of the sources of populism in Hungary, and the relationship of Christian culture with populism has been continuing since the period between the two world wars. Although today there is no politicised

interventionist economic leftism^{242,243,244}, high state responsibility and the idea of national sovereignty and national identity²⁴⁵ with the idea of right-wing sovereign leadership. In addition, Viktor Orbán, who made the idea of sovereignty that can take a state of emergency decision more important than democracy, started to organise Fidesz's policies according to this form. In short, the factors that enabled Fidesz to win the elections in 2014 and 2018 are directly related to the political changes Hungary has experienced since 2010.

So much so that Fidesz lost its advantageous position in the Hungarian Parliament in the 2014 election but managed to retain the 'simple majority'. During this period, the Fidesz government increased its pressure on the media, civil society, and academia.

Fidesz, which won the 2018 election by gaining the majority in the Hungarian Parliament, continues its autocratisation trend. In fact, Viktor Orbán and Fidesz, entered the 2018 election with the confidence of the positive economic data between 2014-2018, anti-immigrant, anti-EU, protector of Christianity and Hungarian culture, were not affected by the immigrant crisis economically and were successful in this election.

Fidesz, being in power since 2010, builds its strength on the following factors:

- Policies of centralised hegemonic power and 'personal autocracy', in which opposition movements are excluded/marginalised, and the monopoly party system is advocated,
- Ethnic nationalism, which defines the concept of a nation with an ethnic community and advocates the idea of national unity,

Christianity like that period (Adam and Bozoki 2016, 106) (in Hungary, the number of believers in God is 23%, the number of those who participate in church activities is 10% (Pall and Sayfo 2016, 6)), Fidesz continues to bring the right-wing together and carry out politics on this issue. At this point, the Hungarian Christianity belief and culture supported by Fidesz transforms into Christian nationalism, religion is blended with nationalism, makes ethno-nationalism come to the fore in Hungary and ensures that Fidesz receives the support of the Hungarian church.

²⁴² Improvements in education and health care, tax cuts, government-provided jobs, better pensions, anti-IMF, higher taxes from banks and international companies.

²⁴³ The interventionist economic model of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz has created a populist-based economic model called 'Orbanomics'. So much that this model creates a structure that rejected the IMF's recommendations, transferred the pension funds of Hungarian citizens to the national fund, nationalised the private pension system, provided assistance and tax exemption for families with children, employs many Hungarian citizens by creating low-paying jobs for social work, imposes sector-specific taxes, keeps interest rates low, and includes policies for the nationalisation of companies and banks (Scheiring, 2020; Tacconi, 2018).

²⁴⁴ Interventionist economic left-wing forms the basis of Fidesz's economic populism. So much so that Fidesz's interventionist economic policy has become an election promise.

²⁴⁵ Other discourses that enable Fidesz to expand its populist discourses are: socio-economic anti-Romani, culturally anti-Semitic, and 'Greater Hungary' (Nagy-Magyarország) in terms of identity and social.

- Social excluding that supports a divide-and-rule policy against the opposition movements,
- Radical change of the elites who were elected from a closed political circle,
- Power politics that advocates maximising power over ideals,
- The idea of the so-called revolutionary situation, advocating extraordinary policies in extraordinary situations,
- Cultural manipulation, propaganda and monotony advocating the continuity of the right-wing politics.

(Bozoki 2016, 95-98).

Fidesz's policies of power, nationalist policies, policies of social exclusion and radical transformation of the elite show similarities with Jobbik's political demands. In addition, the fact that the Hungarian regime is based on the autonomy of politicians, sovereign leadership (Kovarek and Soos, 2016), leadership democracy and the idea of political constitutionalism (Antal, 2016) transforms the regime in Hungary into an oligarchic regime with weakened moral and legal foundations and increased corruption. For this reason, it is essential to analyse the Jobbik party to better understand this transformed regime in Hungary.

Jobbik, which has been in existence since 1999 as a right-wing, anti-communist and conservative movement against liberalisation and defining itself as a national-Christian, pioneer of national counter-revolution (Pytlas 2015, 37), ultra-nationalist, Russophile, and a rebellious 2006 generation movement aiming to break the liberal hegemony and policies of the 1989 generation movement (Kreko and Mayer 2015, 191), became involved in Hungarian politics as a radical right party in 2003 after the defeat of MIEP in the 2002 election²⁴⁶. Jobbik, which could not enter the parliament after the election alliance with MIEP in 2002, was able to get 2% of the votes in the 2006 elections but managed to increase its vote rate significantly in the following period. Notably, the 15% of the votes it won in the 2009 European Parliament election was the first indication of Jobbik's success in the Hungarian national elections in

²⁴⁶ Unlike other Central and Eastern European countries, radical right trends in Hungary had a strong position even before the refugee crisis (Kolar 2016, 6).

2010²⁴⁷. Especially before 2010, the events during the left-wing bloc coalition government²⁴⁸ brought the Hungarian voter (especially voters living in the countryside of northeast Hungary) closer to the right-wing. This development caused Jobbik to gain power in Hungarian politics. Jobbik, which was much more radical than the radical right parties in many European countries (Biro-Nagy, Boros and Vasali, 2013a) and was strengthened with these policies, has managed to attract attention with its ultranationalist, racist, xenophobic, homophobic, anti-Semitic, anti-immigrant, supporting the building of a united, homogeneous and Christian Hungarian nation, anti-liberal, anti-European integration (Neumayer 2007, 147), and anti-Romani minority policies^{249,250,251} (Jobbik 2010, 11; Kovacs 2013, 227; Finchelstein and Bosoer, 2013; Varga 2014, 797; Mudde 2012, 6; Biro-Nagy, Boros and Vasali 2013b, 233).

After the Arab Spring, the increasing xenophobia in all European countries due to the wave of immigrants from the Middle East to Europe, and the increase in support for radical right parties that incorporated anti-immigrant ideas into their policies, worked differently in

²⁴⁷ Jobbik created its election campaign in 2010 within the scope of the 10-item 'Urgent Action Plan' policies. These policies were:

- 1-) The principle of zero tolerance against corruption and the crimes of politicians,
- 2-) Tax reductions and providing more job opportunities,
- 3-) Higher taxes from banks and restructuring of debts of Hungarian citizens owed to banks,
- 4-) Nationalisation of the energy sector,
- 5-) Taking more taxes from multinational companies,
- 6-) Reducing the pensions of former communist leaders to the minimum level,
- 7-) Giving social assistance in return for public service,
- 8-) Preventing foreigners from owning lands in Hungary,
- 9-) Establishment of a gendarmerie unit in addition to the police force to ensure public order and security,
- 10-) Granting citizenship right to the ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary due to the Treaty of Trianon (Bozoki 2016, 90-91).

²⁴⁸ Jobbik, which managed to attract the attention of the Hungarian voters by organising demonstrations against the socialist government in Hungary after the 'lie scandal' in 2006, also managed to form the electoral base in this period. Particularly between 2006-2010, Jobbik acted with Fidesz against the socialist government and played an important role in the rapid polarization of the Hungarian society and the strengthening of the Hungarian right-wing parties.

²⁴⁹ Unlike the other radical right parties in Europe, Jobbik is anti-Israeli and supports of Palestine, Turkey, China, and Russia. In addition, Jobbik, which supported the policy of establishing close relations with Eastern countries, changed this policy after the migration crisis and started to perceive Islam as a threat (Thorleifsson 2017, 324).

²⁵⁰ The radical policies which Jobbik supported were not the only reason for Jobbik's rise in Hungarian politics. The failure of the neo-liberal structure in Hungary, the damage to liberal democracy and its ability to present itself to the Hungarian electorate as a new alternative to these developments were the most important factors that brought Jobbik to success (Toth and Grajczjar 2015, 153). Also, Jobbik's ability to monopolise anti-Romani policy was another important reason for Jobbik's success (Petsinis 2015, 276).

²⁵¹ Unlike the radical right movements in Western Europe, Jobbik, which did not emerge as the 'party of the losers' of political and economic transformation, has a qualified, middle-class and partially good economic background voter base. Jobbik supports the policy of a 'strict and homogeneous Hungarian nation' to 'preserve the Hungarian identity', claiming that the Romani and Jewish minorities threaten Hungary (Rudas, 2010). Despite these policies, the fact that Krisztina Morvai, the iconic leader of Jobbik, was a law professor specialising in women's rights before entering politics and was married to a Jewish (György Baló), contrasts with the anti-Semitic policies Jobbik advocated.

Hungary. So much so that Jobbik, which was already strong in Hungarian politics with anti-Romani and anti-Semitic policies before the immigration wave, included the idea of anti-immigrants in its policies after the start of the immigration movement²⁵² (Kolar 2016, 6). In addition, Jobbik, which supported the idea of national rejuvenation, the need to reunite the fragmented Hungarian nation (a form of nationalism and tendency to nationalise Hungarians living abroad (Jobbik, 2010)), policy of accepting people with no political background as party members²⁵³ and the nationalist economic model against the market economy, achieved significant success in Hungarian politics especially with its 'strong national state' policies (Toth and Grajczjar 2015, 156; Jobbik 2010, 20).

Since 2010, Hungary has faced immigration and immigrant problems as it is on the route of immigrants who want to cross to Western Europe (Metelkina, 2018), and it has been significantly affected by two dimensions of immigration. The first of these effects is the problems with the EU regarding the immigration quota policy determined by the EU. The second effect is that Hungarian right-wing parties (Fidesz and Jobbik) normalise anti-immigration to get more votes. The policies of the Hungarian right-wing parties on both the normalisation of anti-immigration and the immigrant quota were blended with EU-sceptical policies and gained strength with the joint discourse of Fidesz and Jobbik (Aras and Sağıroğlu 2018, 69; Kolar 2016, 7). Fidesz and Jobbik, which developed their common discourse on migration through the themes of economy, culture, and security²⁵⁴, showed that they are much closer to each other rather than showing similar characteristics (Thorleifsson 2017, 328).

After the migration crisis that started in Europe, Jobbik updated the 'criminal Roman minority' discourse as 'criminal Muslim immigrant' and defined Muslim immigrants as directly related to terrorism in *Barikád* journal²⁵⁵. Apart from these developments, although Jobbik presented a constitutional amendment to the parliament in 2016 that prevents refugees from

²⁵² The anti-Romani and anti-Semitic policies of Jobbik, which managed to enter the parliament as a strong opposition movement with the loss of power of MIEP, were the old policies of MIEP.

²⁵³ Seeing that the political past affected the Hungarian voters due to the corruption of the socialist government between 2006-2010, Jobbik succeeded in attracting Hungarian voters who lost their trust in politics and politicians by accepting people without a political background as party members.

²⁵⁴ The idea of 'Protection of Christian Europe' is another of Fidesz's and Jobbik's shared ideas on immigration (Juhász, 2016).

²⁵⁵ Jobbik has managed to use social media extensively and successfully to reach the young voters in Hungary. Websites such as *barikád.hu* and *Kuruc.info*, which broadcast on the Internet, played an important role both in Jobbik's success and in Jobbik's influence on the Hungarian voters (Korkut 2012, 185-187). Semi-official subgroups and organisations that support Jobbik and the ones Jobbik supports are not limited to these. Newspaper 'Barikád', online TV channel 'Jobbiktv.hu', website 'kuruc.info', radio channel 'Szent Korona' (Holy Crown), bookstore chain 'Szkítia', nationalist festival 'Magyar Sziget' (Hungarian Island), college 'Atilla Király Népfőiskola' (King Attila National College) and the paramilitary group 'Hungarian Guards' (Magyar Gárda).

settling in Hungary, it later remained neutral to this amendment due to the suggestion that 'immigrants can obtain the right of residence in Hungary for a certain fee' added to this amendment by Fidesz (Dunai, 2016). Stating that the proposal to 'gain the right of residence for a certain fee' was a national risk, Jobbik accused Viktor Orbán and Fidesz of political corruption due to this change (Zalan, 2016a).

Jobbik, which published the 'anti-immigrant action plan' before the 2018 election and defined EU policies as the reason for migration, stated that “Hungary's southern borders should be protected, border guard groups should be established, new anti-immigrant laws should be added to the constitution and the quotas set by the EU should be rejected” (Pivarnyik, 2018).

The expansion of Fidesz's footprint in the Hungarian political spectrum put significant pressure on Jobbik, which was afraid of losing its own space²⁵⁶. Therefore, Jobbik which entered the parliament after the 2010 election, started to distance the radicals and ultra-nationalists from the party. Over time, the party's position on the radical right began to shift to the mainstream right. Jobbik entered a tough competition with Fidesz in the election campaign in 2014. During this period, Jobbik changed its extremist image, preserved 'important radicalism', abandoned 'formal radicalism' (Biro-Nagy and Boros 2016, 245), turned towards the youth, and assumed the appearance of a contemporary conservative and dynamic party (Pytlas 2015, 224). This image change of Jobbik has been called the 'sweetness campaign'. Jobbik has defined itself as an 'innovation party' since 2016 (Sikk, 2012) and thus managed to maintain its political distance from Fidesz and move away from its 'marginal' appearance and is basically running a campaign within the framework of 'anti-corruption' policies. This political change Jobbik experienced was not a choice but a necessity because over time, Fidesz gained absolute dominance and control over the policies of nationalism, anti-immigration and Euroscepticism that formed the core of Jobbik's policies²⁵⁷. In other words, Jobbik, which lost the policies that formed the core of its politics to Fidesz (Böcskei and Molnar 2019, 2-3), had to go through a necessary political change²⁵⁸. Although this strategy allowed Jobbik to maintain a presence in the rest of Hungary (Murer, 2015), it resulted in Jobbik losing its voters in the

²⁵⁶ In fact, eight items of the 10-item 'Urgent Action Plan' policy determined by Jobbik in 2010 (except for the first and ninth items) were implemented by Fidesz until 2015.

²⁵⁷ This situation shows that Hungarian right-wing parties can easily benefit from radical right policies. However, the radical policies that Hungarian right-wing parties can use to win more votes and influence more voters are shifting them to an anti-democratic direction.

²⁵⁸ A group of Jobbik members who reacted to the moderate policies that Jobbik started to follow (Varga, 2014), left the party and established the radical right-wing 'Mi Hazánk' (Our Homeland) party under the leadership of László Toroczkai (Szigeti, 2018).

northeast. However, left-wing and mainstream voters' prejudiced and sceptical attitudes towards Jobbik can be an obstacle to Jobbik's rise in its new political position.

3.1 Fidesz Attacks on Liberal Democracy

Although it is thought that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, authoritarian regimes were defeated by democracy and democratisation movements became the primary form of new political regimes in a short time, the democratic transformation changed its course through the populist leaders that befell unstable democracies and settled in the 'grey zone' between the democratic regime and the autocratic regime (Carothers, 2002). The different characteristics of the regimes in which the democratic transformation settled in the 'grey zone', caused these regimes to be defined as 'hybrid regimes' (Diamond, 2002), while 'competitive authoritarian regimes' were defined as the most common hybrid regime type.

Systems that can be placed between authoritarianism and democracy can be seen in many countries today. Regimes that can be placed between the autocratic regime and the democratic regime are seen in many countries today. The regimes between democracy and authoritarian regimes, which emerged especially in the newly formed regimes after the Cold War, are regimes where the rights of expression, press and organisation are still problematic, despite regular and multi-party elections. In addition, the fact that even some democratic regimes cannot fully fulfil all the criteria of democracy²⁵⁹ reveals some problems in democratic regimes²⁶⁰. Academic studies conducted to describe the problems that arise in democracies define regimes that are neither democratic nor fully authoritarian (Diamond 2002, 25) and where regular elections are held as 'competitive authoritarian regimes'²⁶¹ (Levitsky and Way, 2002). Studies also reveal the positive relationship between competitive authoritarian regimes and populism (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Competitive authoritarian regimes, in which democratic institutions are weakened by populist leaders (anti-elitism and anti-pluralism) and popular will is used to crush the opposition movements²⁶², provide an invaluable political environment for populist leaders who

²⁵⁹ The existence of elected officials, free and fair elections, citizens' right to free vote, right to stand for elections, freedom of expression, access to alternative information and association autonomy (Dahl, 1977).

²⁶⁰ The problems faced by Western European democracies regarding immigration, freedom of religion and minority rights. Despite this, the fact that violations of democracy are not continuous and systematic protects Western democracies.

²⁶¹ The most important point distinguishing a competitive authoritarian regime from a classical one is that elections can be held regularly in competitive authoritarian regimes.

²⁶² The thought of 'We are 100%' (Müller, 2017, 3).

created this regime and were strengthened with it (Levitsky and Loxton 2013, 108; Yabanci 2016, 597).

While competitive authoritarian regimes are competitive in offering democratic opportunities to the opposition, they are organised and structured in such a way that the political space provides an advantage to the ruling party (unequal playground²⁶³) and enforce elections, fundamental rights, and freedoms very differently from liberal democracies (Levitsky and Way 2010, 5). Although elections, fundamental rights and freedoms are not denied in these regimes, they can be easily abused thanks to the powerful manipulations and advantages of the power that governs the regime.

Hungary, which got out from the political influence of the Soviet Union in 1989 and started to develop democracy and parliamentary democracy, is now among the 'competitive authoritarian regimes' with the policies implemented by Fidesz since 2010. So much so that the 2010, 2014 and 2018 elections, won by Fidesz under the leadership of Viktor Orbán, and the policies implemented during these periods clearly transformed the Hungarian democracy and enabled the 'competitive authoritarian regime' to settle in Hungarian politics. Especially in the 2000s, because of the crises experienced by the mainstream left parties in Hungary, the formation of undecided and insecure voters and the 2010 election were a turning point for the Hungarian democracy because the 'super majority' in the 2010 election gave Viktor Orbán and Fidesz the power to accelerate the illiberal democracy process and to make all kinds of changes on Hungarian democracy. For this reason, the political moves (especially in the constitution, media, law, and economics) of Viktor Orbán, who wanted to place himself and his party Fidesz at the centre of Hungarian politics, caused the Hungarian democracy to openly shift to a 'competitive authoritarian regime' (Levitsky and Way 2002, 52-53).

Although there is a possibility of democratisation of 'competitive authoritarian regimes', this is only possible with the correct use of democracy in the country or with the influence of the West. In other words, the economic, legal, and cultural relations that competitive authoritarian regimes have with Western democracies or the financial support they receive from the West

²⁶³ The 'unequal playground' is formed according to three important criteria. These criteria are economic resource, media, and law. According to the economic resource criterion, the opposition cannot access sufficient financial resources to finance its campaign during the election period in this regime. According to the media criterion, the opposition cannot reach the media organs under the control of the government and cannot sufficiently introduce itself to the public in this regime. According to the criterion of law, the judiciary, which is under the control of the government, can give its full attention to the opposition and keep it under constant pressure (Oğuz 2020, 29). The political situation in a regime where these criteria are effective directly hinders the fair competition between the opposition and the government (Levitsky and Way 2010, 10-12).

can increase their democratisation probability. However, it is clearly seen that the closeness of these regimes to the West does not make a difference in terms of democratisation (Bozoki and Hegedüs, 2018). So much so that, at the EU summit held in Lithuania in 2015, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker's greeting to Viktor Orbán as “Hello Dictator” has clearly revealed the views of the European Commission and the EU on Hungary and Viktor Orbán (Woodard, 2015; Fassin 2017, 35; Greenhalgh, 2019).

3.2 Interference in Democratic Mechanisms and the Use of Populist Narrative

When the power of populist movements in Hungarian politics is examined, it can be seen that populism has had a limited effect in the Hungarian election equation since the 1990s and did not come to an influential position until the beginning of the 2000s. The weak populist trend in Hungary continued until Jobbik received 9% of the votes in the 2009 European Parliament elections. Fidesz's adoption of Jobbik's anti-Romani, anti-immigrant and anti-foreign, and later anti-Arab, anti-Muslim and homophobic (Renkin, 2015) views laid the foundations for Viktor Orbán and Fidesz to set a true example of populism today (Agh 2016, 279). Viktor Orbán and his party Fidesz, which have been in Hungarian politics for a long time, made many political changes in Hungary after the 2010 election. Some of the political changes made by Viktor Orbán and his party Fidesz include anti-elite policies, policies that divide the people into legitimate and illegitimate²⁶⁴, anti-immigration and anti-immigrant policies²⁶⁵, anti-liberal democratic policies, anti-EU policies²⁶⁶, policies that suppress the free press, and policies that include interventions against bureaucracy, checks and balances mechanisms, especially to the

²⁶⁴ Fidesz's 'we-they' policy is based on 'internal' enemies in Hungary and 'external' enemies outside Hungary. Fidesz's 'internal' enemies are the liberals, dissidents, representatives of the old socialist order, left-wing, collaborators of Soros, and elites in Hungary. Fidesz's 'external' enemies are the immigrants, the EU, global liberal elites, foreign capitalist companies and speculators. The segment that Fidesz describes as 'we' are the Christian nationalists, illiberal democrats, and anti-globalists.

²⁶⁵ Fidesz's anti-immigration and anti-immigrant view is based on the foresight that immigration and immigrants will create problems in Hungary regarding economic, social, cultural, and national security. So much so that, Viktor Orbán defines multiculturalism based on the coexistence of Christians and Muslims as an illusion. On the other hand, Fidesz's anti-immigration and anti-immigrant stance also reveals Fidesz's anti-EU, anti-multiculturalism, and anti-Islamism. At this point, the phenomenon of Fidesz's 'Christian society' emerges.

²⁶⁶ Fidesz's anti-EU attitude is related to its distrust in EU institutions and EU democracy. In fact, liberal democracy implemented and supported by the EU constitutes is one of the main factors of Fidesz's populist discourses. Some EU policies that Fidesz is against are: economic policies, cultural policies, Eurozone and Euro-based coexistence policies, immigration policies, free movement policy with Schengen, immigration quota policy, foreign worker policy. In addition, another important reason for Fidesz's anti-EU views is the idea that the EU harms Hungary's independence and national interests (Korkut 2012, 184). So much so that Viktor Orbán 's anti-EU policies bring Hungary closer to Russia.

constitutional court. These changes and arrangements made by Viktor Orbán and Fidesz in Hungary also formed the basis of populist policies in Hungary. All these practices and policies both cause an increase in social fragility and social polarisation in Hungary and provide excellent environment for the development of populism in Hungary.

Undoubtedly, the political changes that Viktor Orbán and Fidesz went through after the 2002 election directly connect with the populism that developed in Hungary. So much so that, although Fidesz won more deputies in the Hungarian Parliament in the 2002 election, it lost the election against the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition due to the electoral system. However, due to the economic crisis in 2008, the failure of the neo-liberal policies implemented by the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition government and the leaked speech of Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány to the press, the Fidesz-KDNP coalition won the 2010 election with the majority of votes. Fidesz, which won the 2010 election with the thought that considers liberal democracy a 'fiction', with anti-elite policies and rhetoric that divides the public, then started to increase its pressure on the judiciary and the media to protect its power. During this period, the most important factors that enabled the development and strengthening of Fidesz's populist policies were: the struggle claimed by Fidesz against the Islamisation of Europe, the struggle against liberal values and globalisation, the search for a new political representative and the desire to be represented by a new representative of the Hungarian society, which had economic and social difficulties, and the political deficiencies and inadequacies of the left-wing parties, which could not produce a political alternative and solution to the problems of the people. At this point, the most important factor that enabled the formation and strengthening of Orbán's populist policies is that Orbán's criticisms of liberal democratic values supported by the EU were shaped within the framework of the concept of illiberal democracy.

Orbán's populist policies enabled Fidesz to turn anti-elite, nationalist, and conservative Hungarian voters into its constituency, and Orbán to introduce himself as a 'man of the people' to Hungarian voters. Defining himself as an anti-elite, ordinary peasant boy raised by an authoritarian father in the countryside to the Hungarian electorate, Viktor Orbán is also portrayed as a significant 'political value' by the Hungarian media that is under his control (Zalan, 2016b). The populist policies of Orbán, who wanted to abandon the values of liberal democracy (Simon, 2014), came close to the policies of the radical right Jobbik, especially after 2010, and the political differences between Fidesz and Jobbik became almost invisible. In other words, Fidesz, which came to power in 2010 and maintains/want to maintain its power, used/is using the strong wind of populist discourses and policies to hold on to power. Even worse, the

populist rhetoric and policies of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz are supported by almost every populist radical right party in Europe.

3.3 Illiberal Democracy and Constitutional Boundaries Violation

The concept of illiberal democracy (Zakaria, 1997) defines regimes in which the government violates constitutional boundaries, fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens are restricted, and strengthened through elections and referenda. The concept of illiberal democracy is based on coming to power through elections, as in other democratic regimes.

Democracy crises that began to occur in the Visegrad countries, where democratisation movements started after the political influence of the Soviet Union in the region and where these movements became stronger by spreading rapidly, revealed the existence of 'defective democracies' in this region²⁶⁷. As noted earlier, these 'defective democracies' are described as 'illiberal' (Zakaria, 1997) or 'competitive authoritarian' (Levitsky and Way, 2002). This 'defective democracy' situation is clearly seen today especially in Hungary, one of the Central and Eastern European countries²⁶⁸.

After Hungary transitioned to democracy, Hungarian parties, which were shaped under internal and external pressures, were divided into left-wing parties advocating Europeanisation (MSZP) and right-wing parties advocating nation-centrism (Fidesz) (Agh, 2010). For this reason, the two-party tendency that started to form the party system of Hungary in the last period has basically brought political polarisation. In a word, Hungarian society and Hungarian politics are divided into those who support nationalisation (Hungarianisation) and those who advocate Europeanisation. In other words, nationalisation and Europeanisation have become the political identities of political parties in Hungary. Right-wing parties benefited the most from this situation in Hungary, where political polarisation and political separation gained

²⁶⁷ Especially in 2008, Prime Minister Gyurcsány's statement that 'we lied to the public' was leaked to the press, greatly damaged the Hungarian understanding of liberal democracy and the trust in Hungarian left-wing parties. So much so that, after this scandal, the number of voters of Hungarian right-wing parties that held demonstrations against the socialist government increased, MSZP became a weak ruling party after SZDSZ left the coalition, Prime Minister Gyurcsány resigned in 2009 and a new crisis government was established under the leadership of Gordon Bajnai. This situation significantly increased the political polarization of Hungarian society and Hungarian politics. Although such democracy crises have been experienced in many liberal countries, this crisis laid the foundations of the populist and illiberal policies in Hungary.

²⁶⁸ In fact, Viktor Orbán explained the existence of illiberal democracy in Hungary as follows: "The Hungarian nation is not a simple sum of individuals, but a community that needs to be organised, strengthened and developed, and in this sense, the new state that we are building is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state" (Toth, 2014).

strength. So much so that Fidesz and Jobbik successfully used the nationalisation aspect of political identity. Especially Fidesz successfully used/uses nationalisation policies and party polarisation to increase the power of illiberal democracy and populism in Hungary (Bozoki 2012b, 1; Enyedi 2016b, 9).

Supporting Hungary's membership process to the EU²⁶⁹, Fidesz has successfully combined the Eurosceptic rhetoric that it started after the membership process with national populist rhetoric. In other words, after Hungary's accession to the EU, Viktor Orbán used the EU to develop his nationalist policies and Eurosceptic rhetoric. In addition, using the 'majority of the people' he has, Viktor Orbán politicises the idea of nationalism with the 'so-called national freedom struggle' and the discourse that "liberal principles should be abandoned to organise the state" (Buzogany 2017, 1308), and states that "Hungary can have a presence outside the EU" (Szelenyi and Csillag 2015, 23). However, in the current situation, it is not easy for Hungary to find an economical alternative outside the EU or to benefit as much as the EU even if it does. In other words, Hungary clearly needs the EU in the current political and economic conjuncture (Kelemen, 2015; Kelemen 2017, 227). Although this situation affects the rhetoric of the nationalist and EU sceptical Hungarian parties against the EU, it is not quite right to call these parties anti-EU because even the EU sceptical Hungarian parties, which tend to nationalise, are aware that Hungary needs the EU economically²⁷⁰ (Kelemen, 2015).

Especially after Fidesz won the 2010 election with a 'super majority', Hungary, which experienced a decline in democracy indexes with the policies implemented by Viktor Orbán and Fidesz, became a 'defective democracy' by being affected by this situation economically, politically, and culturally²⁷¹. Especially in the context of illiberal democracy, Viktor Orbán, who accepts illiberal countries such as Russia and China as political role models (Rachman, 2014; Kelemen 2017, 223; Boyle, 2016), clearly contradicts the liberal democracy model determined and defended by the EU and causes a political legitimacy crisis in the EU. Worse still, populists are increasingly adopting the illiberal democracy model not only in Hungary but

²⁶⁹ Hungary's EU membership was a process supported by all Hungarian parties except the radical right parties. In addition, Hungary has successfully passed the economic and political adaptation processes by creating a very successful political system during the membership process. Hungary, which set a political and economic example to other Visegrad countries during the democratic transition process, later became the pioneer of illiberal democracy in the Visegrad region.

²⁷⁰ While the financial contribution of Hungary under Fidesz administration to the EU is 1 billion Euros, the EU transfers 3-5 billion Euros annually to Hungary (Huszka 2017, 593).

²⁷¹ Such as the creation of the new constitution, the interventions against the constitutional court, the significant damage to the balance and control system, and the obstructive political moves against non-governmental organisations and the opposition (Juhasz, Laszlo and Zgut 2015, 15-16).

also in many European countries, and EU structures that can prevent this situation are inadequate to these developments (Kelemen 2017, 223). Populism, which has become increasingly stronger and almost unstoppable due to the disappointments, anger and distrust of the citizens living in EU countries, continues to strengthen and grow in the EU due to the inability of the left-wing and mainstream parties to produce policies against populism.

Fidesz presents its policies shifting to the radical right under the influence of illiberal policies to the Hungarian society by blending them with the ‘second transition’ and ‘national renewal’ visions (Kreko and Mayer, 2015). Fidesz also defends the concept of illiberal democracy with the help of Viktor Orbán's propaganda with the necessity of ‘preserving national culture and Christian democratic norms’ against ‘liberals’, ‘globalists’ and ‘enemies’ who support liberal democracy (Palonen 2018, 10). Fidesz's and Viktor Orbán's illiberal policies against ‘others’ and ‘enemies’ also legitimise Fidesz's and Viktor Orbán's repression policies against the Hungarian society. Especially the portrayal of the free, independent, and critical Hungarian academy and non-governmental organisations as the ‘enemy’ and ‘fifth column’ by Fidesz and Viktor Orbán (Novak, 2017) constitutes an important proof that the created pressure environment has spread everywhere.

3.4 Immigration as a Political Problem

Following the election Fidesz won in 2014, anti-government protests took place all over Hungary. These demonstrations, in which demonstrators protested the increasing corruption, increasing authoritarianism and Fidesz's policies moving away from the EU and approaching Russia, seriously damaged both the national and international popularity of Fidesz (BBC, 2014). However, the migrant crisis, which became the sole focus of all European policies in 2015, saved Fidesz and Viktor Orbán from the protests in Hungary. In fact, interests (social and economic conditions) and identities (cultural and psychological tendencies)²⁷² (Sides and Citrin 2007, 478-480; Karapın 1998, 214) that constitute the two main factors of the immigration

²⁷² The Hungarian economy, which started to show a high growth rate after 1989 with austerity, privatisation, and the inflow of foreign capital, continued to show a good rise after Hungary became a member of the EU in 2004, but started to recess very rapidly after the 2008 crisis. This economic contraction in Hungary continued until 2014 and the Hungarian economy started to recover from this period. However, the influx of immigrants and the financial burden of immigration in this period motivated Hungary to implement stricter policies on immigration and immigrants. For this reason, Hungary resisted the EU's decisions on this issue in order not to be affected by the influx of immigrants economically.

problem were used very successfully by Fidesz before the election²⁷³. The rhetoric of fear and security concerns created by Fidesz before the election, nativist policies that reject the interference of another race, society or religion with the Hungarian Christian culture and national traditions, revealed the positive relationship between immigrants-radical right-populism (Rojon, 2013; Karacsony and Rona 2011, 63; Davis and Deole, 2017; Ernst, 2015) and directed Hungarian voters to right-wing parties²⁷⁴. These developments also enabled Viktor Orbán to introduce himself to Hungarian voters as the 'protector of Christian Europe' (Huet, 2018).

The migration crisis in Hungary after 2015 has set an excellent example of the 'inadequacies' of the mainstream parties in Hungary. So much so that the 'positive indecision' policies of the MSZP on this issue (Györi, 2015) gave Fidesz the chance to set the agenda on this issue, which opposed the 'quota system' and the decision to settle refugees in all European countries. The indecisive and impartial policies of the mainstream parties in Hungary on immigration created a unique opportunity for Fidesz to expand its dominance on socio-cultural issues and gain legitimacy for Fidesz's radical and polarising policies.

Hungary, which is used as a 'transit' country for immigrants because it is on the migration route of the refugees who want to move to Western Europe (Juhasz, Hunyadi and Zgut 2015, 10; Mitrovits, 2016), despite this situation, received 177,000 asylum applications in 2015 and found itself at the centre of a migration wave that it had never encountered before²⁷⁵ (Simonovits 2019, 155). Turning this migration crisis Hungary is facing into a political opportunity, Viktor Orbán successfully politicised the migration crisis by organising campaigns stating that refugees would harm Hungary culturally and economically. In other words, the policies of othering, creating a perception of emergency and crisis, and portraying the enemy, which have formed the basis of Viktor Orbán's policies since 2010, have ultimately targeted immigrants (Yabancı 2016, 607; Körösenyi 2018, 9). Defining refugees as 'thieves', 'arsonists', 'terrorists', 'disease carriers' and 'criminals', Viktor Orbán, and his party Fidesz continued these

²⁷³ Migration was not a prominent issue in Hungary until 2015. So much so that the 'Immigration Strategy' developed by Fidesz in 2013 included articles that included the admission of new immigrants to Hungary for economic reasons. In other words, immigration, Islamophobia, and anti-Islamism were not one of the main policies of Fidesz until 2015.

²⁷⁴ In fact, 76% of Hungarian citizens directly associated refugees coming to Europe with terrorism, and 82% thought that immigrants would harm the Hungarian economy (Wike, Stokes and Simmons, 2016).

²⁷⁵ The fact that Hungary and the homogeneous population in Hungary have not faced such an immigration crisis before has formed the basis of prejudiced and separatist discourses and thoughts in the Hungarian people and Hungarian politics.

policies and rhetoric despite the opposition of the Socialists and Green Parties (Juhasz, 2016; Juhasz, Hunyadi and Zgut 2015, 24).

After Viktor Orbán's anti-immigrant policies and rhetoric were supported by Fidesz, the Fidesz government launched the 'National Consultation' initiative on terrorism and immigration. Viktor Orbán received the reaction he wanted from this initiative, which started with 'survey letters' sent to eight million citizens over the age of 18 in Hungary, and both legitimised his anti-immigration policies and continued his anti-immigration policies with anti-refugee posters published all over Hungary^{276,277}. Viktor Orbán, who gave legitimacy to his immigration and anti-immigrant policies and increasingly continued these policies, also produced policies that restricted the movement of refugees and prevented them from crossing over Hungary to Western Europe (Dunai, 2015). After these obstacles, Germany and Austria, stepped in to reduce the tension on the Hungarian border and accepted 5,000 refugees trying to cross from Hungary to Western Europe (Koren, 2015).

The 'quota system', which was adopted in 2015 to reduce the effects of the migration crisis in Europe in the EU, aimed to share the 160,000 migrants in Europe among all EU countries²⁷⁸ (Stevis-Gridneff and Pronczuk, 2020). However, the EU countries Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania opposed this 'quota system' of the EU and in 2015 Hungary and Slovakia applied to the EU Court of Justice against the 'quota system'. In addition, Viktor Orbán decided to hold a referendum in Hungary on whether to accept this plan²⁷⁹ (Traynor, 2016; Dunai and Than,

²⁷⁶ These 'survey letters' sent to Hungarian citizens contained highly biased questions involving the anti-immigrant views of the Fidesz government (Miles, 2015; FNFEUROPE, 2017; Balogh, 2017). Despite the criticism of the European Commission, the 'survey letters', which specifically associated immigrants with terrorism, economic crisis, and cultural erosion (Juhasz, 2016), legitimised Viktor Orbán's anti-immigrant policies by getting the approval of one million Hungarian citizens (Kafkadesk, 2019; Kreko and Juhasz, 2015; Halasz, 2015). Viktor Orbán, who got the result he wanted from the 'survey letters', said, "Hungarian people have decided. Hungary must be protected" (Barry, 2019; Orban, 2015). These discourses of Viktor Orbán also include the idea that "European Christianity should be defended against Islam" (Traynor, 2015). Viktor Orbán, who managed to keep the opposition away from the decision-making process with these attitudes, supports majoritarianism instead of pluralism (Enyedi 2016a, 11).

²⁷⁷ Some of the rhetoric in the anti-refugee posters published were as follows: 'You can't take Hungarian jobs when you come to Hungary', 'When you come to Hungary, you will respect Hungarian culture' and 'We don't want illegal immigrants' (Thorpe, 2015; Keszthelyi, 2015).

²⁷⁸ The 'quota system' accepted by the EU has been determined according to objective and measurable criteria. These criteria are based on population (40%), GDP (40%), number of asylum applications (10%) and unemployment rate (10%) (European Commission, 2015). Hungary, which should host 1,294 immigrants according to these criteria and the decision of the EU Council of Ministers (Kanter, 2017), rejected this decision together with Slovakia, Czechia, and Romania (Traynor and Kingsley, 2015; BBC, 2015b).

²⁷⁹ Fidesz spent 16 million Euros during the referendum campaign and used the following slogans: 'Did you know that harassment against women has increased since the immigration crisis began?', 'Did you know that the terrorist attacks in Paris were perpetrated by immigrants?', 'Did you know that 300 people have been killed in terrorist attacks in Europe since the start of the migrant crisis?', 'Did you know that 1.5 million illegal immigrants

2016). The referendum for the 'quota system' in Hungary was used as a political tool to legitimise Fidesz's anti-immigrant policies²⁸⁰. However, despite Fidesz's strong propaganda and anti-immigrant rhetoric, the 50% public participation required for the referendum to become law could not be achieved (Than and Szakacs, 2016). Despite this, Viktor Orbán, who found the 40.4% popular turnout sufficient, stated that “the referendum achieved its purpose and that 3.3 million Hungarian citizens rejected the 'quota system' accepted by the EU, so the constitution should be changed according to the result of this referendum” (Foeger, 2016).

Fidesz, which managed to legitimise its anti-immigrant ideas by getting the desired result from the referendum, took legal measures to further restrict the immigrants after the referendum. Even though the legal measures that Fidesz initiated against the immigrants, including the deportation and detention of the immigrants caught at the Hungarian border, were criticised by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (HHC) for violating the EU and international laws, they were accepted by the Fidesz government²⁸¹ (HHC, 2016; Dearden, 2017). Following the laws passed by Fidesz, Hungary closed its borders with Serbia and Croatia and made the process of granting refugee status to immigrants very difficult (HHC, 2020). Following these developments, the Fidesz government, which significantly reduced the number of refugees in Hungary, nevertheless extended the state of emergency, which was initiated due to the dangers of mass migration, until March 2018 (Köves, 2017). Victor Orbán, who won the 2018 election by successfully politicising the political opportunities of the migrant crisis, subsequently approved a law that could penalise individuals and non-governmental organisations that assist asylum seekers and migrants. By naming this law the 'Stop Soros Law', Viktor Orbán succeeded in associating Soros²⁸² with immigrants and presenting Soros to the public as a criminal, thus succeeding in killing two birds with one stone (Rankin, 2018).

came to Europe in 2015?', 'Did you know that only one million immigrants came to Europe from Libya?' (Thorpe, 2016; Demesmay 2016, 55; Vidra 2017, 11).

²⁸⁰ Question asked to Hungarian citizens in the referendum: 'Do you want to allow the European Union to mandate the relocation of non-Hungarian citizens to Hungary without the approval of the National Assembly?' (European Parliament, 2016).

²⁸¹ Between 15 September 2015 and 31 December 2016, 2,843 immigrants were convicted for crossing the border (HHC, 2016).

²⁸² Anti-Semitism in Eastern and Central Europe was shaped by the tension created over religion and with the idea of preserving Christianity (Quigley, 1990). At the same time, the effective economic and political power of the Jews also influenced the development of anti-Semitism in the region. In this respect, Fidesz and Viktor Orbán are implementing anti-Semitic policies in the context of nationalism, economy, politics and religion-culture in Hungary against the Hungarian-born Jewish businessman George Soros, global speculators, and the Open Society Foundation (Liphshiz, 2019). On the other hand, the anti-Semitic policies, and discourses of Fidesz and Viktor Orbán have been shaped as political tactics. So much so that, even though Viktor Orbán implemented hostile policies through Soros and Jewish businessmen, Fidesz spent 3.4 million Euros to prevent anti-Semitic rhetoric in

Fidesz's anti-immigration and anti-immigrant policies differentiate Hungary from many European countries. So much so that Fidesz's anti-immigration and anti-immigrant policies and discourses show closeness to the policies and discourses advocated by the radical right parties in Europe and reveal the effects of radical right policies and discourses in Hungary. In particular, the Fidesz government's implementation of this policy and rhetoric by imitating the rhetoric and policies of the radical right-wing Jobbik shows the political situation of Hungary. Worse, the Fidesz government's use, adoption and imitation of the policies and discourses used by the radical right are causing radical right policies and discourses to be normalised and supported more in Hungary. Fidesz, which managed to win the 2014 election by losing votes after the 2010 election (Györi, 2015), managed to increase voters' support after the refugee crisis in 2015 (Hargitai 2020, 196-202). The most important reasons why Viktor Orbán and his party Fidesz increased the voter support in this period were as follows: Fidesz's success in presenting its own policies to the Hungarian people as national policies and the opposition's policies as non-national policies, the support of the majority of the Hungarian people to anti-immigration and anti-immigrant policies, and the unresponsiveness of the divided left-wing parties to these developments.

Identity and interest policies, which form the basis of anti-immigration and anti-immigrant thought (Sides and Citrin, 2007), are used on an identity-based basis in Hungary. That is, unlike the interests and economic policies that form the basis of anti-immigration and anti-immigrant policies in Western Europe, anti-immigration and anti-immigrant policies in Hungary focus on identity and security policies. For this reason, Viktor Orbán, who defines immigrants as “toxic”, “enemies of the Hungarian culture, nation and Christianity”, “aggressive”, “closed to integration”, “unnecessary” and “potential criminals”, created fear in the Hungarian people and caused an increase in anti-immigration, anti-immigrant, and xenophobic ideas²⁸³ (Kroet, 2016; Vidra 2017, 22).

Hungary and declared 2014 as the '70th Memorial Year' for Hungarians who suffered the Holocaust (Dettke 2014, 20). In other words, the main reason for Fidesz's and Viktor Orbán's anti-Semitic policies is the continuation of the polarization in society. Thus, by placing Soros at the head of social polarization, Viktor Orbán and Fidesz created a new polarization, a new opposition for their illiberal, nationalist, and conservative policies.

²⁸³ In fact, while 41% of Hungarian citizens supported xenophobic policies in 2015, this number increased to 60% in 2017. In addition, 72% of the Hungarian population express a negative view towards Muslims, 76% think that refugees increase the risk of terrorism, and 82% see refugees as an economic threat (Juhász, Molnár and Zgut 2017, 15; Wike, Stokes and Simmons, 2016).

Viktor Orbán's anti-immigrant views, his policies against immigrants' asylum applications, his presentation of the refugee crisis as a religious problem²⁸⁴, hard asylum protocols for immigrants, the project of building barbed wire on the borders of Serbia and Croatia (the borders of Hungary-Serbia and Hungary-Croatia were closed with barbed wire in 2015) (Feher, 2015; BBC, 2015a), allowing the military and police to intervene with plastic bullets against immigrants and other national policies²⁸⁵ have made Viktor Orbán Europe's toughest anti-immigrant leader²⁸⁶ (Karasz, 2018; Tok 2018, 89-90).

3.5 Seizing Control Over Judicial, Legislative and Electoral Systems

The principle of the rule of law, separation of powers and an independent and fair judiciary system, which are indispensable for liberal democracy, have become the main targets of populist politicians who are getting stronger today. The most important reason why populists target independent law and fair justice is the desire of populist leaders to acquire state institutions (Müller, 2017).

While Hungary was politically under the influence of the Soviet Union, Viktor Orbán, who produced anti-Soviet, anti-communist policies, started anti-EU policies after Hungary became a member of the EU and focused mainly on policies against the independence of balance and control mechanisms. Fidesz, which gained a 'super majority' by winning 68% of the number of deputies in the parliament in the 2010 election, and thus had the opportunity to change the constitution on its own, made nearly 10 amendments to the Hungarian Constitution²⁸⁷, and then took the opportunity of 'super majority' and created a new constitution.

²⁸⁴ Viktor Orbán makes anti-immigrant and xenophobic statements such as “Hungary is the defender of Christian Europe against Muslim invaders” (Al Jazeera, 2019; Hungary Today, 2019; Mackey, 2015).

²⁸⁵ Just as the Fidesz government announced that “all immigrants who cross the barbed wire would be imprisoned and declared a state of emergency in Hungary during the migration crisis” (Than, 2016).

²⁸⁶ So much so that Viktor Orbán's discourses and policies towards refugees give him the image of a strong leader who protects the Hungarian people and tries to protect Europe from 'others'. This presents an important political opportunity for Viktor Orbán to develop and strengthen his competitive authoritarian and populist rhetoric and policies. Worse still, between 2015-2016, Viktor Orbán's anti-immigration and anti-immigrant policies and practices were also supported by Jobbik (Juhasz, 2016).

²⁸⁷ The most important amendments made by Fidesz to the Hungarian Constitution in 2010 were the amendment of the law regarding the candidacy applications to the constitutional court and the amendment of the law regarding the abolition of the constitutional court's authority in tax and budget matters. However, Fidesz was criticised for the changes made in the Hungarian Constitution and therefore decided to make a new constitution (Oğuz 2020, 32).

Following these changes, members and judges loyal to Fidesz were appointed to the Constitutional Court, which was built strongly in the democratisation process²⁸⁸ (Agh 2010, 188) and was emphasised by Viktor Orbán in the 1990s. In addition, the appointment of Tünde Handó, the wife of one of the founders of Fidesz, József Szájer, to head the Hungarian judicial system, proved the approach of Fidesz and Viktor Orbán to judicial independence (Rozenberg, 2012; Kirchick 2017, 59). Fidesz, which gained the power to change the constitution on its own by winning the 'super majority' in the parliament in the 2010 election, accepted the new constitution in the Hungarian Parliament on January 1, 2012²⁸⁹ (Dempsey, 2011). However, since the new constitution Fidesz created and accepted in the Hungarian Parliament, was accepted without any unanimity (without the opinion of the opposition) and without any referendum. This situation was evaluated as a kind of 'constitutional coup' (Bozoki, 2015; Toth, 2015). So much so that, the liberal constitutional understanding of democracy based on the principle of impartiality has left its place to a conflicting understanding of constitution and state that polarises society and politics. The most important changes made in the new constitution, which was also criticised by the Venice Commission²⁹⁰, were as follows: amendments to the law on the election of the president of the constitutional court by the Hungarian Parliament, not by the members of the constitutional court, amendments to the law on changing the rules of candidacy for judges, and a change in the law on lowering the retirement age of judges and prosecutors to 62²⁹¹.

In accordance with the new constitution prepared and adopted by Fidesz, it was decided to retire many judges and prosecutors in Hungary, to increase the number of judges in the Constitutional Court from 11 to 15, and that all members of the Constitutional Court to be elected by the Hungarian Parliament. Fidesz, which held the 'super majority' of the Hungarian

²⁸⁸ The Hungarian Constitutional Court, which was established as a result of the 'Round Table Discussions' in 1989, was a product of the democratic transition process. For this reason, the Hungarian Constitutional Court had an active and important position in Hungarian politics. So much so that, the Hungarian Constitutional Court played a central role in the political debates that took place in Hungary from 1990 to the 2000s.

²⁸⁹ Hungary's first written constitution came into force in 1949. However, this constitution was created with a Marxist understanding that was not based on the principle of separation of powers and did not guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms (Fröhlich and Csink 2012, 426). Hungary, which was the only country among the Visegrad countries that did not make a new constitution after the transition period to democracy, was governed by making changes in the 1949 Constitution until 2012 (Vincze and Varju 2012, 439; Bayar 2012, 89).

²⁹⁰ The criticisms of the Venice Commission and the EU Parliament towards the new Hungarian Constitution were as follows: not including the opposition in the process of making the new constitution, making changes that jeopardise the independence of the judiciary in Hungary, presentation of Christianity as the main feature of the Hungarian people, and changes that endanger the press freedom (Venice Commission, 2011; 2013).

²⁹¹ As a result of these changes, the European Commission warned Hungary and thus Hungary had to make some concessions. Even though Fidesz took a step back in the criticism made about lowering the retirement age of the judges, the judges who were thought to be dissidents were purged based on legal regulation (Agh 2018, 39).

Parliament in this period, had the right to determine 12 of the members of the Constitutional Court after these amendments²⁹². In addition, after the constitutional amendments, the Constitutional Court's authority to oversee the executive power was reduced, all horizontal supervisory institutions that supervise the government were abolished, the powers of the parliament were limited, the independence of the judiciary was weakened, and the political pressure on the independent media was increased (Buzogany 2017, 1312). Apart from these developments, the 'administrative courts' (közigazgatási bíróságok) established in 2018 was another important change created by Fidesz in the Hungarian judicial system. So much so that in 2018, the administrative control of the constitutional court was abolished with these newly established 'administrative courts' under the control of the Ministry of Justice (Novak and Kingsley, 2018). In other words, this new constitution brought the judiciary under the control of Fidesz, and the principle of separation of powers in Hungary suffered greatly.

After the adoption of the new constitution, the power of criticism, impartiality and independence of the Hungarian Constitutional Court was removed and it became an institution that protects the government (Bozoki 2015, 18; Landau 2013, 209; Scheppele, 2015). Following these developments, it was decided to establish the 'National Judicial Office' (Országos Bírósági Hivatal), which is responsible for the personal rights of judges and is under the control of the government (Oğuz 2020, 32). After the changes made, illiberal democracy, which started to gain strength because of the damage to the rule of law in Hungary (Novak and Kingsley, 2018), seriously damaged the concepts such as 'State of Law', 'Human Rights' and 'Minority Rights' in Hungary, enabled Fidesz and Viktor Orbán to become a kind of 'ruler makers'²⁹³.

After adopting the new constitution, Fidesz managed to take the Supreme Election Board under its control and made extensive changes in the election system in Hungary in 2014 (Landau 2013, 10). The first change made in the new electoral system was the switch from the

²⁹² The structure of the constitutional court established after the transition to democracy was as follows before the newly made Hungarian Constitution in 2012: The Constitutional Court consists of 11 members. Candidates for the Constitutional Court are proposed by a committee of one member from each party in the Hungarian Parliament. The judges of the Constitutional Court can be chosen from among those who are experts in the field of law and have worked in the field of law for 20 years. Persons who have served in political parties and state administration institutions in the last four years cannot be elected as members of the Constitutional Court (Halmai 2002, 229-230).

²⁹³ Fidesz government followed a systematic method in its policies towards the judiciary. In this context, Fidesz launched a three-stage plan and aimed to completely control and seize the state apparatus, checks and balances systems in the first stage. In the second stage, Fidesz targeted the Hungarian judiciary. At this point, it was aimed to control and seize the Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Office of the Chief Prosecutor through political appointments (Agh 2018, 39). In the third stage, it was aimed to criticise international organisations and commissions that oppose these developments. The pressure produced in this way was rejected under the name of 'democracy' and in this context, the choice of the Hungarian people was highlighted.

double-round electoral system to the single-round electoral system, which rewards the strongest party or electoral alliance. This change caused the opposition parties, which became polarised and divided according to the result at the end of the first round, to eliminate the possibility of forming a coalition in the second round²⁹⁴. The second change made in the electoral system was the reduction of the number of deputies of the Hungarian Parliament, from 386 deputies to 199, the reduction of the number of constituencies from 176 to 106, and the redefinition of electoral districts (Sadecki 2014, 11; Bozoki, 2015, 20; Biro-Nagy 2017, 38-39). Due to these changes in the electoral system, Fidesz won the 2014 election despite losing votes and managed to retain the parliamentary majority it needed to change the constitution on its own (Scheppele 2014, 3). The new constitution, which was made without the opinion of the opposition and a referendum, constitutes one of the most important indicators of the competitive authoritarian transformation in Hungary.

Increasing his power over the state institutions through the new constitution, Viktor Orbán succeeded in increasing and consolidating his power over the institutions (especially the Office of the Chief Prosecutor, the Ombudsman, and the Court of Accounts) by appointing people close and loyal to him²⁹⁵ (Faris, 2015; Biro-Nagy, 2017). The new constitution also gave Viktor Orbán the right to arbitrarily dismiss public servants without reason (Bozoki 2015, 19). In addition, the new constitution increased the prime minister's powers, allowing the prime minister to dominate the entire institutional system. In other words, the new constitution handed over the control and the final word to the prime minister over the entire political system of Hungary.

3.6 Growing Corruption and Political Pressure on Civil Society and Academy

Populists, who have come to power aim to weaken, silence, and suppress civil society movements to weaken opposition movements (Müller, 2017). Populists try to put pressure on the groups and movements formed by specific segments of the society for certain purposes and

²⁹⁴ The electoral system established in Hungary after the democratic transition was as follows before it was changed: Of the 386 deputies of the Hungarian Parliament, 176 are elected from the single-member region system according to the majority system, 152 from the single-member region with proportional representation from the regions and the capital according to the party lists, and 58 from the national circles according to the party lists (Schackow 2014, 3-5).

²⁹⁵ For example, Fidesz representative György Matolcsy, who served as Minister of Economy between 1999-2002 (Bilefsky, 2013) and Minister of National Economy between 2010-2013, was appointed as the President of the Hungarian Central Bank in 2013 by Viktor Orbán (Than and Dunai, 2013).

try to prevent the emergence of current realities through pressure. These repression policies of populists against non-governmental organisations and facts can be clearly seen in the policies of Viktor Orbán and his party Fidesz (Bard, 2017). In particular, non-governmental organisations in Hungary, which have close relations with Western countries and are funded by Western countries, are pressured by Viktor Orbán and Fidesz with the accusation of 'treason'.

However, the pressure on facts in Hungary is not limited to suppressing non-governmental organisations only. Trying to put pressure on academics and universities, the Fidesz government and Viktor Orbán targeted the Central European University (CEU) supported by George Soros in two ways (Oğuz 2020, 34). Viktor Orbán, who wanted to take the independent, free, and critical academy under control, described especially the CEU and Soros, who financed the CEU, as threats to Hungary. Thus, criticised by Fidesz, Orbán and media outlets close to Orbán (such as Figyelo and Origo)²⁹⁶, CEU and Soros have become political targets in Hungary²⁹⁷ (Foer, 2019; Than and Szakacs, 2017; Walker, 2017).

Viktor Orbán also made an important change in the Hungarian Higher Education Law to control the independent, free, and critical Hungarian academy. In fact, with the change made within two weeks, it has become mandatory for foreign universities to have campuses both in Hungary and in their own countries²⁹⁸. Although the European Commission rejected this amendment to the Hungarian Higher Education Law, the Fidesz government did not repeal the law (Littlelaw, 2020; DW, 2020; EC.Europe, 2017), which forced CEU to move its Budapest campus to Vienna.

Hungary, which performed poorly in corruption as in other Visegrad countries, has moved to a very different stage in terms of corruption since 2010, compared to other Visegrad countries. So much so that increasing corruption and falling competition in Hungary were directly reflected in the country's corruption scores²⁹⁹. Increasing corruption and decreasing competition in Hungary can be clearly seen, especially in public tenders. The single bid for 36%

²⁹⁶ Although Figyelo stated that “CEU does not accept Hungarian students”, CEU rejected this news by stating that “40% of CEU's students are Hungarian” (CEU, 2017a). In addition, Origo accused CEU of fraud, saying that “CEU does not have program accreditation”, but this accusation was also denied by CEU (CEU, 2017b).

²⁹⁷ Especially after Soros's positive statements about immigrants, Viktor Orbán made Soros a target. Soros, who became the target of Viktor Orbán, was accused by Viktor Orbán of being the “planner of the refugee crisis in Hungary”. For this reason, Viktor Orbán launched anti-Soros campaigns all over Hungary.

²⁹⁸ According to this law, CEU, which only had a campus in Budapest, was required to have a campus in the USA as well.

²⁹⁹ Hungary Corruption Scores: 2010: 4.7, 2011: 4.6, 2012: 4.6, 2013: 4.7, 2014: 4.8, 2015: 5.0, 2016: 5.7, 2017: 6.6, 2018: 6.4, 2019: 7.0, 2020: 6.9 (out of 10) (Transparency Online). Competitiveness Index: 2010: 52, 2011: 48, 2012: 60, 2013: 63, 2014: 60, 2015: 63, 2016: 69, 2017: 60 (among 137 countries) (The World Bank).

of public tenders and the distribution of EU funds to people close to Fidesz reveals the growing irregularities and increasing corruption in Hungary (Toth and Hajdu, 2017). Lőrinc Mészáros, one of Viktor Orbán's close friends, single-handedly won 4.5% of the public tenders held between 2010 and 2016. Also, Viktor Orbán's other close friends, István Garancsi and Lajos Simicska, and Viktor Orbán's son-in-law, István Tiborcz, have been the most successful people in public tenders and finance since 2010 (Oğuz 2020, 33). On the other hand, Lajos Simicska, who won 11% of the public tenders in Hungary in 2013, was able to win only 0.1% of the public tenders in 2015, after falling out with Viktor Orbán (Martin 2017, 274). This situation (public aids, tax exemptions and credit opportunities for businessmen close to Fidesz and Viktor Orbán), which can be defined as the 'Mafia State' (Magyar, 2016) or 'Crony Capitalism' (Martin, 2017; Berend, 2020) in Hungary, seriously damages not only the competition in the market but also the competition in the political arena.

3.7 Control over Media

One of the common policies of competitive authoritarian regimes and traditional authoritarian regimes is the pressure policies that are tried to be created on the media³⁰⁰. The restructuring of the media in Hungary, where the competitive authoritarian regime developed, Viktor Orbán supporting the media members close and loyal to him, and the difficulties created by the state institutions for the opposition media organs clearly reveal that the freedom of the press has been violated in Hungary (Tok 2018, 95).

Fidesz, which won the 2010 election by gaining a 'super majority' in the parliament, started to increase the pressure on the independent state channels by enacting a new media law. First, Viktor Orbán, who appointed people close and loyal to himself as the head of state-affiliated media organisations, then decided to dismiss 1,600 people who worked in these channels and were described as opponent and started to violate the media pluralism and media independence in Hungary (Human Rights Watch, 2020; Dunai, 2018). The Fidesz government, which passed the 'Mass Media Act and Freedom of the Press Act' in 2010 to legitimise the increased pressure on the media, also allowed the establishment of a new Fidesz and Viktor Orbán-supported institution called the 'Media Council, the National Media and Information Communications

³⁰⁰ In the traditional authoritarian regime, the media is completely under the control of the state and the leader. In this regime, the media that broadcasts against the government are either banned or eliminated (Levitsky and Way 2002, 57).

Authority', of which president was elected by Viktor Orbán. The licensing control authority, content control authority, censorship authority and power to impose fines given to the newly created 'Media Council' (Médiatanács) both further strengthened and legitimised the pressure on the media in Hungary³⁰¹ (Haraszti, 2011; CMCS, 2011; Bozoki 2015, 20). Hungary was ranked 89th out of 180 countries in the 2020 media freedom index³⁰². Though the European Commission and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) strongly criticised the policies of increasing pressure against the media in Hungary. Therefore Viktor Orbán had to make some changes in the media law (RSF, 2020).

The oppressive policies against the independent media organisations, the government's support to the government supporter private channels³⁰³, the punishment and suppression of opposition channels, and the state channels becoming the propaganda tool of the party³⁰⁴ are indicators of the populist policies of Fidesz and Orbán in Hungary. The closure of the Népszabadság newspaper, which was opposed to Fidesz's policies, known for its socialist line and which had a 60-year publication history in Hungary, after publishing the corruption news of Fidesz in 2016 is an important example of this situation (Le, 2017; Baume, 2016). Another example is Klubrádió, which was closed despite the license renewal application being accepted³⁰⁵ (Wesolowsky, 2020).

In addition to intervening in the media through the Media Council, Viktor Orbán appointed people close to him as the head of media outlets and created opportunities for people close to him to buy media outlets (Bajomi-Lazar 2017, 167; Batory 2016, 294). For example, Gábor Széles, known for his closeness to Viktor Orbán, bought the newspaper Magyar Hírlap and founded the channel Echo TV³⁰⁶ (Gorondi, 2016). Also, Figyelo was bought by Mária Schmidt,

³⁰¹ The duties and powers of this institution are clearly stated in Article 187 of the Media and Press Law (NMHH 2011, 102-103). Viktor Orbán succeeded in suppressing dissident voices in the media through the 'Media Council'.

³⁰² Hungary ranked 73rd in 2018 and 87th in 2019 in the media freedom Index ranking (RSF, 2018; 2019).

³⁰³ By placing public advertisements on private channels that support and sympathise with Fidesz, Viktor Orbán manages to maintain their commitment to power (Batorfy and Urban, 2019). In this way, Fidesz and Viktor Orbán transfer public resources to media organs that support them and also succeed in limiting the public's access to opposition media organs (Palonen 2018, 8).

³⁰⁴ Hungarian Public Television (Magyar Televízió, MTV) is the most dramatic example of this situation. So much so that after the pressure on the media, MTV reduced the time it allocated to the opposition and allocated 83% of its broadcasts to the government. In addition, Hungarian State Radio (Magyar Rádió, MR) allocated only 19% of its broadcasts to the opposition (Bajomi-Lazar 2012, 83-84).

³⁰⁵ This decision caused intense protests in Budapest (Lendvai 2012, 220).

³⁰⁶ Széles sold Echo TV to Lőrinc Mészáros, close to Orbán, with the promise to continue to support right-wing policies (Gorondi, 2016).

who is known for her closeness to Viktor Orbán³⁰⁷ (Öney, 2017). In addition, 'Origo' was sold to a company affiliated to Fidesz and personnel changes were made after this sale (Novak, 2015). With the 'common news policy' that started to be implemented in the media after people close to Viktor Orbán became media moguls, it was ensured that news would praise Fidesz and Viktor Orbán and blame everything Fidesz and Viktor Orbán were against (Byrne, 2016; Simon and Racz, 2017).

Media under Viktor Orbán's control contribute to Viktor Orbán's competitive authoritarian transformation in Hungary by making propaganda against all opposition figures, groups, institutions, and organisations that Fidesz and Viktor Orbán define as 'enemies'. In this way, the media, which gave public legitimacy to Viktor Orbán's propagandas, has been reporting against immigrants and the opposition, which Fidesz and Viktor Orbán define as 'enemies' since 2015 (Messing and Bernath, 2016).

³⁰⁷ After Schmidt purchased Figyelo, an independent weekly economy magazine, she got involved in editorial issues and appointed three important persons of Fidesz as the head of the magazine, causing all the archives of the magazine to be deleted (Öney, 2017).

Conclusion

All the cases examined in the previous thesis sections show that radical right does not consist of only radical right movements. The changing strategies of the mainstream parties, their electoral rivalries with the radical right³⁰⁸, their attitudes towards the radical right, their agenda-setting and implementation strategies, discourse changes and all the ideological changes they experience play a significant role in understanding the radical right. Especially the positive/negative approach of the mainstream parties to the radical right affects the existence of the radical right in the system (Downs 2001, 23). Mainstream movements that have a positive attitude towards the radical right can adopt the ideas, policies, discourses, and ideologies of the radical right, choose radical right parties as coalition partners, bring radical right parties to the agenda, and change their positions using the populist language of the radical right. In this case, mainstream parties legitimise and support the policies of radical right parties³⁰⁹. On the other hand, mainstream parties that have a negative attitude towards the radical right can preserve the cordon sanitaire and distance the radical right from the political system and the political system from the radical right.


One of the most important factors that put the right-wing movements in competition with each other in the voter competition is the supply-demand relationship, which constitutes the expectations (Markowski and Enyedi, 2011) of the right-wing voters in the country from the parties and ideologies. What do voters in the country expect from right-wing policies? What is the ideological view of right-wing voters? How should the right-wing party present itself to meet the expectations of the demanding voters?

In this case, three different situations can arise. According to the first situation, due to the voters showing more demand for the mainstream, mainstream parties can bring themselves closer to the centre and leave the ends of the political spectrum empty. In this case, the decrease in the political differences between the mainstream right and mainstream left parties may lead to the erosion of the determining elements of the right-wing and left-wing (like choosing

³⁰⁸ The rivalry between the two ideologies begins when the mainstream party realises that it has lost its voters to the radical right. During this election competition, the mainstream politicises the important to the electorate and begins to imitate the policies and discourses of the radical right to win back the voters they lost to the radical right. This situation likens the mainstream right to the radical right and centralises the radical right.

³⁰⁹ Another situation to which the radical right owes its success is that it can ask questions that mainstream parties cannot ask. These questions are often based on economic inequalities, unemployment, job security, immigration, social cohesion, religious tradition, and identity. The fact that the questions that the mainstream right and left parties have not been able to ask and answer for years are boldly brought to the political scene by the radical right brings European voters closer to the radical right parties.

between Coca-Cola and Pepsi) (Müller 2017, 53). In this case, the disappearance of political differences may result in the voters being dragged into radical wings that are different from mainstream politics. In the political spectrum where the political differences between the right-wing and left-wing parties have disappeared, radical parties that fill the radical ends left empty by the mainstream can find a place for themselves in the political system and attract a certain mass of voters. So:




(Figure 8) Parties’ Changes 1

According to the second situation, mainstream parties can become the catch-all parties of the right-wing and the left-wing by expanding their politics towards the radical ends in line with the voters' demands. In this case, mainstream parties, which can form a policy and discourse appealing to radical voters, may limit the radical right and radical left's development and existence. In other words, the mainstream-right party, which wants to win the votes of the radical right voters, can assume the representation of the radical right by shifting its policy, discourse, and ideology to the radical right. Due to the radical right representation undertaken


by the mainstream-right the existence and development of radical right movements in these countries can be restricted. In other words, the mainstream-right party can shift its policy, discourse, and ideology to the radical right to get more votes when there is no radical right threat in the country. Celep (2009, 182) defines this situation as 'preemption'.

In this case, since the mainstream parties, which are the catch-all parties of the right-wing and the left-wing, will include radical politics and discourses, it would not be correct to limit the radical right and the radical left as radical right and radical left movements. In other words, the absence of a radical right movement in a country does not mean that there are no radical ideas in that country. So:



(Figure 9) Parties' Changes 2

According to the third situation, in countries where the existence of the radical right and the voting rate is strong, the mainstream-right can move its policy, discourse and ideology closer to the radical right in order not to lose votes to them. In other words, the mainstream-right party can shift its policies to the radical right when there is a threat of the radical right in the country. Celep (2009, 183) defines this situation as 'accommodation'. So:



(Figure 10) Parties' Changes 3

In the second and third situations, the mainstream right stands closer to the radical right, bringing itself closer to the right-wing. The mainstream's shifting its policy, discourse, and ideology to the right-wing in both cases gives legitimacy to radical right ideas and causes an increase in authoritarian tendencies. The most important situation that needs to be considered together in both cases is that while the mainstream right approaches the radical right, it does this not as a radical right party but by preserving its mainstream right identity. In other words, the real danger is not the strength of the radical right in its own region but the convergence of the mainstream with the radical right. For this reason, the third situation constitutes the main dangerous situation.



Because in the last period, mostly mainstream parties have embraced the attractive discourse and ideology of the radical right and included them in their party politics to attract the radical right voters who are at the radical end of the political spectrum. This state of inclusion reveals how mainstream right parties adopt the politics and discourses of radical right parties (Rydgren 2005, 429). Accepting of the policies and discourses of the radical right by the mainstream right is neither a problem related to the Visegrad countries nor is it a phenomenon that belongs only to conservative parties (Bale, Green-Pedersen, Krouwel, Luther and Sitter, 2010). The first examples of this situation emerged with the adoption of the radical right policies and discourses

on the immigration issue by Western European mainstream right parties after 1980³¹⁰ (Minkenberg, 2001; Bale, 2003). Studies on this subject show that the adoption of the radical right policies and discourses by the mainstream right parties decreases the vote rate of the radical right while increasing the vote rate of the mainstream parties (Meguid, 2005; Schain, 2006). In other words, both conservative and radical right voters tend to vote for mainstream right parties that try to include all right-wing voters and adopt the radical right policies and discourses. In this case, although the mainstream right may move away from the mainstream line by accepting the radical right policies, it can attract the voters of the radical right party, destroy the radical right party, and allow the mainstream right party to become the 'catch all' party of the right-wing (Meguid, 2005).

The most crucial point of this situation is that the mainstream right parties form a coalition with the radical right parties. In other words, the government or election coalition formed by a mainstream party with another party on the radical right results in favour of the mainstream party and can push the coalition partner of the radical right out of the political arena because the voters of the radical right party, which is weaker than the mainstream right in terms of voter rate, may tend to shift to the stronger mainstream right party that adopts the radical right rhetoric and policies it supports. Visegrad countries offer us examples of this situation³¹¹. For example:


³¹⁰ In the 1980s, radical right parties, policies and discourses began to gain power in Western Europe and succeed in national elections.

³¹¹ Though not as much as the radical right parties in Western European countries, the policies of the conservative parties in the Visegrad countries show that the radical right parties and politics have gained power in the national elections. However, the radical right-shifting policies of the conservative parties in the Visegrad countries cannot provide the same effect for all Visegrad countries. For example, conservative PiS in Poland and conservative Fidesz in Hungary attract voters on the radical right of the political spectrum, while the same cannot be said for Smer in Slovakia (Pytlas, 2009).



PiS – LPR – SRP Government Coalition in 2005

Poland 2007 Election:




(Figure 11) Polish Parties' Changes based on Elections between 2005-2007

(Stanley, Markowski and Czesnik 2019, 4-5)


Leaders and parties need to be analysed very well to understand this danger because leaders and parties can appear democratic at first and then change. They can protect this change under a mask or a camouflage. For this reason, the relations of parties and leaders with democratic principles and democratic institutions and their stance towards the judiciary and the media can at least provide us with information about the party and the leader. However, there are exceptions to this situation. In other words, parties or leaders that are considered not to pose a threat to democracy, institutions, judiciary, and media before or after coming to power may differ in their policies after they are elected or after they come to power. These differences can

have many reasons. Some of these may be the desire to win votes, increase power, control, political ambition, and the desire to regain voters' interest in the party.


As stated earlier in the thesis, Fidesz, under the leadership of Viktor Orbán, is an excellent example of this situation. Adopting democratic principles when it was founded, Fidesz has undergone a 180-degree change after 2010. Especially after 2010, the amendments made by Fidesz and Orbán in the constitution, the damage done to the principle of separation of powers, the pressures on the judiciary, media, civil society, and institutions make it clear that Fidesz has moved away from the democratic principles on which it was first established. Fidesz got closer to the party on its right after every election it won or lost after its establishment, adopted its policies, discourses and ideologies and formed coalitions with them and has become the 'catch all' party of the right-wing by attracting the voters of the parties on its right. So much so that, after 2010, Fidesz managed to attract Jobbik's voters by copying the policies of Jobbik, the only party on the radical right, and forced Jobbik to change places in the political spectrum. Although Jobbik still has some radical ideas today, it moved towards the mainstream right/conservative wing that was emptied by Fidesz and is less radical compared to 2010. So:




(Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski and Toka 1999, 251)




Hungarian 1998 Election




Hungarian 2010 Election



Hungarian Right-Wing Parties after 2010






(Figure 12) Hungarian Parties' Changes based on Elections between 1990-2020

Fidesz's shift to the right-wing after the 1990s is in line with both the second and the third situations mentioned above. According to these situations, Fidesz was founded as a liberal party. However, afterwards, Fidesz got closer to right-wing parties and brought its politics, discourse, and ideology closer to the right-wing. So much so that by 2010, Fidesz was even closer to the right-wing, despite Jobbik. Jobbik, which realised that it lost its political position and voters to Fidesz, changed its place in the political spectrum and got closer to the mainstream right. This has allowed Fidesz to become the 'catch all' party of the right-wing, which includes both conservative and radical voters. As can be seen in the example of Hungary, Fidesz, that internalised the populist radical right policies, uses the populist interpretation of the democratic ideal as a tool to legitimise these policies. Especially using populism as a descriptive notion of democracy, Fidesz tries to usurp the representation rights of other Hungarian parties by defining them as 'evil villains' and 'parties that are manipulated by internal and external enemies'. The illiberal interpretation of the democratic ideal empowers the ruling Fidesz to de-legitimize the separation of powers and the rule of law. In particular, the mainstream parties competing with Fidesz could not prevent the populist usurpation of the democratic ideal in Hungary. The delayed and insufficient policies against the populist policies that developed after the democratic transition legitimised the filling of the dispersed system in Hungary by the populists and formed the key point of the illiberal transformation initiated by Fidesz in Hungary.

Although Fidesz's politics, discourse and ideology have shifted to the right-wing and its electoral profile has changed, Fidesz still defines itself as a mainstream right party today (Fidesz.hu, 2020). In other words, in theory, Fidesz is a mainstream right-wing party and a right-wing populist party close to the radical line in practice. Since this change and transformation of Fidesz displays a view far from a simple transformation, this situation requires a special definition. Fidesz's differences in theory and practice, and the party's shift

from mainstream to the right-wing, lead us to a new term that we need to define/name both Fidesz and other parties displaying these characteristics.

These parties, whose politics, discourse, and ideology have shifted to the radical right, even though they define themselves as mainstream right, can be defined as 'Disguised Parties'. While the parties included/will be included in this definition aspire to the vote of the mainstream elector in theory, it also attracts the voters of the radical right in practice. This situation can be explained mainly in terms of Fidesz, which was examined in depth throughout the thesis. So:



(Figure 13) Theoretical and Practical Differences of Fidesz


In this case, for a party to be named as a 'Disguised Party', the party should be directing its position, policy, discourse, and ideology towards the radical right in practice differently from its previous position and stating that it maintains its old position in theory while making this shift. According to this definition, it is possible to define Fidesz as a 'Disguised Party', which differs in theory and practice and makes a political, discursive, and ideological shift from mainstream right to radical right. As a 'Disguised Party', Fidesz mainstreams radical politics by associating the radical policies it practically approaches with its theoretical mainstream right. On the other hand, mainstreamed radical policies affect the entire political sphere of Hungary and make Hungarian politics authoritarian. Also, Viktor Orbán's recent policies are clearly anti-democracy, based on Juan Linz's 'litmus test' proposition³¹² (Linz 1978, 29-30).

³¹² Juan Linz's 'litmus test' is a proposition that helps identify politicians who have dictatorial tendencies or are prone to dictatorial tendencies. According to this, if the leader's discourses and policies reject democratic rules, if the leader refuses to accept opposition, condones violence and tries to restrict the freedom of the media and civil society, this is a matter of concern (Linz 1978, 27-38).

➡ : Change in the Political Position of the Party
← : Change in Voters' Position

The main point to be noted is that the negative effects on liberal democracy do not originate only from radical right parties. Especially the radical right's ability to set the agenda and use identity politics and exclusionary discourses seriously harm liberal democratic principles. At this point, the acceptance, internalisation and legitimation of the policies and discourses of the radical right by the mainstream connects the rings of the chain necessary for the illiberal transformation of liberal democracy. In this context, it can be said that liberal democracy in Hungary is not damaged directly by the radical right parties but by the mainstream, which internalises the policies and discourses of the radical right and succeeds in blending it with the anti-modernist illiberal narrative.

In other words, examining the radical right only in terms of radical right movements gives very misleading results. Focusing only on the votes, rhetoric and stances of radical right parties can mislead us because the radical right does not only consist of radical right parties. As mentioned before, there are mainstream parties close to the radical right, legitimising the radical right and accepting/supporting the exclusionary and authoritarian ideas and ideologies of the radical right. The conclusion is that the political supply-demand relationship shifts to the right-wing.



(Figure 14) Authoritarianisation of Parties and Society

For this reason, mainstream movements employ a strategy in which radical right themes increase in their policies, discourses, and ideologies. This situation reveals that the main current is shifting to the right-wing. Worse still, although radical right movements are strong today, mainstream parties advertise the political influence of the radical right, and these advertisements empower the radical right. This strategy, pursued by the mainstream, is more effective than the radical right because the mainstream movements are coming to power. Thus, radical right ideas come to the fore more easily by mainstream movements.

One of the biggest questions of our day is how to prevent the rise of radical right and right populism and how to make changes. Although it is difficult to answer this question, the first thing to do is to ensure that mainstream parties, independent institutions, constitutions, and independent law continue to protect democracy because leaders and parties with radical tendencies can be prevented from gaining power only in this way. For this reason, the most important thing for the mainstream parties to do is to completely exclude radicalism from both social life and the political arena. Therefore, instead of accepting radical ideas, mainstream parties should exclude members with a radical mindset from their parties³¹³, avoid possible coalitions with radical parties, and distance the radical right from politics (Barneo 2003, 238; Ceaser 1982, 84-87). The only way for mainstream parties to achieve this is through a successful and established understanding of democracy, the unification and cooperation of the mainstream against radicalism³¹⁴ because radical movements develop or regress to the extent of the responses that the mainstream and liberal democracy can produce.

³¹³ Like the German CDU party distancing itself from the radicals after the Second World War.

³¹⁴ For example, the conservative-green alliance against Norbert Hofer in the 2016 Austrian election and the François Fillon-Emmanuel Macron alliance against Le Pen in the 2017 French election.

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Conservative Parties and Liberal Conservative, Christian Democrat and National Conservative Politics and Elections

States	Conservative Parties	Liberal Conservative	Christian Democrat	National Conservative	Social Conservative	Turnout % and Total Number of MEPS
Austria	ÖVP and FPÖ*	NONE	1999: 26.9% (52 MEPS)	1999: 26.9% (52 MEPS)	NONE	1999: 80.4%-183
			2002: 42.3% (79 MEPS)	2002: 40.0% (18 MEPS)		2002: 84.3%-183
			2006: 34.3% (66 MEPS)	2006: 11.0% (21 MEPS)		2006: 78.5%-183
			2008: 26.0% (51 MEPS)	2008: 17.5% (34 MEPS)		2008: 78.8%-183
Belgium	N-VA**, PP*, CD&V and CHD	N-VA** and PP* 2003: 3.1% (1 MEP) and NONE 2007: 18.5%*** (5 MEPS)*** with CD&V and NONE	2003: 13.3% (21 MEPS) and 5.5% (8 MEPS)	2003: 14.3%*** (31 MEPS)*** with US-DEU (US)	NONE	2003: 91.6%-150
			2007: 18.5%*** (30 MEPS) and 6.1% (10 MEPS)	2006: 7.2% (13 MEPS)		2007: 91.3%-150
			2010: 10.9% (17 MEPS) and 5.5% (9 MEPS)	2010: 4.4% (8 MEPS)		2010: 87.2%-150
			2014: 11.6% (18 MEPS) and 5.0% (9 MEPS)	2013: 20.5% (40 MEPS)		2014: 88.5%-150
Belgium	N-VA**, PP*, CD&V and CHD	2019: 16.0% (25 MEPS) and 1.1% (0 MEP)	2019: 37.5% (71 MEPS)	2017: 26.0% (51 MEPS)	NONE	2019: 90.0%-150
			2009: 8.9% (12 MEPS) and 3.7% (5 MEPS)	2019: 16.2% (31 MEPS)		2017: 79.5%-183
			2009: NOT PARTICIPATED (NP)	2019: 16.2% (31 MEPS)		2019: 75.6%-183
			2013: NP	2019: 16.2% (31 MEPS)		2019: 75.6%-183
Bulgaria	RB, VMRO-BND and GERB	NONE	2009: NOT PARTICIPATED (NP)	VMRO-BND 2009: 4.1%*** (0 MEP)*** with RZS	GERB and RB 2009: 39.7% (116 MEPS)	2009: 60.2%-240
			2013: NP	2013: 1.9% (0 MEP)	2013: 30.5% (97 MEPS)	2013: 51.3%-240
			2014: 8.9% (23 MEPS)	2014: 7.3%*** (8 MEPS)*** with NPSB (PF)	2014: 32.7% (84 MEPS)	2014: 51.1%-240
			2017: 3.1% (0 MEP)	2017: 9.1%*** (11 MEPS)*** with NPSB and ATAKA	2017: 32.7% (95 MEPS)	2017: 54.1%-240
Croatia	HDZ, HSLS, HDS, MOST, HOSSEB**** and DP	HSLS and MOST 2007: 6.4%*** (2 MEP)*** with HSS and NP 2011: 3.0% (0 MEP) and NP	HDZ and HDS 2007: 36.0% (66 MEPS) and NP 2011: 23.4% (47 MEPS) and NP	HOSSEB**** and DP 2007: 1.8% (3 MEPS) and NP 2011: 2.9% (6 MEPS) and NP	NONE	2007: 59.5%-133
			2015: 33.4%*** (2 MEPS)*** with HDZ and HDS and 13.5% (19 MEPS)	2015: 1.4% (2 MEPS) and NP		2011: 54.3%-151
			2016: 36.3%*** (1 MEP)*** with HDZ and HDS and 9.9% (13 MEPS)	2016: 1.3% (1 MEP) and NP		2015: 60.8%-151
			2020: 37.3%*** (66 MEPS)*** with HDZ and HOSSEB and 7.4% (8 MEPS)	2020: 37.3%*** (66 MEPS)*** with HSLS and HOSSEB and 0.2% (1 MEP)		2020: 46.4%-151
Cyprus	DISY and KA (EVROKO)	NONE	DISY 1996: 34.5% (20 MEPS)	KA (EVROKO) 1996: NP	NONE	1996: 90.1%-80
			2001: 34.0% (19 MEPS)	2001: 3.0% (1 MEP)		2001: 91.8%-80
			2006: 30.3% (18 MEPS)	2006: 5.8% (3 MEPS)		2006: 89.0%-80
			2011: 34.3% (20 MEPS)	2011: 3.9% (2 MEPS)		2011: 78.7%-80
Czechia	ODS*****, TOP09, STAN and KDU-CSL	ODS***** and TOP 09 and STAN 2002: 24.5% (58 MEPS) NP and NP 2006: 35.4% (81 MEPS) NP and NP	ODS***** and TOP 09 and STAN 2002: 14.3%*** (31 MEPS)*** with US-DEU (US)	NONE	2002: 58.0%-200	
			2010: 20.2% (53 MEPS), 16.7% (41 MEPS) and NP		2006: 64.5%-200	2010: 62.6%-200
			2013: 7.7% (16 MEPS), 12.0% (28 MEPS) and NP		2013: 6.8% (14 MEPS)	2013: 59.5%-200
			2017: 11.3% (25 MEPS), 5.3% (7 MEPS) and 5.2% (6 MEPS)		2017: 5.8% (10 MEPS)	2017: 60.8%-200

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

	FI and NCI	CP, SVP (SVP-PARTT), UDC (NCI), FI and NCI	FDI (ANI)	UDC (NCI)
Italy	2001: 29.4% (194 MEPS) and NP	2001: NP and 0.5% (3 MEPS)	2001: 12.0% (99 MEPS)	2001: 3.2% (41 MEPS)
	2006: 23.7% (140 MEPS) and NP	2006: NP and 0.5% (4 MEPS)	2006: 12.3% (72 MEPS)	2006: 6.8% (39 MEPS)
	2008: 37.4% (276 MEPS) and NP	2008: NP and 0.4% (2 MEPS)	2008: NP	2008: 5.6% (35 MEPS)
	2013: 21.6% (98 MEPS) and NP	2013: NP and 0.4% (5 MEPS)	2013: 2.0% (9 MEPS)	2013: 1.8% (8 MEPS)
Latvia	2018: 14.0% (106 MEPS) and 1.3% (4 MEPS)	2018: 0.5% (2 MEPS) and 0.4% (4 MEPS)	2018: 4.4% (31 MEPS)	2018: NP
	IV and JKP	NA* (TB/LVNNK)	NA* (TB/LVNNK)	NSL
	2006: NP and NP	2006: NP	2006: 6.9% (8 MEPS)	2006: NP
	2010: NP and NP	2010: NP and NP	2010: 7.7% (8 MEPS)	2010: NP
Lithuania	2014: 21.9% (23 MEPS) and 0.7% (0 MEPS)	2014: 16.6% (17 MEPS)	2014: 13.9% (14 MEPS)	2014: 6.9% (7 MEPS)
	2018: 6.7% (8 MEPS) and 13.6% (16 MEPS)	2018: 16.6% (17 MEPS)	2018: 16.6% (17 MEPS)	2018: 0.8% (0 MEPS)
	LT	TS-LKD and LURA		
	2004: TT 11.4% (10 MEPS) and LLS 9.2% (18)	2004: 14.7% (25 MEPS) and 3.8% (2 MEPS)		
Lux.	2008: TT 12.7% (15 MEPS) and LLS 5.3% (8 MEPS)	2008: 19.6% (44 MEPS) and 4.8% (3 MEPS)	NONE	NONE
	2012: TT 7.3% (11 MEPS) and LLS 2.1% (0 MEPS)	2012: 15.1% (33 MEPS) and 5.8% (8 MEPS)		
	2016: 7.5% (8 MEPS)	2016: 21.7% (31 MEPS) and 5.5% (8 MEPS)		
	2020: 2.0% (1 MEPS)	2020: 24.8% (50 MEPS) and 4.8% (3 MEPS)		
Malta	NONE	CSV	ADR	NONE
		1999: 30.1% (19 MEPS)	1999: 11.3% (7 MEPS)	
		2004: 36.1% (24 MEPS)	2004: 10.0% (5 MEPS)	
		2009: 38.0% (26 MEPS)	2009: 8.1% (4 MEPS)	
Netherlands	2013: 33.7% (23 MEPS)	2013: 6.6% (3 MEPS)	2013: 6.6% (3 MEPS)	
	2018: 28.3% (21 MEPS)	2018: 8.3% (4 MEPS)	2018: 8.3% (4 MEPS)	
	PN	PN		
	1998: 51.8% (35 MEPS)	2003: 51.8% (35 MEPS)		
Poland	2008: 49.3% (35 MEPS)	2008: 49.3% (35 MEPS)		
	2013: 43.3% (30 MEPS)	2013: 43.3% (30 MEPS)		
	2017: 43.7% (28 MEPS)	2017: 43.7% (28 MEPS)		
	PO	PSL	PS	PS
Portugal	1997: 7.3% (27 MEPS)	1997: 7.3% (27 MEPS)	1997: NP	1997: 47.9%-460
	2001: 12.7% (65 MEPS)	2001: 9.0% (42 MEPS)	2001: 9.5% (44 MEPS)	2001: 40.2%-460
	2005: 24.1% (133 MEPS)	2005: 7.0% (25 MEPS)	2005: 27.0% (135 MEPS)	2005: 40.6%-460
	2007: 41.5% (209 MEPS)	2007: 8.9% (31 MEPS)	2007: 32.1% (156 MEPS)	2007: 53.8%-460
Portugal (PSD/CDS-PP) and CSD-PP	2011: 39.2% (207 MEPS)	2011: 8.4% (28 MEPS)	2011: 29.9% (157 MEPS)	2011: 48.9%-460
	2015: 24.1% (138 MEPS)	2015: 5.1% (16 MEPS)	2015: 37.6% (235 MEPS)	2015: 50.9%-460
	2019: 27.4%*** (134 MEPS)*** with N	2019: 8.6% (30 MEPS)	2019: 43.6% (235 MEPS)	2019: 61.7%-460
	PSD (PSD/CDS-PP)	CDS-PP		
Portugal	2005: 28.7% (75 MEPS)	2005: 10.4% (21 MEPS)		2005: 64.0%-230
	2009: 29.1% (81 MEPS)	2009: 10.4% (21 MEPS)		2009: 59.7%-230
	2011: 38.7% (108 MEPS)	2011: 11.7% (24 MEPS)		2011: 58.1%-230
	2015: 38.6%*** (89 MEPS)*** with CSD-PP	2015: 38.6%*** (89 MEPS)*** with PSD		2015: 55.9%-230
Portugal	2019: 27.8% (79 MEPS)	2019: 4.2% (5 MEPS)		2019: 48.6%-230

		PNL, PDL (ARD) and PMP	PDL (ARD) and PMP			
Romania	PNL, PMP and PDL (ARD)	2004: 31.5%*** (54 MEPS) *** with PDL	2004: 31.5%*** (48 MEPS) *** with PNL and NP	NONE	NONE	2004: 58.5%***
		2008: 18.6% (65 MEPS)	2008: 32.4% (115 MEPS) and NP			2008: 39.2%***
		2012: 58.6%*** (100 MEPS) *** with PSD, PC and UNPR (USL 273 MEPS Total)	2012: 16.5% (56 MEPS) and NP			2012: 41.8%***
		2016: 20.0% (69 MEPS)	2016: NP and 5.4% (18 MEPS)			2016: 39.8%***
		2020: 25.2% (93 MEPS)	2020: NP and 4.8% (0 MEPS)			2020: 33.2%***
		SPOLU, MH and SIET	OLIANO, SIET and KDH	SR and SNS	KDH, OLIANO and SR	
		1998: NP and NP	1998: NP and NP	1998: NP and 9.1% (14 MEPS)	1998: 26.3%*** (42 MEPS) *** with SDK	1998: 84.2%***
		2002: NP and NP	2002: NP and NP	2002: NP and 3.3% (0 MEPS)	2002: 8.3% (15 MEPS)	2002: 70.0%***
		2006: NP and NP	2006: NP and NP	2006: NP and 11.7% (20 MEPS)	2006: 8.3% (14 MEPS)	2006: 54.7%***
		2010: NP and 8.1% (14 MEPS)	2010: NP and NP	2010: NP and 5.1% (9 MEPS)	2010: 8.5% (15 MEPS)	2010: 58.8%***
		2012: NP and 6.9% (13 MEPS)	2012: NP and 4.6% (0 MEPS)	2012: NP and 4.6% (0 MEPS)	2012: 8.8% (16 MEPS)	2012: 59.1%***
		2016: NP and 6.5% (11 MEPS)	2016: 11.0%*** (19 MEPS) *** with NOVA (21 MEPS Total) and 5.5% (10 MEPS)	2016: 6.6% (11 MEPS) and 8.6% (15 MEPS)	2016: 4.9% (0 MEPS)	2016: 59.8%***
		2020: 7.0%*** (0 MEPS) *** with PS and 2.1% (0 MEPS)	2020: 25.0% (53 MEPS) and NP	2020: 8.2% (17 MEPS) and 3.2% (0 MEPS)	2020: 4.7% (0 MEPS)	2020: 65.8%***
			NSI	SDS (SDSS)	NSI	
			2004: 9.1% (9 MEPS)	2004: 29.1% (29 MEPS)	2004: 60.6%***	
			2008: 3.4% (0 MEPS)	2008: 29.3% (28 MEPS)	2008: 63.1%***	
			2011: 4.8% (4 MEPS)	2011: 26.3% (26 MEPS)	2011: 64.7%***	
			2014: 5.6% (5 MEPS)	2014: 20.7% (21 MEPS)	2014: 51.7%***	
			2018: 7.1% (7 MEPS)	2018: 24.9% (25 MEPS)	2018: 52.1%***	
			PP, EAL-PNV*** and UPN (NA+)*****	VOX*		
			2011: 44.6%*** (186 MEPS) *** with UPN (NA+), 1.3% (5 MEPS) and 44.6%*** (2 MEPS) *** with PP	2011: NP		2011: 68.9%***
			2015: 28.7%*** (123 MEPS) *** with UPN (NA+), 1.2% (6 MEPS) and 28.7% (2 MEPS) *** with PP	2015: 0.2% (0 MEPS)		2015: 69.7%***
			2016: 33.0%*** (137 MEPS) *** with UPN (NA+), 1.2% (5 MEPS) and 33.0% (2 MEPS) *** with PP	2016: 0.2% (0 MEPS)		2016: 66.5%***
			2019(1): 16.7% (66 MEPS), 1.5% (6 MEPS) and 0.4% (2 MEPS)	2019(1): 10.3% (24 MEPS)		2019(1): 71.8%***
			2019(2): 20.8% (88 MEPS), 1.6% (7 MEPS) and 0.4% (2 MEPS)	2019(2): 15.1% (52 MEPS)		2019(2): 69.9%***
			M	SD*		
			2002: 15.3% (55 MEPS)	2002: 1.4% (0 MEPS)		2002: 80.1%***
			2006: 26.2% (97 MEPS)	2006: 6.6% (24 MEPS)		2006: 82.0%***
			2010: 30.1% (107 MEPS)	2010: 5.6% (19 MEPS)		2010: 84.6%***
			2014: 23.3% (84 MEPS)	2014: 12.9% (49 MEPS)		2014: 85.8%***
			2018: 19.8% (70 MEPS)	2018: 17.5% (62 MEPS)		2018: 87.1%***
			CON*****	DUP		
			2005: 32.3% (197 MEPS)	2005: 0.9% (9 MEPS)		2005: 61.4%***
			2010: 36.1% (307 MEPS)	2010: 0.6% (8 MEPS)		2010: 65.1%***
			2015: 36.9% (331 MEPS)	2015: 0.6% (8 MEPS)		2015: 66.1%***
			2017: 42.4% (318 MEPS)	2017: 0.9% (10 MEPS)		2017: 68.7%***
			2019: 43.6% (365 MEPS)	2019: 0.8% (8 MEPS)		2019: 67.3%***
			UK	DUP		
			CON***** and DUP	Check the National Conservative		
			2005: 61.4%***			2005: 61.4%***
			2010: 65.1%***			2010: 65.1%***
			2015: 66.1%***			2015: 66.1%***
			2017: 68.7%***			2017: 68.7%***
			2019: 67.3%***			2019: 67.3%***

*Right-wing Populism, **Separatism, ***Coalition, ****Regionalism, 5* Euroscepticism, 6*Gaulism

National Election Results of the Conservative Parties of the European Union Countries

Source: Own Elaboration based on PartiesandElections.eu (a)

APPENDIX B

Radical Right Parties and Right-Wing Populist, Nationalist and Eurosceptic Politics and Elections		States	Radical Right Parties	Right-Wing Populist	Nationalist	Eurosceptic	Turnout % and Total Number of MEPs		
Austria	FPÖ*			1999: 26.9% (52 MEPs)	FPÖ*	Check the Right-Wing Populist	1999: 80.4%-183		
				2002: 10.0% (18 MEPs)			2002: 84.3%-183		
				2006: 11.0% (21 MEPs)			2006: 78.5%-183		
				2008: 17.5% (34 MEPs)			2008: 78.8%-183		
				2013: 20.5% (40 MEPs)			2013: 74.9%-183		
				2017: 26.0% (51 MEPs)	Check the Right-Wing Populist	2017: 79.5%-183			
				2019: 16.2% (31 MEPs)		2019: 75.6%-183			
				pp and VB**		VB**	Check the Right-Wing Populist and Nationalist	2003: 91.6%-150	
				2003: NP					
				2007: NP					
Belgium	pp and VB**			2010: 1.3% (1 MEP)	2007: 12.0% (17 MEPs)	Check the Right-Wing Populist and Nationalist	2007: 91.3%-150		
				2014: 1.5% (1 MEP)			2010: 7.8% (12 MEPs)	2010: 87.2%-150	
				2019: 1.1% (0 MEP)			2014: 3.7% (3 MEPs)	2014: 88.5%-150	
				VMRO-BND* and BBC			2019: 12.0% (18 MEPs)	2019: 90.0%-150	
				2009: 4.1%*** (0 MEP) *** with RZS and NP			NFSB and ATAKA	BBC, NFSB and ATAKA	2009: 60.2%-240
Bulgaria	VMRO-BND*, NFSB, ATAKA and BBC			2013: 1.9% (0 MEP) and NP	2009: NP and 9.4% (21 MEPs)	For BBC check the Right-Wing Populist For NFSB and ATAKA check the Nationalist	2013: 51.3%-240		
				2014: 7.3%*** (8 MEPs)			2014: 7.3%*** (11 MEPs) *** with VBRO-BND (PF) and 4.5% (11 MEPs)	2014: 51.1%-240	
				2017: 9.1%*** (11 MEPs) *** with NFSB and ATAKA and NP			2017: 9.1%*** (9 MEPs) *** with VMRO-BND and ATAKA and 9.1%*** (7 MEPs) *** with VMRO-BND and NFSB	2017: 54.1%-240	
				Dp* and HDSSB*			HSP* (HSP-HKDU) and HDSSB*	ZZ****	2007: 59.5%-153
				2007: NP and 1.8% (3 MEPs)			2007: 3.4% (1 MEP)	2007: NP	2011: 54.3%-151
Croatia	HSP (HSP-HKDU)*, HDSSB*, ZZ**** and Dp*			2011: NP and 2.9% (6 MEPs)	2011: 3.0% (0 MEP)	2015: 4.2% (1 MEP)	2011: 60.8%-151		
				2015: NP and 1.4% (2 MEPs)			2015: 0.6% (0 MEP)	2016: 6.2% (8 MEPs)	
				2016: NP and 1.3% (1 MEP)			2016: 0.7% (0 MEP)	2020: 2.3% (0 MEP)	2016: 54.4%-151
				2020: 10.9% (16 MEPs) and 37.3% (66 MEPs)			2020: NP	SYPOL**** and ELAM	2020: 46.4%-151
				ELAM and SYPOL****			ELAM	1996: NP	1996: 90.1%-80
Cyprus	ELAM and SYPOL****			2001: NP	2001: NP	2006: NP	2001: 91.8%-80		
				NONE			2006: NP	2006: 89.0%-80	
				SPD and USVIT			2011: 1.1% (0 MEP)	2011: NP	2011: 78.7%-80
				2002: NP and NP			2016: 3.7% (2 MEPs)	2016: 66.7%-80	
				2006: NP and NP			NONE	ODS**** and SPD	2002: 58.0%-200
Czechia	SPD, USVIT and ODS****			2010: NP and NP	2013: 7.7% (16 MEPs)	2017: 11.3% (25 MEPs)	2002: 24.5% (58 MEPs)		
				2013: NP and 6.9% (14 MEPs)			2006: 35.4% (81 MEPs)	2006: 64.5%-200	
				2017: 10.6% (22 MEPs) and NP			2010: 20.2% (53 MEPs)	2010: 62.6%-200	
				DF*			2013: 7.7% (16 MEPs)	2013: 59.5%-200	
				2005: 13.3% (24 MEPs)			2017: 11.3% (25 MEPs)	2017: 60.8%-200	
Denmark	DF*, EL**** and NB*			2005: NP	2005: NP	EL**** and DF* and NB*	2005: 84.5%-179		
				2007: 13.9% (25 MEPs)			2007: 2.2% (4 MEPs)	2007: 86.5%-179	
				2011: 12.3% (23 MEPs)			2011: NP	2011: 87.7%-179	
				2015: 21.1% (37 MEPs)			2015: NP	2015: 85.8%-179	
				2019: 8.7% (16 MEPs)			2019: 2.4% (4 MEPs)	2019: 84.5%-179	

Estonia	EKRE* and EIP	2003: 13.0% (13 MEPs)	2003: 0.5% (0 MEP)	EKRE* and EIP	2003: 58.2%-101	
		2007: 7.1% (6 MEPs)	2007: 0.2% (0 MEP)		2007: 61.0%-101	
		2011: 2.1% (0 MEP)	2011: 0.4% (0 MEP)		2011: 62.9%-101	
		2015: 8.1% (7 MEPs)	2015: 0.2% (0 MEP)		2015: 64.2%-101	
Finland	PS (SMP)*	2019: 17.8% (19 MEPs)	2019: NP	PS (SMP)*	2019: 64.2%-101	
		PS (SMP)*	PS (SMP)*		2003: 66.7%-200	
		2003: 1.6% (3 MEPs)			2007: 65.0%-200	
		2007: 4.1% (5 MEPs)			2011: 67.4%-200	
France	FN and DLF*/*****	2015: 17.6% (38 MEPs)	Check the Right-Wing Populist	FN and DLF*/*****	2015: 66.9%-200	
		2019: 17.5% (39 MEPs)			2019: 68.7%-200	
		FN and DLF*/*****			FN and DLF*/*****	1997: 68.0%-577
		1997: 14.9% (1 MEP) and NP				2002: 62.4%-577
Germany	AfD* and NPD	2002: 11.3% (0 MEP) and NP	Check the Right-Wing Populist	NPD and AfD*	2007: 60.2%-577	
		2005: NP			2005: 77.7%-614	
		2009: NP			2009: 70.8%-622	
		2013: 4.7% (0 MEP)			2013: 71.5%-631	
Greece	EL, XA and ANEL*	2017: 12.6% (94 MEPs)	2017: 0.1% (0 MEP)	EL, XA and ANEL*	2017: 76.2%-709	
		EL and XA	XA and ANEL*		2012(1): 65.1%-300	
		2012(1): NP	2012(1): 7.0% (21 MEPs)		2012(2): 62.5%-300	
		2012(2): NP	2012(2): 6.9% (18 MEPs)		2015(1): 63.9%-300	
Hungary	FIDESZ, JOBBIK, MIEP (HU) and MHM	2015(1): NP	2015(1): 6.3% (17 MEPs)	MIEP (HU), MHM, JOBBIK and FIDESZ	2015(2): 56.6%-300	
		2015(2): NP	2015(2): 7.0% (18 MEPs)		2019: 57.9%-300	
		2019: 3.7% (10 MEPs)	2019: 2.9% (0 MEP)			
		FIDESZ, JOBBIK and MHM	JOBBIK and FIDESZ			
Ireland	NONE	1994: 7.0% (20 MEPs)	1994: NP	NONE	1994: 68.9%-386	
		1998: 29.4% (148 MEPs)	1998: NP		1998: 56.3%-386	
		2002: 41.1%*** (165 MEPs) *** with MDF	2002: NP		2002: 50.2%-386	
		2006: 42.0%*** (141 MEPs) *** with KDNP (CP)	2006: 2.2%*** (0 MEP) *** with MIEP (HU)		2006: 67.8%-386	
Ireland	NONE	2010: 52.7%*** (227 MEPs) *** with KDNP (CP)	2010: 16.7% (47 MEPs)	NONE	2010: 64.4%-386	
		2014: 44.9%*** (117 MEPs) *** with KDNP (CP)	2014: 20.2% (23 MEPs)		2014: 61.7%-199	
		2018: 49.3%*** (117 MEPs) *** with KDNP (CP)	2018: 19.1% (26 MEPs)		2018: 68.1%-199	
		2020: 62.9%-160				

	LN (LN-MPA)*** and FDI (AN)***	FDI (AN)***	LN (LN-MPA)*** and FDI (AN)***
Italy	LN (LN-MPA)*** and FDI (AN)***	2001: 3.9% (30 MEPS)	2001: 12.0% (99 MEPS)
		2005: 4.6% (26 MEPS)	2006: 12.3% (72 MEPS)
		2008: 8.3% (60 MEPS)	2008: NP
		2013: 4.1% (18 MEPS)	2013: 2.0% (9 MEPS)
		2018: 17.4% (124 MEPS)	2018: 4.4% (31 MEPS)
	NA* (TB/LN/UNK)	NA* (TB/LN/UNK)	NA* (TB/LN/UNK)
Latvia	NA* (TB/LN/UNK)	2006: 6.9% (8 MEPS)	
		2010: 7.7% (8 MEPS)	
		2011: 13.9% (14 MEPS)	
		2014: 16.6% (17 MEPS)	
		2018: 16.6% (17 MEPS)	
	TT (LDP)*	TT (LDP)*	
Lithuania	TT (LDP)* and CPT (LCP) (AKK)****	2004: 11.4% (10 MEPS)	
		2008: 12.7% (15 MEPS)	
		2012: 7.3% (11 MEPS)	
		2016: 5.3% (8 MEPS)	
		2020: NP	
	ADR*	ADR*	
Lux.	ADR*	1999: 11.3% (7 MEPS)	
		2004: 10.0% (5 MEPS)	
		2009: 8.1% (4 MEPS)	
		2013: 6.6% (3 MEPS)	
		2018: 8.3% (4 MEPS)	
	Check the Right-Wing Populist	Check the Right-Wing Populist	
Malta	NONE		
	Check the Right-Wing Populist	Check the Right-Wing Populist	
Netherlands	PVV, FVD*, SP***** and JA 21 (SP is a Socialist and Euro sceptic party)		
Poland	PiS*, KONFEDERACJA and K-15 (PSL)		
Portugal	CH	2005: NP	
		2009: NP	
		2011: NP	
		2015: NP	
		2019: 1.3% (1 MEP)	
	PRM	PRM	
Romania	PRM	2004: 13.0% (48 MEPS)	
		2008: 3.2% (0 MEP)	
		2012: 1.3% (0 MEP)	
		2016: 1.0% (0 MEP)	
		2020: NP	
	Check the Right-Wing Populist	Check the Right-Wing Populist	

		SNS* and LSNS	LSNS	SAS****, SNS* and LSNS		
Slovakia	SNS*, LSNS and SAS****	1998: 9.1% (14 MEPs)	1998: NP	1998: NP	1998: 84.2%-150	
		2002: 3.3% (0 MEP)	2002: NP	2002: NP	2002: 70.0%-150	
		2006: 11.7% (20 MEPs)	2006: NP	2006: NP	2006: 54.7%-150	
		2010: 5.1% (9 MEPs)	2010: 1.3% (0 MEP)	2010: 12.1% (22 MEPs)	2010: 58.8%-150	
		2012: 4.6% (0 MEP)	2012: 1.6% (0 MEP)	2012: 5.9% (11 MEPs)	2012: 59.1%-150	
		2016: 8.6% (15 MEPs)	2016: 8.0% (14 MEPs)	2016: 12.1% (21 MEPs)	2016: 59.8%-150	
		2020: 3.2% (0 MEP)	2020: 8.0% (17 MEPs)	2020: 6.2% (13 MEPs)	2020: 65.8%-150	
		SDS (SDSS)* and SNS		SNS		
		2004: 29.1% (29 MEPs)		2004: 6.3% (6 MEPs)		2004: 60.6%-90
		2008: 29.3% (28 MEPs)		2008: 5.4% (5 MEPs)		2008: 63.1%-90
Slovenia	SNS and SDS (SDSS)*	2011: 26.3% (26 MEPs)	2011: 1.8% (0 MEP)	NONE	2011: 64.7%-90	
		2014: 20.7% (21 MEPs)	2014: 2.2% (0 MEP)	NONE	2014: 51.7%-90	
		2018: 24.9% (25 MEPs)	2018: 4.2% (4 MEPs)	NONE	2018: 52.1%-90	
		VOX*		VOX*		
		2011: NP				2011: 68.9%-350
		2015: 0.2% (0 MEP)				2015: 69.7%-350
Spain	VOX*	2016: 0.2% (0 MEP)	Check the Right-Wing Populist		2016: 66.5%-350	
		2019(1): 10.3% (24 MEPs)			2019(1): 71.8%-350	
		2019(2): 15.1% (52 MEPs)			2019(2): 69.9%-350	
		SD*		SD*		
		2002: 1.4% (0 MEP)		2002: 8.4 (30 MEPs)		2002: 80.1%-349
Sweden	SD* and V*****	2006: 2.9% (0 MEP)	Check the Right-Wing Populist		2006: 82.0%-349	
		2010: 5.7% (20 MEPs)	2010: 5.6% (19 MEPs)		2010: 84.6%-349	
		2014: 12.9% (49 MEPs)	2014: 5.7% (21 MEPs)		2014: 85.8%-349	
		2018: 17.5% (62 MEPs)	2018: 8.0% (28 MEPs)		2018: 87.1%-349	
		DUP* and UKIP		UKIP and DUP*		
		2005: 0.9% (9 MEPs)		2005: 2.2% (0 MEP)		2005: 61.4%-545
UK	DUP* and UKIP	2010: 0.6% (8 MEPs)	2010: 3.1% (0 MEP)		2010: 65.1%-550	
		2015: 0.6% (8 MEPs)	2015: 12.6% (1 MEP)		2015: 66.1%-550	
		2017: 0.9% (10 MEPs)	2017: 1.8% (0 MEP)		2017: 68.7%-550	
		2019: 0.8% (8 MEPs)	2019: 0.1% (0 MEP)		2019: 67.3%-550	
				For DUP check Right-Wing Populist For UKIP check the Nationalist		

*National Conservatism, **Separatism, ***Coalition, ****Centrism, 5* Euroscepticism, 6* Gaulism

National Election Results of the Radical Right Parties of the European Union Countries

Source: Own Elaboration based on PartiesandElections.eu(a).

APPENDIX C

Parties and Elections/MPs		1991	1993	1997	2001	2005	2007	2011	2015	2019	Coalitions		
UD	%	12.31%	10.06%								UD-KLD-ZChN-PCiD-PPPP-PSL PL (GC) 1993 - end in 1993 (PSL PL left from GC)		
	MPs	62	74										
SLD (was an Election Coalition between 1991-1999)	MPs	(EC) 11.98%	(EC) 20.04%	(EC) 27.13%	(SLP-UP) 41.04%	11.31%	(LiD) 13.2%	8.24%	(ZL) 7.6%	(Lemnica) 12.6%	S&RP-SDU (EC) (SLD) 1991-1999 SLD-PSL (EC) 1993 SLD-PSL-BBWR (GC) 1993 - end in 1995 (BBWR left from GC) SLD-PSL (GC) 1995-1997 SLD-PSL (EC) 1997 SLD-UP-S&RP-LiD (EC) (SLD-UP) 2001 SLP-UP-PSL (GC) end in 2003 (PSL left from GC) SLD-UP (GC) 2004-2005 (S&P.L. Joined GC in 2004) SLD-S&P-LiD-UP (EC) (LiD) 2007 SLD-TR-UP-PZ (EC) (ZL) 2015 SLD-Lemnica Razem(6)-Wiosna (18) (EC) (Lemnica) 2019		
		%	(EC) 11.98%	(EC) 20.04%	(EC) 27.13%	(SLP-UP) 41.04%	11.31%	(LiD) 13.2%	8.24%	(ZL) 7.6%		(Lemnica) 12.6%	
	WAK	%	8.73%										Party Dissolved in 1991
		MPs	49										
	PSL	%	8.67%	15.4%	7.31%	8.98%	6.96%	8.91%	8.36%	5.1%		(Koalicja Polska) 8.6%	PSL-UiED(1)-SD-Slonzoki Razem (EC) (Koalicja Polska) 2019
		MPs	48	132	27	42	25	31	28	16		20	
	KPN	%	7.50%	5.8%	0%	0%							Party Dissolved between 2003-2007
		MPs	46	22	0	0							
	PC	%	(POC) 8.71%	4.4%	(AWS)	0%							Party Dissolved in 1994
		MPs	40	0	14	0							
	KLD	%	7.48%	3.99%									Party Dissolved in 1994
		MPs	37	0									
										PC-ZChN-KPN-KLD-PSL PL (GC) 1991 - end after 6 months (KLD and KPN left from GC), PC-ZChN-PSL PL (GC) end in 1992			
										KPN-SD-RCS-PZZ-BL-C-PPE Z (EC) 1991			
										KLD-ZChN-PC-SD (GC) 1991 - end in 1991			
										Party Dissolved in 2002			
										Did not Join National Elections			
										Party Dissolved in 2018			

	%		NT		Party Disolved in 2010		ZChN- WAK ZChN-PSL S-POL-D-PR (EC) (Ojczyzna) 1993		
	(WAK)	(Ojczyzna) 6.37%			1002% (ZL)	(Lewica)			
ZChN	0	0					ZChN- WAK ZChN-PSL S-POL-D-PR (EC) (Ojczyzna) 1993		
RP	%	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE			
	MPs	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE			
Koalicja	%					8.8% (Koalicja Polska) 8.6%	Koalicja 15-RN (EC)		
	MPs	NE	NE	NE	NE	42	6 2015 Koalicja 15-PSL (EC) (Koalicja Polska) 2019		
N	%	NE	NE	NE	NE	7.6% (KO)			
	MPs	NE	NE	NE	NE	28	8		
KORWIN	%	NE	NE	NE	NE	4.7% (KONFEDERACJA) 6.8%	KORWIN-RN (S)-KRP (EC) (KONFEDERACJA) 2019		
	MPs	NE	NE	NE	NE	0	5		
SP	%	2.06%	Party Disolved in 1992						
	MPs	4							
UPR	%	2.26%	3.18%	2.0%	1.57%	Did not join National Elections		UPR-RPW (EC) 1991	
	MPs	3	0	0	0				
UW	%	NE	NE	13.4%	3.1%	Disolved in 2005			
	MPs	NE	NE	60	0				
INDEPENDENT	MPs	0	0	0	0	0	0	Other Coalitions: CHD-PP-PROUD (EC) (CHD) 1991	
	MPs	2%-33	6.61%-0	5.4%-0	0.9%-0	3.6%-0	1.5%-0	4.0%-0	9.0%-0
OTHERS	MPs							WIR-PPP-RACJA-PPS (EC) 2007	

NE: Not Yet Established - NT: No Information EC: Election Coalition - GC: Government Coalition - MGC: Minority Government - Ind: Independent

Parties and Elections in Poland between 1991 – 2019

Sources: Own Elaboration based on PartiesandElections.eu (b); Kosowska-Gąstoł Sobolewska-Myślik, 2019; Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik, 2017

The List of Political Parties in Poland:

UD: Founded in 1991 (Merger of ROAD and FPD, Split from KO'S'). Dissolved in 1994 (Merged into KLD and UW-Freedom Union (Unia Wolności). Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna).

PC: Founded in 1990 (Split from KO'S'). Dissolved in 2002 (Merged into PiS). Centre Agreement (Porozumienie Centrum).

SLD: Founded in 1991 as a coalition SdRP and SDU (Merger of SdRP and some other small parties) and in 1999 as a party. Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej).

WAK: Founded in 1990. Dissolved in 1991. Catholic Election Action (Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka).

PSL: Founded in 1990 (Preceded by ZSL). Polish People's Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe)

KPN: Founded in 1979. Dissolved in 2018. Confederation of Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej).

KLD: Founded in 1990. Dissolved in 1994 (Merged with UW and UD and PO). Liberal Democratic Congress (Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny).

PSL.PL: Founded in 1991. Dissolved in 1999 (Merged with RS-AWS). Polish People's Party – Peasants' Agreement (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe – Porozumienie Ludowe).

Solidarity: Founded in 1980. Solidarity (Solidarność).

PPPP: Founded in 1990. Dissolved in 1993. Polish Beer-Lovers' Party (Polska Partia Przyjaciół Piwa) (Rissanen 2018, 200-203).

ZChN: Founded in 1989. Dissolved in 2010. Christian National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe).

UPR: Founded in 1987. Real Politics Union (Unia Polityki Realnej).

MN: Founded in 1990 (not a political party, is an organisation that represent national minorities in Sejm). German Minority Electoral Committee (Komitet Wyborczy Mniejszość Niemiecka).

SP: Founded in 1990 (Split from Solidarity). Dissolved in 1992 (Merged with UP).

ChD: Founded in 1991 (Election Coalition between ChDSP-ChPP-PFChD). Dissolved in 1993.

SRP: Founded in 1992. Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland (Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej).

UP: Founded in 1992 (Merger of RDS and PUS and SP). Labour Union (Unia Pracy) (Wrobel, 1998).

RS-AWS: Founded in 1996 (Preceded by PC and Solidarity and more than 30 parties). Dissolved in 2001 (Succeeded by PiS and PO (Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2019, 11-12) and ROP). Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność). After 1997: AWSP. Electoral Action Solidarity of the Right (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność Prawicy).

BBWR: Founded in 1993. Dissolved in 1997 (Merged into RS-AWS). Nonpartisan Bloc for Support of Reforms (Bezpartyjny Blok Wspierania Reform).

UW: Founded in 1994 (Merger of UD and KLD and SD). Dissolved in 2005 (Succeeded by PD and PO). Freedom Union (Unia Wolności).

PO: Founded in 2001 (Split from AWSP and UW). Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska).

PiS: Founded in 2001 (Split from RS and PPChD and AWSP and SKL and ZChN and ROP and PC) (Bale and Szczerbiak, 2006). Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość).

RP: Founded in 2013 (Split from PO). Palikot's Movement (Ruch Palikota). After 2013 TR: Your Movement (Twój Ruch).

ROP: Founded in 1995. Dissolved in 2012. Movement for Reconstruction of Poland (Ruch Odbudowy Polski).

SdPi: Founded in 2004 (Split from SLD). Social Democracy of Poland (Socjaldemokracja Polska).

LPR: Founded in 2001. League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin).

N: Founded in 2015. Modern (Nowoczesna).

KORWIN: Founded in 2015. Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic – Liberty and Hope (Koalicja Odnowy Rzeczypospolitej Wolność i Nadzieja).

Kukiz'15: Founded in 2015.

Coalitions, Governments, Prime Ministers and Presidents in Poland:

- 1991-1993: PC and ZChN and KPN and KLD and PSL.PL (Government Coalition – ended after six months because KLD and KPN left the coalition) (Szczerbiak, 2001), PC and ZChN and PSL.PL (Government Coalition – ended in 1992) (Jasiewicz 1992, 64), UD and KLD and ZChN and PChD and PPPP and PSL.PL (Government Coalition-PSL.PL left the coalition in 1993).

Solidarity and PC and Ojcowizna ((POC) Electoral Coalition) (Jasiewicz 1992, 60), MN and BKW (Electoral Coalition), RPW and UPR (Election Coalition), SD and RCS and KPN and PZZ and BLC and PPE-Z (Election Coalition), SdRP and SDU ((SLD) Election Coalition), ChDSP and ChPP and PFChD ((ChD) Election Coalition).

1991-1993: Prime Minister(s): Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (KLD) (1991-1991) and Jan Olszewski (PC) (1991-1992) and Waldemar Pawlak (PSL) (1992-1992) and Hanna Suchocka (UD), President: Lech Wałęsa.

- 1993-1997: SLD and PSL and BBWR (Government Coalition – ended in 1995 because BBWR left the coalition), SLD and PSL (Government Coalition).

SLD and PSL (Election Coalition).

1993-1997: Prime Minister(s): Hanna Suchocka (UD) (1992-1993) and Waldemar Pawlak (PSL) (1993-1995) and Józef Oleksy (SLD) (1995-1996) and Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (SLD), President(s): Lech Wałęsa (1990-1995) and Aleksander Kwaśniewski.

- 1997-2001: RS-AWS and UW (Government Coalition – ended in 2000 because UW left the coalition) and AWSP (Minority Government Party) (BBC, 2000).

SLD and PSL (Election Coalition), RS-AWS and PC (Election Coalition that had 35 parties) (Körösenyi 1999, 37).

1997-2001: Prime Minister(s): Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (SLD) (1996-1997) and Jerzy Buzek (RS-AWS), President: Aleksander Kwaśniewski.

- 2001-2005: SLD-UP and PSL (Government Coalition – ended in 2004 because PSL left the coalition in 2003), SLP-UP (Government Coalition).

SLD and UP and SdPi and PLD ((SLD-UP) Election Coalition) (BBC, 2001; McManus-Czubinska, Miller, Markowski and Wasilewski 2002, 2).

2001-2005: Prime Minister(s): Jerzy Buzek (RS-AWS) (1997-2001) and Leszek Miller (SLD) (2001-2004) and Marek Belka (SLD-UP), President: Aleksander Kwaśniewski.

- 2005-2007: PiS and LPR and SRP (Government Coalition - SRP left the coalition in 2007).

SdPi and PD and UP (Election Coalition) (Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2019, 12).

2005-2007: Prime Minister(s): Marek Belka (SLD-UP) (2004-2005) and Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz (PiS) (2005-2006) and Jarosław Kaczyński (PiS), President(s): Aleksander Kwaśniewski (1995-2005) and Lech Kaczyński.

- 2007-2011: PO and PSL (Government Coalition).

SLD and SdPi and PD and UP ((LiD) Election Coalition), LPR and UPR and PR (Election Coalition), PiS and Piast and LN and PC and ZChN (Election Coalition), SRP and PL and NL and NKP (Election Coalition), WiR and PPP and RACJA and PPS (Election Coalition) (National Electoral Commission, 2007).

2007-2011: Prime Minister(s): Jarosław Kaczyński (PiS) (2006-2007) and Donald Tusk (PO), President(s): Lech Kaczyński (2005-2010) and Bronisław Maria Komorowski.

- 2011-2015: PO and PSL (Government Coalition).

PO and PSL (Election Coalition).

2011-2015: Prime Minister(s): Donald Tusk (PO) (2007-2014) and Ewa Kopacz (PO), President: Bronisław Maria Komorowski.

- 2015-2019: PiS and SP and PR (Government Coalition).

SLD and TR and UP and PZ (ZL-United Left, UP left the coalition in 2015) Election Coalition (Radio Poland, 2015), Kukiz'15 and RN (Election Coalition)

2015-2019: Prime Minister(s): Ewa Kopacz (PO) (2014-2015) and Beata Szydło (PiS) (2015-2017) and Mateusz Morawiecki (PiS), President(s): Bronisław Maria Komorowski (2010-2015) and Andrej Duda.

- 2019-2023: PiS and SP and Porozumienie (Government Coalition).

KORWIN and RN and KKP ((Konfederacja) Election Coalition) (Do Rzeczy, 2018), Nowoczesna and PO and iPL and Zieloni ((KO) Election Coalition) (Bogdanska, 2019), Lewica Razem and SLD and Wiosna ((Lewica) Election Coalition) (PAP, 2019), PSL and Kukiz'15 ((Koalicja Polska - ended in 2020) Election Coalition) (Rzeczpospolita, 2019).

2019-2023: Prime Minister: Mateusz Morawiecki (PiS), President: Andrzej Duda.

- 2023-2027: ?

PiS and SP and Porozumienie and Piast ((ZP) Possible Election Coalition), PO and Nowoczesna and iPL and Zieloni ((KO) Possible Election Coalition), Lewica Razem and SLD and Wiosna ((Lewica) Possible Election Coalition), PSL and UED and Ślonzoki Razem ((Koalicja Polska) Possible Election Coalition), KORWiN and RN and ZchR and LN ((Konfederacja) Possible Election Coalition).

APPENDIX D

Categories	Democracy Score of Poland between 2009-2020											
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
National Democratic Governance	3.25	3.25	2.75	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.75	3.25	4.0	4.0	4.0
Election Process	2.0	1.75	1.75	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
Civil Society	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.75	2.0	2.25	2.5
Independent Media	2.0	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.75	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
Local Democratic Governance	2.0	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.75	2.0	2.0	2.25
Judicial Framework and Independence	2.25	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.75	3.25	4.25	4.25	4.5
Corruption	2.75	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.50	3.5	3.75	3.75
Democracy Score	2.25	2.32	2.21	2.14	2.18	2.18	2.21	2.32	2.57	2.89	2.96	3.07
Democracy Percentage	<p>Countries are Rated on a Scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic process and 7 the lowest.</p> <p>1.0-2.99: Consolidated Democracy - 3.0-3.99: Semi-Consolidated Democracy - 4.0-4.99: Transitional Government or Hybrid Regime - 5.0-5.99: Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regime - 6.0-7.0: Consolidated Authoritarian Regime.</p>											

(Table 10) (Democracy Score of Poland between 2009 – 2020)

Sources: Own Elaboration based on Shkolnikov 2009, 7-8; Walker 2010, 37; Walker 2011, 12-21; Walker and Habdank-Kolaczowska 2012, 11-20; Habdank-Kolaczowska 2013, 13-22; Habdank-Kolaczowska 2014, 11-19; Habdank-Kolaczowska 2015, 17-25; Schenkkan 2016; 21-22; Schenkkan 2017; 23-24; Schenkkan 2018, 23-24; Freedom House, 2019; Csaky 2020, 24-25.

APPENDIX E

Parties and Elections/MPs		1990 (CoP)	1990 (CoN)	1992 (HoP)	1992 (HoN)	Coalitions
OF	%	36.2%	34.0%	Party Dissolved in 1991		OF-VPN (EC) 1990 OF-VPN-KDH (GC) 1990-1992
	MPs	68	50			
VPN	%	10.4%	11.9%	Party Dissolved in 1991		
	MPs	19	33			
KSC	%	13.6%	13.7%	Party Dissolved in 1992		KSCM-KSS (KSC) (EC) 1990
	MPs	23	24			
KDH	%	6.1%	5.3%	2.9%	2.8%	KDU-KDS (KDU)-KDH (EC) 1990
	MPs	11	14	6	8	
KDU	%	(KDU) 5.9%	(KDU) 6.0%	Party Dissolved in 1992		
	MPs					
KDS	%			(ODS)	(ODS)	
	MPs			NI	NI	
SNS	%	3.5%	3.6%	3.0%	3.0%	
	MPs	6	9	6	9	
COEX	%	2.8%	2.7%	2.4%	2.4%	COEX-MKDM (EC) 1990 COEX-MKDM (EC) 1992
	MPs					
MKDM	%					
	MPs					
HSD-SMS	%	5.4%	6.2%	2.9%	3.4%	
	MPs	9	7	0	0	
ODS	%	NE	NE	23.0%	22.6%	ODS-KDS (EC) 1992 ODS-KDS (GC) 1992-end because of separation
	MPs			48	37	
HZDS	%	NE	NE	10.8%	10.9%	
	MPs			24	33	
KSCM	%	(KSC)	(KSC)	9.7%	9.8%	KSCM-DL (EC) 1992
	MPs	NI	NI	19	15	
CSSD	%	3.2%	3.3%	6.8%	6.6%	CSSD-SDSS (EC) 1992
	MPs	0	0			
SDSS	%	0%	0%	10	11	
	MPs	0	0			
SDL	%	NE	NE	4.7%	4.5%	
	MPs			10	13	
SPR-RSC	%	0.7%	0.8%	4.5%	4.4%	
	MPs	0	0	8	6	
KDU-CSL	%	NE	NE	4.0%	4.1%	
	MPs			7	6	
SZ	%	3.1%	3.2%	(LSU) 4.0%	(LSU) 4.1%	SZ-CSNS (EC) (LSU) 1992
	MPs	0	0			
CSNS	%	1.9%	2.0%	7	5	
	MPs	0	0			
INDEPENDENT	MPs	0	0	0	0	
OTHERS	MPs	7.8% - 0	8.01% - 0	19.3% - 0	16.2% - 0	

CoP: Chamber of People - CoN: Chamber of Nations - NE: Not Yet Established - NI: No Information
EC: Election Coalition - GC: Government Coalition

Parties and Elections in Czechoslovakia between 1990 – 1992

Source: Own Elaboration based on Archive.ipu.org (a) and Archive.ipu.org (b).

The List of Political Parties in Czechoslovakia:

OF: Founded in 1989 (Split from CSNS). Dissolved in 1992 (Succeeded by ODS and OH). Civic Forum (Občanské Fórum).

VPN: Founded in 1989. Dissolved in 1991 (Succeeded by ODU). Public Against Violence (Verejnost' Proti Násiliu).

KSC: Founded in 1921 (Split from CSSD). Dissolved in 1992 (Succeeded by KSCM and SDL). Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická Strana Československa).

KDH: Founded in 1990. Christian Democratic Movement (Křest'anskodemokraticke Hnutie).

KDU: Founded in 1990. Dissolved in 1992 (Succeeded by KDU-CSL). Christian and Democratic Union (Křest'anská a Demokratická Unie).

KDS: Founded in 1990 (Preceded by HOS). Dissolved in 1998 (Merged into ODS). Christian Democratic Party (Křest'anskodemokraticka Strana).

SNS: Founded in 1989 (Preceded by SNS (historical)). Slovak National Party (Slovenská Národná Strana).

COEX: Founded in 1990. Dissolved in 1998 (Merged into SMK-MKP). Coexistence (SL: Spolužitie – CZ: Soužití).

MKDM: Founded in 1990. Dissolved in 1998 (Merged into SMK-MKP). Hungarian Christian Democratic Party (Maďarské Křest'anskodemokratické Hnutie).

HSD-SMS: Founded in 1990. Dissolved in 1996 (Merged into CMUS). Movement for Autonomous Democracy – Party for Moravia and Silesia (Hnutí za Samosprávnou Demokracii - Společnost pro Moravu a Slezsko).

ODS: Founded in 1991 (Preceded by OF). Civic Democratic Party (Občanská Demokratická Strana).

HZDS: Founded in 1991 (Split from VPN). Dissolved in 2014. Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za Demokratické Slovensko).

KSCM: Founded in 1990 (Preceded by KSC). Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (Komunistická Strana Čech a Moravy).

CSSD: Founded in 1878. Dissolved in 1948 (Merged into KSC). Refounded in 1989. Czech Social Democratic Party (Česká Strana Sociálně Demokratická).

SDSS: Founded in 1990. Dissolved in 2005 (Merged into Smer-SD). Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (Sociálnodemokratická Strana Slovenska).

SDL: Founded in 1990 (Preceded by KSC). Dissolved in 2004 (Merged into Smer-SD). Party of the Democratic Left (Strana Demokratickej ľavice).

SPR-RSČ: Founded in 1989. Rally for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (Sdružení pro Republiku – Republikánská Strana Československa).

KDU-CSL: Founded in 1919 (Merger of MSKSSM, KNKSM, CKSSKC, KNKSC, KSL). Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party (Křesťanská a Demokratická Unie - Česká Strana Lidová).

SZ: Founded in 1990. Party of Greens (Strana Zelených).

CSNS: Founded in 1897 (Split from CSSD and NSS). Czech National Social Party (Česká Strana Národně Sociální) (Archive.ipu.org (a)).

Coalitions, Governments, Prime Ministers and Presidents in Czechoslovakia:

- 1990-1992: OF and VPN and KDH (Government Coalition).

OF and VPN (Election Coalition), KSCM and KSS ((KSC)Election Coalition), KDU and KDS (KDU) and KDH (Election Coalition), COEX and MKDM (Election Coalition)

1990-1994 Prime Minister: Marián Čalfa, President: Václav Havel.

- 1992-Separation: ODS and KDS (Government Coalition – ended in 1992 because of separation).

APPENDIX F

Parties and Elections/MPs		1990	1992	1996	1998	2002	2006	2010	2013	2017	Coalitions
OF	%	49.50%									OF-KSC-CSL-CSS (GC) 1990-end in 1990
	MPs	124									
	%	13.24%									
KSC	MPs	33									Party Dissolved in 1992
HSD-SMS	%	10.03%	5.87%								Party Dissolved in 1996
	MPs	23	14								
KDU	%	8.42%									Party Dissolved in 1992
	MPs	16									
	%		29.73%	29.62%	27.74%	24.47%	35.38%	20.22%	7.73%	11.32%	
ODS	MPs	NE	66	68	63	58	81	53	16	25	ODS-KDS (EC) 1992 ODS-KDS-HSD SMS- KDU (GC) 1992-separation ODS-KDU CSL-ODA (GC) 1992-1996
	%	(KDU)	(ODS)								ODS-KDU CSL-ODA (GC) 1996-1998 ODS-KDU CSL-ODA (EC) 1998 ODS (MGP) 2006-end in 2007 ODS-KDU CSL-SZ (GC) 2006-end in 2009 ODS-CSSD-SZ (GC) 2009-2010
KDS	%	(KDU)	(ODS)								Party Dissolved in 1996
	MPs	4	10								
KSCM	%	NE	14.05%	10.33%	11.03%	18.5%	12.81%	11.27%	14.9%	7.76%	CSSD (GP) 1998-2002 CSSD-KDU CSL- US DEU (GC) 2002-2006
	MPs		35	22	24	41	26	26	33	15	
	%	4.11%	6.53%	26.44%	32.31%	30.2%	32.32%	22.1%	20.46%	7.27%	CSSD-KSCM (EC) 2006 CSSD-KDU CSL-ANO 2011 (GC) 2013-2017
CSSD	MPs	0	16	61	74	70	74	56	50	15	
	%		6.28%	8.08%	9.0%	(4K) 14.27%	7.32%	4.39%	6.78%	5.8%	
KDU-CSL	MPs	NE	15	18	20	23	13	0	14	10	KDU-CSL-US DEU (EC) (4K) 2002
	%		4.1%	(LSU) 6.52%	0%	1.12%	2.36%	6.29%	2.44%	3.2%	1.46%
SZ	MPs	0	3	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	SZ-CSNS (EC)(LSU) 1992
	%	2.7%	(LSU)	2.05%	0.3%	0.8%	0.03%	0%	0%	0.03%	
CSNS	MPs	0	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	%	1%	6%	8.01%	3.9%	1%	(NS)	0.03%	0%	0.2%	
SPR-RSC	MPs	0	14	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	SPR-RSC-NS (EC) 2006
	%										

Party	%	NE	5.93%	6.36%	0%	0.5%	0%	Party Dissolved in 2007			Party Dissolved in 2011		
								MPs	14	13			
ODA	%	NE	5.93%	6.36%	0%	0.5%	0%	Party Dissolved in 2007			Party Dissolved in 2011		
	MPs	NE	14	13	0	0	0						
US-DEUT	%	NE	NE	NE	8.6%	(4K)	0.30%	Party Dissolved in 2011					
	MPs	NE	NE	NE	19	8	0	0					
TOP 09	%							Party Dissolved in 2011			TOP 09-STAN (EC) 2010 and 2013 TOP 09-LES (EC) 2017		
	MPs	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	36	22	7			
VV	%	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	Party Dissolved in 2015			ANO 2011-CSSD (GC) 2017-2021		
	MPs	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	10.88%	0%	0			
ANO 2011	%	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	Party Dissolved in 2015			ANO 2011-CSSD (GC) 2017-2021		
	MPs	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	18.66%	47	78			
USVIT	%	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	Party Dissolved in 2015					
	MPs	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	6.9%	14	0			
Přah	%	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	Party Dissolved in 2015					
	MPs	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	0.8%	2.66%	10.79%			
SPD	%	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	Party Dissolved in 2015					
	MPs	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	10.64%	22				
STAN	%	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	Party Dissolved in 2015					
	MPs	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	(TOP 09)	(TOP 09)	5.2%			
INDEPENDENT	MPs	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	Party Dissolved in 2015					
	MPs	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	7.9%-0	19.09%-0	9.11%-0			
OTHERS	MPs	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	Party Dissolved in 2015					
	MPs	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	7.9%-0	19.09%-0	9.11%-0			

NE: Not Yet Established - EC: Election Condition - GC: Government Condition - MGP: Minority Government Party

Parties and Elections in Czechia between 1990 – 2020

Sources: Own Elaboration based on PartiesandElections.eu (c); Nsd.no.

The List of Political Parties in Czechia:

OF: Founded in 1989. Dissolved in 1991 (Succeeded by ODS and OH). Civic Forum (Občanské Fórum).

KSC: Founded in 1921 (Split from CSSD). Dissolved in 1992 (Succeeded by KSCM and SDL). Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická Strana Československa).

HSD-SMS: Refounded in 1990. Dissolved in 1996 (Merged into CMUS). Movement for Autonomous Democracy – Party for Moravia and Silesia (Hnutí za Samosprávnou Demokracii - Společnost Pro Moravu a Slezsko).

KDU: Founded in 1990. Dissolved in 1992 (Succeeded by KDU-CSL). Christian and Democratic Union (Křesťanská a Demokratická Unie).

ODS: Founded in 1991 (Preceded by OF). Civic Democratic Party (Občanská Demokratická Strana).

KDS: Founded in 1990 (Preceded by HOS). Dissolved in 1996 (Merged into ODS). Christian Democratic Party (Křesťanskodemokraticka Strana).

KSCM: Founded in 1990 (Preceded by KSC). Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (Komunistická Strana Čech a Moravy).

CSSD: Founded in 1878. Czech Social Democratic Party (Česká Strana Sociálně Demokratická).

KDU-CSL: Founded in 1919 (Merger of MSKSSM, KNKSM, CKSSKC, KNKSC and KSL). Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party (Křesťanská a Demokratická Unie - Česká Strana Lidová).

SPR-RSC: Founded in 1989. Refounded in 2016. Rally for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (Sdružení Pro Republiku - Republikánská Strana Československa).

ODA: Founded in 1990 (Preceded by OF). Dissolved in 2007. Civic Democratic Alliance (Občanská Demokratická Aliance).

SZ: Founded in 1990. Green Party (Strana Zelených).

CSNS: Founded in 1897 (Split from CSSD and NSS). Czech National Social Party (Česká Strana Národně Sociální).

US-DEU: Founded in 1998 (Split from ODS). Dissolved in 2011. Freedom Union – Democratic Union (Unie Svobody - Demokratická Unie).

NS: Founded in 2002. Dissolved in 2011. National Party (Národní Strana).

TOP 09: Founded in 2009 (Split from KDU-CSL). Tradition Responsibility Prosperity (Tradice Odpovědnost Prosperita).

VV: Founded in 2001. Dissolved in 2015. Public Affairs (Věci Veřejné).

ANO 2001: Founded in 2012. Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (Akce Nespokojených Občanů).

USVIT: Founded in 2013. Dissolved in 2018. Dawn – National Coalition (Úsvit – Národní Koalice).

Pirati: Founded in 2009. Czech Pirate Party (Česká Pirátská Strana).

SPD: Founded in 2015 (Split from USVIT). Freedom and Direct Democracy (Svoboda a Přímá Demokracie).

STAN: Founded in 2004. Mayors and Independents (Starostové a Nezávislí).

Coalitions, Governments, Prime Ministers and Presidents in Czechia:

- 1990-1992: OF and KSC and CSL and CSS (Coalition Government - ended in 1990).

KDU and KDS (Election Coalition) (Altuž 1994, 118-119).

1990-1992 Prime Minister: Petr Pithart (OF), President: Václav Havel.

- 1992-1996: ODS and KDS and HSD-SMS and KDU (Government Coalition-separation), ODS and KDU-CSL and ODA (Government Coalition).

ODS and KDS (Election Coalition), SZ and CSNS ((LSU) Election Coalition).

1992-1996 Prime Minister(s): Petr Pithart (OF) (1992-separation) and Václav Klaus (ODS), President: Václav Havel.

- 1996-1998: ODS and KDU-CSL and ODA (Government Coalition - ended in 1998 because of disintegration of ODS).

1996-1998 Prime Minister(s): Václav Klaus (ODS) and Josef Tošovský (Ind.) (1997-1998), President: Václav Havel (Kunc 2002, 184-187).

- 1998-2002: CSSD (Government Party).

ODS and KDU-CSL and ODA (Election Coalition).

1998-2002 Prime Minister(s): Václav Klaus (ODS) (1992-1998) and Miloš Zeman (CSSD), President: Václav Havel (Müller-Rommel and Fettelschoss, 2004).

- 2002-2006: CSSD and KDU-CSL and US-DEU (Government Coalition)

KDU-CSL and US-DEU ((4K) Election Coalition).

2002-2006 Prime Minister(s): Miloš Zeman (CSSD) (1998-2002) and Vladimír Špidla (CSSD) (2002-2004) and Stanislav Gross (CSSD) (2004-2005) and Jiří Paroubek (CSSD), President: Václav Havel (1993-2003) and Václav Klaus (Williams 2003, 48-50).

- 2006-2010: ODS (Minority Government-end in 2007), ODS and KDU-CSL and SZ (Government Coalition-end in 2009), ODS and CSSD and SZ (Government Coalition).

SPR-RSC and NS (Election Coalition), ODS and KDU-CSL and SZ (Election Coalition), CSSD and KSCM (Election Coalition).

2006-2010 Prime Minister(s): Jiří Paroubek (CSSD) (2005-2006) and Miloslav Vlček (CSSD) (2006-2006) and Mirek Topolánek (ODS) (2006-2009) and Jan Fischer (Ind.), President: Václav Klaus.

- 2010-2013: ODS and TOP 09 and VV (Government Coalition) (Idnes.cz, 2010).

TOP 09 and STAN (Election Coalition).

2010-2013 Prime Minister(s): Jan Fischer (Ind.) (2009-2010) and Petr Nečas (ODS) (2010-2013) and Jiří Rusnok (Ind.), President: Václav Klaus (Balík and Hlousek 2016, 105-107).

- 2013-2017: CSSD and KDU-CSL and ANO 2011 (Government Coalition) (BBC, 2013a) (Kopeček and Svacinová, 2016).

TOP 09 and STAN (Election Coalition).

2013-2017 Prime Minister(s): Jiří Rusnok (Ind.) (2013-2014) and Bohuslav Sobotka (CSSD), President(s): Václav Klaus (2003-2013) and Miloš Zeman (BBC, 2013b).

- 2017-2021: ANO 2011 (Minority Government-end in 2018), ANO 2011 and CSSD (Coalition Government) (Havlik and Haughton, 2017).

TOP 09 and LES (Election Coalition).

2017-2021 Prime Minister(s): Bohuslav Sobotka (CSSD) (2014-2017) and Andrej Babiš (ANO 2011), President: Miloš Zeman.

- 2021-2025: ANO 2011 and CSSD (Government Coalition)

ODS and KDU-CSL and TOP 09 ((SPOLU) Election Coalition) (Ct24.cz, 2020; Zachova, 2020), Pirati and STAN (Election Coalition) (Idnes.cz, 2020).

2021-2025: Prime Minister: Andrej Babiš (ANO 2011), President: Miloš Zeman.

APPENDIX G

Categories	Democracy Score of Czechia 2009-2020											
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
National Democratic Governance	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	3.0	2.75	2.75	2.75	3.0	3.0	3.0
Electoral Process	1.5	1.5	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25	1.25
Civil Society	1.5	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Independent Media	2.25	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	3.0
Local Democratic Governance	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75
Judicial Framework and Independence	2.25	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	2.0
Corruption	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5
Democracy Score	2.18	2.21	2.18	2.18	2.14	2.25	2.21	2.21	2.25	2.29	2.29	2.36
Democracy Percentage	Countries are Rated on a Scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic process and 7 the lowest. 1.0-1.99: Consolidated Democracy - 3.0-3.99: Semi-Consolidated Democracy - 4.0-4.99: Transitional Government or Hybrid Regime - 5.0-5.99: Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regime - 6.0-7.0: Consolidated Authoritarian Regime											

Democracy Score of Czechia between 2009 – 2020

Sources: Own Elaboration based on Shkolnikov 2009, 7-8; Walker 2010, 37; Walker 2011, 12-21; Walker and Habdank-Kolaczowska 2012, 11-20; Habdank-Kolaczowska 2013, 13-22; Habdank-Kolaczowska 2014, 11-19; Habdank-Kolaczowska 2015, 17-25; Schenkkan 2016; 21-22; Schenkkan 2017; 23-24; Schenkkan 2018, 23-24; Freedom House, 2019; Csaky 2020, 24-25.

The List of Political Parties in Slovakia:

VPN: Founded in 1989. Dissolved in 1991 (Succeeded by ODU). Public Against Violence (Verejnost' Proti Násiliu).

KSC: Founded in 1939 (Preceded by KSD). Dissolved in 1990 (Succeeded SDL). Communist Party of Slovakia (Komunistická Strana Slovenska).

KDH: Founded in 1990. Christian Democratic Movement (Kresťanskodemokratické Hnutie).

DS: Founded in 1989 (Preceded by SSO). Dissolved in 2006 (Merged into SDKU-DS). Democratic Party (Demokratická Strana).

SNS: Founded in 1989 (Preceded by SNS (historical)). Slovak National Party (Slovenská Národná Strana).

SZ: Founded in 1990. Party of Greens (Strana Zelených).

HZDS: Founded in 1991 (Split from VPN). Dissolved in 2014. Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za Demokratické Slovensko). 2002: LS-HZDS: People's Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Ľudová Strana – Hnutie za Demokratické Slovensko).

SDL: Founded in 1990 (Preceded by KSC). Dissolved in 2004 (Merged into Smer-SD). Party of the Democratic Left (Strana Demokratickej ľavice).

COEX: Founded in 1990. Dissolved in 1998 (Merged into SMK). Coexistence (SL: Spolužitie – CZ: Soužití).

MKDM: Founded in 1990. Dissolved in 1998 (Merged into SMK). Hungarian Christian Democratic Party (Maďarské Kresťanskodemokratické Hnutie).

ODU: Founded in 1991 (Preceded by VPN). Dissolved in 1994 (Merged into DS). Civic Democratic Union (Občianska Demokratická Unia).

DEUS: Founded in 1994 (Merger of APR and ADS). Dissolved in 1995 (Merged into DU). Democratic Union of Slovakia (Demokratická Unia Slovenska).

ZRS: Founded in 1994 (Split from SDL). Dissolved in 2017. Union of the Workers of Slovakia (Združenie Robotníkov Slovenska).

KSS: Founded in 1992 (Merger of KSS '91 and ZKS) Communist Party of Slovakia (Komunistická Strana Slovenska).

SMK: Founded in 1998 (Merger of MKDM and COEX and MOS). Party of the Hungarian Community (Strana Mad'arskej Komunity).

SDKU-DS: Founded in 2000 (Merger of DU and DS) (Split from SDK). Dissolved in 2018. Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party (Slovenská Demokratická a Kresťanská Unia – Demokratická Strana).

Smer-SD: Founded in 1999 (Split from SDL). Direction – Social Democracy (Slovenská Sociálna Demokracia).

ANO: Founded in 2001. Dissolved in 2017. Alliance of the New Citizen (Aliancia Nového Občana).

SOP: Founded in 1998. Dissolved in 2003 (Merged into Smer-SD). Party of Civic Understanding (Strana Občianskeho Porozumenia).

SaS: Founded in 2009. Freedom and Solidarity (Sloboda a Solidarita).

Most-Hid: Founded in 2009 (Split from SMK).

OL'aNO: Founded in 2011 (Split from SaS). Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (Obyčajni Ľudia a Nezávislé Osobnosti).

L'SNS: Founded in 2010. People's Party Our Slovakia (Ľudová Strana Naše Slovensko).

NOVA: Founded in 2012 (Split from KDĤ and SaS). New Majority (Nová Váčšina).

Sme Rodina: Founded in 2015 (Preceded by Nas Kraj). We Are Family (Sme Rodina).

SKS (SIET): Founded in 2014 (Split from KDĤ). Slovak Conservative Party (Slovenská Konzervatívna Strana).

SPOLU: Founded in 2018 (Split from SKS (SIET). Together (Spolu).

PS: Founded in 2017. Progressive Slovakia (Progresívne Slovensko).

Za Ľudi: Founded in 2019. For the People (Za Ľudi).

Zmena Zdola: Founded in 2000 (Split from DU). Change from the Bottom (Zmena Zdola, Demokratická Unia Slovenska).

SDSS: Founded in 1990. Dissolved in 2005 (Merged into Smer-SD). Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (Sociálnodemokratická Strana Slovenska).

RSS: Founded in 1989. Dissolved in 1997 (Merged into NAS). Peasants' Party of Slovakia (Rol'nicka Strana Slovenska). (ParlGov.org (a)).

Coalitions, Governments, Prime Ministers and Presidents in Slovakia:

- 1990-1992: VPN and KDH (Government Coalition-end in 1991 because VPN collapsed), KDH and ODU and DS (Government Coalition).

COEX and MKDM ((ESWMK) Election Coalition).

1990-1992 Prime Minister(s): Milan Čič (KSS-VPN) (1989-1990) and Vladimír Mečiar (VPN) (1990-1991) and Ján Čarnogurský (KDH), President: Václav Havel (Williams 2003, 43-44).

- 1992-1994: HZDS (Minority Government), HZDS and SNS (Government Coalition)

DS and ODS (Election Coalition), COEX and MKDM ((MKM-EGY) Election Coalition).

1990-1994 Prime Minister: Ján Čarnogurský (KDH) (1991-1992 (separation)) and Vladimír Mečiar (HZDS), President: Václav Havel (1989-1992 (separation)) and Michal Kováč (Williams 2003, 46).

- 1994-1998: DEUS and KDH and SDL and NDS (Government Coalition-end in 1994), HZDS and SNS and RSS (Government Coalition).

HZDS and RSS (Election Coalition), SDL and SDSS and SZ ((SV) Election Coalition), COEX and MKDM and MOS ((MK) Election Coalition).

1994-1998 Prime Minister(s): Vladimír Mečiar (HZDS) (1992-1994) and Jozef Moravčík (DEUS) (1994-1994) and Vladimír Mečiar (HZDS), President: Michal Kováč.

- 1998-2002: SDK and SDL and SMK and SOP (Government Coalition).

KDH and DU and DS and SDSS and SZ ((SDK) Election Coalition).

1998-2002 Prime Minister(s): Vladimír Mečiar (HZDS) (1994-1998) and Mikuláš Dzurinda (SDK), President(s): Michal Kováč (1993-1998) and Rudolf Schuster.

- 2002-2006: SDKU-DS and SMK and KDH and ANO (Government Coalition-KDH left the GC in 2006).

SDKU and DS and SMK and KDH (Election Coalition).

2002-2006 Prime Minister: Mikuláš Dzurinda (SDKU), President: Rudolf Schuster (1999-2004) and Ivan Gašparovič (Nohlen and Stöver 2010, 1747-1756).

- 2006-2010: Smer-SD and SNS and LS-HZDS (Government Coalition).

2006-2010: Mikuláš Dzurinda (SDKU) (1998-2006) and Robert Fico (Smer-SD), President: Ivan Gašparovič (Nohlen and Stöver 2010, 1757).

- 2010-2012: SDKU-DS and SaS and KDH and Most-Hid (Government Coalition - ended in 2011) (BBC, 2011b).

Smer-SD and SNS and LS-HZDS (Election Coalition) and SDKU-DS and KDH and Most-Hid and SMK (Election Coalition).

2010-2012 Prime Minister(s): Robert Fico (Smer-SD) (2006-2010) and Iveta Radičová (SDKU-DS), President: Ivan Gašparovič.

- 2012-2016: Smer-SD (Government Party).

2012-2016: Iveta Radičová (SDKU-DS) (2010-2012) and Robert Fico (Smer-SD), President: Ivan Gašparovič (2004-2014) and Andrej Kiska.

- 2016-2020: Smer-SD and SNS and Most-Hid and SKS (SIET) (Government Coalition-ended in 2017 SKS (SIET) left GC), Smer-SD and SNS and Most-Hid (Government Coalition) (Cas.sk, 2016).

OL'aNO and NOVA (Election Coalition) (Cunningham, 2016).

2016-2020 Prime Minister(s): Robert Fico (Smer-SD) (2012-2018) and Peter Pellegrini (Smer-SD) (Cas.sk, 2016), President: Andrej Kiska (2014-2019) and Zuzana Čaputová.

- 2020-2024: OL'aNO and Sme Rodina and SaS and Za L'udi (Government Coalition). (BBC, 2020)

Smer-SD and SNS and Most-Hid (Election Coalition), PS and SPOLU (Election Coalition).

2020-2024 Prime Minister: Peter Pellegrini (Smer-SD) (2018-2020) and Igor Matovič (OL'aNO) (2020-2021) and Eduard Heger (OL'aNO), President: Zuzana Čaputová (ParlGov.org (b); ParlGov.org (c); Archive.ipu.org (c)).

APPENDIX I

Categories	Democracy Score of Slovakia 2009-2020											
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
National Democratic Governance	2.75	3.0	2.75	2.75	2.75	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.25	3.25
Election Process	1.5	1.75	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.75
Civil Society	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	2.0	2.0	1.75	1.75
Independent Media	2.75	3.0	3.0	2.75	2.75	2.75	3.0	3.0	2.75	2.75	3.0	3.0
Local Democratic Governance	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
Judicial Framework and Independence	2.75	3.0	2.75	2.75	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75	3.0
Corruption	3.25	3.75	3.5	3.5	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75
Democracy Score	2.46	2.68	2.54	2.5	2.57	2.61	2.64	2.61	2.61	2.61	2.63	2.71
Democracy Percentage	<p>Countries are Rated on a Scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic process and 7 the lowest.</p> <p>1.0-1.99: Consolidated Democracy - 3.0-3.99: Semi-Consolidated Democracy - 4.0-4.99: Transitional Government or Hybrid Regime - 5.0-5.99: Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regime - 6.0-7.0: Consolidated Authoritarian Regime.</p>											

Democracy Score of Slovakia between 2009 – 2020

Sources: Own Elaboration based on Shkolnikov 2009, 7-8; Walker 2010, 37; Walker 2011, 12-21; Walker and Habdank-Kolaczowska 2012, 11-20; Habdank-Kolaczowska 2013, 13-22; Habdank-Kolaczowska 2014, 11-19; Habdank-Kolaczowska 2015, 17-25; Schenkkan 2016; 21-22; Schenkkan 2017; 23-24; Schenkkan 2018, 23-24; Freedom House, 2019; Csaky 2020, 24-25.

APPENDIX J

Parties and Elections/MPs		1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014	2018	Coalitions			
FIDESZ	MPs	21	20	148	164	141	227	117	117	FIDESZ-SZDSZ (EC)(2) 1990-1994 FIDESZ-SZDSZ-VP (EC) (Agrarian Alliance-ASZ)(1) 1994	FIDESZ MNP- FKgP-MDF (GC) 1998-2002	FIDESZ MNP- MDF-VP (EC) 2002	FIDESZ MPgSZ-KDNP-VP (EC) 2006-2010 FIDESZ MPgSZ-KDNP (EC and GC) 2010-2014 (EC and GC) 2014-2018 (EC and GC) 2018-'Today'
	%	8.93%	7.02%	29.48%	41.1%	42.0%	52.7%	44.9%	49.3%				
KDNP	MPs	21	22	0	0	23	36	16	16	KDNP-MDNP-ZDSZ-HOM (EC) (Centrum Part (CP)) 2002			
	%	6.46%	7.03%	2.3%	(CP) 3.9%	(FIDESZ)	(FIDESZ)	(FIDESZ)	(FIDESZ)				
SZDSZ	MPs	92	69	24	19	18	0	Party Dissolved in 2013		MSZP-SZFV-HVK (EC) (Agrarian Alliance-ASZ) (2) 1990			
	%	21.39%	19.74%	7.57%	5.6%	6.5%	MDF	MDF	11.9%	MSZP-SZFV-HVK (EC) 1998-2002 (EC) SZDSZ-MSZP 1994-1998 (GC) 1998-2002 (EC) 2002-2006 (EC and GC) (1) 2006-2010 (EC and GC - end in 2008) (6) MSZP-PARBESEZED-DK-EGYÜTT-MNP (EC) (Unity 2014) 2014			
MSZP	MPs	33	209	134	178	186	59	29	17	MSZP-LNP (EC) 2010			
	%	11.73%	8.82%	13.15%	0.8%	0%	0%	0.2%	0%	MSZP-PARBESEZED-DK-EGYÜTT-MNP (EC) (Unity 2014) 2014			
MDF	MPs	165	38	17	24	11	0	Party Dissolved in 2011		MDF-FKgP-KDNP-EKGP (2) (EC and GC) 1990-end in 1993 (FKgP left from GC) MDF-EKGP-KDNP (GC) 1993 (EC) 1994			
	%	24.73%	11.74%	3.10%	(FIDESZ)	5.0%	2.7%			MDF-SZDSZ (EC) 2010			
FKgP	MPs	43	26	48	0	0	0	0	0	FKgP-FIDESZ (EC) 1998-2002			
	%	1.6%	5.47%	4.4%	(HU) 2.2%	0.1%	0%	0%	0%	MNP - JOBBIK (EC) (Third Way Alliance-Harmadik Ut) 2006			
MNP	MPs	0	14	0	0	0	0	0	0	LNP-4K1-Fourth Republic (EC) 2014			
	%	0	16.7%	20.2%	19.1%	16.7%	47	23	26	PARBESEZED-MSZP-MNP (EC) 2018			
PARBESEZED	MPs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	PARBESEZED-MSZP-MNP (EC) 2018			
	%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
DK	MPs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
	%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
EGYÜTT	MPs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
	%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
MNP00 (LdU)	MPs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
	%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
MNP	MPs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
	%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
INDEPENDENT OTHERS	MPs	15.85% - 11	11.06% - 2	8.31% - 1	2.3% - 0	0.43% - 1	1.0% - 1	3.8% - 0	6.0% - 1				
	MPs												

NE: Not Yet Established - NI: No Information EC: Election Coalition - GC: Government Coalition - (Number): Coalition's MPs

Parties and Elections in Hungary between 1991 – 2020

Sources: Own Elaboration based on PartiesandElections.eu (e).

The List of Political Parties in Hungary:

Fidesz: Founded in 1989. League of Young Democrats (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége-Fidesz) (1988-1995), Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party (Magyar Polgári Párt-Fidesz MPP) (1995-2003), Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union (Magyar Polgári Szövetség-Fidesz-MPSZ) (2003-today) (Dailynewshungary.com).

VP: Founded in 1989. Dissolved in 2007 (Integrated into Fidesz). Entrepreneurs' Party (Vállalkozók Pártja).

KDNP: Refounded in 1989 (Preceded by EKP). Christian Democratic People's Party (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt).

MSZP: Founded in 1989 (Preceded by MSZMP). Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt).

DK: Founded in 2011 (Split from MSZP). Democratic Coalition (Demokratikus Koalíció).

SZU: Founded in 2010 (Split from MSZP). Dissolved in 2013 (Merged into KTI, an election coalition with more than ten parties). Social Union (Szociális Unió).

SZDSZ: Founded in 1988. Dissolved in 2013. Alliance of Free Democrats Party (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége).

MDF: Founded in 1987. Dissolved in 2011. (Succeeded by Democratic Community of Welfare and Freedom – Jólét és Szabadság Demokrata Közösség, JESZ) Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum) (Index.hu, 2011).

MIEP: Founded in 1993 (Split from MDF). Hungarian Justice and Life Party (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja).

FKgP: Refounded in 1988. Independent Smallholders' Party (Független Kisgazdapárt).

EKGP: Founded in 1993 (Split from FKgP). Dissolved in 2003. United Historical Smallholders and Civic Party (Egyesült Történelmi Kisgazda és Polgári Párt).

Jobbik: Founded in 2003. Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom).

LMP: Founded in 2009. Politics Can Be Different – Hungary's Green Party (Lehet Más a Politika – Magyarország Zöld Pártja), LMP-Hungary's Green Party (LMP- Magyarország Zöld Pártja) (2020-Today).

PARBESZED: Founded in 2013 (Split from LMP). Dialogue for Hungary (Párbeszéd Magyarorszáért).

EGYÜTT: Founded in 2013 as a party (was an Electoral Coalition in 2012 (Együtt 2014- Together 2014)). Dissolved in 2018. Together (Együtt).

MNOÖ (LdU): Founded in 1995. National Self-Government of Germans in Hungary (Magyarországi Németek Országos Önkormányzata).

MLP: Founded in 2013. Hungarian Liberal Party (Magyar Liberális Párt).

MHM: Founded in 2018 (Split from Jobbik). Our Homeland Movement (Mi Hazánk Mozgalom).

Coalitions, Governments, Prime Ministers and Presidents in Hungary:

- 1990-1994: MDF and FKgP and KDNP (Government Coalition – ended in 1993 because FKgP left the coalition), MDF and EKGP (People founded party who left FKgP) and KDNP (Government Coalition).

SZDSZ and Fidesz (Election Coalition) (Grzymala-Busse 2002, 108), MDF and FKgP and KDNP (Election Coalition) (Popescu and Toka 2000, 4-6), MSZP and SZFV and HVK ((ASZ-Agrarian Alliance) Election Coalition).

1990-1994 Prime Minister(s): Miklós Németh (MSZP) (1989-1990) and József Antall (MDF) (1990-1993) and Péter Boross (MDF), President: Árpád Göncz.

- 1994-1998: MSZP and SZDSZ (Government Coalition).

SZDSZ and Fidesz and VP ((ASZ-Agrarian Alliance) Electoral Coalition), MDF and FKgP and KDNP (Election Coalition) (Popescu and Toka 2000, 4-6; Dingsdale and Kovacs, 1996).

1994-1998: Prime Minister(s): Péter Boross (MDF) (1993-1994) and Gyula Horn (MSZP), President: Árpád Göncz.

- 1998-2002: Fidesz-MPP and FKgP and MDF (Government Coalition).

MSZP and SZDSZ (Election Coalition), Fidesz-MMP and FKgP (Election Coalition) (Körösenyi 1999, 37).

1998-2002: Prime Minister(s): Gyula Horn (MSZP) (1994-1998) and Viktor Orbán (Fidesz-MPP), President(s): Árpád Göncz (1990-2000) and Ferenc Mádl.

- 2002-2006: MSZP and SZDSZ (Government Coalition).

MSZP and SZDSZ (Election Coalition), Fidesz-MPP and MDF and VP (Election Coalition), KDNP and MDNP and ZDSZ and HOM (Election Coalition – Centre Party, Centrum Párt, CP) (Benoit 2002, 130).

2002-2006: Prime Minister(s): Viktor Orbán (Fidesz-MPP) (1998-2002) and Péter Medgyessy (MSZP) (2002-2004) and Ferenc Gyurcsány (MSZP), President(s): Ferenc Mádl (2000-2005) and László Sólyom.

- 2006-2010: MSZP and SZDSZ (Government Coalition – end in 2008) (Szakacs and Chance, 2008), MSZP (Minority Government Party).

Fidesz-MPSZ and KDNP and VP (Election Coalition 2005), MSZP and SZDSZ (Election Coalition – ended in 2008), Jobbik and MIEP ((Third Way Alliance- Harmadik Út) Election Coalition).

2006-2010: Prime Minister(s): Ferenc Gyurcsány (MSZP) (2006-2009) (Stark 2007, 6-7) and Gordon Bajnai (Independent), President: László Sólyom.

- 2010-2014: Fidesz-MPSZ and KDNP (Government Coalition).

Fidesz-MPSZ and KDNP (Election Coalition) and MDF-SZDSZ (Election Coalition), MSZP and LMP (Election Coalition) (Archive.ipu.org (d)), KTI (Election Coalition).

2010-2014: Prime Minister(s): Gordon Bajnai (Independent) (2009-2010) and Viktor Orbán (Fidesz-MPSZ), President(s): László Sólyom (2005-2010) and Pál Schmitt (2010-2012) and László Kövér (2012-2012) and János Áder.

- 2014-2018: Fidesz-MPSZ and KDNP (Government Coalition).

Fidesz-MPSZ and KDNP (Election Coalition), MSZP and EGYÜTT and DK and PARBESZED and MLP ((Unity 2014 – Összefogás 2014) Election Coalition) (Novak, 2014), LMP and 4K! – Fourth Republic (Election Coalition).

2014-2018: Prime Minister: Viktor Orbán (Fidesz-MPSZ), President: János Áder.

- 2018-2022: Fidesz-MPSZ and KDNP (Coalition Government).

Fidesz-MPSZ and KDNP (Election Coalition), MSZP and PARBESZED and MLP (Election Coalition) (National Election Office).

2018-2022: Prime Minister: Victor Orbán (Fidesz-MPSZ), President: János Áder.

- 2022-2026: ?

Fidesz-MPSZ and KDNP (Possible Election Coalition), DK and JOBBIK and LMP and Momentum and MSZP and PARBESZED³¹⁵ (Possible Election Coalition) (Bayer, 2020), Mi Hazánk and MIEP and FKgP (Possible Election Coalition) (Narancs.hu, 2019).

³¹⁵ This electoral alliance established by the opposition parties for the 2022 elections is important for Hungarian democracy. The most important reason for this is that the source of the democratisation success of illiberal regimes is the opposition alliances because the electoral alliances formed by the opposition not only bring the opposition parties together but also attract the voters to the ballot box by increasing the voter's belief in success (Howard and Roessler 2006, 371). In addition, opposition alliances make it possible to reach the election results freely by making the electoral field competitive (Bunce and Wolchik, 2010, 61; Donno, 2013). So much so that the alliance of the opposition in the 2019 Hungarian local elections has achieved great success (Oğuz 2020, 27).

APPENDIX K

Categories	Democracy Score of Hungary between 2009-2020											
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
National Democratic Governance	2.5	2.5	3.0	3.5	3.5	3.75	3.75	4.0	3.5	4.5	4.75	4.75
Electoral Process	1.75	1.75	1.75	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.75	2.75	3.0	3.25	3.5	3.75
Civil Society	1.75	1.75	2.0	2.0	2.25	2.25	2.5	2.5	2.25	3.0	3.5	3.5
Independent Media	2.5	2.75	3.25	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.75	3.75	5.25	4.5	4.75	4.75
Local Democratic Governance	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.75	2.75	3.0	3.0	3.25	3.0	3.0	3.25
Judicial Framework and Independence	1.75	2.0	2.25	2.75	2.5	2.5	2.75	3.0	3.75	3.0	3.25	3.25
Corruption	3.25	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.75	3.75	4.0	3.75	4.75	4.75	5.0
Democracy Score	2.29	2.39	2.61	2.86	2.89	2.96	3.18	3.29	3.54	3.71	3.93	4.04

Countries are Rated on a Scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic process and 7 the lowest.

1.0-2.99: Consolidated Democracy - 3.0-3.99: Semi-Consolidated Democracy - 4.0-4.99: Transitional Government or Hybrid Regime - 5.0-5.99: Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regime - 6.0-7.0: Consolidated Authoritarian Regime.

Democracy Score of Hungary between 2009 – 2020

Sources: Own Elaboration based on Shkolnikov 2009, 7-8; Walker 2010, 37; Walker 2011, 12-21; Walker and Habdank-Kolaczowska 2012, 11-20; Habdank-Kolaczowska 2013, 13-22; Habdank-Kolaczowska 2014, 11-19; Habdank-Kolaczowska 2015, 17-25; Schenkkan 2016; 21-22; Schenkkan 2017; 23-24; Schenkkan 2018, 23-24; Freedom House, 2019; Csaky 2020, 24-25.